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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a contribution to the on-going development 
debates on adjustment, state-civil society relations and 
democratization in Africa. In recent years, with the 
proliferation of a myriad of civic associations and the 
intensification of pro-democracy struggles on the continent, 
occurring in a dramatically changed global political economy 
with the end of the 'cold war', there has been a growing 
intellectual renaissance with non-state actors and the 
potentialities which Africa's nascent civic terrain holds for 
democratic development. Neo-liberal and radical analysts alike 
now see a strong and independent civil society, capable of 
playing a 'watchdog function' by delimiting the state as the 
necessary pre-condition for economic recovery and development 
in Africa in the 1990s.
In the increasing departure from state-centric and 
economistic interpretations of Africa's development problems, 
analysts have employed the concept of civil society in an 
attempt to capture the dynamics of these processes and to 
identify the potential for democratic development in Africa. 
However, the concept of civil society is often used 
uncritically, according the civic terrain with romantic 
libertarian attributes, rather than employing the concept as 
a rigorous analytic tool to identify the possible sources of 
democratic renewal in Africa. While there is a need to shift 
analysis to the dynamics of civil society in order to 
recognize the subjective factors of African development, the 
conceptualization of state-civil society relations in much of 
the new literature fails to illuminate the concrete dynamics 
of African social realities or the direction of socio-economic 
and political change.
This thesis is therefore an attempt to go beyond the 
current orthodoxy which posits a positive and mechanistic 
relationship between neo-liberal market reforms, 
informalization, civil society and democracy in Africa to 
critically examine and relate the complexities of the current 
processes to the prospects of democratic developmental without 
reaching deterministic conclusions. It also seeks to transcend 
the limitations of existing schools of thought on African 
development which hitherto negated the subjective factors of 
development, and the current proclivity in analysis to 
romanticize the civic terrain. By giving particular attention 
to the contradictions, conflicts and challenges within and 
between popular groups in civil society, I hope to further the 
understanding of the concrete dynamics of the processes of 
change in Africa today and the potentialities of democratic 
initiatives from below to resolve the unabated African crisis.
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ADJUSTMENT, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
IN AFRICAt THE CASE OF NIGERIA
7h« Irruption of dtmoetacy, which may b# eonaldorad on# of th# major #v#nt# 
of th# pa#t f#w yaar#, in African tarm#, confirm#... (that] it ha# bacom# 
inpoaaibl# to overlook th# fact that th# priority i##u#a with which th# Third 
World i# attempting to com# to grip# are of a political natura. Until 
recently they were held to be technical problem#.. .calling for an increaae in 
financial or material aid. It ha# b#com# apparant that a financial, economic 
or technical approach to the## problem# addreaee# only the eonaequence# of 
the handicap# beeatting the T^ird World and fail# to tackle their true 
eauae#... th# type of government running the country and the nature of the 
authority reaponaible for taking the final deciaiona, which are neceaaarily 
politically oriented.'
The recent political ferment ha# focuaed attention on a newly invigorated 
'civil aoeiety' in Africa. The proliferation of autonomou# aaaociation# and 
aocial network# ha# been regarded a# a dynamic eatalyat for the advent of 
democracy and a crucial bulwark for the maintenance of democratic governance. 
Conaequently, many have interpreted the decline and collapae of the ancien 
regime a# an opening for th# aeaertion of civil aoeiety in Africa. Civil 
aoeiety, in turn, i# aeen a# the crucial agency for creating public 
accountability and participatory government.’
Although democracy has not been a prominent feature of 
Africa's post-colonial political economies, the 1990s 
parallels the 1950s for the vibrancy in the civic terrain and 
may emerge as the decade of African democratization, if not 
substantively, at least in the development of certain formal 
institutional structures. The reinvigoration of pro-democracy 
movements in Africa, occurring in a dramatically changed 
global political economy since the collapse of socialist 
regimes in Eastern Europe, has opened up new opportunities for 
the democratization of state and polity in Africa. Comprised 
of trade unions, student and women's organizations, civil
 ̂ Jacques-Mariel Nzouankeu, "The African Attitude to Democracy" in
îBtmrnatlonal flocUl. fleimno» Jourofcl. no.128, 1991, p.373.
 ̂ Peter M. Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil
Society in Africa" in Journal ot International Affairji. vol.46, no.l. Summer 
1992, p.31-32.
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liberty and human right's associations, non-government al 
organizations(NGOs) and voluntary development 
organizations (VDOs) , social movements throughout the continent 
have increasingly linked the unabated socio-economic and 
political crises under neo-liberal market reforms to demands 
for greater state accountability, popular representation in 
national politics and a departure from three decades of 
development strategies which marginalized the majority of 
people. These developments have renewed academic and policy 
interest in non-state actors and the potential which a nascent 
civil society holds for economic, social and democratic 
development in Africa.
Scholarly attention of both liberal and radical analysts 
has switched from an exclusively statist perspective on 
Africa's political economy, typified by the 1980s critiques of 
the African state, characterizing it as; 'soft', 'over­
developed', 'underdeveloped' 'compradorial' 'captured' 
'suspended', 'non-autonomous' 'delinked ' neo-patrimonial' 
'over-extended' etc.̂ to an increasing focus on democracy and 
the strengthening of civil society. There has been a growing 
academic and policy consensus that the opening of democratic 
space, popular participation and the strengthening of civil 
society are all necessary pre-conditions for economic recovery
 ̂ For a literature review of the post-colonial state in Africa see 
Bjorn Beckman, "The Post-Colonial State; Crisis and Reconstruction" in 
Afrieati Futur##■ (25̂ " Anniversary Conference of the Centre of African
Studies, University of Edinburgh, Seminar Proceedings #28, December 1987), 
Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate; Retrospect and 
Prospect" in Th# Journal of Medetft.AtricâDStudiei, vol.28, no.2, 1990.
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and development in Africa. Moving beyond the critique of the 
post-colonial state, analysts have begun to adopt a society- 
centred approach, particularly employing the concept of civil 
society in an attempt to capture the dynamics of these 
processes and to identify the potential for democratic 
development in Africa.
Broadly, civil society refers to the "sphere of social 
interaction between the economy and state, composed above all 
of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of 
associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication."^ The 
. oliferation of voluntary associations in Africa has led 
liberal and radical analysts to view a strong and independent 
civil society, capable of playing a 'watchdog function' as the 
'new panacea' for Africa's democratic and developmental woes. 
Whether attributable to the general disillusionment with the 
state and state-centric perspectives; the developmental record 
of one-party states in Africa; the emboldening of pro­
democracy movements in Africa; and/or theoretical reflections 
on the anti-democratic ills of the collapsed socialist regimes 
of Eastern Europe, the term civil society is now in vogue. 
However, the concept of civil society is often used 
uncritically, according the civic terrain with romantic 
libertarian attributes, rather than employing the concept as
* Anthony W. Pereira, "Economic Underdevelopment, Democracy and Civil 
Society I The North-East Brazilian Case" in Third World Quarterly, vol.14, 
no.2, 1993, p,37l.
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a rigorous analytic tool to identify the possible sources of 
democratic renewal in Africa.® While there is a need to shift 
analysis to the dynamics of civil society in order to 
recognize the subjective factors of African development, the 
conceptualization of state-civil society relations in much of 
the new literature fails to illuminate the concrete dynamics 
of African realities or the direction of socio-economic and 
political change.
This thesis is a contribution to the on-going development 
debates on adjustment, state-civil society relations and 
democratization in Africa. It attempts to go beyond the 
current orthodoxy which posits a positive and mechanistic 
relationship between neo-liberal market reforms, 
informalization, civil society and democracy in Africa to 
critically examine and relate the complexities of the current 
processes to the prospects of democratic developmental without 
reaching deterministic conclusions. Such a critical
examination of the dynamics of civil society could not be more 
relevant to the current crisis in Africa. It seeks to
transcend the limitations of existing schools of thought on
African development which hitherto negated the subjective 
factors of development and the current proclivity in analysis 
to romanticize the civic terrain. By giving particular 
attention to the contradictions, conflicts and challenges
® Gerald J. Schmitz and Eboe Mutchful, Pa>iftiar*fclaation and geoular 
Participation in Africa. (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 19'32i .
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within and between popular groups in civil society, I hope to 
further the understanding of the concrete dynamic of the 
processes of change in Africa today and the potentialities of 
democratic initiatives from below to resolve the unabated and 
multifarious continental crisis. The objective of this thesis 
are twofold. I first critically examine the impact of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund inspired 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the African economy, 
state and civil society. My second objective is to analyze and 
relate the political responses of various social forces in the 
civic terrain to the prospects of democratic development. With 
specific reference to Nigeria, I attempt to identify the 
possible sources of democratic renewal and the factors and 
forces which frustrate and/or facilitate the strengthening of 
civil society.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The analysis of the problematic of democracy in Africa 
must take cognizance of the interconnection of the objective 
and subjective factors and forces in development. The 
objective considerations recognize Africa's historical 
experience, the unequal integration into the periphery of the 
global capital economy, the internal patterns of accumulation, 
the social relations of production and similar international 
factors and forces. The objective factors establish the 
parameters of what is possible at a particular historical 
juncture. The subjective factors pay attention to the nature
6
of the state and the dynamics of civil society. They recognize 
the dialectical unity of these spheres and focus on the nature 
of social forces, the level of organization of the people, the 
internal character and contestation within organized groups 
and the multiple struggles on the basis of class, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, national minorities and ecology. Without 
romanticizing and celebrating a priori the libertarian 
character of civic terrain, an examination of the often 
neglected subjective factors of African development 
illuminates how various social force struggle to change 
constricting objective parameters while considering the 
prospects for democratic and developmental alternatives to the 
current crisis from 'below'.
THESIS
The principal proposition of this thesis is that 
democratic consolidation in Nigeria and periphery social 
formations in Africa, is simple not a question of 
strengthening the autonomy of the civic realm. Though crucial, 
the level of organization and autonomy of civil society and 
the manner in which the popular forces are able to restructure 
the state (from local to national levels) and change the 
balance of power, politics, production and exchange, is 
critical for democratic renewal and consolidation in Nigeria 
and Africa. While popular struggles for democracy in Africa 
are currently manifest in demands for multipéwrties and civil 
liberties and the rule of law they are inextricably linked to
7
the improvement of material conditions and the betterment of 
life chances. In this process popular forces must be 
instrumental in defining and creating the institutions that 
will ensure their participation, while maintaining the 
autonomy of civil society.
Three arguments are put forth in support of this thesis. 
First, I argue that while the current project of free-market 
reforms has led to the reinvigorated civic terrain in Nigeria 
and Africa, this was a consequence of continuing popular 
response to the failure of post-colonial development, the 
deepening economic crisis exacerbated by SAP and the seething 
authoritarianism the programme has engendered. Therefore, the 
emergence of democratic struggles in Africa has very little to 
do with the age-long mechanistic association between economic 
and political liberalization widely held by neo-liberal 
analysts. Secondly, I maintain that the Nigerian civil 
society still remains fragmented and weak, divided by 
economic, social, ethnic and religious contradictions and 
conflicts and subject to manipulation, cooptation and 
repression by the state. Thirdly, I further argue that no 
meaningful democracy can be sustained if conditions of poverty 
and underdevelopment persists.
RSSBARCH METHODOLOGY
Primary sources include statistical studies and a 
questionnaire interview conducted by the authors. In addition, 
documents from the Nigerian government and international
8
development agencies have been referred to. Position papers 
and policy statements from various non-governmental and 
popular organizations in Nigeria on national issues have been 
examined in order to assess the alternative social projects 
articulated by these movements. Direct interviews and 
discussions with human rights organizations, trade unions, 
student and women's organizations and academics associations, 
non - governmental organizations were conducted to discern their 
democratic character and to further gauge the various 
responses of social forces in civil society to the structural 
adjustment programme and Nigeria's recently aborted political 
transition programme. With specific reference to NGOs in 
Nigeria, a questionnaire interview was conducted with 14 NGOs 
between December 10, 1993 and January 31, 1994. Following Akin 
Aina's typology of NGOs in the country, (see below) the 
interviews were fairly balanced between the three tiers (1:5, 
11:5, III, 4.). The constraints of time and financial 
resources limited the investigation to NGOs operating in 
Southern Nigeria. Tier one and two interviews were conducted 
exclusively in Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt. The major 
urban centres were chosen because of the predominance of NGO 
activities in these cities. Outside these locales, interviews 
of tier-three NGOs were administered in Nsukka and Owerri 
because of their proximity to the author. Secondary sources 
consist of library materials, Nigerian newspapers and 
periodicals, consultation with African and International
9
Development research centres and organizations, and 
correspondence with specialists on Africa.
STRUCTURE OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
Taking the form of a literature review, Chapter One 
attempts to clarify theoretical issues on the question of 
democracy by first examining the classical treatment of state- 
civil society relations before discussing the contemporary 
debates on civil society and democracy in Africa. The 
predominance of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
guided structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Africa during 
the 1980s is the focus of Chapter Two. The evolution of the 
neo-liberal market reforms are examined in Part One, from the 
interpretation of the crisis, impact of market-driven recovery 
programmes on the Nigerian economy, the continuing policy 
debates to the new democratic agenda of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. In Part Two of the chapter, the socio-economic 
impact of adjustment on various social forces in Nigeria is 
examined with the individualized survival strategies to the 
crisis also explored. In Chapter Three, an empirical study of 
Nigeria is conducted. I analyze the collective and political 
responses of social forces in the civic terrain to structural 
adjustment and the democratization process (the programmatic 
transition was recently aborted) with specific attention given 
to the role of NGOs in the democratization process. In Chapter 
Four, the concluding chapter of this expositi^an, I relate my 
empirical findings to competing explanations of the
10
problematic of civil society and democracy in Africa and make 
some general conclusions. In examining the Nigerian 
experience, I draw on the experience of other African 
countries. The concluding chapter also offers alternative 
policy recommendation and investigates the challenges ahead 
for democratic development in Africa in the last decade of the 
millennium.
CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
ON THE PROBLEMATIC OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY 
IN AFRICAt A LITERATURE REVIEW
. ..th* problem* of th* ‘overdevelopment' of the poat-eolonlal etete In Africa 
end it* pro** violation* of human right* have generated a new inherent in the 
efficacy of civil aoeiety, a* oppoaed to the atate, a* an agent of 
démocratisation, tranaformation, and development. Given the particular 
international context of thia renewed intereat in civil aoeiety, it may 
eaaily become the ideological plank on which to atrangthen even further 
unrentrained tree market polieiea on the continent.^
However conatructive it* uaea in defending human lihertiea againat atate 
oppreaaion, or in marking out a terrain of aocial practice*, inatitutiona and 
relation* neglected by the ‘old' Marxiat left, ‘civil aoeiety' la now in 
danger of becoming an alibi for capitaliam.'
The move towards re-democratization in Africa is widely 
welcomed by both liberal and radical analysts, in recognition 
that the constriction of political space has retarded 
development in Africa for the past three decades. While 
radical analysts have paid particular attention to democratic 
struggles in Africa for some time, linking them to issues of 
class, human rights, gender and democratic development, 
mainstream/liberal discourses on democracy in Africa now 
recognize that free market reform alone will not set Africa on 
the path to recovery and development. Consequently, the new 
political dimension of the international finance 
institutions(IFIs) and bilateral donors' policy prescriptions 
concentrate on questions of good governance, political 
accountability, the rule of law, liberal institutions and
 ̂ Akoto Ampaw, "Empowerment and the Limits of Political Liberalism" 
in Richard Sandbrook and Mohamed Halfani eds., satüawmving Peoplet ■ttlldina 
CoBttunitv, Civil Associatieas and Laaalitv in Africa. (Toronto: Centre for 
Urban and Community Studies University of Toronto, 1993, Seminar proceeding 
of the International Conference on Empowering People and Civil Associations 
held in Arusha, Tanzania, August 1991) p.37,38.
 ̂ Ellen Meiksins Wood, "The Uses and Abuses of ‘Civil Society'" in 
Soetalist Register 1990, (London: Merlin Press, 1990) p.60.
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multiparty democracy as the sin qua non for the achievement of 
economic recovery and sustainable development in Africa in the 
1990s.
From this perspective, democracy is conceptualized as a 
political system divorced from economic and social systems. It 
denotes a structure of governance, which places primacy on the 
multiparty system, the regularization of free and fair 
elections, participation of all adult social groups, and the 
protection of civil and political liberties and the rule of 
law. In contrast, radical democrats conceptualize democracy 
from a class and national perspective; the question of 
democracy must take cognizance of the historical context and 
social character of the social formation. Herein lies the 
distinction between democracy and democratization. The former, 
though important, is associated with the formal institutional 
arrangements of democracy, while the latter emphasizes the 
substantive aspect of the concept to include the 
democratization of socio-economic as well as political life. 
This entails not only the civil and political rights 
historically associated with liberal democracy, but must 
include the right to economic livelihood, welfare, security, 
health, education, proper utilization of the environment, etc. 
I accept Lumumba-Kasongo's radical conceptualization of 
democracy, viewed as
...a social and historical creation through which people and 
states organize their social relations of production and their 
society at large. Without economic equality and justice, the 
political dimension of democracy is meaningless. As long as the 
means of production and systems of distribution in a society are
13
controlled by a few people, that society will always suffer from
an imbalance of power and social injustices,'
The struggle for democracy is not a one-time phenomena, 
culminating in multiparty elections or the 
institutionalization of civil liberties. Although important, 
democracy must correspond to the objective and concrete socio­
economic interest of the popular social base whose democratic 
participation is most at stake in Africa today. While it is 
clear that the prevailing conditions of poverty and 
underdevelopment militate against democratization, it does not 
constitute a fundamental immutable obstacle.
On the question of democracy in Africa, civil society has 
become the bedrock on which democratic renewal rests in both 
liberal and radical discourses; analysts have placed emphasis 
on the independence and strengthening of civil society. This, 
it is widely argued, enables non-state actors to play the 
necessary 'watchdog' function which checks the abuses of the 
state and buttresses democratic accountability. One 
manifestation of Africa's reinvigorated civil society is the 
proliferation of NGOs and VDOs. In recent years they have 
gained unprecedented visibility in the debates on Africa's 
recovery and development. The crisis of the state and its 
tenuous relationship with civil society has led many scholars, 
students of development and international agencies to focus on
 ̂ Tukumbl Lumumba-Kasongo, Watlonaliitio Idaoloaiw, Thair JPoliev 
implication# and the Strutfola for Pamoeracv in Afrtean golibics. (Lewiston: 
The Edwin Melien Press, 1992).
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these organizations as agents of democratization and as an 
alternative means to mobilize people in the process of 
development. This chapter attempts to clarify some of the 
theoretical and conceptual issues on the problems of African 
democracy. The first section traces how democracy has featured 
in post-colonial development policies. A historical sketch of 
the concept of civil society is conducted in section two 
focusing on both liberal democratic theory and classical 
Marxism as a basis for theoretical clarity, before returning 
to the contemporary debates on civil society in Africa in the 
third section. The growing role of non-governmental 
organizations in African democratization is treated in the 
concluding section of the chapter.
SECTION ONE; POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
Throughout much of Africa today, we are witnessing what 
might be called the 'second moment' of civil society. The 
emboldening of Africa's nascent civil society began in the 
period of decolonization and perhaps even earlier. The 
struggle for national independence witnessed the rise of mass 
based social movements comprising students, women, workers and 
peasants demanding the democratic transformation of colonial 
state, economy and civil society. The weakness of mass groups, 
however enabled the better organized petit-bourgeoisie to play 
a leading role in determining the direction of decolonization.
15
While initially mobilizing popular groups to challenge 
colonial political domination, petit bourgeois constituencies 
soon distanced themselves from the subaltern social forces and 
the popular democratic demands to transform the polity 
economically and politically. The leadership of the 
nationalist movement readily accepted to contest foreign hold 
on political power, but were largely unwilling to challenge 
the domination of the domestic economy by transnational 
capital. At independence, the petit-bourgeoisie faced the 
contradiction of having political power but little or no 
uuiitrol over the economy. Marginalized in the process of 
production and exchange in the colonial period, the domestic 
bourgeoisie were too fragment and economic weak, having as an 
incipient ruling class a negligible capital base. Therefore 
th'i task for the new political class which presided over the 
politically independent African states was to enhance its 
accumulation and become 'modern'.
The idea of Africa's modernization carried out by the 
state and modernizing elite gained intellectual credence from 
the post-independence ideology of developmentalism.* The 
raison d'etre for the post-colonial state was the exclusive 
concentration on the national development project. The move 
towards one-party or non-party states and the relegation of 
democracy to a negligible role within the imperative of
* Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "Political Instability and Prospects for 
Democracy in Africa" in Afriet Development, vol. XIII, no.l, 1988, p.73.
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development was influenced by the academic and political 
consensus of the time. The beguiling song of the ideology of 
developmentalism subscribed to by those involved in the 
development enterprise, rejected the democratization of the 
polity at two inter-related levels. First, the concept of 
development was state-centric, relegating civil society to the 
status of objects in this process; while at another level 
democratization was viewed as inimical to economic 
development. There was a shared belief among development 
agencies, government officials, and development economists 
that the state was to be the main agent in the development 
process. This was in part due to the weakness of the domestic 
bourgeoisie and its low level of capital accumulation, and 
thus led to an uncritical® focus on the role of the state in 
this process. International development institutions, like the 
World Bank "expected the state to act as a trustee of a 
budding capitalism" and encouraged "state sponsored 
development schemes...treated as nurseries."® The state was 
expected to build schools, roads, industries, universities, 
and to create employment, while also providing other social 
amenities. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the state became 
increasingly tenuous due to its inability to meet the demands
® The uncritical view of the state refers not to the role of the state
in economic development, but rather the liberal assumption of a benevolent
state, devoid of contestation.
® Bjorn Beckman, "The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal
Ideology and Political Theory" in Kaviaw ef African golttieal toonoav (K0AM81
no.58, 1993, p.21-22.
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of contending social forces.
Mkandawire highlights such contradictions in the state- 
centric development model. He takes exception with,
the state-centrism of development economics, not in as much as 
the states role in economic development but because of the 
assumption of a benevolent state, and a passive role for civil 
society which was to be the object and not the subject of the 
development process.(sic)’
In so doing, development economist accepted the legitimacy of 
the new African states without questioning its 
representativeness or the legitimacy of decision makers. In 
essence, liberal analysts dismissed the state as a locus of 
social contestation and accepted instead a neutral state, in 
which consensual national development plans to meet 'national 
objectives' could be articulated with a scientific and 
technical edge® contributed by those involved in the 
development enterprise. Radical critiques focused on how the 
state increasingly became the locus of primitive accumulation 
and a vehicle for the dominant class to create an economic 
base. An inability to provide for the social base which 
thrusted this class into power, and the subsequent expectation 
of the democratic transformation of colonial structures, 
brought popular disillusionment and plummeted the state into 
a crisis of legitimacy. The fledgling liberal democratic 
institutions and enshrined civic and constitutional rights 
were consistently trampled by the state and the ruling classes
Thandika Mkandawire, "The Crisis in Economic Development Theory" in 
Africa Development, vol XV, no.3/4, 1990, p 215-216.
* Ibid., p.216.
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in the fierce struggle for power. When electoral defeat meant 
the erosion of the economic base of ruling class factions, 
"the stakes became too high to be placed on the risky alter of 
democracy."® To mitigate these contradictions the African 
ruling class moved towards one-party systems, depoliticizing 
society, imposing a common political creed, banning political 
organizations, curtailing political expression, and imposing 
severe sanctions.'®
A host of theories from the advocates of one-party 
systems emerged, as many argued that a single party reflected 
an 'appropriate and authentic' form of African democracy, 
which would promote national unity, dissipate fruitless 
politicking, and facilitate popular consensus to enable the 
government to concentrate on development." The one-party 
system served to assuage both intra-bourgeois and inter-class 
struggles. It was established to regularize access to the 
state and enabled the private accumulation of the dominant 
classes. While dismissing the substantive aspects of 
democracy, the retention of a formal democratic appearance by 
the one-party state allowed it to maintain a veneer of 
legitimacy. Dispensing with this facade, military regimes in
® Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Political Debate and the Struggle for Democracy 
in Nigeria" in R0XP8. no.37, 1986, p.40,
Claude Ake, X Political tcenow of MtidA, (New York, Longman, 
1981), p,180-182.
" Peter Xnyang' Nyong'o, "Africa: The Failure of One-Party Rule* In 
Journal of flemoaraev. vol.3, no.l. January 1992, p.91.
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post-colonial Africa have intensified depoliticization by the 
direct limitation of political space.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY DEBATE
From the mid-1960s when authoritarianism became prevalent 
in Africa, modernization analysts tended to be supportive of 
these regimes. In fact, some modernization theorists, as part 
of the debate on the relationship between democracy and 
economic development, argued that an authoritarian regime was 
a necessary and inevitable outgrowth of the process of 
development. Chief amongst these proponents was Samuel 
Huntington who argued, that in the state's attempt to meet 
developmental goals, it could not afford to be both stable and 
democratic.In developing countries, an 'open door policy' 
towards contending social forces in the context of a scarcity 
of public resources would produce chronic political 
instability. Popular demands were viewed as unrealistic, being 
both atavistic (particularistic and tribal) and post­
industrial (minimum wage and welfarist demands). In a 
political economy that was conceptualized as pre-industrial, 
a crystallization of these rising expectations, and attempts 
by the state to address popular demands were viewed as hostile
 ̂ Samuel Huntington, pQlitical Order in Changiao- Soeietiee. (New 
Havens Yale University Press, 19£8), p.39-44. Similar arguments were advanced 
by D.E. Apter, The Polities of Modirnisation. (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1965), D.C. O'Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a 
Democratic Ideal" in D. Lehmann ed.. Development TheoTYv Pour Critical 
Studies. (London; Prank Cass, 1979). In a recent articulation of the 
Huntingtonian position see Meddi Mugyenyi, "Development. First, Democracy 
Second" in Walter 0. Oyugi, et al. eds., Demoeretio Theory end Practise in 
Africa. (London: James Currey, 1986).
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to development.13 instead, Huntington maintained that to 
ensure order in lieu of certain political decay, it was 
necessary to strengthen the state vis-a-vis civil society." 
It was incumbent on the state to depoliticize civil society by 
inhibiting the entrance of popular forces into politics, 
curtailing public dissent and the expression of the mass 
media, reducing access to education, and also an outright 
suppression popular forces, While more subtle than 
Huntington, liberal analysts tended to reject even liberal 
democracy to the developmental imperatives of order, 
stability, efficiency, and growth."
The liberal analysts' case for democratization of polity 
as antithetical to economic development was challenged by 
radical analysts in the 1960s and 1970s. While, prima facie 
evidence tended to support the concept of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism for some Asian and Latin America countries, 
this model in Africa led to increased corruption and 
consumption by fractions of the bourgeoisie, rather than 
increased savings, capital accumulation and economic growth 
and development. Shivji, writing on Tanzania argued that state
" M. Mamdani, T. Mkandawire, E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, Social Movement#,
Social Ttanatoraation and Tha Sttugqla for Damocraev in Africa. CODESRIA,
Working Paper no.l, 1988, p.4.
" Ibid., p,4.
" Mamdani et; al., Social Movaaanti. p.38,
3® Bjorn Beckman, "Whose Democracy? Bourgeois versus popular 
Democracy" in ROAPt, no,45/46, 1989.
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bureaucracy grows, not in the interest of the state to use 
public resource rationally, but rather to facilitate the 
primitive accumulation of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie which 
uses the state for its own self-enrichment.^ Anyang Nyong'o 
supports this position arguing that, in practise, models of 
authoritarianism attempting to achieve high levels of growth 
and internal capital accumulation have alienated the national 
fraction of the bourgeoisie necessary to sustain this 
model." State socialist development experiments in Africa 
have also tended to submerge the imperative of democratization 
to that of development. It was argued that the redressing of 
conditions of dependency and underdevelopment required strong 
statist control. The attainment of rapid economic growth 
required the curtailment of individual and collective freedoms 
in the short-term in order for eventual material achievement 
in favour of popular classes.
Despite the material improvement anticipated by academic 
and policy subscribers of the ideology of developmentalism, 
the vulnerability of African countries to shocks in the global 
political economy was evident in late 1970s. Deepening socio­
economic crisis in the 1980s made it abundantly clear that the 
promise of developmentalism from both left and right -- 
socialist and capitalist, both of which contended, that the
" Shivji cited in Nyong'o, "Democratization Processes in Africa" in 
CODlsm Bulletin, no. 2, 1991, p.3.
IB Ibid., p.3,4.
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achievement of material development in African would be 
accomplished, if only the state was strengthened while 
autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations in civil society 
were suppressed and/or co-opted -- failed miserably.'® By the 
end of the 1980s as the Africa crisis deepened, democracy 
appeared to be a focal point of the debates on Africa's 
recovery and development. In the current conjuncture, the term 
civil society has become fashionable. Denoting the space 
between the public realm and the individual, civil society has 
become the 'new panacea' for the woes of underdevelopment. In 
the next section, a brief historical review of the liberal 
democratic theory and the classical Marxism on the concept of 
civil society is instructive as a basis to clarify some of the 
contemporary democracy and civil society debates, which I 
return to in the subsequent section.
SECTION TWO: LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE CLASSICS 
OF MARXISM ON THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
While the term civil society can be traced to European 
classical and medieval thought, its current usage dates back 
to modern political thought of the 17th and 18th century. In 
contrast to its antecedent which conflated the state and civil
Michael* von Preyhold, "Labour Movements or Popular Struggles in 
Africa" in ROAPg. no.39, 1967, p.30,
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society,*® the major pre-occupation of liberal political 
thought in this period was the separation of private property 
from community property or the state. The distinction between 
the state and civil society occurred in a particular 
historical context. Inextricably linked to the emergence of 
the bourgeoisie and to imperatives of capitalist development, 
which required a pool of formal and free, but property-less 
labourers, the commodification of all factors of production, 
and the concentration of capital in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie, the concept of civil society was used by this 
class in its struggle to supplant monarchical and feudal 
institutions, while entrenching property relations in the 
civic sphere and also delimiting state power.
Liberal democratic discourse on the distinction between 
the state and civil society has three principle variants.* 
contract theorist, Hegelian, and associationalist. Contract 
theorists are best represented by the work of Hobbes, Locke, 
and Paine. For Hobbes, the delineation between the state and 
civic realm is blurred. In order to escape the natural 
condition of violence, competition and confusion, a strong 
state is required to radically negate the vicissitudes of the
John Keane, "Deepotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development 
of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State, 1750-1850" in J Keane 
ed., Civil Seciatv and the State. (London: Verso, 1988).
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State of nature.21 Hobbes seems to enthrone the state with 
unlimited powers. Attributed to the contractual agreement in 
which individuals relinquish a certain degree of autonomy for 
the imperatives of order, peace and sociability, the state is 
thus viewed as legitimate. While Hobbes does not place 
absolute limits on the exercise of state power, and dispels 
any challenge to the improprieties of state, the use of state 
power must be exercised in accordance with natural laws, which 
protects individual life and private property,
In contrast, Locke challenges the unlimited powers 
accorded the state by Hobbes, and attempts to limit state 
prerogatives in favour of the civic realm. The state is not 
viewed as a mechanism to eradicate the state of nature, but 
rather the medium to rectify imperfect sociabilitiesThe 
state and civil society for Locke must be subject to the rule 
of law. The state governs in trust, a contractual arrangement 
where state decrees require consent by the enfranchised (male 
property-owners). Civil society is devoid of conflict, as the 
natural inclination of individuals to live in larger 
collectivities and adhere to the laws of nature ensures the 
preservation of life and the respect for the private property
2̂  Norbèrto Bobbie, "Oramsci ar -lie Concept of Civil Society" in J. 
Keane ed., Civil fleeietv and the Stats (London: Verso 1988), p.74.
22 John Keane, Peaoeracv and Civil Society. (London; Verso, 1908),
p.38,
22 Bobbie, "Gramsci", p.74.
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of individuals. Similarly, Paine's conceptualization of civil 
society is devoid of conflict and antagonisms. Accorded with 
libertarian attributes and self-regulating capacities the 
civic realm requires minimal state intervention. Thus the 
state, is guided by the rule of law and active consent from 
civil society. Bound by a common interest in political 
stability, individual's establish amicable relations based on 
reciprocal self-interest and mutual aid.̂  ̂The second variant 
of the state-civil society distinction is represented in the 
works of Hegel. Unlike Locke and Paine, he presents civil 
society as a long historical transformation and not a natural 
condition of freedom. Civil society, the sphere between the 
patriarchal family and the state, includes the economy, social 
classes, corporations and the institutions concerned with the 
functioning of the market and protection of its members. 
Differing again from the aforementioned theorist, the civic 
terrain in Hegel is conflictuel, a "restless battlefield where 
private (male) interest meets private (male) interest. 
Unable to regulate its own conflicts, as argued by Paine, 
civil society for Hegel requires a state --an incarnation of 
reason -- which represents the universal interest of the 
populace and intervenes in the civic realm to protect this
24 Keane, Pwocynev and Civil Soetetv. p.45.
Edward Shi Is, “The Virtue of Civil Society" in Government and 
Oopoeition. vol.26, no.l. Winter 1991, p.5-6.
2é Keane, "Despotism and Democracy", p.47.
26
interest which it defines/"
This state-centred view of civil society is oppositional 
to the associationalist variant. Best articulated in the works 
of de Tocqueville, the delineation of state and civil society 
boundaries is not simply ensured by reciprocal contractual 
agreements (Locke, Paine) or a universalist state (Hegel). The 
democratic mechanisms to ensure accountability and formal 
rights are insufficient to prevent the advent of an elected 
despotic state. De Tocqueville, argues that the delimitation 
of state power requires a vibrant associational life which 
operates beyond the control of the state and it institutions. 
A civil society comprised of "scientific and literary circles, 
schools, publishers, inns, manufacturing enterprises, 
religious organizations, municipal associations are crucial 
bulwark against both political despotism and social un­
freedoms and inequality."*® This emphasis on the 
associational life in civil society, is the cornerstone of 
contemporary democratic discourses.
On the relationship between the state and civil society 
in classical Marxism, two variants derived from a critique of 
Hegel can be identified and are represented by Marx and 
Gramsci. The continuities and discontinuities in their texts 
have been the subject of considerable debate. While new 
revisionist interpretations view Gramscian civil society as
Keane, "Deapotistn ana Democracy", p.48. 
*® Keane, "Deapotism and Democracy", p.61,
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constituting a rupture with its antecedent, others on the
Left, maintain the writings are consistent and merely a
question of the author's emphasis.” The contradictory
explanations of their works is attributed to conflicting
analysis of the base/superstructure distinction, the corollary 
of which identifies the sphere that constitutes the 'motor' of 
social-economic and political change. The conclusions drawn 
from the competing interpretations is in part attributed to 
Marx's inconsistency on this question. In the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues 
that
in the social production of life, men enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, 
relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces. The sum total 
of these relations of production constitute the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, of which rises a 
. juridical and political superstructure and to which correspond 
determinate forms of social consciousness."
From the above it may be inferred that Marx posited a
mechanistic causality between the base and superstructure in
which the latter is determined by the economic structure.
Therefore, it is argued that Marx reduced politics and ideas
to economic phenomenon. However, it is clear that Marx was
aware that the determination by the base could be interpreted
as a form of economic reductionism. In his other texts, civil
Marx focused on mode of production and property relations in 
capitalist societies (the material or economic base of civil society), while 
Gramsci emphasised the superstructure of civil society and the operation of 
hegemony.
Karl Marx Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy" in Robert Tucker ed., The Marx-»naels Reader, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1970), p.4.
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society is not merely a passive manifestation of structural 
factors and forces, as human subjectivity is present as the 
motor of history and an active and creative element.“
In fact, Marx's concept of civil society rejects the 
universality of the Hegelian state, and the maintenance of 
liberal theorists distinction between the state and civil 
society. He argued that the state is not the embodiment of the 
people, as posited by Hegel, but rather it constitutes the 
class relations and particularities within civil society.” 
In so stating, Marx viewed civil society, not the state 
(Hegel) as the real 'theatre of history'. Marx histoiicizes 
the distinction between the state and civil society in the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism which was a necessary 
pre-condition for the consolidation of capital accumulation. 
The separation of the two spheres, Marx argued, is more 
apparent than real. The demarcation facilitated the birth of 
civil liberties, but these liberties did not constitute 
freedom and human emancipation since inequalities based on 
property relations were solidified in civil society.” 
Therefore, the distinction between the state and civil society 
is ideological, serving to mask class inequalities. While
” Ernesto Laclau and Chantai Mouffe, "Socialist Strategy; Where 
Next?" in Marxist Today. 1981.
” Meiksins Wood, "Abuses of 'Civil Society'*, p.63.
” Blade Nzimande and Mpume Sikhosana, "Civil Society and Democracy" 
in The Afrieme Goamunlst. The Journal of the South African Communist Party, 
1st Quarter 1992. See Also "Civil Society and Democracy: A Rejoinder" in Ihi 
African Communist, 3rd Quarter 1992.
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civil society remains a contested terrain in capitalist 
economies, this realm is mainly in the service of the 
bourgeoisie. The critique of the autonomy which conventional 
thinking accorded the civic terrain, where people are 
unencumbered to pursue their own interests without hinderance, 
led him to explore the anatomy of civil society in political 
economy.^ Critics of this conceptualization of civil society 
argue that Marx and Marxism erred when the civic terrain was 
reduced to the realm of commodity production. Marx failed to 
appreciate the complexities of the institutions and 
organizations in the civic realm. In so doing, Keane writes 
that "the importance of other institutions of civil society - 
such as households, churches, scientific and literary 
associations, prisons and hospitals - is devalued."^® Such 
charges of reductionism and economic determinism has led to an 
reinvigorated interest in the work of Gramsci.
It is generally agreed by radical analysts that civil 
society in both Marx and Gramsci represents the active stage 
of historical development. However, revisionist 
interpretations posit that Marx's civil society is a 
structural phenomenon, conditioned and determined by the logic 
and contradictions in the capitalist mode of production. In 
contrast, Gramscian civil society is superstructural, the 
conditioning and active moment of history. From an often cited
Nzimande and Sikhosana, "Civil Society and Democracy", p.4. 
Keane "Despotism and Democracy", p.32.
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passage in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks;
What we can do, for the moment is to fix two major 
superatructural levels: the one that can be called civil 
society, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
private and that of political society or the state. These two 
levels correspond on the one hand to the function of hegemony 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the 
other hand to that of direct domination or rules exercised 
through the state and the judicial government,"
analysts such as Keane, maintain that Gramsci interpreted
civil society as only a superstructural phenomenon which was
also independent of the state. Consistent with the age long
attempt to delimit state power in liberal democratic
discourse, revisionist interpretations argue that Gramsci on
this point broke with Marx and economic reductionism. Does
this mean that Gramscian civil society is devoid of class
antagonism and struggles? Is Gramsci's work in the continuum
of dualistic interpretations of the state and civil society,
where the former is characterized as repressive and the latter
autonomous, resilient and free?
On the first problematic, it would seem contradictory
that Gramsci would view civil society as a theatre of
historical development, yet devoid of the class relations
fundamental in capitalist social formations. While civil
society was not identified exclusively with the base, it is
clear from his writings that its dynamics are in dialectical
unity with the economic structure. Commenting on the
relationship between the base and superstructure Gramsci
Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith eds., Salaetlona from th» Prlaen Mofbooki 
of Antonia aranacl. (London ; Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 12.
31
notes:
1, that no society sets itself tasks for whose accomplishment 
the necessary and sufficient condition do not either already 
exist or are not at least beginning to emerge and develop; 2. 
that no society breaks down and can be replaced until it has 
first developed all the forma of life which are implicit in its 
internal relations.a crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for 
decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable 
structural contradictions have revealed themselves, and that, 
despite this, the political forces which are struggling to 
conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making 
every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to 
overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts form the 
terrain of the ' conjunctural', and it is upon this terrain that 
forces of opposition organize.”
On this point Gramscian civil society is consistent with that 
of Marx. For both, the base is determining. But this does not 
suggest a passive superstructure, a mechanistic cause and 
effect relationship with the economic structure, for it is at 
the level of civil society where 'men and women become 
conscious of the conflict which emanate from the economic 
structure and fight it out.'
On the second problematic, it would appear at first 
glance that Gramsci maintains an abstract duality between the 
state and civil society. The state characterized as repressive 
is juxtaposed by an autonomous and libertarian civil society. 
It is, however, clear that for Gramsci the distinction is not 
organic but methodological in order to facilitate the analysis 
of hegemony in capitalist social formations. Hegemony, in the 
Gramscian sense refers to the forms of social regulation, 
which include both coercion and consent. While the state has 
a monopoly on the means of coercion, the use of force to
Hoare and Smith eds., Priaen Hotabooka of Antonio flraaiaei. p.l77-
170.
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reproduce the dominant classes', hegemony is inherently 
tenuous. Thus ruling fractions opt for hegemony by consent, 
'moral and intellectual leadership' such that the state and 
dominant classes disseminate their world view through social 
institutions of civil society in an attempt to persuade the 
subordinate classes that their values and norms are 
legitimate. This internalization by subordinate classes 
represents a more sophisticated version of the maintenance of 
the existing social order. However, a weaker yet equally 
effective method of retaining ruling class hegemony 
delegitimizes the viability of visions and social project 
contrary to the status quo and the capacity of subordinate 
classes to achieve such an alternative order, by arguing that 
in spite of perceived injustice in the existing order, no 
other alternative exists.“ Hegemony by consent is further 
consolidated by ruling class concessions to popular struggle 
for material needs. However, the disjuncture which exists 
between the pronouncements of dominant classes and that of the 
concrete realities, provides opportunities for counter- 
hegemonic struggles by both fractions of the bourgeoisie and 
non-bourgeois forces.
The relevance of this brief historical review of the 
concept of civil society to the contemporary democratic 
discourse in Africa and for peripheral capitalist social
Ralph Miliband, "Counter-Hegemonic Struggles" in Miliband et al,, 
floeialiat Raaiafr 1990. (London: Merlin Press, 1990),
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formations in the Third World is this: First, it has
highlighted the consistent theme in liberal democratic theory 
in which democratic consolidation requires the delimiting of 
state power not only with a formal constitutional arrangement 
but more importantly, through the establishment and 
maintenance of the autonomy of the civic realm as a buffer 
against state encroachment. While it might have been a central 
tenet of liberal democratic thought from Locke to de 
Tocqueville to curb the domination of despotic states, the 
distinction between the state and civil society was an 
imperative of capitalist development and its need to remove 
the state from the marketplace. Secondly, it illuminates the 
Marxist critique of the state-civil society distinction and 
the continuities in the writings of Marx and Gramsci, which 
are both emphatic on the dialectical unity of the base and 
superstructure and -- within the latter -- the 
interconnectedness of the state and civil society. In both 
liberal and radical debates on democracy in Africa today, 
there seems to be a convergence on the importance of 
delimiting state power through the strengthening of civil 
society and establishment of liberal democracy. This, it is 
argued by a wide spectrum of intellectuals and policy-makers, 
is a necessary pre-condition for recovery and development in 
Africa. However, the democratic project has often been 
presented simplistically, anchored uncritically on an 
autonomous civil society, celebrated with romantic democratic
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and libertarian attributes,
SECTION THREEt CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY
In the continuum of the earlier developmental is t debates, 
within the African Left, the exchange primarily between Peter 
Anyang Nyong'o and Thandika Mkandawire, with contributions 
from Bangura, Beckman, Gutto and Shivji, surrounds the 
question of the relationship between democracy and 
development.^® In his catalyzing article. Political 
Instability and Prospects for Democracy in Africa, Anyang 
Nyong'o provides a critique of the misplaced optimism of 
modernization theory, which lent theoretical support to non- 
democratic regimes in Africa. He evaluates the development 
record of authoritarian and democratic regimes and argues that 
"at the centre of the failure of African states to chart 
viable paths for development (or industrialization) is the
For the debates on the relationship between democracy and
developments, see various issues of CODESRIA Bulletin, also Peter Anyang' 
Nyong'o, "Political instability and Prospects for Democracy in Africa" in 
Africa Development. vol.XIII, no.l, 1988. T. Mkandawire, "Comments on 
Democracy and Political Instability" in Africa Dsvloomant. vol.XIII, no.3, 
1988. Anyang' Nyong'o, "A Rejoinder to the Comments on Democracy and
Political Instability" in Africa Davalopnant. vol. XIII, no.3, 1988. Peter 
Anyang' Nyong'o, "Democratization Processes in Africa" in CODESRIA Bulletin, 
no.2. 1991. T. Mkandawire, "Further Comments on the 'Development and
Democracy Debate" in CODESRIA Bulletin, no. 2, 1991. Anyang' Nyong'o,
"'Development and Democracy': The Debate Continues, CODESRIA Bulletin, no.2, 
1991. Contributions to the debates from Shadrack B.C. Outto, "Social
Revolution - The Preconditions for Sustainable Development and Peoples 
Democracies in Africa: A Contribution to the Anyang' Nyong'o/Mkandawire 
Debate" in Africa Development, vol.XIII, no.4, 1988, Bjorn Beckman, "Whose 
Democracy? Bourgeois versus Popular Democracy" in ROAPE. no. 45/46, 1989. 
Issa Shivji, "The Democracy Debate in Africa: Tanzania, ROAPE, no.50, 1991, 
and Yusef Bangura, AuthoriCarias Rule and Daatccracy io Africa* A Theoretical 
Discourse,(Geneva: UNRISD, 19911.
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issue of the lack of accountability, hence of democracy as 
well."''" Anyang' Nyong'o posits instead a "developmental 
democracy" as a more viable route for Africa. Mkandawire, 
takes exception with this instrumentalist and developmental is t 
view of democracy. He states:
...Che question of democracy in Africa must be raised in its own 
right. Democracy should be on the agenda, not because of its 
instrumental, developmental impact, but because it is the 
recognition of the legitimate rights of the African people to 
democratically map the destinies of their countries, to 
determine the rates and types of development they want. It 
should be an objective of value in itself. It alone should 
provide the set of values against which to assess policies and 
economic performance and should not merely be judged by its 
facilitation of development policies and economic performance.
If democracy can also accelerate accumulation so much the 
better, but that should not be its fundamental premise/"
Recognizing Anyang' Nyong'o's narrow definition of
development, based simply on growth rates and models of
accumulation, his critics challenge his study on empirical
grounds, particularly the dubious nature of his correlations
between participatory political systems (Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire,
Malawi) and high growth rates and non-participatory political
systems (Sudan, Zaire) and lower levels of economic growth.
For Mkandawire and Gutto, this correlation is taken
erroneously to infer causality. Furthermore, critics argue
that Anyang' Nyong'o's comparative study is advanced in
abstraction from social, economic and political factors that
affect the growth rates and models of accumulation. Thus it is
deemed politically dangerous, as these correlations can be
Anyang' Nyong'o, "Political Instability" p.71,72, 
Mkandawire, "Comments on Democracy", p.82.
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used to legitimize authoritarian regimes.
While many radical democrats accept this critique of 
Anyang Nyong'o's 'developmental democracy', Mkandawire's 
position that 'democracy is good in and of itself has also 
been widely criticized. Bangura and Shivji reject his 
presentation of democracy as an absolute moral and political 
value divorced from its historical context and social 
forces. Beckman supports this perspective when he 
emphatically asks 'Whose Democracy?' To be sure, Anyang' 
Nyong'o maintains that "we cannot just struggle for democracy 
because it is good in and of itself', Africans need to convince 
ourselves that it will lead to development"^"; he is 
cognizant of the historical context and social character of 
the question of democracy in Africa. Alarmed at the state of 
the debate among African scholars, which fails to maintain 
popular democratic approaches, Issa Shivji warns that 
democratic discourses are "threatening to become an unabashed 
celebration of liberalism"*^.
LIBERAL VS. POPULAR DEMOCRACY
Illuminating the pitfalls of the current debates in
Shivji, "The Democracy Debate", p. 82.
Beckman, "Whose Democracy", p. 92.
"" Anyang' Nyong'o "Development and Democracy", p.12. see also Anyang' 
Nyong'o ed., Booular Sfcyuoolaa ter Denocracv in Attica, (London; Zed Books,
1987).
Shivji, "The Democracy Debate", p.80.
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Africa, Shivji cautions against framing the question of 
democracy around individualism and th^ political framework of 
liberal democracy, rather than equality and the anti­
imperialist and the anti-state compradorialist struggles of 
the majority of the people. To pose the question of democracy 
in an instrumentalist fashion (Anyang Nyong'o) or an abstract 
moral position (Mkandawire), he further notes, reproduces the 
liberal ideology of domination and minimizes the struggle of 
popular forces, in which democracy in the current historical 
context is also an ideology of resistance to decades of neo­
colonial rule.
Jibrin Ibrahim's polemic. History as Iconoclast: Left 
Stardom and the Debate on Democracy^^, repudiates shivji and 
rejects the long held view among African radical democrats in 
which liberal democracy has been perceived as something to be 
fought against at all cost. Indicative of the theoretical 
reflections on the Left in general, in the wake of the 
collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, Ibrahim maintains that sections of the African 
Left, particular its 'icons' (Ake, Amin, Mafeje, Shivji and 
Wamba-dia-Wamba), devalue civil liberties, political pluralism 
and the delimitation of state power, as they continue to wage 
their 'anti-liberal democracy war'. Subsequently, when mass
** Jibrin Ibrahim, "History as Iconoclast: Left Stardom and the Debate 
on Democracy" in C0DI8HIA Bulletin, no.l, 1993. Archie Mafeje, "On "Icons" 
and African Perspectives on Democracy: A Commentary on Jibrin Ibrahim's 
Views" in CQDIBRIA Bulletin, no.2, 1993. Samir Amin, "History as Iconoclast: 
A Short Comment" in C0DB8RIA Bulletin, no.2, 1993. Jibrin Ibrahim, "History 
as Iconoclast: A Rejoinder" in CODESRIA Bulletin, no.2. 1993.
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social movements in Africa are waging a progressive struggle 
for multiparties, freedom of the press and association, and 
the rule of law, etc, African radical intellectuals sideline 
themselves because of their continued perception of political 
pluralism as bourgeois and elitist simply because of its 
historical association with capitalism/'' This historical 
association, it is maintained, is in part fallacious since 
liberal democracy was not merely the historical product of the 
struggle between the nascent bourgeoisie and feudal landlords. 
Rather, its full consolidation was precipitated by the 
struggles of working people and their socialist and Marxist 
allies. Likewise, the extension of the franchise was 
intimately linked to the struggle for social democratic 
rights
It is further asserted that the subordination of civil 
liberties and political pluralist by erstwhile regimes, 
whether 'Marxist-Leninist', 'socialist', 'peoples' or 
'popular' democracies, to the statist pursuit, albeit for the 
general welfare of the popular classes, not only failed to 
improve the material standards of people, but in the process 
led to massive repression and the violation of human and 
democratic rights. Therefore, the collapse of these various
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom", see also Daryl Glaser, "Liberating 
'Liberal' Freedoms" in Work in Proareea, no.61, 1969, p. 10.
Ken Post, "The State, Civil Society, and Democracy in Africa: Some 
Theoretical Issues" in Robin Cohen and Harry Ooulbourne eds., pfmaeraev and 
floeialisn in Africa, (Boulder: Westview, 1991) p.42.
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regimes should be enough to validate liberal democracy as a 
superior alternative to any of the aforementioned statist 
models, in spite of its shortcomings."® Thus the current 
struggle for liberal democracy and its historically associated 
freedoms is crucial for the expansion of the democratic space 
and a necessary progression in the struggle for any 
alternative social project." While a liberal democratic 
political framework is deemed to facilitate the expansion of 
democratic space, its consolidation requires the strengthening 
of associations in civil society.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
The current revival of the concept of civil society has 
apparently impressed upon the Left the dangers of state 
oppression, which have always been central to liberal 
democratic discourses. With this convergence in liberal and 
radical discourses on the importance of the autonomy of the 
civic realm, it has become difficult to identify schools of 
thought associated with a particular civil society perspective 
within genres. It remains a contested concept and some inter­
related common themes are listed below. Within these 
conceptualizations of civil society, I am primarily concerned 
with their relationship to democracy:
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom", see also Mkandawire, "Further Comments" 
and Anyang’ Nyong'o, "Develoi^ment and Democracy".
Beckman, "Whose Democracy?" see also Gutto, "Bocial Revolution", 
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom".
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1. Civil sociaty •• Th# neo-libaral id#a of private property 
unenounbered by the atate.
2. Civil society -• The idea of building and strengthening 
'voices' at the grassroots level.
3. Civil society -- The notion of 'watchdog' checking the 
abuses of the state and entrenching accountability.
The civic terrain in general delineates the arena of free
association, between the state and the individual, in which a
plurality of voluntary associations independent from the state
pursue their interests. For neo-liberal analysts the hallmark
of civil society is the market unhindered by the state. Larry
Diamond, co-editor of the four volume study. Democracy in
Developing Countries, funded by the U.S. Congress sponsored
National Endowment for Democracy, argues that the movement
away from 30 years of statist economic policies in Africa, by
the adoption of free market reforms, bodes well for
democracy." While the autonomy of private business
associations and institutions of capital are the predominant
features of the civic realm, these analysts also emphasize the
vibrancy of associational life, which includes a wide range of
organizations independent of the state. Commenting further on
the process of economic and political reform in Africa
Diamond claims that restructuring state-civil society
relations will,
...most likely...come from below, outside the decrepit, 
authoritarian state, in civil society. Civil society is a 
crucially important factor at every stage of democratization.
The greater the number, size, autonomy, resourcefulness, variety 
and democratic orientation of popular organizations in civil
Larry Diamond, "Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope" in Larry Diamond, 
Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset eds., Pemocrecv In Developing S&miXiÈÈJ. 
Africa. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p.27,
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society, the greater will be the prospects for some kind of 
movement from rigid authoritarianism, and for subsequent 
movement towards semi-democracy and democracy.*’
Therefore, Diamond assumed that the greater the autonomy and 
diversity of organizations in civil society the wider the 
democratic content of the polity. Democratic consolidation 
then requires a minimalist state which ensures the plurality 
of civil society and safeguards its liberties and is 
buttressed by an independent judiciary and mass media."
The second major theme highlighted in the civil society 
discourse posits that civil society requires a strengthening 
of the grassroots. This perspective emphasizes both civil 
society in opposition to a centralized state" and/or employs 
a 'straddling' concept to denote an 'engagement' and 
'disengagement' movement between the state and civil 
society." The central focus of the latter perspective is the 
survival strategies of ordinary people in civil society and 
the manner in which the crisis, structural adjustment and 
informalization change economic and political circumstances. 
Despite the crisis of the state and economy, informality
Larry Diamond, "Beyond Autocracy; Prospects for Democracy in 
Africa" in Bavond Autoeraev in Africa. (Atlanta; Carter Centre, Emory 
University, 1989), p.25.
Shils, "Virtues", p.9.
" Jean-Francois Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa" in Patrick Chabal 
ed,, Political Domination in Africa. (Cambridge; Cambridge Press, 1906).
Victor Azarya, "Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation 
and Disengagement" in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan eds.. The Precarious 
Balance* State and fleciatv in Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988). see 
also Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life 
in Africa in World Politice. vol.XLl, no.3, 1989.
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theorists maintain that ordinary people are challenging the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles of daily survival. They 
further argue, that by taking matters into their own hands and 
organizing an unofficial economy and similar institutions, 
they compensate for the failures of the formal economy and 
attempt to evade the repressive and predatory character of the 
state.^ These activities encompass a wide array of areas 
including, transportation, housing, production of goods and 
services, education and medical care. Placing emphasis on the 
decentralization of economic activities and the vitality of 
informal forms of production and participation at the 
grassroots levels, such analyses maintain that the alternative 
institutions and patterns of interaction, separate from those 
that have developed in the formal arena,” are restructuring 
state-society relations in a manner conducive to democratic 
renewal and consolidation. Whether conceptualized in 
opposition to the state and/or through the 'corrective' notion 
of 'straddling', this perspective asserts that the 
establishment and control of 'small collectives' by rural and 
urban groups, -- the reconstitution of democracy in smaller
Janet MacGaffey, "Initiatives from Below: Zaire's Other Path to 
Social and Economic Restructuring" in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., 
qovarnanea and Polttiea in Africa. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), see also 
Hernando de Soto, Th# Other Path: The Inviaibla Révolution in th# Third 
World. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, in collaboration with the 
Institute Llbertad y Democracia, 1989).
Naomi Chazan, "Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of 
Civil Society" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset eds.,
in Develoolna Countries; Africa. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988).
43
units -- are expressions of the democratic impetus in 
Africa.**
In Left debates, in the social democratic middle ground, 
decentralization, particularly the empowerment of local 
communities is deemed to increase popular participation. Civil 
society is comprised of "ordinary everyday citizens, who do 
not control the levers of political and economic power, have 
access to locally-constituted voluntary associations...in a 
word civil society is about building 'voices' at grassroots 
levels."** This devolution to local governments, it is 
postulated, enables the consolidation of democracy from below. 
Relatedly, the third theme, the so-called 'watchdog function' 
of civil society is the bedrock for democratic renewal and 
consolidation shared by both liberal and radical analysts. The 
renewed concern for the autonomy of civil society emphasizes 
the quintessential liberal democratic concern on the need to 
place limits on state power. Consequently, the strengthening 
of associational movements in the civic realm is critical to 
preventing state encroachment and is a precondition 
democratic consolidation. This anti-statism has also permeated 
radical discourses. The intense debate in South Africa on the
*® Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and 
Disengagement in Africa" in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan eds.. The 
Preoarioue Balancestate end Society in Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988). See also Naomi Chazan, "Liberalization, Governance, and Political 
Space in Ghana" in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., fiLovraanee and 
Politics in Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) .
** Mark Swilling, "Socialism, Democracy and Civil Society: The Case 
of Associational Socialism" in Hark ia Prcaresa, no.76, 1991, p.22.
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relationship between civil society and democracy, since the 
early 1990s -- with the lifting of the ban on mass
organizations (ANC, PAC, the SACP, etc), the lifting of the 
state of emergency, and opening of the constitutional 
process (CODESA) en route to non-racial multiparty elections 
is indicative of this current. The importance of safeguarding 
the independence and autonomy of civil society in a post­
apartheid South Africa, has become an orthodoxy within the ANC 
and the Democratic Movement®®. Social movements in civil 
society which were crucial to liberation politics during the 
1980s, are now simply tools to ensure good government and 
accountability in a democratic South Africa.
In the 1980s, hundreds of civic, cultural, youth, women's 
and other types of community associations, coalesced under the 
umbrella of the United Democratic Front(UDF), organizing 
around concrete social issues in the workplace, universities, 
schools, and conditions of housing and rents.“ Civil society 
for the Liberation Movement was the Gramscian terrain in which 
to build the hegemony of the UDF/ANC for the seizure of state 
power. The pressure generated by these social movements in 
addition to international factors, precipitated the dramatic 
changes in South Africa that hastened the setting of non-
Steven Friedman, "An Unlikely Utopia-. State and Civil Society in 
South Africa" in Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 
vol.19, no.l, December 1991.
Zenebeworke Tadeeee, "Summary Report of the Conference on 
Democratization Processes in Africa: Problems and Prospects in CODKSRIA 
Bulletin, no.1/2, 1993.
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racial elections of April 1994. Since February 1990, the ANC 
has been committed to the 'independence of civil society'," 
and has begun to disengage from social movements. In order to 
guarantee democracy in a post-apartheid South Africa, 
Fitzpatrick and others argue that civil society must be 
"capable of levying irreverent criticism on whatever 
pretensions the new state may assume."" To check state
encroachment and to function as an effective 'watchdog', civil
society must be both independent of the state and political
parties
The civil society discourses and the democracy 
problematic are fraught with a number of weaknesses. First, 
there is a tendency to counterpose the state with civil
society, assumed since the post-colonial state in Africa has 
proven inefficient, bloated, corrupt, authoritarian and unable 
to perform basic developmental tasks. However, to juxtapose an 
authoritarian state with an unproblematic civil society 
characterized as democratic, libertarian, the arena of choice 
and voluntary action, contributes to the inaccurate 
identification of power solely with the state and presents 
civil society as devoid of exploitation and domination on the
" Mark Swilling, "Political Transition, Development and the Role of 
Civil Society" in African ïnaiqht. vol.20, no.3, 1990, p.156.
" Patrick Fitzgerald, "Democracy and the Concept of Civil Society: 
A Response to Daryl Glaser" in Review of African Political gconoav. no.49, 
1990, p.105.
" Shilling, "Role of Civil Society", see also Tim Shaw, "Civil 
Society, the State and African Development in the 1990s : MQOs under SAP 
conditionalities", mimeo: Dalhousie University, 1993.
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basis of class, gender, ethnicity etc. To ignore that the 
state in capitalist social formations are political 
expressions of relations in civil society leads to the 
presentation of the civic realm in an undifferentiated manner. 
This leads to the talk of strengthening civic terrain without 
recognizing internal differentiation. It presents civil 
society as homogenous and assumes that civic associations, 
NGOs and social movements are united in the same democratic 
social project. It fails to question the democratic character 
of civil society, what interests are represented, how they 
relate to the state, their strengths and weaknesses, and thus 
the viability of democratic renewal.
Secondly, some analysts have included or excluded from 
civil society institutions or activities which do not conform 
to their particular social project. Swilling for instance 
argues that civil society is devoid of "profit-driven share­
holder-owned enterprises, and the industrial-commercial 
s e c t o r , w h i l e  Mayekiso, in a similar vein, talks of a 
'working class civil society' composed of trade unions, women 
and youth groups, civic association, in contrast to a 
'bourgeois civil society' comprised of chambers of businesses, 
and other institutions of capital.®* However, capitalist
*® Mark Swilling, "Socialism, Democracy and Civil Society: the Case 
of Associational Socialism" in Work In Progreat. no.76, July/August 1991,
p.21,22.
*® Mzwanele Mayekiso, "Working Class Civil Society" in The African 
Communiât. 3rd Quarter 1992, p.33.
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institutions are part of civil society and cannot be simply 
analyzed away. Further, to present a dual civic realm assumes 
a priori homogeneity of interests in the respective spheres. 
Civil society is a realm of multiple social groupings, 
institutions, and 'struggles. Similarly, some neo-liberal 
analysts and policy-makers have a proclivity towards 
defining out of civil society actors and institutions 
unsupportive of market reforms, while including those assumed 
sympathetic to its social project. The World Bank, for example 
seems to view the civic terrain as comprised of actor and 
activities primarily in the non-wage economy, while those 
attached to the formal economy are seen as an adjunct to the 
parasitic state. In fact, civil society includes transnational 
corporations, chambers of commerce, trade unions, civil 
liberties organizations, student's and women's movements, 
ecological associations, political parties, the institutions 
of education and the media, the marketplace and is the arena 
of hegemonic, ideological and resistance struggles.^'
Third, there has been a proclivity to speak of the 
democratic project as solely the task of building the autonomy 
of social movement capable of playing a watchdog function 
devoid of any questions of state power. Maintaining autonomy 
from the state and political parties, enables these 
organizations to push for positive social change from below
Monty Narsoo, "Civil Society - A Contested Terrain" in Work in 
Progress, no.76, July 1991, p.24-26,
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while enhancing the prospect of democratic consolidation.*" 
However, in calling for the autonomy of civil society, the 
state as a contested terrain has been abandoned to the 
inefficient and inept ruling class decried by both liberal and 
radical analysts. With this primary focus on the autonomy of 
social movements there is a tendency, particularly on the 
Left, to neglect the issue of political mediation, which in 
pluralist democracies means political parties are the 
principle means of channelling the interests in civil society 
to the state level. This may be attributable to the difficulty 
in reconciling the critique of the one-party state without 
celebrating Western multipartyism, the limitations of which 
are well known.*® Lessons from Africa's 'first' democratic 
experience, -- the period of decolonization -- in which 
multiparties were formed in the struggles for national 
independence, reinforces the need to be critical of multiparty 
politics. The emergence of political parties, while hastening 
decolonization, domesticated the mass social movement which 
precipitated the colonial reforms. Political parties which 
were narrowly accountable to social movements, enabled the 
petty-bourgeois leadership of the nationalist movements
*" Blade Nsimande and Mpume Slkhosana, Civieo ar« part of th* National 
Oanooratio Pavolutioo in Mavibttva. Journal of the African National Congreaa, 
June 1991, p.37.
The limitations of multipartiea are familiar and include the; 1. 
activities of isolated individual's and parties displace aocial classes as 
agents of politics; 2. the statification of political parties and consequent 
relegation of popular participation in public realm, and; 3. under 
representation of the subaltern classes in the formal political system
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aspiring to preside over the independent state --to 'delink' 
from its social base, leading to the creation of one-party and 
no-party states. While there is some debate as to whether 
political parties were a creation of social movements or 
colonial powers, generally multipartyism was both a vehicle 
for decolonization and, ideologically and institutionally, a 
manipulative tool of the colonial powers used to reproduce 
Western domination and exploitation. Betrayal of the African 
majority by the petty bourgeois leadership, however, does not 
diminish the importance of political parties. Social movements 
are multi-class and are always vying for hegemony within the 
movement. They can be reformist or radical and when they act 
politically they split into multiparties, and attempt to shape 
society in a manner consistent with their own class 
interest
Contemporary African experiences further expose the 
limits of narrow multipartyism. The state-imposed political 
parties in Nigeria (now defunct), at one extreme, and the 
proliferation of political parties in Zaire -- 258 at last 
count of political parties --at the other, makes a mockery of 
political parties. Any serious analysis of the democratic 
struggles in Africa must be critical of the narrow 
multipartyism now promoted by the West, after decades of
Naimande and Sikhoeana, "A Rejoinder"
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"indifference to the fate of democracy on the continent."'* 
In the current historical conjuncture, multiparties seem to be 
more conducive to the creation of an 'enabling environment' 
for the continuation of the structural adjustment project. 
Similarly, the class character of pro-democracy movements must 
also be critically examined. For the petty bourgeois 
leadership, this process may be more a strategy for power and 
privilege, than a commitment to democratization.'^ 
Nevertheless, a concentration on the autonomy of the civic 
realm to the detriment of political mediation, disarms popular 
forces from having their interest articulated in the formal 
systems, thus inhibiting the democratization of both political 
parties and institutions. While I agree with the need for 
popular organizations to avoid colonization, co-optation and 
manipulation by the state and political parties, neglect of 
novel ways of linking the state to civil society prevents 
popular forces from shaping the political and socio-economic 
landscape and leads to what Robert Fine rightfully calls, 
'anti-politics'^: -- leaving politics as the preserve of a 
tiny minority of the population.
In this respect, Wamba-dia-Wamba's inquiry into an
Claude Ake, "Rethinking African Democracy" in Journal of Pemooracv. 
vol.2, no.l, 1991, p.32.
Claude Ake, "The Unique case of African Democracy" in International 
Affaira, vol.69, no.4, April 1993, p.239,
Robert Pine, "Civil Society Theory and the Politics of Transition 
in South Africa" in ftOAPg, no.55, 1992.
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alternative mode of politics is insightful. From a critique of 
the historical modes of politics (ie. parliamentary and single 
vanguard Party based politics) which have reduced politics to 
the domain of the state, he examines the Mbongi and Palaver^* 
as democratic institutions rooted in African tradition, and 
argues for their reactivation and extension as mechanisms for 
emancipative politics. Furthermore, the national conference, 
which has characterized democratic transitions in some 
Francophone African countries, is an innovative form of direct 
democracy which mobilizes broad sectors of civil society and 
links local discussions to conference debates. For Wamba-dia- 
Wamba, this represents a 'site' for alternative emancipative 
politics.” Certainly, these constitute unique institutional 
forms of popular politics, which do not romanticize African 
traditions and cultures as Ibrahim suggests,” but attempt to 
incorporate positive elements of African traditions into the 
democratic project. Clearly, a sustainable democracy must be 
rooted in those positive aspects of African traditions, yet 
this should not eliminate the need for political parties in 
any democratic country, as suggested by Wamba-dia-Wamba. 
Political parties must be an indispensable part of any
” The Mbongi and Palaver are pre-colonial forms of organizations, 
which mediated issues and differences between women, youth, adults and 
elderly and foster consensus and planed programs of action when necessary.
Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, Beyond Blits Politioe of Ceaoeracy in
Africa, in Quest. African Journal of Philosophy, vol.l, no.l, June 1992.
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom".
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meaningful democratization. In spite of the unequal nature of 
organizations in civil society and the need to defend the 
autonomy of the civic terrain, some mechanism is required to 
mediate and articulate the particular interests of social 
groups at the state level and to transmit these ideas to the 
people. Political parties for all their limitations will 
continue to be a form of mediation between the state and civil 
society in Africa. The question then remains, will the state 
and political parties be the preserve of factions of the 
dominant classes, or will they be democratized from below?
In illuminating some of the limitations of the current 
civil society discourses, it has not been my intention to 
downplay the importance of the issue. Three decades of one- 
party or no-party states which conflate the state and civil 
society and deny civil and political rights in the name of 
'national unity' and economic development have failed 
miserably. Democratic renewal and development in Africa cannot 
be sustained without popular participation, empowerment and a 
strong civil society; it is also an indispensable part of any 
alternative social project. Undoubtedly, liberal democracy in 
Africa would be a vast improvement to the dictatorships that 
have dominated the African political landscape over the last 
three decades. It certainly would be a monumental achievement 
to institutionalize civil liberties, the rule of law and 
principles of representative government, if only to force the 
ruling classes to respect human life and civil liberties.
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Nonetheless, it is erroneous to equate liberal democracy 
with the maximization of the voluntary activity of civic 
association. This is the principle problem I have attempted to 
highlight. While it is crucial to increase the capacity in 
Africa to limit state oppression, we must not forget the 
unequal relations in civil society. The autonomy of civil 
society, and its diversity of organizations, may bode well for 
delimiting state power but do not necessarily of themselves 
alter the balance of power to the popular classes. Liberal 
democracy constitutes a limited form of democracy. The 
separation of the political and judicial spheres from the 
social and economic realms, while facilitating civil liberties 
and democratic rights, disguises the inequalities and 
relations of domination and exploitation in civil society. It 
is insufficient for Ibrahim, and others who call for the 
expansion of the democratic space, to downplay this 
association by arguing on the comparative record between 
socialist and liberal democracies. Eastern Europe's socialist 
failures do not dispose of the socio-economic problems of 
peripheral capitalism nor negate the limitations of liberal 
democracy. An autonomous and strengthened civil society with 
a liberal political framework may bode well for the 
democratization of the state, but it is not required of the 
civic terrain. As recent experience of liberal democracy in 
developed capitalist countries confirms, the political freedom 
and social democratic gains extended in an earlier period are
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by no means irreversible.
The struggle for democracy while currently manifest in 
the calls for freedom of speech and association, a free press, 
the right to vote, and the rule of law, etc., is as much a 
fight for a means of livelihood, freedom from poverty and 
disease, the right to a properly utilized environment and 
freedom from conditions of underdevelopment. Such a critique 
of the limits of liberal democracy is by no means an apologia 
for dictatorship as Mkandawire would suggest nor does it 
devalue civil liberties. It makes the distinction between the 
principles of democracy and its institutional manifestaLluus, 
which are not automatically safeguarded by Western liberal 
democracy. The critical question is how popular forces in 
Africa can play a role both inside and outside the state in 
order to have an impact in the decision-making that effects 
their daily lives. The challenge is how to build sustainable 
democratic institutions which insure widespread popular 
participation and political accountability, and still maintain 
the autonomy of civil society. The proliferation of NGOs which 
are widely deemed as expressions of the vitality of civil 
society and agents of democratization are increasingly 
highlighted as crucial mechanisms of mediation, linking 
popular movements and political institutions.
SECTION POURt NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS,
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, NGOs 
have gained unprecedented visibility in the current processes
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of political and socio-economic change. Integral in the 
process of decolonization, the activities of modern NGOs in 
the form of ethnic welfare groups, professional associations, 
separatist churches were first highlighted in their role in 
nationalist movements of the 1940s and 19508.’’' In the post­
colonial period the numbers and activities of NGOs have vastly 
increased. From an exclusive focus on relief and refugee work 
in the 1960s, the activities of NGOs have expanded to include 
such diverse developmental areas as primary health care, 
agriculture, non-formal education, rural and community 
development training, and women and environmental issues.’® 
With the crisis of the 1980s, the retreat of the state 
precipitated also by adjustment demands for deregulation, 
desubsidization, privatization, and the imposition of user 
fees -- has stripped the poor of social amenities and forced 
the majority of the people to find creative ways to survive 
the deepening crisis. In this period, NGOs have become crucial 
in mitigating deteriorating social conditions. Increasingly 
dissatisfied with the hegemonic neo-liberal development 
project, NGOs have also expanded their operations to include 
advocacy work. In addition to conducting development education 
programmes and campaigning and lobbying governments in their
” Michael Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in
Africa" in World Development, vol.17, no.4, 1989, p.571.
’® U.N. Non-Governmental Liaison Service, Non-Governttental
Oroaniiation* andSubrSaharan Afriea. (Geneva: United Nations Non-
Governmental Liaison Service, 1988).
56
home countries, NGOs have become vocal in international 
forums. The establishment of various consortia provides a 
crucial network to facilitate NGO co-operation and an 
important mechanism to influence policy debates on 
international development. The formation in 1967 of the 
Senegal (Dakar) based, Forum of African Voluntary Development 
Organization (FAVDO) -- a major umbrella organization for 
African NGOs -- has been a significant mechanism in 
coordinating and articulating African positions.
At the final review of the United Nations Programme of 
Action for African Recovery and Development(UNPAAKRD) held in 
September 1991, --a five year development program adopted in 
1986 -- the NGO committee of UNPAAERD was highly critical. 
Comprised of over a 100 NGOs and NGO networks globally, the 
committee condemned the World Bank and IMF-guided structural 
adjustment programmes(SAPs) for their negative repercussions 
on Africa's development. Highlighting the undemocratic process 
of its imposition and the effects of its policy prescriptions 
on popular empowerment and participation, the committee argued 
that ;
SAPs, as they have been implemented, have diminished the role of 
the African people in charting their own future, something which 
is integral to the whole notion of popular participation. These 
programmes are contradictory to popular participation, are 
diminishing the freedom of African people and subjugating them 
to destitution.”
* NGO Committee on UNPAAERD, Statement to the Ad-Hoc Committee of the 
Whole on the Final Review and Appraisal of the United Nations Proarmmm# of 
Action (or African geonomic Racovarv and Developmant.. Delivered by 
Mr.Charles Karemano on Behalf of the NGO Committee on OMPAABRÏ). September 
1991, p.22.
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Beyond the condemnation of SAPs, the committee made strong 
recommendations which at the centrepiece called on NGOs and 
the international community to support African alternatives to 
the crisis. The committee particularly implored the 
international community to support the African Charter for 
Popular Participation, a human centred development programme 
which was adopted in early 1990 at the International 
Conference on Popular Participation in Africa, held in Arusha 
Tanzania.International NGOs{INGOs) have been increasingly 
commended for their support of African alternatives to the 
crisis diiU their advocacy of these positions in global forums. 
The expansion of NGO activities has led many analysts to label 
the 1980s the 'development decade of non-governmental 
organizations.
The growth of NGOs can be directly attributable to the 
tremendous increase in their funding during the 1980s. A 
policy shift by bilateral donors in favour of funding 
channelled through NGOs has significantly increased their 
resources and leading to the expansion of this sector." 
Regarding their growth in size and operations, various reasons
Both the 1909, African Altarnatlve Framework to Structural 
Adiuatmant Proarammea for Socio-Economic Racovarv and Tranaformation (AAP 
SAP) and the 1990, African Charter for Popular .Participation in Davalopnanfc
and Tranaformation adopted by the Economic Commission for Africa will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Bratton, "Government-NGO Relations". Alan Powler, Non-Govai entai 
Orqrniaaticna in Africa: Achieving Comparativa Advantage in Relief and^iicrQ- 
Dev lopment■ Institute of Development Studies : Discussion Paper, no.24, 1989.
Alan Fowler, Distant Obligationst Speculation on NGO Funding and 
the Global Market in ROAPjB, no.55, 1992, p. 15.
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have been cited in the literature on the importance of NGOs. 
They include:
1) disillusionment with the dictatorial and predatory African 
state and with statecentric analysis of Africa's political 
economy, has led to a focus on NGOs, as an important part of the 
non-state sector which may provide solution to the political and 
socio-economic crisis,
2) NGO have a comparative advantage over governments in 
facilitating micro-development,
3) NGOs, are a strong manifestation of the vitality of the civic 
terrain, which encourage direct democracy at the grassroots, and 
have played a significant role in the current struggles for 
multiparty democracy. NGOs thus facilitate stable forms of 
state-civil society relations,
4) its autonomy from the state enables NGOs to facilitate the 
pluralization of the institutional environment, encouraging 
participation and promoting democracy.
5) NGOs encourage the autonomy of civil society and must play 
a'watchdog function' tv keep the state accountable,
6) given the popular responses against the adjustment exercise,
NGOs should be encouraged to contain and divert possible radical 
alternatives to the crisis, and to ensure the sustainability of 
market reforms, and,
7) NGOs represent radical potentials in the civic terrain and 
may aid in the construction of alternative democratic forms.*’
Thus the contradictory nature of the role and importance of
the NGOs. While these perspectives share a common
disillusionment with the Africa state, NGO operations can
conform to various social projects.
Advocates of radical development alternatives, in which
Bratton, "Government-NGO Relations", Michael Bratton, "Non- 
Governmental Organizations in Africa : Can They Influence Public Policy" in 
Development and Change. vol.21, 1990. Alan Fowler, "The Role on NGOs in 
Changing State-Society Relations : Perspectives from Eastern and Southern 
Africa" in Development Pollev Review, vol.9, 1991. Alan Fowler, "Non-
Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization; An African 
Perspective" in Journal of internetionel Development, vol.5, no.3. 1993. 
Shadrack B.C. Gutto, "Non-Governmental Organizations, Peoples Participation 
and The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights; Emerging Challenges 
to Regional Protection of Human Rights" in Bard-Anders Andreassen and Theresa 
Swinehart eds., Hunan.Rights in Developing Countriest ÿeejcbpok i m , (Oslo; 
Scandinavian University Press, 1992) . Tim Shaw, Civil Society, the State and 
Development ia the 1990s: KOOs under SAP conditionalities, (mimeo; Dalhousie 
University, 1993). South Commission, The Challenge to the South. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1990).
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popular participation in the decision making of development is 
central, view NGOs as crucial in building conscientization and 
a historical force to alter the balance of power to popular 
forces. Conventional thinking views NGOs as an important part 
of Africa's nascent civil society, which are crucial to 
Africa's recovery and development in the 1990s. The World 
Bank/IMF and donor agencies, as part of 'humanizing' 
adjustment packages, have accepted a need for a minimalist 
welfare safety net in its policy prescriptions. Given the 
prevailing ideology of anti-statism, they are turning to NGOs 
to provide some social amenities in order to mitigate the 
negative impacts of its macro-economic policies on vulnerable 
groups.
In addition, NGOs are increasingly viewed as agents of 
democratization. The World Bank's 1989 Report Sub-Saharan 
Africa; From Crisis to Sustainable __ Growth : A Long-Term
Perspective Studv (LTPS). argues that NGOs have an important 
role to play in delimiting state power and are crucial 
institutions of mediation. The Bank's Report notes that NGOs 
as
...intermediaries have an important role to play; they can 
create links both upward and downward in society and voice local 
concerns more effectively than grassroots institutions. In doing 
so they can bring a broader spectrum of ideas and values to bear 
on policy-making.'*
Thus the formation of umbrella NGO bodies in many African 
countries, like the Tanzanian Association of Nongovernmental
World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa; Fro» Crtslato Sustalnibl» Qrewth 
(Washington: World Bank, 1969), p.61.
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Organization (TANGO) and the Nigerian Asp )ciation of Voluntary 
Development Organization (NAVDO) bodes well for mediating 
between the state and civil society. It is this latter 
emphasis, on the role of intermediate non-governmental 
organizations (both indigenous and international) in Africa's 
democratization that is of central importance in this thesis. 
In the case study on Nigeria, the role of NGOs in 
strengthening civil society and its capacity to mediate 
between popular movements and political institutions is 
critically examined.
DEFINING AND TYPOLOGIZINQ NGOs
The term non-governmental is somewhat of a misnomer, as 
many of the organizations defined as NGOs often have strong 
financial ties to governments, national and/or international. 
Since no generally agreed alternative term exists in the
literature, the conventional definition of NGOs is taken 
broadly to mean non-profit development agencies which are 
neither initiated or controlled by the targeted
constituency.Embracing as they do a wide array of
activities, orientations, and scope it is necessary to
delineate between NGOs' various operations. John Clark 
provides a useful typology for NGO operations in the Third 
World:
1. Relief and Welfare agencies, 2. Technical Innovative 
Organizations. 3. Public service Contractors. 4. Popular 
Development Agencies. 5. Grassroots Development Organizations.
Alan Fowler, "Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa".
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6, Advocacy Groups and Networks.'*
With specific reference to Nigeria, Tade Akin Aina, 
distinguishes between three tiers of overlapping NGO 
categories :
Tier Onei normally highly formalized in operations 
and large scale and includes international 
agencies.
Tier TWO! indigenous organizations which are formal 
in operations and national in scale and include 
foundations, civil associations, with a few 
professional staff. This second tier, overlaps with 
the national branches or offshoots of national 
branches of global groups such as the Red Cross,
Rotary etc.
Tier Three 1 consists of Town and Regional 
Development Associations, voluntary groups, special 
interest groups such as women's organizations, 
occupational and trade guilds.”
In this study, I am primarily concerned with intermediate NGOs 
self-defined as people-oriented. This correlates with 
categories four and six in Clark's typology, and overlaps the 
three tiers, highlighted by Aina, on Nigeria. Like any other 
association in civil society, the Non-government Organization, 
even the most democratic, is susceptible to manipulation, 
cooptation and colonization by the state, ruling classes and 
international factors and forces. Therefore, a critical 
assessment of the democratizing impact of NGOs must take
John Clark, Democratizing D«vlopmenti Th# Rol* of Voluntary
oraanlaatlona (London: Earthscan, 1991), p.40,41.
Tade Akin Aina, (1993) "Empowering Environmental NGOs: The
Experience of the Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team" in Richard 
Sandbrook and Mohamed Halfani eds., Bmpowaring People » Building Community, 
Civil Aeeoeiatione and Legality in Afriea (Toronto: Centre for Urban and 
Community Issues, University of Toronto, Seminar Proceeding of an 
International Conference on Empowering People and Civil Associations held in 
Arusha, Tanzania, August 1991), p.141.
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cognizance of the internal structures of NGOs and relations 
between NGOs, particularly between international and 
indigenous NGOs. It must also examine the relationship of non­
governmental organization with the state, social forces, and 
the donor community. The next chapter examines the impact of 
the structural adjustment programme on the Nigerian economy, 
state and civil society and illuminates the individualized 
responses of various social forces struggling to cope with the 
deepening socio-economic exigencies. In Chapter Three, I 
return to the assessment of the democratizing impact of NGOs 
in Nigeria as part of the broader investigation into the 
political and collective responses of various social groups 




THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OP AFRICA IN THE 1980ft 
CRISIS, ADJUSTMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Th# Afrioan world ha# fallan apart. Th# ooumtcyaid# 1# ravagad by drought, 
loouata, and paatllaaoai thar# la an AZDa apidamlo, Paopla flock from th# 
rural araaa be eltiaa which ar# uaabla to oopa. Znduatry la althar atagnanb 
or In daollna and unaaploymant grow#, National aeonoalaa ara naar bankruptcy,
Import bill# far axcaad export ravanuaa. Tha balança of paynant difficulty 
haa baan ralagatad to tha futur# through borrowing but maw loana ara 
difficult to obtain and Intaraat rataa ara onaroua. Poralgn axchamga la 
virtually axbauatad. Pood la la abort aupply. Pualwood la bacoalng daplata.
Many araaa ara auftaring from a lack of water. Oovammanta ara oonataatly 
changing through coupa. If Inooapatant aoldlara ara not ruling, uncaring 
politician# and growing nuabara of buraauorata ara anaconead la power. There 
la an aura of political and économie decay» napotlam, corruption, eoarclon 
and Inaptitude hold away. Tha bright hopaa and axpaetatlona of political 
Indapandanca of a generation ago have baan cruahad.'
Throughout tha IffOa Africa axparlancad a vlcleua and unremitting 
aooloaeottomlo crlala. All tha major Indicator# point to algnlfleant and 
aomatlmaa praclpltoua ratrograaalon to tha extant that African# ara woraa off 
today than there ware tan year# ago. Output and Income growth, capital 
formation and apport growth have declined. Deficit# In tha balance of 
payment# and Inflation rataa have aooalaratad, while tha debt and debt 
aarvlclng burden# have reached unmanageable level#. Tha productive and 
Infraatruotural facllltlaa have crumbled, while tha baaic aoolal aarvleaa- 
aapaclally education, health and houalng-hava baan rapidly deteriorating.
Piling on top of tha récurrent drought and chronic food deficit# phenomena, 
thaaa problem# have contributed to uninterrupted economic decline and falling 
atandarda of living of the Africa paopla. It la no wonder than that tha 
number of African countrlaa officially olaaalflad aa Laaat Development 
Countrlaa (LDCa) •• tha wretched of tha aarth -- Incraaaad from 17 countrlaa 
In 197$ to ai countrlaa In 19$$, a total of 56 percent of all African 
countrlaa. Anf more ara knocking at tha door. Thua tha 1960# ware Indeed a 
loot decade for Africa In every aanaa. (a^haala mine)'
...tha crlala currently engulfing Africa, ia not only an economic crlala but 
alao a human, legal, political and aoolal orlala.*'
It is generally agreed that the 1980s for Africa was a 
lost decade of development. It began with the majority of 
countries in the region being overwhelmed by deteriorating
 ̂ J, Barry Riddell, "The African Malaise: A Summary Review" in 
Canadian Journal of Davmleonant Btudies. p.387.
 ̂ Adebayo Adedeji, "Economic Progress ; What Africa Needs" in 
TransAfrica fcrua. vol.7, no.2, Summer 1990, p.11-12.
 ̂ UN-ECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Davalonaant, 
(Addis Ababa: ECA, 1990) p.7.
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material conditions. The economic crisis which engulfed the 
capitalist world economy in the late 1970s and deepened in the 
early 1980s had devastating impacts on Third World countries, 
but for Africa the consequences were disastrous. Tottering on 
weak structure of production, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 
further propelled African countries into grave crisis. The 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from an annual average 
growth rate of 7.7% in 1976 to 0.1% by 1981.* The increase in 
oil prices led to a huge rise in the cost of capital and 
consumer imports. Compounded by the contractionary policies 
adopted by the advanced capitalist countries to grapple with 
'stagflation', the ensuing inordinate prices for imported 
goods from the West, drastically affected both agricultural 
and industrial production. The annual average growth rates in 
the agricultural and manufacturing sub-sector of industry 
declined from 8.5% and 1.4% in 1960-65 to 3.6% and 0.6% 
respectively in 1980-81 with both sectors averaging 0.4% 
growth in 1982-83.® Food production also decreased 
dramatically, reflected in the continent's shift from a food 
exporter in the 1960s to a net-importer of food by the mid- 
1970s. Faced with declining export revenues, with the collapse 
of agricultural commodity prices and rising import demands to
* World Bank, World Tmbl*# 1993 (Baltimore; The John Hopkina 
University Press for the World Bank, 1993), p.22.
® Organization of African Unity (OAU) cited in Claude Ake, "The 
Political Economy of Development; Does It Have A Future?" in internetienal 
floolal Boienee Journal, no.118, 1988,p.488.
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meet food requirements and to sustain domestic production 
processes, African countries experienced extreme balance of 
payment difficulties. Total external debt in sub-Saharan 
Africa increased from 10.1 billion in 1973 to 21.7 billion 
doubling again to 40.4 billion by 1981.®
Given these conditions the international finance 
institutions (IPIs) intervened to redress the socio-economic 
crisis in Africa. The 'counter-revolution' in development 
thinking inspired the 1981 World Bank publication, Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (popularly called the Bëcg 
Report) which articulates the tenets of the neo-liberal 
development model. This predominant development policy works 
on the assumption that the statist capitalist development of 
the 1960s and 1970s precipitated the crisis of the early 1980s 
and must be abandoned to enable the development of liberated 
markets in order to catalyze economic recovery and 
development. Since 1982 over two-thirds of the countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have adopted the IFIs and/or African 
governments' guided structural adjustment programmes(SAPs) 
intended to redress the crisis of the state and economy.
In Part One of this chapter, I examine one of the salient 
features of Africa's political economies in the 1980s, mainly 
the neo-liberal economic reforms. It seeks to illuminates the 
evolution of the IMF and World Bank inspired SAP from its
® World Bank, World Pabt Tablaa. 1981 (Washington: World Bank 
Publication, 1981), p.2.
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origins, content, impact on African economies, and shifting 
policy emphasis. Taking the case of Nigeria, I will critically 
assess the performance of the neo-liberal reforms on the 
country's economy. The examination of SAP will be limited to 
the period between its inception in 1986 and December 1993. 
The economic policy changes intr )duced in the 1994 Budget by 
Sani Abacha -- head of the current military junta -- which 
attempts to reverse the blanket liberalization of both trade 
and foreign exchange regimes, will be considered later in this 
exposition. In section one, competing theoretical explanations 
on the African crisis, its root(s) and dimensions are 
expounded. The limitations of the neo-liberal and 
dependency/underdevelopment perspectives in holistically 
treating the specificities of the crisis are highlighted. A 
brief examination of Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial 
political economy, in the second section, will show how the 
current crisis is embedded in the pattern of accumulation, 
which has propelled the state into a crisis of legitimacy. The 
pre-adjustment recovery programmes of the Nigerian state are 
also examined in this section. Section three assesses the 
impact of the predominant adjustment programme on the 
agricultural and industrial sectors of the Nigerian economy 
and argues that adjustment rather than catalyzing economic 
recovery and development has accentuated the crisis, deepening 
the conditions of poverty and underdevelopment. The fourth 
section traces the continuing policy debates on the adjustment
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exercise, particularly between the World Bank and the Economic 
Commission for Africa, and the new 'global consensus' on 
Africa's developmental needs in the 1990s.
SECTION ONE; INTERPRETING THE AFRICAN CRISIS OF THE 1980#:
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS OF ITS ROOTS AND DIMENSIONS
The severity of the crisis in Africa during the 1980s is 
well documented. Equally familiar are the theoretical debates 
on the causes of the crisis, which have been the topic of 
intense discourse, filling the pages of several African 
newspapers and development journals, as well as leading to 
numerous conferences on the crisis from Addis Ababa to Arusha 
and from New York to London. Scholars within the neo-liberal 
and dependency/underdevelopment genres viewed the deepening 
malaise in this region as a vindication of their theoretical 
perspectives. Since the crisis is reflected most glaringly in 
its economic dimensions, interpretations of Africa's 
developmental failures tended to be economistic, negating the 
political causes of the crisis. Attempts to provide a 
political economy of the crisis in a neo-liberal framework, 
however, treat the concrete dynamics of politics in Africa 
simplistically.
An early neo-liberal contribution to the debates on the 
African crisis was therefore technocratic and economistic in 
approach. Reflected in the position of the IFIs, particularly 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMP) this 
perspective was articulated in the now infamous Berg Report.
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The Report attributed the pattern of post-colonial state 
capitalist development as prohibitive to capital accumulation 
and economic growth. Focusing on domestic policy deficiencies, 
the report criticizes the import substitution 
industrialization(ISI) policies followed by African 
governments in the 1970s. The Berg Report, maintained that ISI 
led to inefficiency and a mis-allocation of resources. The 
import restrictions to protect 'infant industries' promoted a 
quasi-monopolistic position, barring foreign competition, 
reducing the incentive to become more efficient, while causing 
excessively high prices for consumers goods. The corollary to 
the ISI strategy was its anti-agrarian bias. Import 
restrictions created a disincentive against agricultural 
exports, forcing farmers to purchase high-cost local 
implsments.? The overvaluation of African currencies 
discriminated against agricultural and mining exports, making 
these products relatively more expensive in the world market. 
The Report noted that, though several African countries had 
enjoyed a 'comparative advantage' in their traditional 
exports, skewed trade and exchange rate policies caused high 
production costs and slower rates of economic growth.
The Berg Report laments over statist intervention in the 
economy during the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, the high 
level of state ownership in agriculture, industry, commerce
 ̂ World Bank, AcoaXwatad Davlopaant in flub-Saharan Agrlcat an matadâ 
for action. (Washington: World Bank Publication, 1981), p.25.
69
and transportation was condemned for spawning massive misuse 
of scarce resources. Public expenditure in the areas of 
education, health care, transportation, communication, 
irrigation, etc, in a period of economic contraction, they 
argue, constrained the productive sectors further, because of 
the tax measures necessary to subsidize these social programs 
and the inflationary effects induced by this expansion. 
Therefore, the 'over-extended African state,' reflected 
concretely in the inefficiency of government marketing boards 
and parastatals, "negates the benefits which privately 
organized markets bring to the development process."® The 
totality of these policy failures of African governments are 
identified as prompting increasing levels of inflation, 
unemployment, balance of payment difficulties and the 
stagnating economic growth experienced by the 1980s.
Beyond this Report which would become the basis of IPI 
policy responses in the 1980s, a number of approaches 
emphasizing the politics of the crisis emerged in support of 
the World Bank's intervention. Within a neo-liberal political 
economy framework, the perspectives of the 'urban 
biaM/coalitlon* and the 'economy of affection' schools on the 
crisis are noteworthy. The 'urban bias/coalition' school arose 
initially to explain the origins of rural poverty. It provided 
a useful political theory on the origins of the African crisis
® John Toye, of D#v#loDm#nk, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd,
1987), p.63.
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and a legitimation of the ongoing neo-liberal reforms. The 
works of this school's principal proponents Michael Lipton* 
and Robert Bates" sought to identify the underlying roots of 
rural deprivation. The failure of post-colonial development 
and rural neglect in particular, were attributed to the 
unequal distribution of power and resources between the rural 
and urban areas. Both Lipton and Bates for instance argue that 
post-colonial development policies were built on a fundamental 
'urban bias'.
An 'urban coalition' constructed during the anti-colonial 
struggles and comprised of public and private capital, 
workers, professionals, intellectuals, radio producers and 
influential editors have controlled the pattern of post­
colonial development and the distribution of resources such 
that the state intervenes in the marketplace and distorts 
prices in favour of this 'urban class'. In the pursuit of 
rapid industrialization, the state and the 'urban class' 
relegated rural areas to squalor while extracting cheap foods, 
mobilizing savings and earning foreign exchange in support of 
the 'modernizing' project. Sharing a common sectoral interest 
in directing the surplus value extracted from the rural areas 
towards urban localities, they manipulated public policies to
 ̂ Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Sfv Poor» A Study of Urban Bia» in 
World Pavloanent. (London : Temple Smith, 1977).
"  Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Trooical 
Political Basis of Agrienltural Policies (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1981).
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ensure the allocation of subsidies, credit, investment 
opportunities, health and educational facilities to the 
capitalist urban enclaves. Anti-agrarian government policies 
have combined to cause stagnating per-capita food production 
and declining agricultural exports. The*efore, recovery and 
development requires a policy shift, in which the market 
rather than s^ate determines the structures of incentives. 
This would shift the balance of forces from the rapacious 
'urban coalition' to the 'rural sector' which has been 
exploited in the process of post-colonial development.
In a similar emphasis on the internal roots of the 
African crisis, the 'economy of affection' school provided a 
sophisticated political theory on the dynamics of the failure 
of post-colonial development, supportive again of the neo­
liberal reform. Goran Hyden and j aponents of this thesis 
attribute the deteriorating conditions in Africa to the soft 
character of the state. Hyden's two major works Beyond Uiamaa 
in Tanzania and No Shortcuts to Progress expound this 
thesis.It places the failure of development in Africa on
11 Goran Hyden, Bevond Piaaaa in Tmnianimn* Pnderdev«lopm>nt and an 
Oncaoturad Piaaantrv. (London: Hlenemann, 1980); Wo.Shortcut» to frogro»» 
xfrioan Davlopmant Manaoamant in Porapoctlve (LondontHienemann, 1983) ; "The 
Anomaly of the African Peasantry" in Development and Change, vol.17, 1906; 
"The Pinal Rejoinder" in Development and Change, vol.18, 1987; "State and 
Nation Under Stress" in Recovery in Africai A Challenge for Development 
Cooperation in the 1990#. (Stoc)(holm: GOTAB for Department for International 
Development and Co-operation, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1908). 
The economy of affection theeie ia elaborated at length in Hyden'• 1980 and 
1983 publieatione. Truncated versions of this thesis are provided in his 
1986, 1987 and 1988 articles. Critiques of Hyden's worke by, Nelson Xasfir 
(1986), Lionel Cliffe (1987), Bjorn Beokman (1988) and Bjorn Hettne (1988) 
are featured also in these respective journals.
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the persistence of relations of affection. African countries 
are characterized as pre-capitalist, dominated by a peasant 
mode of production which colonial capital failed to destroy. 
Because peasants still retain "rights to land, and the simple 
technology applied, and the reliance on family as opposed to 
wage labour, the predominant productive systems in Africa are 
still remarkably autonomous."^ The economy of affection is 
then, the social and cultural relations that are produced by 
this mode of production. It denotes "a network of support, 
communication and interaction among structurally defined 
groups connected by blood, kin, community or other affinities, 
for example religion".The economy of affection functions 
in a co-operative and reciprocal manner at the level of basic 
survival, social maintenance and development.''* While most 
prevalent in the rural areas, the economy of affection 
penetrates all levels of society. The egalitarian and 
reciprocal exchange of affection provides social safety nets 
and plays a developmental roles when access to formal 
structures are blocked to the majority of the population. 
Small-scale community-based associations provide members with 
an avenue to greater employment opportunities and social 
advancement, access to credit, assistance with weddings and 
funerals and/or other personal and community emergencies.
Goran Hyden, "State and Nation", p .151. 
Hyden, No Shortout», p 8 - 
Hyden, No Shottout#, p.11-15.
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These organizations also contribute to community development 
in areas of infrastructure, health care, adult education, 
water supply etc/^
However, relations of affection spawn consequences 
detrimental to national development. Because the Africa state 
is a colonial creation and not a by-product of internal social 
processes, a disjuncture exists between the values pervading 
society and the African state. At the level of the state, the 
persistence of the economy of affection engenders nepotism, 
tribalism and corruption, which undermine bureaucratic 
rationality and renders the state incapable of directing 
development. For Hyden, the crisis of development is a product 
of the inability of the state and market to capture the 
peasantry and destroy these inhibiting relations of affection. 
The state is thus characterized as suspended in 'mid-air 
without any structural roots in society' and unable to 
penetrate the countryside. This consequently gives the 
peasantry the autonomy to 'exit' from the state and markets, 
preventing the state from extracting surplus value from rural 
areas to fund national development. The economy of affection 
also engendered the crisis of governance. It precipitated a 
lack of transparency and accountability, and fostered a 
climate of insecurity and instability that has caused military 
juntas and one-party or no-party states in post-colonial
IB Hyden, “State and Nation", p.153.
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Africa. In prescribing a way out of the crisis, Goran Hyden 
shifts his policy emphasis from an initial support of state 
intervention in Beyond Uiamaa to the liberating dynamic of the 
market mechanisms in No Shortcuts to Progress and subsequent 
writings. Market forces are to foster a productive 
bourgeoisie, the social forces capable of destroying the 
peasant mode of production and economy of affection and its 
negative by-products of nepotism, corruption and 
authoritarianism, while in the process creating not only a 
modern, rational economy but also a vibrant civil society and 
stable democratic order.
It is important to note that the neo-liberal 
interpretation of the African crisis shared by both the urban 
bias/coalition and economy of affection schools of thought, 
emerged out of a broader critique of state-capitalist 
development in advanced capitalist countries and the post-war 
Keynesian economic philosophy. Keynesianism in the post-war 
period was the hegemonic political economy approach which 
arose in response to the pattern of laissez-faire capitalist 
development that it blamed for causing the depression of the 
1930s. Keynes held that laissez-faire could not reconcile ard 
maintain a balance between savings and investment. He argued, 
for example, that low savings in relation to increased demand 
for investment led to inflation, while high savings in 
relation to decreased demand for investment would induce
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increased levels of unemployment.“ Therefore, both inflation 
and unemployment were organic features of a market economy 
which could not be adjusted without active state intervention. 
Keynes thus offered a prescription to resolve the propensity 
of capitalism to create periodic crises. Placing emphasis on 
the unemployment problems engendered by capitalism, Keynes 
advocated an interventionist fiscal policy, where increased 
public spending would induce higher levels of demand, thus 
catalyzing employment and boosting productivity and economic 
growth. State-led capitalist development would also resolve 
the gross social inequities by extending a social wage in the 
areas of health care, education, unemployment insurance, etc. 
-- in short creating a welfare state. Indeed, the post-war 
global economy witnessed unprecedented levels of productivity, 
economic growth, expansion of world trade, employment and the 
establishment of a welfare state. While the benefits of this 
prosperity was uneven between/within regions and countries, 
the high levels of growth temporarily affirmed the Keynesian 
economic and social policies.
However, by the early 1970s, post-war global affluence 
began to decline. Falling growth rates, rising unemployment, 
increasing inflation, declining investments and profit rates 
were characteristic of developed economies in the wake of the 
1973 oil crisis. World output declined from an annual average
Yusuf Bangura, ''Overcoming Some Basic Misconceptions of the 
Nigerian Economic Crisis" in Adebayo Olukoshl ed., Crisis and Adjustment in 
the Miaarian Econcnv. (Lagoai JAD Publishers Limited, 1991).
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growth rate of 5.5% between 1961-1973 to 3.6% in the 1974-1980 
period.^ In this contracting global political economy, the 
predominant view blamed the post-war Keynesian policies of 
high demand, full employment and social welfare for the 
precipitous economic decline. Theoreticians of what came to be 
known as the 'new right', particularly its most ardent 
proponents Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek attacked 
the inflationary impact of Keynesian economic prescriptions 
which, they argued, inhibited economic growth. For neo­
liberals, excessive state expenditure and intervention in the 
economy led to rising levels of inflation by propelling 
increases in both public sector borrowing and the printing of 
money in support of state expansionism. By failing to regulate 
the money supply, the state caused excessive liquidity in the 
economy, prompting higher demand. Adversely effecting the 
process of capital accumulation, inflation increased workers 
demands for higher wages which cut into the profit margins of 
capitalists, thus reducing investments, which are further 
constrained by rising interest rates. All this inhibits 
economic growth and employment.
The neo-liberal explanations of economic decline in the 
advanced capitalist countries were simultaneously used to 
critique the pattern of Third World development and the role 
played by development economists. The discipline of
" Dharam Ghai, fltruetural Adiuataant. Global Inf ar»tioiL_and_flQCial
QtBSfiXASX' (UNRISD Discussion Paper no.37, 1992) p.2.
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development economics which in part influenced the pattern of 
post-colonial development, emerged in the post-war hegemonic 
Keynesian environment and was facilitated by the intellectual 
support accorded state-led developmental. The fall from grace 
of Keynesian economic thought in the 1970s, thus also led to 
an intense critique of development economics by neo-liberal 
analysts. Mkandawire aptly notes that "the crisis of the 
welfare state in the developed countries spelled trouble for 
Development Economics which was guilty of the Keynesian sin, 
if not by commission, at least by intellectual 
association."^® In short, for neo-liberal analysts, the 
African crises of the 1980s were not a consequence of 
exogenous factors, but rather primarily a result of bad 
domestic policies which encouraged statism, the ensuing 
inflationary pressures, declining economic growth and balance 
of payment difficulties. The development experience of the 
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of Southeast Asia were 
portrayed as current and concrete proof that market forces 
allowed to operate could generate rapid and equitable patterns 
of growth." This is the broader context in which the Berg 
Report intervened to promote the 'rolling back the state' and 
the liberation of market forces as the catalyst for economic
Mkandawire, "Development Theory", p.213.
Nigel Harris provides a strong critique of the development record 
of the NICs. It illustrates that the state in these countries were extremely 
Interventions, counter to the neo-liberal myth of the miracles of the market. 
Nigel Harris, Ib#
the Peoline of an Ideology, (Markham: Penguin Books, 1986) .
78
recovery and development.
In contrast to the neo-liberal emphasis on the internal 
determinant of the economic decline, the dependency/ 
underdevelopment school of thought attributed exogenous 
factors and forces for the current crisis. Emerging in the 
1960s, a product of both Marxist and Latin American 
structuralist traditions, this school of thought focused on 
the constraints metropolitan capitalism placed on the 
development of peripheral countries and regions. The central 
organizing concept of dependent istas, unequal exchange, 
illuminated the manner in which social surpluses were siphoned 
from the periphery. Unequal trade, profit repatriation of 
transnational corporations and interest payments to foreign 
banks were the primary mechanisms through which social 
surpluses in the periphery are transferred to the centre. The 
consequence of this unequal relationship, led to distortions 
in the process of domestic accumulation and inhibited 
productivity and national development. The current socio­
economic decline in Africa and Third World countries could not 
be extricated from the on-going appropriation of surplus value 
from the periphery to advanced capitalist countries. 
Accordingly, the pressures emanating from the global 
capitalist economy, propelled by the recession in West and the 
resultant contractionary and protectionist policies pursued by 
these countries, adversely affected dependent peripheral 
countries and regions. With declining terms of trade and
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mounting import bills, the ensuing debt and debt servicing 
burdens were identified as the conditions which propelled 
African countries into crisis.
The dependency position was reflected in an early 
continental policy response to the socio-economic decline. The 
Lagos Plan of Action(LPA) adopted by the OAU in April 1980, 
emphasized the adverse consequences of colonial and neo­
colonial exploitation on Africa's developmental experience.^" 
Taking cognizance of the marginal position of the continent in 
the international division of labour, the LPA argued that 
development in this region had been hampered by the dictates 
of the world system, where internal improvements have relied 
heavily on the developments in the European Community, tied to 
the Yaounde and Lome Conventions.*^ Alternative prescriptions 
to the crisis stressed the need for both national and regional 
self-reliance. At the cornerstone of the plan was the proposed 
formation of an African Common Market by the year 2000. A 
dynamic and interdependent African economy would lay the 
foundation for overcoming underdevelopment.
LIMITATIONS OF DEPENDENCY AND NEO-LIBERAL INTERPRETATIONS
The LPA suffered from similar limitations which have been
OAU, faoi Plan of. Action tor the »oonottio Development of Afrio# 
1980.2000. (Addis Ababa: OAU Publication, 1980), p.S.
The Lome and Yaounde Conventions are recurrent trade and aid 
agreements between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European 
Union.
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associated with dependentiataaUndoubtedly, this school of 
thought offers valuable insights into the external dimensions 
of the crisis. It illuminates the manner in which social 
surpluses are expropriated from peripheral regions and 
countries by an unequal integration into the global economy 
and their subsequent vulnerability to global capitalist 
crises. Nonetheless, the near exclusive focus on exogenous 
factors of the socio-economic decline neglected the internal 
factors and forces which predisposed African political 
economies towards crisis. Relegating the state and domestic 
social forces to objects of exogenous dynamics, they failed to 
appreciate the intra and inter-class struggles in the state 
and civil society and the manner in which the contestation 
over social surpluses determined the process of e. nomic 
development. The economism of much of the dependency analysis 
thus negated, like the LPA. the political dimension of the 
malaise and how internal social relations gave rise to 
developmental failure. The un-hegemonic character of the 
state, the rapacious character of large sections of the 
dominant class (es), the suffocation of political space and the 
ensuing marginalization of subaltern classes in civil society, 
are also factors which contributed to the crisis in Africa.
Needless to say, dependency theory is not a homogeneous school of 
thought, as it has variants which differ in their emphasis on the nature of 
underdevelopment and the roots of the current crisis. Space limitations 
preclude a comprehensive discussion of the divergent approaches. For an in 
depth examinations of the variations of dependentietaa see: Anthony Brewer, 
Marxist Theorise of IneeriaUsmi A Critical Review (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1980), Sid Christobel Kay, Letim ^Amerioam Theories q£
Peveloemsnt. (London; MacMillan, 1984).
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What is abundantly clear about the neo-liberal 
interpretation of the malaise in Africa, by comparison, is the 
tertiary importance accorded external determinants of the 
crisis. Giving primacy to the detrimental impact of the 
politicization of the marketplace by an 'urban coalition', or 
the impediments of a relatively autonomous peasantry and the 
resultant relations of affection, there was a near total 
silence on how the integration into the periphery of an 
unequal division of labour makes the peasantry and the entire 
social formation susceptible to exogenous fluctuations. 
Recognizing the extraction of surplus value from the rural 
area to the urban centre, 'urban coalition' theorists however, 
divorce this process from the dynamics of the global economy. 
For instance, while both Lipton and Bates critique 
agricultural marketing boards as the principal mechanism 
through which surplus value is extracted from the peasantry 
and directed to capitalist urban enclaves, this is extricated 
from external factors such as access to markets, the stability 
of commodity prices and cost of inputs which also affect the 
ability of rural producers to reap equitable remuneration for 
their labour. For the economy of affection school, in 
contrast, it is the inability to extract surpluses from the 
peasantry which has caused the crisis in post-colonial 
development. Not only does this proposition ignore the 
penetration of the countryside by colonial state and capital - 
- albeit incomplete -- and the surplus value extracted from
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the peasantry, but moreover, it overlooks how the rural areas 
in the post-colonial period have been subjected to the 
dynamics of both the smaller, yet dominant capitalist sector 
and the processes of the global capitalist economy. Various 
policies were enacted by colonial and post-colonial state in 
Africa to induce production of a narrow range of cash and food 
crops. This has integrated the peasantry both into the world 
market and the dynamics of the domestic capitalist economy. 
Peasant incorporation into the domestic capitalist economy is 
such that their reproduction is dependent on the market. This 
being the case, the countryside cannot be immune from crises 
in the global economy. These exogenous factors are 
conveniently omitted, opting for the near exclusive 
concentration on internal determinants of the crisis.
Departing from the technocratic approach of the Berg 
Report, the focus on the social and political determinants of 
the post-colonial developmental crisis by the urban coalition 
and economy of affection schools are however welcomed. The 
direction of development and the manner in which it is to be 
pursued are fundamentally political questions, contested by 
various social forces both within the state and civil society 
for control of the allocations of, and access to resources. 
The neo-liberal policies of the last decade are certainly not 
neutral, and promote particular interests in civil society. 
What is deficient about the neo-liberal schools of thought 
however, is the simplification of politics in Africa to
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contrasting models of 'winners and losers' attached to state 
or market allocation of resources.” Taking the case of the 
former, the statism of post-colonial development is assumed to 
have benefited the 'urban class' to the detriment of the 
'rural class'. Lipton and Bates recognize class 
differentiation within the rural and urban sectors. 
Nevertheless, oscillating in the treatment of the concept of 
class, in both the conventional materialist sense and the 
mainstream interest group usage, they invariably present a 
simple picture of 'winners' and 'losers' of post colonial 
development based on sectoral homogeneity. This ignored the 
ongoing process of class formation and the social 
differentiation and inequalities which permeated both the 
rural and urban areas.
Rural neglect in post-colonial Africa is largely not 
contested between liberal and radical genres. Available 
evidence supports the 'policy of indifference' towards the 
rural areas. While offering contrasting interpretations of 
rural neglect and the ensuing developmental ramifications, the 
economy of affection school, in asserting the predominance of 
a single peasant mode of production, and the so-called 
affective ties which the economy of affection spawns, also 
disguises the gross inequalities in African countries. The
Yusuf Bangura and Peter Gibbon, "Adjustment, Authoritarianism and 
Democracy; An Introduction to Some Conceptual Empirical Issues" in Peter 
Gibbon et al. Authoritarianism Deneoraev and Adluitmentt The Politic.» of 
«oonomio Reform in Africa. (Uppsala; Scandinavian Institute of African 
Studies, 1992) .
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assumption that affective relations act as social safety net 
for members of a community when economic conditions 
deteriorate, fails to discern "the way in which the material 
conditions for actually doing so differ radically between 
different segments of society.
For the urban bias proponents, the poor masses are 
identified with the rural classes. In contrast, the working 
class are presented as a labour aristocracy, a willing 
accomplice in the so-called privileged, consumptionist and 
parasitic urban coalitions which have captured the state and 
distorted the pattern of post-colonial development. In so 
doing, the 'urban coalition' school provides theoretical 
support not only for the neo-liberal reform, which are to 
shift the balance of forces in favour of the long neglected 
rural poor, but also legitimizes the detrimental effects of 
these policies on subaltern classes in urban and rural areas. 
Similarly, the economy of affection school, in arguing that 
development will not take place unless the peasantry are 
captured and subjected to the logic of the market, further 
legitimates the market reform and its adverse consequences on 
different social forces in civil society. These schools of 
thought converge to prop-up market forces and discredit the 
state as an instrument of development.
Bjorn Beckman, "Comments" in R»covtv_in Atriot A Chellenoe fog 
Development Co-pperatlon in the 1990m. (Stockholm, QOTAB for Department for 
International Development and Co-operation, Swediah Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 1988) p.162.
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Whether captured by the 'urban coalition' or permeated by 
patron-client relations, the African state they assert is 
incapacitated by these forces and needs to be 'rolled back'. 
Post-colonial developmental crisis in Africa therefore was 
simply not a precipitate of policy errors by the state but 
rather a result of a constraining syndrome whereby the state 
is manipulated to serve narrow sectoral interests, with the 
state portrayed as an obstacle to development, liberated 
markets are then the only path to ensure recovery and 
development in Africa. In a summary article in which Goran 
Hyden responds to his critics, he presents a case for 
extricating state retrenchment from the ongoing neo-liberal 
reforms. He notes,
...what is at stake here in not a matter of 'rolling back the 
state* to suit a neo-liberal model of economics but to enhance 
the role of the state as a socially responsible agent. 
Ironically perhaps, this does entail reducing the role of the 
state as the pivotal and monopolistic dispenser of resources and 
services in African society.
In the attempt to divorce these complementary processes --an 
inextricable part of the same neo-liberal project -- Hyden 
failed to answer some critical questions. What exactly is a 
socially responsible state? Who exactly determines the state's 
responsibilities? Is the state not a contested terrain in 
which various social forces struggle for control of resources 
and to push for how society should be organization and thus 
their interpretation of a socially responsible state? Is a
Hyden "State and Nation",
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socially responsible state one which fires workers, cuts 
social amenities, depresses incomes and represses social and 
political forces which challenge the neo-liberal onslaught? 
Hyden is silent on these questions, thus reproducing the neo­
liberal 'vision' of what development ought to be. With the 
ideological shift in the global political economy in the late 
1970s and the political ascendency of conservative governments 
in the West, the neo-liberal interpretation of the crises and 
its 'vision' of development, based on a strong commitment to 
market forces, became hegemonic. In what Toye has called the 
counter-revolution in development theory, the neo-liberal 
paradigm has been the basis of policy-prescriptions on the 
African crisis for two decades.
SECTION TWOi THE ORIGINS OF T3E NIGERIAN CRISIS AND 
PRE-ADJUSTMENT STATE CRISI'J MANAGEMENT POLICIES
Nigeria's integration into an unequal international 
division of labour, as the producer of a narrow range of 
agricultural commodities in the colonial period, subjected the 
country to the expansion, contradiction and crisis in the 
global capitalist economy. The operations and domination of 
the major sectors of the colonial and post-colonial economy by 
transnational companies, such as the United Africa Company 
(commercial and manufacturing sectors), Elder Dempster 
(shipping), Barclays Bank currently Union Bank of Nigeria 
(financial) and Shell-BP and Texaco (mining) inextricably 
incorporated the political economy into the dynamics of
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external factors and forces." Inhibiting internal 
development, unequal incorporation into the global economy, 
however, does not render Nigerian and Third World regions idle 
captives to exogenous constraints. Colonial and post-colonial 
development created its own dynamism, fostering internal 
contradictions, struggles and state and class formation.
Relations of appropriation and domination in colonial 
capitalism engendered responses against racial domination and 
contestation over social surpluses from subordinate groupings 
and the incipient indigenous ruling classes. Prom the early 
formation of the Nigerian Civil Service Union in 1912 and the 
militant unionism which developed in the wake of the 1929 
depression, hidden and overt, trade union movements in Nigeria 
resisted and struggled against racial discrimination, meagre 
wages and poor working conditions. The strikes of the 1940s, 
particularly the general strike of 1945, won concessions to 
the working classes and posed a direct challenge to colonial 
domination.*'' The period of decolonization led to the 
proliferation of trade unions, artisans groups, market women's 
and students' association, co-operatives, ethnic and religious 
bodies and professional associations in Nigeria's nascent 
civil society. Demands from subordinate classes for higher 
wages and better working conditions, increased producer
Bangura, "Mlaeonceptlons", p.54.
Wogu Ananaba, Tha Trad# Pnion Movasaafe..ia Jtiasxia (Benini Bthlope 
Publlehing Corporation, 1969).
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prices, expansion of education and health care and democratic 
participation in the process of development formed the basis 
of the anti-colonial struggles. Internally disharmonious and 
unfailingly subjected to state manipulation and suppression, 
the weakness of civic associations and popular groups enabled 
the emerging ruling class to determine the direction of 
decolonization.
This period also intensified the contestation between 
colonial capital and emerging indigenous ruling classes. By 
and large this class was co-opted by the colonial state. 
However, state instituted obstacles which inhibited the 
emergence of a manufacturing class and frustrated less 
constricted commercial activities, were increasingly issues of 
concern for indigenous elites. Compounded by state 
discrimination against educated professionals, these were some 
of the compelling reasons which propelled indigenous elites 
into the leadership of the anti-colonial movement which ended 
formal political domination. At political independence, 
indigenous capitalists were weak, largely divorced from the 
means of production and for the most part commercial in 
outlook. The productive factions of the ruling class(es), 
engaging mainly in small-scale production, could not compete 
with transnational capital which controlled and dominated 
major sectors of the Nigerian economy. The dependent pattern 
of internal accumulation, bequeathed by colonialism, nurtured 
the contradiction between social surplus and investment, which
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still persists today. The external orientation of the economy 
ensured that substantial surpluses generated internally were 
not retained to induce social and economic development in the 
country, but were squandered through TNC profit repatriation, 
overseas investments, conspicuous consumption, import 
dependency etc.
Consequently, the state became the principal locus of 
capital accumulation and the modality through which to create 
a economic base, and reconcile contradictions in the political 
economy. The disjuncture between what Festus lyayi called the 
political and economic instances of the ruling class (es) 
was a central contradiction which the post-colonial state 
attempted to mediate. For the state and ruling class (es), this 
disconnection militated against the expansion of the country's 
material base and the reconciliation of the incongruity 
between social surplus and investment. It also inhibited the 
ability to mediate the social contestation on the basis of 
class (intra and inter), gender, ethnicity and religion in the 
state and civil society and thus the ensuing difficulty in 
consolidating and reproducing ruling class hegemony.
POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN NIGERIA
Development planning has been the basic instrument used 
by the post-colonial Nigerian state to redress these 
contradictions. As mentioned in the Chapter One, in the 1960s,
Festua lyayi, "The Primitive Accumulation of Capital in a Neo- 
Colony: The Nigerian Case" in AOAM. no.30, 1986,
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a consensus existed between the ruling classes in the Third 
World, development agencies and development economists, on the 
centrality of the post-colonial state in the process of 
development.*® The post-war balance of forces which eclipsed 
the neo-classical free-market economic doctrine and its 
emphasis on international trade as the 'engine of growth' and 
the ensuing rise of Keynesian, state-led capitalist 
development influenced the study of Third World countries. 
Theoretical support from the proponents of the emerging 
discipline of development economics", such as the Singer- 
Prebisch thesis and Myrdal's 'backwash effect', that 
illuminated the adverse effects of primary commodity 
production on the term of trade of underdeveloped regions and 
countries, served to further discredit neo-classicalism and, 
in particular, the Ricardian concept of 'comparative 
advantage'. Influenced therefore by the post war Keynesian 
political economy, development economists advocated an 
interventionist state.
The state was viewed as the catalyst to increase domestic 
savings sufficient enough to achieve investment levels
"  Kari Levitt, Mvelutlott of Development Iconoaioa. Saint Mary's 
University International Development Studies Working Paper no.6, 1991, p.4. 
Levitt's article provides a useful analysis of the both the factors and 
forces in the immediate post-war global political economv, which gave rise to 
the study of Third World countries, and the intellectual currents in the new 
discipline of development economics.
For a succinct compilation and retrospective of the works of the 
principal contributors to the discipline of development economics seei Gerald 
M. Meiers and Dudley Seers ed., Pioneers in Pevelepaent (London: Oxford 
University Press for the World Bank, 1994).
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conducive to changing the structure of the economy. While some 
analysts within this genre emphasized the indispensability of 
world trade (Viner) and/or foreign aid (Lewis) in order to 
compensate for insufficient domestic resources, in general 
development economists were weary of the benefits accruing 
from an unequal world trading system and sceptical on the 
longevity of resource flows in the form of foreign aid from 
the West. They stressed the need to mobilize domestic 
resources, particularly from the agrarian sector in order to 
finance import-substitution industrialization. Underdeveloped 
countries could break the 'vicious cycle of poverty' 
(Rosenstein-Rodan) and overcome the obstacle to capital 
formation and investment, if the state implemented well 
articulated development plans drafted by Western economists. 
Placing priority on increasing domestic savings (Nurkse and 
Rosenstein-Rodan) a path of balanced (Rosenstein-Rodan) or 
unbalanced (Hirshman) growth could be pursued, triggering -- 
to use Lewis' analogy -- a 'snowball effect', ensuring a 
process of continuous economic growth.“ Industrialization 
was to be undertaken with vigour. The state was encouraged to 
establish the appropriate exchange and trade policies to 
protect nascent industries from foreign competition in order 
to enable industrial productivity and economic growth. Without 
questioning how the unequal international division of labour
Lewie cited in Bjorn Hettne, Development theory end t h e , T h f
World#■ (London) Longman Group, 1990), p.30*34.
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militated against domestic development or critically viewing 
the internal social structures, development was reduced to 
economic growth and incremental rises in per capita real 
incomes.
This optimistic vision of a linear growth process under 
the direction of the state was quite attractive to the ruling 
classes in the Third World. The consensus on the centrality of 
the state in the development process boded well for the weak 
Nigerian ruling class in its appeal over a liberal market- 
driven option and compatibility with the need to use state 
power to ensure its reproduction in the political and economic 
spheres. With this imperative in mind, successive development 
plans set out to i) shift the structure of production from the 
dominance of agricultural exports to import substitution 
industrialization, ii) increase indigenous participation in 
the economy (particularly the productive sectors), and iii) 
meet the welfarist expectation of the mass democratic movement 
which were mobilized in nationalist struggle by providing 
employment opportunities, higher wages, access to education, 
housing, and health care for the majority of the population. 
Intra-ruling class conflicts, the politicization of region and 
ethnicity and ensuing political instability which led to the 
civil war (1967-1970) prevented the full implementation of the 
threefold strategy in the first plan period (1962-68) . It was 
not until the 1970s that serious efforts were made to achieve 
these stated goals.
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The confluence of the successful prosecution of the civil 
war and the developments in the global political economy in 
the wake of the first oil shock, where OPEC, the Group of 77, 
UNCTAD, and the Non-Aligned Movement demanded the 
restructuring of Third World peripheral integration into the 
global capitalist economy, gave the Nigerian state the impetus 
to strive to actualize post-colonial assertions of economic 
nationalism. Benefiting from the 1973 oil price hikes, the 
base of accumulation in the country shifted from the agrarian 
to the crude oil sector. The price of Nigeria's oil increased 
from 64 cents a barrel in 1970 to 1.56 U.S. dollars a barrel 
in 1971, representing a tremendous 240% rise in income, which 
nearly doubled (477%) by 1974. Oil production rose from 2.1 
million barrels per day in 1970 to its peak of 2.4 million 
barrels in 1979 with revenues accrued, escalating from 
Nl,403.3 million to NIG billion in the same period.”
Oil revenues provided the financial basis of the Second 
■ilS70^_74l_and.Third National Development Plans (1975-1980) . An 
indigenization plan, import substitution strategy, and an 
ambitious public expenditure programme were central to the 
development plans of the 1970s. The 1972 and 1977 Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion .Decree(NBPD). introduced by the military 
governments of Gowan and Mohammed/Obasanjo, were the specific 
mechanism through which the Nigerian state sought to promote
”  JuliuB Ihonvbere, Tb# Th# SauroaeiBia And The eriiia of
P<vloea«at in »OBt-CQlonl«l Miaafia. mimeo; University of Texae, 1992,
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the interest of local productive capital. The indigenization 
plan espoused the extension of Nigerian participation in the 
economy by defining spheres of influence in the economy 
between local and transnational capital. The indigenization 
component of the 2nd Plan under Gowan, reserved schedule one 
for entirely Nigerian capital. Schedule two stipulated that 
Nigerian equity must be at least 40%, while schedule three was 
left unaffected by the plan. Building on its predecessor, the 
3rd Plan extended indigenization to include all enterprises 
operating in Nigeria by a similar three-tier scheduling of the 
economy. Schedule one again was the domain of local capital, 
while schedule two and three required 60% and 40% Nigerian 
equity respectively.
Though the 3rd Plan attempted to incorporate all sectors 
of the economy into the indigenization scheme, it had only a 
marginal affect in redressing transnational domination of the 
economy. Indeed, with the scope of manufacturing enterprise 
included, there was an increase not only in equity holdings in 
existing intermediate-scale manufacturing enterprise, but some 
local capital ventured into beverages, textiles, building 
materials and chemical production. Prima facie, it appeared as 
if the Nigerian state was able to counteract the dominant 
position of transnational capital in the Nigerian economy by 
the virtual compliance of TNCs with the equity sharing plan 
and the exodus of only two of the hundreds of TNCs operating 
in Nigeria. However, this was because TNCs were not yielding
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managerial control of these enterprises. They utilized legal 
and extra-legal mechanisms to retain power.” It became more
lucrative for factions of local capital to be a front for
transnational firms in these equity schemes. Rather than 
investing the capital accrued from the indigenization exercise 
into expanded reproduction, factions of the local bourgeois 
engaged in corrupt practices, inflated contracta, and imported 
and consumed all sorts of luxury goods. J.S. Zwingina's study 
of the structure of ownership of the leading corporations in 
Nigeria concludes,
the domination of strategic enterprises by such powerful 
Nigerian gave the illusion of a Nigerian control of the economy, 
but in almost all cases, the management of foreign enterprises 
was operated by the foreign directors of the Board, who received
many directives from their parent companies, while at the same
time, enjoying the domestic protection of their powerful board 
members with contacts in the government, [sic]̂ ^
While indigenous participation did increase in the 
government's three-sector scheduling of the Nigerian economy, 
the emphasis on ownership as opposed to control failed to 
alter the pattern of accumulation.
The ISI strategy was similarly designed to change the 
structure of production and the dependent pattern of 
accumulation in the country. By adopting compatible trade and
For an in depth examination of the Indigenization programme in 
Nigeria, and specifically how foreign capital circumvented the equity 
requirements see: Claude Ake, PQlttlcel laonottV- of Niaeris. (London: Longman, 
1985), Thomas Biersteker, "Limits of State Power in the Contemporary World 
Economy" in P.O. Brown and H. Shue eds., Boundaries, (Tctowa: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1981), Beckman, "Whose State? State and Capitalist Development 
in Nigeria" in ROAPl. no.23, 1982.
"  J.S. Zwingina, Capitalist Develonment in an Afrloan_:@on@m*i_Th#
Casa of Niaaria (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, 1992), p.ISO.
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exchange policies, the local production of previously imported 
consumer goods could be induced. The strategy would discourage 
import dependency, avert balance of payment problems, while 
increasing foreign exchange savings and domestic manufacturing 
value-added. The fostering of sectoral linkages would 
contribute to the transformation of the structure of 
production towards national self-reliance. Nigerian 
manufacturing output grew rapidly between the adoption of the 
2nd Plan and 1980. (see Table 2.1)
In this period, the annual average growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector was 12%, then began to decelerate in the 
1980s. The most dynamic sector in the 1970s, manufacturing 
growth surpassed agriculture which registered negative growth 
rates in this period. Reflecting the continued import 
dependency of industrial production and the low level of value 
added, manufacturing growth was not associated with any 
significant increase in this sector contribution to GDP, as 
the 5% share of GDP in 1979 replicated the 1960 level, (see 
Table 2.2) The structure of manufacturing output was biased 
towards consumer goods and concentrated on the production of
T M b i  a.i. O K o m n  or ikoouctiom in Niatixkt A v m a i  umu. dNONIM K A M I  (%) v A i u  a.a a n t f c n m i  o r  inodoctiom i n  H t o n x A  iactoMXi iHANN or oof 1**0 laia (»>
m a a w Mk'b tUb'V laMOi t ia v t m m # i W t M Mft'L 4 a m i  l u v ic t #
&##« 10 i.\ -0.4 i%.i 5.4 111# 3.110 4) 11 m  2»
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i l l # <A.«) 2) 10 (n.Ai 21
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commodities such as food beverages, tobacco, and beer. The 
contributions of intermediary and capital goods in
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manufacturing output was insignificant, merely reaching a peak 
of 26.7% in 1980. (see Table 2,3.) Though the 
industrialization plan shifted the structure of merchandise 
imports with machinery and transport equipment increasing from 
34% in 1965 to 38% in 1982 and a decrease in consumer goods 
from 48% to 35% in the same period,the importation "of 
intermediate and capital goods was for the domestic production
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of consumer g o o d s " . ^ The ISI strategy only served to 
replace one form of structural dependency with another. As 
A.M. Osoba's study on small-scale industries in Nigeria 
revealed, major industrial groups such as textiles, paper and 
paper products, rubber and plastic products and basic metal 
were respectively 60, 90, 70 and 90 percent dependent on 
foreign sources of inputs.The oil boom used to finance the 
plans of the 1970s did not reconcile the contradiction between 
surplus and investment by the diversification and 
strengthening of the country's productive base. The inability 
of the state to monitor and direct the ISI strategy such that
World Bank, World Davloownt Raoert 1988, (New York, World Bank 
Publication, 1985), Table 11, p.194.
Bright Ekuerhare, "Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market and the 
Structure of industrial Growth in Nigeria" in R, Omotayo Olaniyan and ChibuBO 
N. Nwoke, Struoturml Adjustment im Hiaeriai TheH^aet of BfSM on__teht 
goonamv. (Lagos!The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1989), 
p. 53.
Osoba cited in Zwingina, Capitalist PevlPPfteafc.
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it ensured the utilization of local inputs and encouraged the 
production of intermediate and capital goods, led to the 
squandering of surplus value through TNC profit repatriations 
and the increased importation of both capital and consumer 
goods. The industrial sector only averted crisis because the 
huge petro-dollars accrued to the state were temporarily 
sufficient to meet the growing import needs of the economy.
Huge oil-rents also led to the rapid expansion of public 
sector expenditure in the areas of social services and 
physical infrastructure. Weak and disorganized subordinate 
groups, while unable to reduce the outflow of resources from 
the country or curb state excesses and abuses and subject 
development to the imperative of the poor majority; their 
struggles however, did lead to state concessions in areas of 
social welfare. In part compelling expanded public 
expenditures, parallel demands from ruling class factions, 
which saw an avenue for private accumulation, also prompted 
state action. Public expenditure, for instance, in the 
education and health sectors during the 2nd and 3rd Plan 
periods rose from 11.4 and 4.3 million naira(mn) in 1970/71 to 
213.1 and 21.6 (mn) in 1974/75 respectively and then to 391.1 
and 80.2 (mn) in 1979/80. State expenditure on water supply 
and transportation increased from 24.0 and 159.2 (mn) in 
1973/74 to 123.6 (mn) and 1.2 billion naira (bn) in 1975/76, 
respectively, and to 359.6 and 962,3 (mn) in 1979/1980." In
a# zwingina, Capittliat Devaleaiitnt. p.123-124
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addition to increased wages and extended social wages during 
the Gowan regime, the Nigerian state sought to extend its 
hegemonic project beyond the capitalist urban enclave by 
pursuing regional development programmes and rural development 
schemes designed to reduce urban and rural disparities. For 
example, in the first year of the 3rd Plan.. the stated 
resource commitments for the duration of the projects and 
programmes of rural electrification, community development and 
health and water supplies in the countryside were respectively 
23.9, 84.3, 7.2 and 20.0 percent disbursed.
In spite of the expansion of social expenditures, the 
increasing dependence on oil exports to fuel internal 
development rendered these achievements unsustainable. 
Notwithstanding the enlarged expenditures in the countryside, 
the 1970s witnessed a near total neglect of the agricultural 
sector. As indicated in Table 2.1 and 2.2, this sector 
recorded an average growth rate of -0.3 between 1970 and 1900, 
while sectoral contribution to GDP fell drastically from 63% 
in 1965 to 20% by 1980. The export base of the Nigerian 
economy glaringly exhibited the same pattern, as major 
agricultural commodities which were the primary source of 
foreign exchange in the 1960s, by 1970 represented 30 percent 
of export earnings, declining to 5 percent in 1975 and 
dramatically dropping to 1 percent in 1980. (see Table 2.4) 
Cocoa, one of the country's major agricultural products, 
declined from 7.7 percent of total exports in 1975 to 2.2
100
percent by 1980.’* Non-oil mineral production suffered a
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similar neglect as the production of the sector's two 
principal commodities, cassiterite and coal both declined by 
nearly 50% between 1975 and 1980.^°
Reflecting the predominant role of transnational and 
comprador capital in the Nigerian economy, the huge oil 
surpluses in this period led to the rapid expansion of 
imports. Nigeria's import receipts increased from N1.727 
billion in 1974 to N7.087 bn in 1977 and nearly doubled by 
1981 to the level of N12.919 billion. The import of capital 
and consumer goods represented 69% and 25%; 68% and 28%; and, 
60% and 30% of total imports, in 1974, 1977 and 1981
respectively.*’ This phenomenal growth in imports 
increasingly consisted of foodstuffs. By the mid-1970s Nigeria 
became a net importer of food. Food imports rose 
astronomically from N166.4 million in 1974 to Nl.O bn in 1977
’* B. Ufloro, "Development of the Nigerian Agricultural Sector Within 
the framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme" in A. Phillips and B. 
Ndekwu eds., Adjyttaiat Aa • Otvelcpina ■ ■oonoav» The Case of
Niaaria (Ibadani WISER, 1SS7).
** Zwingina, easibalist Develomaenk.
*’ Yusuf Bangura, "Basic Misconceptions", p.S7,
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then more than doubled to N2.1 bn by 1981. The unproductive 
activities of comprador and transnational factions of the 
dominant class, which by succeeding in taking advantage of 
their control of the state apparatus to strengthen themselves 
in the commercial sector, greatly contributed to massive 
capital flight and the balance of payment difficulties the 
country experienced in the late 1970s. From the balance of 
payments surplus of N3.1 billion in 1974, Nigeria recorded a 
payment deficit of N3.4 billion in 1976 and N4.7 bn by 1977. 
The unproductive character of capitalist development in 
Nigeria was such that sectoral composition of GDP continued to 
be dominated by trading, extractive and service sectors. With 
the instability in the oil markets during the 1970s, the 
Nigerian state and economy could not avert a crisis of 
accumulation and legitimacy.
CRISIS AND PRB-ADJUSTMENT RECOVERY PROGRAMMES IN NIGERIA
The immediate signs of a deepening crisis in Nigeria 
occurred in 1977 when world oil prices briefly declined. 
Production of oil dropped from 2.1 million barrels a day in 
1977 to l.Bmn barrels in 1978, reducing export revenues from 
N7 billion to N5.9 billion in the same p er i o d . W i t h  
declining state revenue, the government was unable to meet its 
public sector expenditures. Agricultural and industrial 
production were constrained by the inability to import
Adebayo Olukoshl, "The Origine, Dimeneions end Conemquenoee oC the 
Nigerian Boonomio Criaiei 1982 -1985" in Olukoehi ed., Criaie and AdiuatMaat 
in the Kiaariaa Beeaoatf. 1991, p.29.
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necessary Inputs for the production process. In light of these 
developments, the Obasanjo regime, in the midst of a 
transition to Nigeria's Second Republic, introduced some 
'austerity' measures. The government increased tariff levies 
in order to reduce the importation of particularly consumer 
goods. Public expenditures were reduced and user fees 
instituted on a range of social services. Continued foreign 
exchange constraints, however, led the import-dependent 
industries to either close down or dramatically reduce 
productive capacities. The ensuing increase in unemployment, 
rising inflation and cuts to social services led to a decline 
in living standards of the poor majority.
Popular responses to deteriorated material conditions 
were met by increased state repression. For instance, in 1976, 
students reacted to the immediate increases in university fees 
and the broader degeneration of socio-economic conditions in 
the country by organizing peaceful protest nation-wide. At 
both the University of Lagos (UNILAG) and Ahmadu Bello 
University (ABU), in particular, these demonstrations were met 
with police brutality, leading to the death and wounding of 
large numbers of students.*^ These atrocities were followed 
by strong public outcry and protests which later swept the 
country. A disorganized trade union movement in spite of the 
newly state constituted central labour organization, the
A.s. Mohammed, "The Aftermath of the Ahmadu Bello Unlveralty 
Students' Crisis of May 1986" in ROAM, no.37, 1966.
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Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), remained factionalized and 
immobile amidst these developments. Despite the non­
participation of trade unions, the nation-wide unrest rocked 
the Obasanjo regime and its precarious political transition. 
Facing a crisis of accumulation and legitimacy, the government 
entered into the international money markets borrowing in 
excess of $U.S. 2 billion, in order to contain the deepening 
crisis/" Temporarily easing financial constraints, the 
infusion of revenues could not mitigate the economic decline 
and the tenuous legitimacy of the government. Attempts to re­
institute 'belt-tighten' measures by the new civilian regime 
which came to power in October 1979 could not allay the 
impending crisis.
The ascendency of Alhaji Shehu Shagari and the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN, 1979-1983) became a 'free for all' for 
the ruling classes before the new government recognized that 
the state and economy were in the throes of a protracted 
crisis. With the domination of the state by a comprador 
faction of capital, the state moved to reverse the austerity 
measures introduced by the Obasanjo regime. Trade regimes were 
quickly liberalized and public expenditures expanded. The 
contradiction between social surpluses and investment was 
sharpened. Between 1979 when the Shagari regime took office 
and 1981, the country's import bill increased from 6.0 billion
"  P.N.C. Oklgbo, mticnâl (Londoni
Jamas Curray, 1989) p.174.
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to nearly 13.0 bn. When in 1981-82 the oil glut in the world 
capitalist economy led to a decline in oil prices, export 
revenues plummeted by 50%, dropping from NlO.l bn in 1979 to 
N5.1 bn in 1982. Federal and state governments which depended 
on oil-export earnings for 60% and 80% (respectively) of their 
revenue faced a financial crisis."
Nigeria's balance of payment difficulties deepened in 
this period. Increasing from $8.9 billion in 1977, Nigeria's 
external debt by 1982 totalled $12.9 billion. Both 
agricultural and industrial crises reached unprecedented 
levels. For the import-dependent manufacturing sub-sector, 
production since the 1970s had been heavily tied to the fate 
of the oil-sector on which it exclusive relied to finance the 
imports of much needed raw materials. Unable to develop local 
sources of inputs, the process of deindustrialization which 
began in 1977 accelerated in the wake of the 1982 crisis. An 
industrial survey conducted by the Manufacturing Association 
of Nigeria (MAN) in 1983, concluded that between June 1982 and 
1983 a total of 161 companies employing over 20 000 workers 
closed down. Industrial closures and reduced capacity 
utilization in existing manufacturing companies led to the 
unemployment of over a million workers between 1980 and 
1983." With the addition of public sector unemployment this
Jon Kraus, "Economic Adjustment and Regime Creation in Nigeria" in 
Current History, vol.88, no.538, May 1989, p.233.
Olukoehi, "Origin", p.32-33.
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figure rose significantly. Workers wages in both the public 
and private sectors went unpaid for months. Social 
expenditures were drastically cut. Education and health 
sectors nearly collapsed. Agricultural neglect continued. 
Inflation rose exponentially, with the continued decline in 
living standards of the majority of Nigerians, the state 
finally introduced some measures to contain the crisis.
The Economic Stabilization,JTemporarv. ErQvisions) Act 
adopted in 1982, deepened the austerity measures followed by 
the Obasanjo regime. Import restrictions were widened on 
consumer goods. Existing tariff levies on both capital and 
consumer goods were increased. Attempts were made by the 
government to regulate the import licensing system. Tight 
fiscal policies were introduced and included both the decrease 
in public sector spending and the increase of interest rates 
designed to reduce both inflation and the external deficit. 
Public sector workers were laid off in large numbers, wage 
freezes were enacted, user fees continued on a wide range of 
social services, new taxes, fees and tolls were initiated and 
interest rates were raised by 2 percent.*''
While stringent adherence to these measures would have 
gone some way to resuscitate productive sectors of the 
economy, albeit temporarily, slippage in the implementation of 
these provisions exacerbated the crisis. Transnational
Julius Ihonvbere, "Structural Adjustment and Nigeria's Democratic 
Transition" in TrensAfrioe gorua. vol.e. no.3, Pall 1991, p.64.
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capital, determined to maintain access to markets for the sale 
of excess commodity products, particularly when the crises in 
advanced capitalist countries inhibited the ability to dispose 
of surplus goods, increased the pressure on the Nigerian state 
to reduce trade restrictions. The influence of comprador 
capital, -- transnational and domestic --in conjunction with 
factions of productive capital -- transnational and domestic - 
- which shared an interest in reversing the current trade 
regimes, enabled the circumvention of import controls. While 
the activities of comprador capital, TNC or domestic, 
concentrated as they are at the level of exchange, stood to 
benefit outright from the easing of trade regulations, the 
impact of relaxed import levies was mixed for factions of 
productive capital. For instance, both transnational and local 
productive capital do benefit from loosened trade regimes. 
Transnationals tend to acquire intermediary and capital inputs 
from the West, likewise, the import-dependent Nigerian 
industries, However, the anarchic import licensing system and 
constraints which Nigeria's high import profile had on 
productive sectors was a source of concern for domestic 
capital. The increasing indebtedness and scarcity of foreign 
exchange needed to import inputs inhibited the growth of 
production.
Their collective activities, nonetheless, reproduced the 
contradiction between social surpluses and investment as the 
continued high levels of imports -- both consumer and capital
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goods -- exacerbated the country's balance of payments 
position. Access to import licenses and scarce foreign 
exchange under the Shagari administration was dominated by 
comprador capital. Posing a much greater threat to economic 
stability, the 'free license' to import a whole range of 
consumer goods accorded comprador capital, coupled with their 
continued speculative activities, continued to be lucrative 
but inconsequential in reviving productive sectors of the 
economy. The manufacturing bourgeoisie condemned the poor 
implementation of the austerity measures and continued to 
voice strong concerns about the constraints which foreign 
exchange scarcity posed for industrial production. The 
deteriorating situation led Jerome Udoji, the then President 
of MAN to declare "that 1983 was the worst in all the 
industrial history of Nigeria. One fifth of Nigeria's 
organized industry, or 107 industrial establishments suspended 
production for 'four to eight weeks' that year, while others 
went out of business"Unable to obtain import licenses and 
access to foreign exchange, some companies closed and joined 
the unproductive activities of comprador capital, using the 
state for its own private accumulation.
When in April 1983 the Shagari government entered into 
negotiations with the IMP on an Extended Fund Facility of 
between Nl.9 and N2.4 billion, the response from productive
s. othman, "Claaaaa, Griaaa, and Coupai The Demlae of the Qhàg&ti 
Regima" In Afgiaan Affaira, no.83, no.333, 1984, p.452.
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capital was mixed. An IMF loan was welcomed in that it 
provided an immediate ease on foreign exchange constraints 
faced by Nigeria's import-dependent industries. However, 
factions within domestic capital remained sceptical on the 
short and medium-term benefits of trade reversals. This is 
reflected in MAN'S opposition to blanket liberalization since 
the inception of the negotiations. The Shagari government and 
the IMF however were deadlocked on the 'conditionalities' of 
the loan. Though the Economic Stabilization Act embraced 
policy prescriptions embodied in the standard orthodox package 
of the IFIs, such as the cuts in public expenditure, 
imposition of user fees, regulation of wages, privatization of 
state parastatals and incentives to transnational capital, 
continued state subsidizes on petroleum products and the 
regulation of trade and exchange rate regimes were critical 
points of contention between the government and the IFIs.** 
These outstanding issues were not resolved in the 'second 
life' of the NPN regime which returned to power in the 1983 
election.
The Supreme Military Council (SMC, 1984-85) headed by 
Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon came to power in a widely 
anticipated and welcomed coup on December 31, 1983. The
recovery programme of the Shagari regime could not reverse the 
precipitous socio-economic decline. Unemployment, poverty, 
hunger, inflation increased rapidly in this period.
Ekuerharê, "Second Tier", p.50.
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Indiscipline and waste were taken to new heights, The state 
fostered a culture of corruption. Agricultural and industrial 
production continued to decline. The GDP growth rate in 1984 
was -5.5 percent while external indebtedness stood at $18 
billion in the same year.®“ The gross mismanagement of the 
economy by the Nigerian state alienated productive capital, 
sections of the petty bourgeoisie and popular classes. Any 
vestige of legitimacy which the state might have enjoyed among 
popular classes in civil society waned as they continued to 
bear the brunt of the economic decline. Increased state 
repression from a crisis-ridden Nigerian state bent on 
reproducing itself, even through coercion, worsened the 
predicament. The conduct of the elections supervised by the 
ruling NPN, ensured that the incumbents won the rigging 
contest among factions of the ruling class. The concomitant 
manipulation of ethnicity, religion, region and the 
intensification of political violence and thuggery, totally 
discredited the state, its 'democratic' institutions and 
processes. This was the turbulent political and economic 
environment which the SMC was attempting to redress when it 
entered the fore of Nigerian politics.
Espousing the usual litany of explanations for the 
military's intervention, the maiden speech of the SMC captured 
deep rooted sentiments in civil society on th'j political and 
socio-economic decline experienced during the Second Republic.
Kraufl, “Economic Adjustment'', p.233,
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In the national broadcast of the coup, the then Brigadier- 
General Sani Abacha proclaimed to his,
...fellow countrymen and women...(that) you are all living 
witnesses to the grave economic predicament and uncertainty 
which an inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved 
nation for the past four years. I am referring to the harsh, 
intolerable conditions under which we are now living. Our 
economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor 
and a beggar nation...” (emphasis mine)
Scuttling all previous political institutions and suspending 
all talk on a return to civilian rule, the SMC set out to 
resurrect Nigeria's tottering economy. Reflecting the
interests of productive capital at the base of the SMC,
policies were enacted to curtail the activities of the
parasitic comprador and corrupt elements of the ruling class 
which threatened the productive sectors of the economy. The 
1984 Budget laid out the regime's recovery programme aimed at 
improving Nigeria's balance of payment position, encouraging 
foreign investment and restoring economic growth and
development. The main tenets of the Budget included,
1. a rapid repayment of external loans in order to reestablish 
the country's credit worthiness; 2. a high rate of repayment of 
internal debts to placate local investors and contractors; 3. an 
increase in the rate and volume of internal revenue raised 
through taxes, levies, tolls and fees; 4. overall reduction in 
public expenditures particularly of social services li)ce 
education and health; 5. a freeze on wages and salaries and a 
reduction in the total amount paid as wages through the drastic 
reduction of allowances; 6. large scale reduction of the labour 
force in the public services and parastatals to reduce the wage 
bill and promote efficiency and proper resource management; 7. 
closer monitoring and taxing of the economic activities of 
petty-traders, artisans and other self employed professionals as 
a way of raising revenue; 8. expanded incentives for foreign 
investors and the review of the indigenization regulations 
promulgated in the 1970s; 9. encouragement of large scale 
private investment in agriculture through a review of the land 
use decree and the indigenization programme; 10. the 
privatization and commercialization of public parastatals even 
those making profits as a way of generating revenue and rolling
61 S. Othman, "Classes, Crises and Coups", p.441,
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back the role of the etate in the economy,- 11. review of all on­
going projects with funding for only 'core projects' especially 
in the areas of basic raw material production; 12. priority 
investment in power and telecommunication 13. mover effective 
coordination of the budgeting processes particularly at the 
level of mcnitoiing; and 14. strict foreign exchange control in 
order to build up the foreign reserves and encourage the inflow 
of foreign investors.“
In the continuum of 'austerity measures' embraced since the 
late 19708, the implementation of the government's tight 
fiscal policies were pursued vigorously. Public sector 
expenditure continued to be curtailed. Rampant unemployment, 
wage freezes, and spending cuts in education and health care 
continued. State governments imposed onerous taxes on the 
people; workers, peasants and artisans, were required to pay 
poll and cattle taxes. User fees on education and health care 
were raised." Reinforcing the states fiscal discipline, new 
capital projects were frozen and interest rates were raised.
Measures were also taken to reverse capital flight. In 
addition to extending import levies beyond the levels 
maintained by both the Obasanjo and Shagari regimes, the state 
reduced the percentage of remittable incomes, decreased 
foreign travel allowance and enacted anti-currency trafficking 
decrees. The puritanical manner in which the implementation of 
these measures were pursued increased the initial legitimacy 
of the SMC. Presenting comprador capital as the saboteurs of 
national development, the state, eager to curtail their
"  Ihonvbere, Poet Colontel Wloerie. p.19.
Othman, "Claseee, Crisee, and Coupe", p.459.
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activities, arrested members of this class, raided warehouses 
and seized their goods. Swift state actions against contract 
inflation, over-invoicing of imports, forgery, kickbacks, 
fraud, misappropriation of funds and a host of other corrupt 
practices reinforced the disciplinarian character of the 
state. The so-called 'War Against Indiscipline' (WAX) which 
the government declared early in its administration, provided 
the ideological plank to force through further draconian anti­
labour and unpopular decrees. Frivolous strikes, industrial 
slow-downs and lockouts, declared the Labour Minister, S.K. 
Omojokun, were public acts of indiscipline which would be 
dealt with ruthlessly.^ Thacherite 'no work, no pay' 
legislations adopted by the Nigerian state were an outgrowth 
of the global ideological shift to the right in this period. 
Protests by workers and other subordinate social groupings 
were then met with brutal force.
Through the discipline of labour, the state sought to 
enhance the conditions for domestic capital accumulation. 
Unlike previous regimes, the SMC seriously pursued measures to 
shift the dependent pattern of accumulation by restructuring 
the nature of industrial production. Emphasizing the optimal 
use of local raw materials and inputs, the state enforced 
tariff increases -- between 5 and 200 percent -- on all 
imports destined for industrial production.A critical
othman, "Claaaea, Crises, and Coupa", p.458. 
Olukoehi, "Origins", p.41.
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component of the SMC's industrial policy was the unilateral 
disallowances of any prospective industry lacking a local 
resource base. The state, additionally, encouraged productive 
capital to reinvest larger profits in order to hasten economic 
recovery. In spite of these far-reaching measures taken by the 
state and the serious attempts to reconcile the contradiction 
between social surpluses and investment by limiting capital 
flight and encouraging inter-sectoral linkages, economic 
decline persisted. External debt by 1985 totalled US$19.5 
billion while the debt servicing ratio stood at 33%'̂'' the 
federal government figure place this figure at 44% of export 
earnings. Inflation increased to 40%, and despite the emphasis 
on the uses of local resources, manufacturing closures and 
decreased capacity utilization continued. The recovery 
programme reached a state of near collapse when in 1985 the 
international financial institutions intensified the pressure 
on the Nigerian state to acquiesce to the dictates of the IMP.
In spite of the resumption of talks between the 
government and the IMF in February 1985, the outstanding 
concerns over the withdrawal of petroleum product subsidies 
and the deregulation of trade and exchange rate regimes, which 
had led to previously stalled negotiations, remained 
contentious Issues. For the government, the adoption of these 
measures would weaken domestic productive capital and flood
World Bank, World Dabt tablaat I M l  (Waahlngtom World Bank 
Publlcablon, 1992), p.298.
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the Nigerian market with all sorts of goods, running counter 
to state efforts to strengthen productive capacities and 
inwardly reorient the Nigerian economy, Reflecting on the 
march towards structural adjustment in Nigeria, Adebayo 
Olukoshi aptly notes that the depth of the anti-labour 
austerity measures, the zeal in implementation and the 
forthrightness of the state in repressing popular opposition 
to these policies, should have been enough to endear the 
Buhari regime to the IMP. But the refusal to adopt all the 
conditionalities of the IMF loan led Western governments and 
commercial banks through the Paris and London Clubs, to 
withiraw credit guarantees on Nigeria's imports. Western 
creditors also insisted that the country adopt the IMP policy 
prescriptions before outstanding debt obligations could be 
rescheduled. The World Bank intensified the pressure on 
Nigeria to come to terms with the IMF by threatening to 
suspend relations.^ With declining industrial and 
agricultural production, unemployment, inflation, widespread 
scarcity of goods, and increasing debt and debt-servicing, the 
government attempted to ease the foreign exchange constraints 
by circumventing the Western dominated international financial 
system through the acquisition of non-Western aid and the 
pursuit of a counter-trade policy. In the latter, Nigeria's
Adebayo Olukoehl, "The March to Adjustment in Nigeria", Olukoshi 
ed., Crisis and Adiustaeat. p.66.
Ekuerhare, "Second Tier".
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oil was bartered for raw materials, spare parts, consumer 
goods and food, from notably Brazil, Italy and Poland. Like 
the abortive efforts to obtain a N1.6 billion loan from the 
Saudi Arabian government -- which capitulated to Western 
pressures -- the policy of counter-trade could not be 
sustained,"
Declining material conditions intensified internal 
contradictions and conflicts. Factions of productive capital, 
constrained by foreign exchange scarcity and disillusioned by 
the counter-trade policies and continued stalemate in the 
negotiations with the IMF, increasingly lost confidence in the 
government." State legitimacy among the petty bourgeoisie 
and popular forces in civil society also continued to wither. 
The proclaimed "WAI" was used to harass and suppress 
opposition to the economic recovery programme by workers, 
peasants, students, radical intellegencia, market women, 
street traders, journalists etc. For instance, in March 1985 
protests by Nigerian Airways pilots against unilateral wages 
cuts led to wholesale job losses and the subsequent re­
employment under harsh terms. A month later, striking doctors 
opposing cuts to medical benefits and the deterioration of the 
health sector were dismissed en masse and the principal
"  Olukoshi, "The March", p.66.
Kris Obodumu, "The Nigerian Military and Leadership Successions A 
Materialist examination of the Economic Foundation of Nigeria's Third Republic" in B. Caron et al. eds., Pesfloratie Treasiteiaa in Afziea. (Ibadan: CRId U, 1992), p.246.
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umbrella medical bodies, Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) 
and the National Association of Resident Doctors(NARD), were 
proscribed.*^ The anti-labour policies of the regimes 
escalated conflicts between the labour movement â .d the SMC. 
Declining to engage the NLC in dialogue over a wide range of 
grievances such as massive job losses, unpaid wages and wage 
freezes experienced under the government's economic recovery 
programme, intensified antagonisms. Public appearances by 
Buhari and Idiagbon at the Organization of African Trade Union 
Unity annual conference held in Lagos in January 1985 and at 
May Day celebrations, led to strong opposition and public 
outcry. Similarly, student unions continued to be one of the 
preferred targets of state harassment. In the attempt to 
clampdown on student political activities, the state banned 
the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) in 1964. 
Confronted by deteriorating material conditions, state 
capacity to co-opt and placate demands from subordinate 
groups, became increasingly limited. It thus relied heavily on 
coercion to reproduce its tenuous hegemony in civil society.
A series of executive fiats in this period intensified 
the suffocation of civil society. The notorious Decree No.2 
empowered state security agents to detain without charge 
individuals regarded as threats to the state. As state 
coercive mechanisms were strengthened, trade union leaders,
Tayo Paahoyln. "Nigerian Labour and Military: Towards Exclusion?" 
in Labeur. Caaital and aoaiatv. vol.23. no.l, April 1990, p.2S.
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Student activists, radical intellectuals and journalists 
increasingly became recipients of heightened harassment and 
detention. The promulgation of Decree No,3 sanctioned the 
formation of military tribunals to expedite deliberations on 
individuals defined as 'security threats'. With closed trials 
and no recourse to appeals, the state dispensed with the 
rudimentary precepts of justice and arbitrarily deliberated 
and convicted individuals onto whom the burden of proof had 
been shifted. Decree No.4 specifically targeted the fourth 
estate and academic freedoms. Empowered to establish a 
National Security Organization (NSC), headed by Idiagbon, this 
decree was mandated to deal with individuals that published 
'false' information about the government and its policies. 
Under this decree prominent journalists and radical 
intellectuals were harassed, arrested and detained. The 
totality of these anti-labour and anti-popular policies which 
dismissed basic civil liberties and human rights increased the 
alienation of the state from civil society. State persecution 
and alienation from virtually all sectors of civil society 
coupled with its isolation from the centres of capital, 
created the environment in which Ibrahim Babangida came to 
power in a blood-less coup in August 1985. The recovery 
programme of Babangida and the Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(APRC, 1985-1993), entailed the fundamental restructuring of 
the pattern of state-capitalist accumulation, guided by the 
IMP, with which it reached an accord in 1986.
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I have discussed Africa's historical experience with 
specific reference to Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial 
development in order to provide a fairly comprehensive 
background on the both the roots of the political and social- 
economic crisis which engulfed African countries during the 
1980s and the antecedent of neo-liberal market reforms in 
Nigeria. The remainder of this chapter discusses the impact of 
the hegemonic structural adjustment programme on the Nigerian 
economy and the continuing policy debates on the adjustment 
exercise.
SECTION THREEt THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
IN AFRICA)THE IMPACT OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK 
POLICIES ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
Since the early 1980s, over two-thirds of the countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have adopted the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and Work Bank guided structural adjustment 
programmes. In this period the IFIs have dominated the debates 
on the African crisis with their recovery programme, designed 
to restructure the pattern of post-colonial accumulation. The 
IMF and World Bank were established in 1944 as part of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement and were sanctioned to regulate the 
post-war international monetary system. The Articles of 
Agreement defined separate but reinforcing functions for the 
International Financial Institutions. The role of the IMF was 
envisioned as promoting, balance of payment stability, 
international monetary co-operation, expansion and balanced 
growth of international trade and assistance to member
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countries through periodic lending.” The World Bank (Group) 
which consists of a number of institutions. The most prominent 
of which include the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the International Development Association, 
(IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and are 
collectively formed to finance reconstruction, promote foreign 
investment, international trade and provide long-term lending 
assistance. The IDA was established in 1956 to financially 
assist low income countries, while the IFC formed in 1960 
concentrated on encouraging and financing private 
enterprises.” Today, the World Bank usually refers to the 
IBRD and the IDA.
Prior to the 1980s the Bank's activities in Africa 
emphasized agricultural promotion, agrarian reforms and 
population controls in the effort to promote rapid economic 
growth,” while the IMF's operations continued to centre 
around the stabilization of external balance of payments 
difficulties. In the wake of the crisis in the global economy 
in the late 1970s, the Bank and Fund worked in closer 
collaboration in their interaction and approach to 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Africa and the
Eghosa Osagle, "The IMP and the World Bank in Nigeria'a Economic 
Recovery" in Bghoaa Oaagie ed., Structural Adiuataant Proaraaaa in Wigaria.
(Kurus NIP88, 1992).
Barend A. de Vriea, Ramakina the World Bank (Washingtons Seven 
Locks Press, 1987) p.8.
” Bade Onimode, "Introduction" in Onimode ed., The IMP. The World 
mank and the African Debt* Yoluaia It The leonoaie Imnaet. (LondonsZed Books, 
1989) p.S.
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Third World. The structural adjustment exercise therefore 
refers to the joint programme advanced by these institutions. 
It aims to achieve short-term balance of payment 'stability' 
and long-term 'adjustment' or reintegration of African 
economies into the international division of labour through 
the promotion of export commodity production.
The IMF seeks to accomplish balance of payment stability 
by providing member countries access to capital to meet 
external debt obligations. The funds which the IMF disburses 
are derived from numerous sources. Contributions first come 
from country members' own deposits or 'quotas', which are a 
function of GNP and percentage of world trade. That is, the 
amounts allotted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries are greater than that of poor 
Third World nations. The IMF makes mandatory the payment of at 
least 25 percent of the quota in hard currency (ie. all G7 
currencies except those of Canada and Italy), or Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs), the credit facility established in 1969 
to purchase hard currencies from the IMF. The Fund also 
provides capital through the General Agreement to Borrow 
facility (GAB) which is obtained from member countries' 
contributions beyond stipulated quotas. The SDR facility 
alluded to, enables members to borrow against the respective 
country's credit account with the IMF and is used to purchase
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hard currency from the Fund/® The IMF, of course, earns 
income from loans to debtor countries and transactions in 
commercial markets.
Borrowing from the IMF is determined by a system of 
'tranche' or lending preconditions, which attaches stricter 
stipulations on escalated acquisition of loans. In the 
'reserve tranche', capital, up to 25 percent of the member 
country's quota is available upon request devoid of 
conditions. The 'first tranche' however, enforces minimal 
prerequisites on members drawing exactly 25 percent of the 
quota.®® The 'upper credit tranche' in which African and 
Third World countries are the main users, consists of an 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Stand-by Arrangements subject 
to full IMF conditionalities. The latter predates the EPF 
established in 1974 -- and differs only in the duration of the 
granted loans. An EFF repayment periods is usually 3-4 years 
while traditional stand-by arrangements last 12-18 months.®' 
The IMF's 'hard' loans are generally short-term in span and 
carry interest rate at prevailing market rates.
The World Bank's lending policies since the early 1900s
*® ' H, Brett, "The IMF's View of the World" in Martin Honeywell ed,,
The Pover Brokent The IMF AND fcttin Aaerict (London: Latin America Bureau,
1983), p.^3-24.
*® Mary Button, "Introduction" in Tony Killick ed., The IMF end 
Bteebiliaationt Peveleeing Country Bxpetiitnoe (New Yorit: St.Martin'e Presa,
1984), p.3-4.
®’ Stephan Haggard, "The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the 
IMF's Extended Fund Facility" in International OraeniMetion. vol.36, no.3, 
Summer 198S, p.506.
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have shifted from stipulations on specific projects or 
programmes to now include economic policy reforms in recipient 
countries. In 1980 the Bank established the Structural
Adjustment Loan (SAL) to provide quick disbursements to debt-
straddled countries and to strengthen and monitor the ensuing 
market policy reforms." Obtaining capital in the same
fashion as the Fund, the World Bank's 'hard' loans are usually 
administered over a 10-15 year period at current market rates. 
Both institutions offer concessional loans to low income Third 
World countries. In addition to pre-adjustment 'soft loans' 
such as the now defunct Compensatory Financing Facility, 
Buffer Stock and Oil Facilities, in 1986 and 1987
respectively, the IMF established the Structural Adjustment 
Facilities (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facilities (ESAF) designed to support, through low interest 
and relatively long-term loans, countries adopting the Fund's 
market reform. The IMF recently approved an Enlarged ESAF 
which will carry the same stipulation for eligibility and like 
SAP and ESAF, an interest rate of 0.5% and a repayment period 
of 10 years with 5 years grace." The Bank's concessional 
lending continues to be administered by the IDA. The IDA, 
through triennially replenished capital contributions from 
advanced capitalist countries, (ie. IDA-6 (1981-83) -- IDA-10
"  Stanley Pleaee, The Mebblad Oientt luayj en the World Bank 
(Boulder: Westvlew, 1964).
** IMP, "IMP'S Executive Board Approves Renewed and Enlarged E8AP" in 
îHf iurvey. vol.23, no.l, January 10, 1994, p.i.
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(1993-96) disburses to least-developed countries, loans which 
have a repayment period of fifty years at a 'service charge' 
of 0.75 percent on the total amount allotted and carry a ten 
year grace period.
As the IFIs have added stringent conditionalities to aid 
to African and Third World countries, it should be noted that 
the recurrent access to capital from the World Bank and IMF is 
contingent on "adequate" progress on the implementation of its 
policy prescriptions. Usually biannually, monitoring teams 
from the Bank and the Fund visit recipient countries to 
evaluate the progress in the execution of market reforms, with 
an endorsement of satisfactory crucial for any further 
multilateral 'hard' or 'soft' loan. Controlling as it does 
U.S.$12 billion of $15 billion in multilateral aid flows to 
the continent'"', the IFIs have gained enormous influence in 
its policy dialogue with African countries. But its power go 
further. The non-compliance to the IFIs dictates has usually 
blocked access to commercial credit, bilateral aid flows, 
debt-rescheduling and debt-forgiveness, since Western 
governments and creditors through the Paris and London Clubs 
(respectively) insist that recipient countries reach an 
agreement with the Bank and the Fund. The implications of this 
to the state autonomy of African and Third World countries are 
quite clear. Commenting on Western leverage over internal 
processes in Africa, given the continent's debt peonage, the
70 Ake, "Rethinking", p.41.
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former Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa, Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, noted that the
"IMF and the World Bank are now more powerful in Africa than
the former colonial masters,"’̂ In the same vein, David
Finch, recently adjudged the relationship between Africa and
the IFIs as "somewhat akin to that of colonial power and
colony."^ With the current practise of aid conditionalities
and consistent external monitoring of adjustment programmes,
the centre of authority have increasingly been supplanted from
national to international institutions, constricting the
policy options of African states in the decisions affecting
the country's recovery and development. This is not to suggest
that African states and civil societies are politically effete
to the designs of IFIs, as the continued contestation around
the direction of economic recovery clearly indicates the
contrary (see Chapter Three). Rather, it underscores the
increasing dependency of African countries on international
capital over the last decade.
The principal objectives and policy prescription of the
IPX's cross-conditionalities, aimed at inducing recovery and
self-sustained growth, include the following.
* Currttney Dévaluationt Thia measure seeks to improve the 
balance of payments position of African countries by raising the 
cost of imported goods and making commodity exports competitivec  
in the glooal economy.
71 Adebayo Adedeji cited in Ake, "Rethinking", p.41.
David Pinch cited in Patrick Smith, "Aid Conditionality is 
"Swamping" Africa" in Africa Reeevarv. vol.7, no.3/4, December 1993-March 
1994, p.15.
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* Domtstic D«»«nd Management Pollaleat This policy aime to chock 
spiralling inflation by cutting public sector expenditures, 
particulary in social services. Massive public sector 
retrenchments, wage cuts and freezes are also pursued. To reduce 
inflationary pressures, tight monetary and credit policies rre 
further adopted.
* Freeing of Prices * Since the statist-model of capitalist 
development is blamed for the current crisis, the freeing of 
prices, through the desubsidization of food, fertilizers, oil 
and other items are required for the restoration of market 
forces necessary to guide economic recovery and development. *
Import Liberalisation( Relatedly, the liberalization of trade 
regimes is an important component in 'getting the prices right,' 
and rolling back the state in economic life. It seeks to open 
local industries to competition and facilitate increased foreign 
trade.
* Privatization of paraatatals: Similarly, this measure further 
seeks to retrench the 'over-extended state' by reducing its 
protection of inefficient economic enterprises, which the 
private sector is better suited to organizes, make productive 
and profitable,
While there has been shifts in policy emphasis over the last 
15 years -- eg. poverty alleviation, political and military 
conditionalities -- the totality of these measure remain the 
policy thrust of neo-liberal market reforms in Nigeria and the 
rest of Africa.
NIGERIA AND THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME
The regime headed by Ibrahim Babangida (AFRC, 1985-1993) 
came to power seeking to end the country's isolation from 
international financial institutions. The regime thus made it 
clear that it would reach an accord with the IMF by conceding 
the outstanding issues of subsidy removals and trade and 
exchange rate deregulations, which had stalled negotiations on 
an EFF of US. $2.5 billion between the Fund and previous 
Nigerian governments. It followed that the APRC in the early 
days of its administration, stressed that market reforms would 
be the central thrust of any economic recovery programme it 
adopted. Recognizing however, the tenuous legitimacy of the
126
Nigerian state and opposition to market reforms from diverse 
sectors of civil society, the government employed a two­
pronged approach in its initial drive to build a consensus 
around the proposed recovery package. The regime first adopted 
a human rights posture, repealing Decree No.4 which was 
previously used to restrict press and academic freedoms. 
Detained journalists and lecturers were immediately released. 
It curtailed the powers of the NSO, held public viewing of the 
NSO detention centres, probed the abuses of NSO, yet, soon 
reconstituted the NSO as the State Security Service (SSS) . The 
government also announced its intention to reestablish 
civilian rule by 1990. These measures were to reinforce the 
new policy of tolerance, openness and a commitment to civil 
liberties. Despite these initiatives, the Nigerian state could 
not divert attention from its contentious economic recovery 
programme.
Therefore, in September 1985, the AFRC held a national 
debate on the question of an IMP loan. Through the media and 
public debates, multiple forces in civil society -- workers, 
students, market-women, community organizations, religious 
bodies, intellectuals, co-operative associations, etc. -- 
forcefully rejected the IMP loan.’’ Acceptance of an IMP loan 
was viewed as a precursor to relinquished Nigerian control of 
the economy, giving Western interests undue influence on the 
direction of development in the country. Drawing on
”  olukoshi, "The March", p.68.
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experiences from other African and Third World countries, they 
also argued that market reforms would create extreme hardship 
for the poor. In spite of internal conflicts, productive 
capital also came out against the IMF loan. While some members 
of this class felt that securing the loan would enable the 
state and private capital to reschedule external debts, obtain 
foreign aid and boost the financing of imports, others feared 
deregulation would have disastrous consequences on industrial 
production. Represented by the MAN, manufacturers expressed 
their strong opposition to the loan.
Amidst these debates, the Nigerian state promulgated the
National Economic Emergency Eflttacs Decree No,22 (n e e p,
198P)which empowered the president to unilaterally make 
decisions on economic policies deemed in the 'national 
interest'. The NEEP deepened the ongoing austerity measures, 
initiated further cuts to public expenditures, laid-off 
workers and expanded the sectors affected by wage cuts and 
freezes. In 1986, the government rejected the IMP loan and 
instead opted for a so-called 'homegrown' structural 
adjustment programme.^ With the full approval of the 
London/Paris Clubs and the IFIs, the annual budget embraced in
Ihonvbere, "Democratic Transition", p 6S1
There was very little 'homegrown' about Babangida's recovery 
programme. It consisted of the standard tenets associated with orthodox adjustment packages. While the government refused to accept the IMP loan, the periodic presence of IMP monitoring team*, and rescheduling arrangements realized in the last eight years, confirms the accord reached with the Pund. In 1966, 1969, 1991 and 1992 the government rescheduled loans with both Paris and London Clubs, consisting also of debt for development and equity schemes.
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Its entirety the prescriptions of standard orthodox SAPs. The 
objectives of SAP articulated in the 1986 budget are as 
follows.
1, to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector for imports. 2. to achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability.3. to lay the basis for sustainable non-Inflationary or minimal inflationary growth. 4. to lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, improve the sector efficiency and intensify the growth potential of the private sector.^*
SAP represents the most far-reaching economic policy in
Nigeria's post-colonial history and is aimed at fundamentally
re-structuring the state led pattern of accumulation in order
to give free reign to market forces,
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With specific reference to the major sectors of the 
Nigerian economy under examination here, mainly industry and 
agriculture, the stated objectives are highlighted in Table 
2.S above. The major policy measures below collectively aim to 
induce the free working of the market mechanisms. Of direct 
bearing on the agricultural and industrial sectors are the 
deregulation of trade and exchange and the pursuance of tight 
monetary policies.
76 Adedotun 0. Phillip#, of Mioêriâ»* Itruatturtl
Ad4umtm#mh (IbadanI NISBR Monograph Sariaa, 1990), p.2.
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1. adoption of a 'reallatic exchange rate', 3. etatederegulation and liberalization of trade. 3. removal ofaubaidizes on public gooda and aervices.4. privatization and rationalization of public enterpriaes and a general reduction of the aize of the government aector. 5, etrong demand management policiea particularly (tight monetary and credit policiea)
The pursuit of a 'realistic' exchange rate through the
abandonment of preexisting administrative controls on foreign
exchange and its new determination through market forces, is
the centrepiece of Nigeria's SAP, In September 1986, the
government established a two-tier foreign exchange market. The
first tier, now defunct and unrelated to current transactions,
was designed to cover existing external debts, both public and
private, incurred prior to the date of deregulation. This was
to enable both the Nigerian government and indigenous
capitalists to settle accounts with foreign creditors at the
previous exchange rates. The second-tier foreign exchange
market (SPEM) -- later replaced by the Inter-Bank Foreign
Exchange Market(IFEM) -- was established to determine the
availability, price and structure of allocation of foreign
exchange in the economy.” As previously discussed, the IFIs
argued that Nigeria's currency was 'overvalued', which
adversely affected industrial production by encouraging a high
import profile and capital flight. By making imports more
expensive, the devaluation of the naira was expected to reduce
the import-dependency of industries and encourage the of local
”  Chriitopher KoUd*, "The Effect of SPEM on Indue try" in R. Omoteyo Olaniyen and Chibuzo N. Nwoke, ifayuatugal xdiuataanfc in jtiaaziai. The lenaiiA a# ayes ah# Maonoav. (Lagoai Nigerian Inatituta of International Affaire,
1990]7 p.32.
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resources, thereby increasing local value-added manufacturing 
and increase inter-sectoral linkages. In the agricultural 
sector, an overvalued currency lay at the root of agrarian and 
rural decay. It was anticipated that devaluation would 
immediately boost the production of food and export crops. Of 
course, devaluation primarily sought to generate capital in 
order to meet external debt and debt servicing obligations.
To fund the new exchange regime, the Nigerian state 
attempted to escape the dependency on oil export earnings. It 
therefore established a foreign currency domiciliary account 
in which Nigerians who had substantial deposits in foreign 
banks -- legal or illegal -- were encouraged to repatriate 
these funds into the new account. Similarly, Nigerian 
nationals who earned salaries in foreign countries and/or 
received commission or payments for professional services in 
hard currency were urged to use these accounts. Export earners 
were forced to retain 75% of their incomes in these accounts, 
while tourism receipts and TNG external accounts served as 
additional sources. The SPEM was the instrument to settle 
external debts, correct past maladies and increase domestic 
production through the anticipated privileged allocation of 
foreign exchange to productive capital. Through the weekly 
auction (later biweekly) of foreign exchange, the naira was 
expected to find its 'realistic' exchange rate. Under the 
supervision of the Central Bank of Nigeria(CBN), a two-tiered 
bidding system, demarcating large and small banks was
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organized. The successful offers in the respective sessions 
were permitted to purchase 10 and 7 percent of the available 
foreign exchange. The weekly bidding wars led to the a 
precipitous decline of the naira. This downward pressure was 
heightened when the government opened the exchange contest to 
so-called new merchant banks. With the continuous depreciation 
of the naira and the ensuing growth of the parallel foreign 
exchange market, this further served to intensify the decline 
in the value of the naira and the massive mis-allocation of 
resources away from productive capital. In January 1989, the 
government merged the pre-existing autonomous Interbank- 
Foreign Exchange Market(IFEM) and the official rates. To stem 
the widening naira gap between the two exchange markets and 
simultaneously improve the allocation of foreign exchange, the 
government licensed financial firms to establish bureau de 
change." In spite of these measures, the devaluation of the 
naira continued unabated.
The corollary of Lhe fixed exchange rate was the 
structure of tariffs in Nigeria, which the IFIs argued 
reinforced the distortions in domestic production. For local 
industries, it encouraged the import-dependency of production 
while in the agricultural sector the inflow of foreign maize, 
rice, vegetable oil and wheat which the country is
Akin Fadahunal, "Dévaluationt Implication for Employmant, Inflation, Growth and Development" In Adebayo 0. Olukoehl ed., The »alitiae ei Structural Adiuetment in ttiaarla. (Ibadan: Helnemann Books, 1993), p.39* 
40.
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climatically suited to produce, was a disincentive to food 
producers. A review of the current tariff structure was needed 
to curtail imports in some areas and an outright ban of the 
aforementioned food commodities and exportable crops, such as 
c o c o a . T h e  rationalisation of custom tariffs, while 
protecting some local industries, was simultaneously designed 
to subject this sector to 'healthy' competition from 
imports.Deregulatory measures therefore were also designed 
to facilitate the flow of foreign trade and capital. The 
Nigerian state initially moved to liberalize the import regime 
in an interim tariff structure. It ended the previous import 
licensing system and generally reduced the level and range of 
import duties, but the government maintained officially a 
commitment to protect local industries. By the late 1960s, 
Nigeria had adopted an 'open door policy', revoking all 
previous impediments to the free flow of trade, investment and 
foreign exchange.
A withdrawal of subsidies from goods and services, the 
privatization and rationalization of public enterprises, the 
reduction of the public sector and strong demand-management 
policies, particularly tight monetary and credit policies were
In 8plt6 of proclaimed support for a ban on food importe, in 
November 1992, the government capitulated to pressure from transnational capital, particular U.S. and fractions of local capitals and reversed the ban on wheat.
M.O.A. Adejugbe, "Nigeria's industrial Policies During the Bra of Structural Adjustment" in Eghosa Osagie ed., structural Adjustment 
in the Nigeria Booneiav (Jos: National Institute for Policy Strategic Studies, 1992), p.219.
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further designed to arrest state intervention in the 
marketplace and to restore sound market prices. The removal of 
subsidies on social services had been a central feature of 
pre-SAP recovery programmes. The AFRC continued to reduce 
public expenditures in these areas. The Nigerian state also 
eliminated subvention for agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilizers. The question of oil subsidies, while partially 
removed, remains a contentious issue and will be treated 
later. The rolling back of the state has been further pursued 
through the active privatization of parastatals and 
abolishment of state-marketing boards. In 1988, the government 
promulgated the Privatization and Commercialization Decree 
No.25. empowering the Technical Committee on Privatization and 
Commercialization (TCPC) to transfer wholesale, government 
shareholdings in specific state corporations to the private 
sector and to drastically reduce state-ownership in others.*' 
In the agricultural sector, the state withdrew from marketing 
and determining agricultural prices. By 1987, the government 
dismantled six agricultural marketing boards and eliminated 
its involvement in 11 of 18 agro-based parastatals.Tight 
fiscal policies designed to control spending and reduce
"  The ggivatiiâtlon ead CoMaereialiMetion Degree No.35. (191» cited 
in Olusegun Yerokun, fceaal Aipecte_jftf-Btruetugal F f M g l U  in
Miaerle (Ibadan : Olakulehin Press, 1989), p.222.
"  Eno. a. Usoro, "Development of the Nigerian Agricultural Sector 
Within the Framework o£ Structural Adjustment" in A.O. Phillips and Eddy 
Ndekwu ed., Etruetural_Ad"lustment & DevaloDinq EoonomYi. ThtGass
ot Mloaria. (Ibadan : The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
198?), p.170.
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inflation and external deficits, has been an integral part of 
the adjustment exercise, After much internal and external 
pressure, the government in 1987 deregulated the interest rate 
enabling market forces to be its determinant. Periodically the 
CBN also issues treasury bills to absorb excess liquidity in 
the economy. In its entirety, the market driven, export- 
oriented development approach was to enable the Nigerian state 
to meet its debt serving requirement, generate foreign 
exchange for internal development and create a stronger and 
more stable national economy by re-directing the Nigerian 
economy away from external dependence towards national self- 
reliance.
IMPACT OF THE SAP ON THE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
Our assessment of the impact of structural adjustment on 
the Nigerian economy must take cognizance of the limitation of 
the data used and the often conflicting figures from data 
sources. The Nigerian state, through its statistical offices, 
mainly the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) and the CBN 
continues to churn out figures, albeit contested, which praise 
the accomplishments of the adjustment exercise. In the final 
analysis, the most significant indicator of the SAP's 
performance is the impact of the programme on the socio­
economic lives of various levels in civil society, 
particularly subordinate classes (see Part Two). The 
discrepancies in the basic economic indicator between the 
MAN'S Half-Year Report for July-December 1991 and the CBN
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yearly Report ending December 1991 intensified the statistical 
controversy on the performance of SAP. For instance, MAN set 
the GDP growth rate and capacity utilization in 1991 at 4.3% 
and 37.4% respectively, while the CBN placed these indices at 
4.4% and 40%." Although the statistical findings of both the 
MAN and CBN listed here are quite close, throughout the eight 
years of the Nigerian adjustment programme these bodies have 
hotly contested SAP's performance. MAN continues to oppose the 
SAP, while the CBN remains optimistic about the programme's 
achievements. In spite of the statistical differences and the 
usual over-optimism of the CBN, we can point to areas were SAP 
has contributed to some appreciable 'gains' in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors.
Setting out to encourage the Nigerian industrialist to 
utilize local raw materials for the production process has 
resulted in less reliance on foreign inputs and an increased 
utilization of domestic resources by some manufacturing firms. 
Local inputs in the bakery, brewery, printing, publishing, and 
pharmaceutical industries, increased to between 40 and 70 
percent." In addition, the programme encouraged agricultural 
productivity in both export and food crops sub-sectors. 
Producer prices in the agricultural sector have also risen.
Anon. "MAN: A Prophet of Doom?" in Gitimen, vol.3, no.27, July 6-12 
1992, p.31. and Anon. "Nigeria: Industries in Doldrums" in West Afrioa. July 
27, 1992, p.1246. (Excerpts of MAN'S Half-Year Report: July-December 1991.
Julius Ihonvbere, Niaerlat _ the Polities of Adjustment and
Oeaoaraov. (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993).
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For example, the price of cocoa initially increased from 
N3,500/per tonne in 1986 to N7,500 in 1987 and then to N16,000 
in 1989. Food crops prices, such as maize and cassava, have 
increased from N714 and N663/per tonne in 1986 to Nl,520 and 
Nl,798 in 1989, respectively.®®
However, the internal contradictions of these 
prescriptions militated against these 'gains' . The devaluation 
of the naira astronomically elevated the cost of agricultural 
and industrial production. In the agrarian sector, devaluation 
while increasing producer prices, raised the cost of basic 
farming implements, imported agrochemicals, fertilizers and 
labour. In the environment of withdrawn subventions from 
agricultural inputs, this led to the increase in food costs. 
For the manufacturing sector, the effects of a devalued naira 
is accelerating the pre-SAP process of de-industrialization. 
The establishment of the IFEM failed to halt the plummeting 
value of the naira. The cost of obtaining hard currency to 
import inputs increased drastically for Industrialists. The 
impact has varied across the manufacturing sectors. Firms able 
to obtain local raw materials tended to be insulated from the 
disastrous effects of currency devaluation. Agro-allied 
industries, for example, have increasingly used local raw 
materials and curbed the need for imported inputs. Import- 
dependent metal processing, engineering works and automobile




assembly firms, in contrast, fared far worse.*® For these 
manufacturing firms, the operation of the IFEM has made the 
production process difficult.
Assessing the performance of SAP, however, by the 
demarcation of manufacturing 'winners' and loser' based on the 
ability to increase access to local raw materials and inputs 
is not clear cut. Some firms able to increase the use of local 
resources still required external inputs. Other manufacturing 
firms were simply unable to obtain the necessary inputs 
internally and/or are awaiting the development of a local 
resource base for the needed input. The inability to use local 
inputs is further compounded by competing demands for local 
raw materials. Potential raw material for certain types of 
manufacturing -- groundnuts, sorghum, maize and cassava -- are 
all important staple foods for both rural and urban 
consumption. Simultaneous efforts of the adjustment programme 
to boost the country's non-oil commodity exports, further 
intensified the demands for these commodities. Also, raw 
materials for other agro-processors -- cocoa, cotton, rubber 
and groundnuts -- were equally in demand by exporters who were 
prepared to out-bid industrialists by paying exorbitantly for 
these commodities in anticipation of earning hard currency. 
Larger firms, in turn, acquired agricultural lands for the
Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Performance of Nigerian Industry Under the 
Structural Adjustment" in Crisis and Adjustment, p.99.
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cultivation of needed raw materials.®’ For instance, textile 
firms have invested heavily in cotton production; likewise, 
flour milling firms in the cultivation of wheat and other 
grains. However, attempts to produce both raw materials and 
consumer goods have proven extremely difficult. Agricultural 
ventures, largely transnationals, such as the United Africa 
Company (UAC), have generally been unsuccessful. In assessing 
this type of backward integration, Okigbo asks: "should the 
shoe-maker be expected to rear his herd of goats and cattle to 
raise the skins for the leather for his shoes? Should the 
tyre-maker raise a rubber plantation or set up a carbon black 
plant to supply the materials for his tyre?"®® Although these 
questions are instructive, they become moot points when 
considered against the backdrop of a rapidly depreciating 
naira, which makes efforts even towards these sorts of 
linkages a daunting task. Curtailing or attempting to curb 
the degree of import-dependency, large sections of the 
manufacturing sector still require external inputs for the 
production process.
Foreign exchange scarcity as an effect of continued 
dependency on volatile oil revenues, escalating debt and debt- 
servicing obligations and the distorted character of exchange
®’ Olukoshi, "Industry", p.99.
®® Okigbo cited in Christopher Kolade, "Second Tier Foreign Exchange 
Market and Structure of Industrial Growth in Nigeria" in R. Omotayo Olaniyan 
and Chibuzo N. Nwoke, eds., fltruatural Adjustment in Nigeria» Th# Imnactof 
flFlM on The aoonottv. (Lagosi Nigerian Institute of International Affairs,
1990) p.50.
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allocation has compounded matters. The new foreign exchange 
regime was designed to remove the distortions associated with 
the import-licensing system and the parallel markets, which 
its proponents argue, caused the foreign exchange scarcity in 
the immediate pre-SAP period. A rational, market allocated 
foreign exchange system, they anticipated, would reward 
productive capital. Access to foreign exchange however, has 
been the exclusive preserve of transnational, financial and 
commercial capital. A study of the sectoral allocation of 
foreign exchange conducted by the CBN concluded that since the 
deregulation of Nigeria's exchange regime, industrial and 
agricultural sectors received respectively, 77.6% and 0.3% in 
1986, 68.6% and 0.2% in 1989 and 64.2% and 0.3% in 1991 of 
total allotments.** While the abysmally low agrarian 
distribution of exchange is widely agreed between several 
independent sources, the stated allocation to the industrial 
sector is however contested. The prominent Nigerian economist 
Sam Aluko recently noted, that foreign exchange channelled 
into productive investment has become minimal, constraining 
productive efficiency. At the (bi)weekly auctions, he further 
asserts, commercial and merchant banks bid on behalf of their 
customers, without much to show in their allocation, 
particular in the distribution of exchange to productive
Mudaehiru Yusef, "Agriculture Dieadvantaged?" in The Migetian 
■oononitt. vol.5, no.23, August 17, 1992, p.27.
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sectors.Demands for foreign exchange, are increasingly for 
speculative activities and for the storage of legitimate or 
ill-gotten wealth. Speculative endeavours have been an 
indelible feature of Nigeria's structural adjustment 
programme. Paralleling experiences in Latin America and 
Eastern European market transitions, the SAP in Nigeria has 
encourage commercial and speculative activities, rather than 
production leading some to label this 'paper' capitalism.
Such endeavours spawned inflationary pressures which 
further contributed to the declining value of the naira. For 
instance, factions of comprador capital "hoard goods in 
anticipation of being able to sell them at a high post-FEM 
price, and has sent the prices of such items as milk, sugar, 
meat, soups and detergents, cigarettes and beer soaring 
u p w a r d s . I n  the agricultural sector, the abolishing of 
marketing boards opened the door to so-called 'new-breed' 
merchants, particularly within the cocoa sub-sector. Comprador 
capital, (local and transnational) seeking to repatriate 
capital from an unstable Nigerian economy, moved their wealth 
through the exportation of cocoa and other primary 
commodities.^
With capital flight, speculative activities and the
Sam Aluko cited In "Is the naira really fuelling Inflation?" in 
African Suainaaa (Special Survey: Nigeria; New Economic Direction, no.177, 
May 1993, p.26
Ihonvbere, Nigeria, p.IB.
Adejugbe, "Nigeria's Industrial Policy", p.214.
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resultant exchange scarcity, the gap between the official 
exchange rate and that in the parallel market widened. Taking 
advantage of this differential, banks and others with access 
to exchange simply made a profit by selling the foreign 
exchange at the higher naira rate in the bureau de change or 
parallel market. In turn, the naira accrued from the 
transactions are used to purchase exchange at the cheaper 
official rates. This encouraged the mushrooming of so-called 
merchant banks and by March 1992 over 120 banks were bidding 
at exchange auctions, compared with approximately 40 at the 
inception of the deregulated regime in September 1986.*' The 
manipulation of exchange rates has become so lucrative that in 
most urban centres it would be highly unusual not to see at 
least one 'merchant bank' on each corner. Rather than being 
the facilitator of productive investments, banks have become 
a locus of accumulation for un-productive factions of the 
dominant classes.
The implications for the industrial sector were clear. 
The instability of the exchange rate increased production 
costs, reduced capacity utilization and forced manufacturing 
closures. On March 5, 1992, the government intervened to
arrest the instability of the naira by selling hard currency 
at the prevailing market prices. The government expected this 
drastic measure to eliminate the foreign exchange
Elizabeth Obadina, "Currency Devaluation 8APa Nigeria" in kitiûa Reflovarv. vol.6, no.2, August 1992.
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differentials, speculative activities and encourage 
production. Overnight, the value of the naira depreciated by 
60%. While temporarily succeeding in eliminating the 8 naira 
gap which existed in the weeks prior to March 5, the 
government's so-called 'shock therapy' failed to maintain the 
stability of the naira (Table 2.6). The differential between 
the CBN rate and that in the parallel markets has escalated
T M L l a.«. ornciM. VI fjuuLua, u t i i  to b o llm  (jm w a h ï i«tt - worn»» itti)
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from NO.21 in January-March 1992 to N4.37 in November 1992 and 
astronomically widening to N21.71 a year later.**
Increased production costs, caused by the rapid 
devaluation of the naira was further exacerbated by the 
government's tight monetary and credit policies. Since 1986, 
the CBN has adopted measures aimed at reducing the level of 
liquidity in the economy. The liquidity ratio, which 
represents the required percentage amounts that commercial and 
merchant banks must deposit in the CBN, has increased 
incrementally, hovering around 30% in the last few years.
** The widening gap between the CBN rate, which remained fairly 
conetant throughout 1993, and the parallel market naira rate, ie attributable 
mainly, to continued speculative activities and the massive capital flight in 
the wake of the cancellation of the June 12 election which deepened the 
political crisis in the country.
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Ostensibly designed to tackle inflation and the external debt 
by removing excess monies from the economy, with such an 
increase in the liquidity ratio, this has compelled commercial 
banks, already averse to leading to productive capital, to 
astronomically increase their interest rates. Furthermore, the 
CBN periodically issues treasury bills, stabilization 
securities and recently initiated an Open Market 
Operations(OMO) -- a new monetary tool -- all designed to 
absorb excess liquidity in the economy. For instance, in the 
first six months of 1992, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued 
and allocated N15.5 billion in stabilization securities to the 
banks. Between 1990, when the securities were first issued, 
and June 1992, the CBN absorbed up N44.1 billion from the 
banks. In September 1992, another N7.5 billion was further 
removed from circulation.®® With the liquidity squeeze, 
inter-bank rates rose drastically to 60% and resulted in 
exorbitantly high rates of interest, ranging between 60% and
65%. w
It has become extremely difficult for industrialist to 
access capital at existing rates. Likewise, the cost of 
capital to increase capacity utilization for tottering local 
industries and for new investments in enterprises have been 
prohibitive. In the agrarian sector, the high interest rates
9S Anon., "It is A Blow" In Mawwitch, November 16, 1992, p.32,
Jato Thompson, "Hoped-for Recovery Is still eagerly awaited" in 
Afriean iuiiaese. May 1993, p.20.
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have also constricted the 'new breed' farmers which moved to 
cash in on the 'cocoa bonanza.' Retired military generals and 
high level civil servants have found it difficult to sustain 
agricultural operations and are putting their farms up for 
sale/" A recent study conducted by Bola Akinji, on cocoa and 
yam production in the era of structural adjustment, also 
highlighted the constraints of escalating interest rates on 
small and medium-scale farmers. Despite the relatively low 
lending rates charged by commercial banks, the collateral 
requirement make loans virtually inaccessible to the majority 
of these farmers. The Study revealed the differentials in 
interest charges between export and food crop producers, with 
the latter required to pay higher lending rates and subjected 
to stiffer collateral conditions." Although the CBN 
intervened to pressure commercial and merchant banks to allot 
a stipulated percentage of loans at concessional rates, by and 
large access to formal institutional loans remains out of 
reach for small and medium scale farmers.
The CBN's recent attempt to ease the liquidity squeeze 
failed to reduce lending rates which still fluctuate between 
60% and 65%. Higher production costs in both the agricultural 
and industrial sectors have led to increased levels of 
inflation. Escalating costs are passed on to consumers, in the
"  Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "Structural Adjustment and Agrarian Change 
In Nigeria" in Adebayo Olukoahi, fhe-,g.oIifeiai of Structural Adjustment in 
Nigeria. (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1993), p.121.
»« Akanjl, (1992) iXBort Crope and Food Cropa. p.23.
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context of decreasing purchasing power of the majority of 
Nigerians. Increasingly, local consumer goods, simply remain 
on retail shelves or stacked in industrial warehouses. The 
MAN'S 1992 Half-Year Report (July-December) highlighted the 
continuing problems of this sector. It concluded that unsold 
stocks held by most manufacturers, increased by 113.3% from 
the previous year. The Report further notes that 51 of the 135 
companies surveyed recorded unsold stocks, totalling N520.86m 
in 1992 as compared to N244.18m in 1991, and 23,3% of the 
total output from the 135 companies surveyed went unsold in 
1992, amounting to N2.23bn.** Olukoshi sums up the situation 
well :
Ab a result of SAP, a vicious inflationary cycle is presently at 
work in the Nigerian economy in which devaluation and high 
interest rates lead to high costs of production which in turn 
reflect themselves in highly priced commodities and an ever­
growing wholesale and retail price index which in turn leads the 
government to tighten further the liquidity and credit squeeze, 
thereby increasing further the cost of production in the context 
of an ever dwindling naira and which, in turn, means even higher 
costs of production and higher wholesale and retail prices.
In spite of drastic cuts in state disbursements to social 
services, the massive unemployment of workers, wage freezes 
and reductions and the tight monetary and credit policies, the 
government continues to spend well beyond its means in a host 
jf unproductive activities and remains the primary locus of 
accumulation for factions of the dominant classes. The 
continuing appropriation of billions of naira in oil revenues.
Pini Jason, "Companies Play a Waiting Game" in African ■usinssi. 
Special Survey: Nigeria: New Economic Direction, no.177, May 1993, p,3G.
Olukoshi, "Industry", p.101.
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the waste of additional billions in ill-conceived white 
elephant projects, the exorbitant amounts of naira drained in 
military expenditures (particular its so-called leadership 
role in ECOMOG), the further squandering of added millions on 
Babangida's vehicle donations to all military officers and 
farewell 'gifts' to loyalist in the top military brass, the 
billions of naira consumed on the aborted political transition 
programme, are merely a few examples of the government's 
'extra-budgetary' expenditures which have contributed to the 
national deficit. The mounting debts and debt-service 
obligations leads to the instability of the naira which 
accentuated the 'vicious cycle of inflation' Olukoshi 
highlighted which such lucidity.
The deregulation and liberalization of trade in this 
context is making it nearly impossible for agricultural and 
industrial producers to compete with foreign imports. In the 
agrarian sector, the government's recent decision to lift the 
six year ban (temporarily?) on wheat imports is a fitting 
illustration of the long-term consequences of trade 
liberalization for domestic food security and self-reliance. 
In 1907, the Babangida regime banned the importation of wheat 
and other grains on the premise that they could be produced 
locally in sufficient quantities to meet both domestic
For an comprehensive examination of corruption in the era of 
structural adjustment seei chapter on "Adjustment, Politics and Corruption" 
in Pita Agbeae and Julius Ihonvbere, Thsu State. Structural Adjustment end 
Crisis in Niseris (Boulderi Westview, 1992).
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consumption and industrial needs. Declared consistent with the 
policy thrust of the government's adjustment programme it 
sought to increase domestic agricultural production, partially 
through the rationalization of trade. The prohibition of these 
food imports would save scarce foreign exchange from the 
massive import bill which totalled N6.1 billion (wheat imports 
were N327m) in 1985 alone. Lower import expenditures would 
enable the government to settle external debt obligations and 
allot exchange to priority sectors such as industry.'"^ In 
the environment of escalating production costs, poor climatic 
conditions and persistent smuggling of wheat imports, the 
production of wheat and producer prices still increased 
significantly between 1987 and 1991.
A combination of external and internal pressure, however, 
led the government to rescind the ban on wheat imports in 
November 1992. Since 1990, the U.S. government, concerned with 
the plight of its grain farmers, intensified pressure on 
Nigeria to lift the ban by threatening sanctions for 'unfair' 
trading practices.^” Domestically, flour mill firms
Maehud Pashola, "Effects of Wheat Importation on the Economy" in 
The Hioe r U n  lconottiat, vol.6, no.5, December 7, 1992, p.39.
U.S. wheat exports to the country between 1975 and 1986 
represented no less than 86% of Nigeria's total wheat import receipts. 
Concerned about losing the Nigerian market, since 1987 the U.S. government 
made its displeasure known on the country's so-called unfair trade practises. 
The U.S. however, adopted a carrot and stick approach to induce the 
rescinding of the ban. Princeton Lyman, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, 
spared no effort in extolling the virtues of liberalized trade. In 1989, the 
U.S. offered a $300 million loan facility to a 'forex strapped' Nigeria in 
order to enable the importation of wheat. In the same period, higher tariffs 
as opposed to an outright ban was encouraged by the U.S. When the loan and a 
revised tariff structure on wheat was rejected, the U.S. threatened trade 
sanctions.
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escalated these demands. Represented by the Flour Milling 
Association of Nigeria (PMAN), the largely U.S. dominated 22 
wheat milling companies in the country complained of 
insufficient domestic wheat production for sectoral needs and 
the resultant decline in utilized installed capacities. 
However, the lifting of the ban has contributed to Nigeria's 
food dependency. Indeed, persistent smuggling of wheat and 
wheat flour made the effect of the ban negligible. A year into 
the government's ban, the MAN was already alarmed about 
rampant smuggling, threats to food security, insufficient use 
of domestic raw materials and existing investments in wheat 
cultivation.Locally owned flour mills, as previously 
mentioned, despite difficulties in simultaneously producing 
wheat and wheat flour, invested enormously to develop a local 
raw material base and, in the process, backward sectoral 
linkages. With the liberalization of trade, local mill firms, 
however, have found it extremely difficult to compete with 
cheaper imported wheat flour and transnational firms that also 
import wheat. Flour mill and bakery closures and ensuing job 
losses have accelerated since November 1992. A 1988 MAN Report 
had already indicated 60,000 jobs lost in this sub-sectors. 
Wheat production has declined. Huge capital investments were 
lost and minimal sectoral linkages were reversed overnight. 
Similar scenarios have vitiated attempts to boost domestic
Padahunei, "Devaluation”, p.50.
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food production through import bans, all generally loosely 
enforced.
In the broader manufacturing sector, the consequences of 
trade liberalization have been similar. The finalization in 
1989 of the new tariff regime hastened the dumping of all 
sorts of foreign manufactured imports on the Nigerian market, 
to the detriment of indigenous industrial production. As 
Molara Ogundipe-Leslie notes;
...SAPs have contributed seriously if not, caused the 
destruction of the entrepreneurial middle class...in Nigeria in 
general. Yet the beguiling song of the policy was that trade 
would be liberalized so that local producers would compete in 
the import and export trade, producing goods for export.'"*■
Broad sectors of Nigeria's manufacturers now compete with
goods from Britain, U.S., Japan, Prance and Germany, when
devaluation, subsidy removals and exorbitantly high interest
rates have increased the costs of local production.
The adverse effects of trade deregulation and
liberalization remains a consistent complaint of the MAN. The
association continues to highlight the short and long-term
consequences of a relaxed trade regime on the manufacturing
sector. MAN argued that between September 1986 and December
1988, it became more profitable for manufacturers to import
certain finished consumer goods than to produce them locally.
Reinforcing this trend, Ohiorhenuan revealed that in the first
Molara Ogundlpe-Leslie, "Stories of Structural Adjustment: The 
Human Cost of The Structural Adjustment Policy for Women". Paper delivered at 
the Workshop sponsored by the Social Science Research Council on fltruotural 
Adiuitmentand Ptoipecti for Peaoe in Africa. (Toronto: Park Plaza Hotel, 
October 1990).
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six months of SPEM's operation about 25% of foreign exchange 
sold or. the Nigerian market wenu towards the importation of 
finished producer goods, with serious implications for the 
survival of industries.*®® For instance, both the textile and 
electronic sub-sectors continue to voice serious concerns over 
negligible import duties. Small-scale local industries, 
anticipated to benefit from the deregulated environment, have 
also suffered from the liberalization of trade. Local 
industries, which produce writing paper, toilet paper, hygiene 
products, candles, soap and cosmetics, have been unable to 
compete with cheap and often sub-standard imported consumer 
goods and are being forced to c l o s e . M A N ' S  consistent 
appeals to government, until recently, did not yield any 
significant concessions.
The above analysis and evidence presented suggests that 
eight years of the structural adjustment programme have failed 
to revive the Nigerian economy. Instead, the policy framework 
pursued by the government in accord with the Bretton Woods 
institutions to enhance domestic accumulation and strengthen 
the country's productive base has inhibited growth and
*°® J . Ohiorhenuan, "Re-Colonising Nigerian Industry: The First Year 
of the Structural Adjustment Programme" in A.O. Phillips and B. Ndekwu, 
Strugtural Adiuatment in a Developing leonoavi The Caseof Hlasria
(Ibadan: NI8ER, 1967), p.136.
*®̂  Adjustment advocates argue that small-scale industries which 
purported rely largely on domestic raw materials and inputs would be insulted 
from the adverse effects of devaluation. In spite of the deepening crisis, 
the informal sector is said to be thriving on the margins of Nigerian and 
African social formations. The process of informalization in recent years has 
been accorded with potentialities conducive to democratic renewal which will 
be assessed in Part Two of this chapter and subsequent chapters.
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development. In the agrarian sector, the initial devaluation 
of the naira led to significant increases in agricultural 
production and producer prices of both food and cash crops. 
However, the escalating production costs associated with 
devaluation induced inflationary pressures, led to declining 
agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Indicative in the 
spiralling coats of basic foodstuffs, the production of food 
remains insufficient to meet the country's needs. Compounded 
by the activities of middlemen and speculators seeking to 
capitalize on the appreciating CFA currency (relative to the 
naira), until its recent devaluation, the smuggling of 
Nigerian foodstuffs into neighbouring Francophone Africa 
countries was rampant. In the cash-crop sub-sector, with the 
exception of cocoa, the production and contribution to export 
of non-food agricultural commodities has been insignificant. 
Plagued by heightened productions costs, declining world 
market prices for these commodities have compounded matters. 
The world price of cocoa, Nigeria's principal non-oil export, 
in 1989 plummeted to a 16 year low.̂ °® Increased productivity 
of other Third World producers, Western protectionism, the 
development of synthetics, continues to exert downward 
pressure on the prices of primary commodities.
In the industrial sector, the SAP has constricted the 
development of a local raw material base, greater inter-
African Development Bank, African fiâvlepeant Haport- IMJ. 
(Abidjan! ADB, 1993),p.31.
152
sectoral linkages and the diversification of the country's 
productive base. Despite efforts to source local inputs, the 
import-dependency of industrial production persists. The oil 
sector remains the lifeline of the economy, which continues to 
depend on oil receipts for over 90% of foreign exchange 
earnings. Though creating a low-wage economy and intensifying 
the exploitation of labour, industrial growth has been 
inhibited by the spiralling prices of raw materials and 
inputs, the high cost of credit, the depressed purchasing 
power of the majority of Nigerians, and the liberalized trade 
environment. The pre-adjustment process of deindustrialization 
accelerated during this period. Surviving local manufacturing 
firms drastically reduced productive capacities, which have 
steadily declined since the inception of SAP. According to the 
MAN'S Half Year Report (July-December) 1992, installed 
capacities utilized decreased from 40.7% in 1989 to 37.4% in 
1991, declining further to 34.5% in 1992.^°® Mass 
unemployment consequently followed. Reorganizing operations in 
recognition of the depreciating naira, transnational companies 
such as the UAC, in spite of increasing sales, and recording 
huge naira profits, drastically reduced work-force sizes, in 
order to increase the real returns on investments.
Unsurprisingly, the general climate of industrial and
MAN'S Half-Year Report 1992 cited In Mudashiru Yusef, "Any More 
Magic?" in The Mioerlan ICQnoaist. vol.6, no.6, 1992.
Padahunei, "Devaluation", p.44.
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economic decline has proven unattractive to foreign investors 
who were anticipated to enter the deregulated Nigerian market. 
Despite intensified efforts by the government to attract 
foreign investment, through the liberalization of investment 
laws, the ambitious pursuance of privatization and debt 
equity-swap programmes, capital inflows remain negligible. On 
the contrary, the deepening crisis in the Nigerian political 
economy encourages continued capital flight. The volatility of 
the naira, the on-going political instability, government 
mismanagement and corruption, growing mistrust of Nigerian 
businessmen, and diminishing returns, has led to divestment by 
some TNC's of their Nigerian operations. New markets opened in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the wake of the 
collapse of socialist regimes, have made the region attractive 
to transnational capital to invest away from Africa. 
Contributing further to capital flight, the deregulation of 
trade and the exchange rate has rewarded transnational, 
financial and comprador capital, leading to the squander of 
substantial social surpluses into conspicuous consumption and 
expatriation, amidst productive decline and domestic squalor. 
Debt and debt-servicing obligations rose respectively from 
19.5bn and 33.3% of export earning in 1985 to 34.5bn and 30.4% 
in 1991 adding further to capital flight."*
Given these developments since the inauguration of the 
programme, it cannot be said that SAP has set the Nigerian
World Bank, World D*bt Tabl## • 1992. p.296.
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economy on the path to recovery and self-sustained growth. The 
deficiency of SAP, however, cannot simply be measured in the 
inability to resuscitate the Nigerian economy. More 
importantly, the abysmal failure of the adjustment exercise is 
reflected in the devastating impact the programme has had on 
the majority of Nigerians. Anti-labour and anti-popular 
policies of the Nigerian government and IFIs exacerbated the 
already depressed living conditions of marginalized groups. 
The doldrums in the economy and industry led to the 
unemployment of hundreds of thousands of public and private 
sectors workers. Wage freezes and reductions are widespread. 
Unemployment and underemployment continues to increase. 
Devaluation has led to rampant inflation. The incomes of wage 
and salary earners have not kept pace with the spiralling cost 
of food, rents and transportation. Inflation has diminished 
the real incomes of farmer. Food security and nutritional 
standards of rural and urban households continues to 
deteriorate. Malnutrition and associated diseases, such as 
kwashiorkor have significantly increased. The imposition of 
user fees on education and health care have made the situation 
unbearable. Throughout the country, hospitals are without 
medicii.es; patients have been left to die because they cannot 
afford the cost of drugs. The deterioration of the living 
standards of the majority of the people has continued unabated 
since the introduction of SAP. Macro-economic statistics which 
extol the 'successes' of SAP continu 9 to ignore the human
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suffering which adjustment has rendered on subordinate social 
groupings.
The uneven pains of adjustment and the continued 
opposition and criticism against the SAP, were met with state 
repression. Anti-SAP riots which erupted in 1989, 1990, 1992, 
and 1993, were ruthlessly crushed. State curtailment of civil 
liberties, democratic rights, popular organizations and 
institutions have been an integral part of the adjustment 
exercise. The credibility of the Nigerian state continues to 
wane. The disastrous consequences of the adjustment programme 
on marginalized groups, the suppression of civil society and 
the attendant political instability engendered, continues to 
militate against economic recovery and development. Since the 
mid-1980s, these critical issues have increasingly been 
highlighted in international debates on Africa's recovery and 
development. Faced with internal and external opposition 
against the SAP, conventional wisdom in the Bretton Woods 
institutions began to appreciate the political dimension of 
the crisis. By the late 1980s the policy prescriptions of the 
Bank and the Fund emphasized 'getting the politics right', as 
the complement to continued market reforms.
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SECTION POUR* THE CONTINUING POLICY DEBATES ON AFRICA'S 
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT* FROM THE BERG REPORT TO 
THE WORLD BANK'S LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY
The early continental response to the deepening crisis, 
the Lagos Plan of Action, was quickly pushed off the agenda 
for Africa's economic recovery in the 1980s. Overly 
economistic, silent on internal causes of the crisis, 
ambiguous in its prescriptive measures and largely dependent 
on foreign assistance to promote national and collective self- 
reliance, these factors all mitigated any serious attempt to 
implement the programme. With mounting debt and debt-servicing 
obligations, internal economic and political instability, the 
unequal nature of the policy debates on the crisis led to the 
predominance of the Bretton Woods institutions' neo-liberal 
market reforms in Africa.
In 1985, the OAU adopted the African Priority Programme
far. Afrigaa— RegflYfirXi 1986-1990 (apper). attempting to
resuscitate the LEA and African endeavours for continental 
recovery. Built on its predecessor, while sharpening its 
prescriptive measures, the revival of the agrarian sector was 
placed at the centre of the plan.^^^ Requiring external 
resources for the full implementation J n.s estimated $128.1 
billion cost, the OAU approached the U.N. to consider the 
region's deepening socio-economic decline and the urgent need
The full implementation of AttlA was estimated to cost $128,5 bn, 
of which African governments committed $82.5 bn and anticipated $48.0bn from 
external sources, see: Adebayo Adedeji, "Transforming Africa's Economies" in 
Afriea Meaegfc. May - June 1986.
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for international support of African programmatic initiatives 
to redress the crisis. In the first exclusive focus on a world 
region, in 1986, the U.N, convened a Special Session on Africa 
and subsequently adopted the United .Nations Programme _ _of
Astl9n_k.r.,..Af,Ki,9an. Recovery and PsYGlopment,
1990 (UNPAAERD). With the objectives of APPER embodied in the 
U.N. programme, and the external financial commitment of $9.2 
bn annually (U.S.$46.0 bn total), it was optimistically felt 
a 'consensus' had emerged on Africa's developmental needs.
The predominance of IFI's orthodox SAPs persisted. In the 
absence of Bank and Fund certification, external financial 
resources remained inaccessible for crisis-ridden African 
countries. In this period however, a plethora of international 
conferences, seminars, workshop, and publications were 
increasingly critical of the adverse consequences of 
adjustment programmes on African countries. The Khartoum 
Conference on the Human Dimenelon of Africans Recovery and 
Development, held in March 1988, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), criticized 
SAPs for overlooking urgent human needs and exacerbating the 
already low living standards of the poor. The subsequent 
Khartoum Declaration noted that adjustment programmes "rather 
than improve the human condition...have aggravated it because
Bxcerptfl of PMPAIÜIIÜ) In Afgiaa Kseovrv. February - April 1987,
no.l.
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they are incomplete, mechanistic, tsic] and negated
fundamental issues of equity in its pursuit of short-term 
macro-economic objectives. Highlighting the deteriorating of 
social gains made during the 1960s and 1970s and the
impoverishment of vulnerable groups, the Declaration insisted 
that recovery programmes in pursuance of economic growth must 
recognize the 'human dimension', and urgently enjoined the
IFIs to place social and human priorities at the centre of
their programmes. Similar assertions by NGOs, UN organizations 
such as the ILO, UNCTAD, UNESCO and UNICEF, stressed the need 
to provide a 'human face' to adjustment programmes. For
instance, the two volume study published by UNICEF, Adjustment 
with a Human Face drew attention to the impact of adjustment 
on vulnerable groups -- children, women, the aged -- and 
advocated the inclusion of poverty alleviation programmes in 
adjustment packages.
Conceding the glaring evidence of the disastrous 
consequences of SAPs on the poor, Michel Camdessus, Managing 
Director of the IMF admitted that "too often in recent years 
it is the poor who have carried the heaviest burden of
Ithartoua Contêrêûeê oa Che Hv ma Oiaeaeion of hfriom'e Beoaomie 
heeevery end Oevelepmeat , Special Supplement of the conference
proceedlnge in Africa heeoverv. vol.2, no.2, June 1986.
us Q.A. Cornia, R. Jolly and P, Stewart, Adiuetjaent .with - Mumhi* 
raee< Rroteateina the Vulnerable and Prometiae flrewteh. (London: Clarendon 
Preae for UMÏCEP, 1987/88), eeealaoi Q.A. Cornia, R. van der Hoeven and 
T.Mkandawire, Africa Reqoverv in the 1980ai frett itaanatian and Adiuekmenb to 
Devaleeaent. (London: St. Martins Press for UNICEF, 1992),
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economic adjustment. By the end of the decade there was 
widespread ccnsensus that adjustment packages required a 
strong social component to protect the poor. Various African 
countries subsequently incorporated measures to protect 
marginalized groups. Ghana, for instance, in late 1988 
initiated the Eragram-gi-^ation to .Mitigate the Social Cost of 
Adjustment(PAMSCAD). in the much heralded first 'socially 
conscious' adjustment programme in Africa. Consisting of 23 
socially oriented projects, PAMSCAD concentrated on employment 
generation, community development and basic human needs 
initiatives.'” Similarly, Nigeria established various 
programmes, such as, the Peoples Bank, Better Life for Rural 
Dwellers, the National Directorate for Employment, the 
Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure, and the 
National Commission on Women, to allay the impact of 
adjustment on vulnerable groups.
However, like PAMSCAD. poverty alleviation programmes 
have not significantly assuaged the hardships generated by 
adjustment. They are poorly grafted onto existing market 
reforms, lack consistency, are insufficiently funded and 
poorly implemented. The March 1989 staff mission report on 
adjustment experiences in Ghana and Senegal, conducted by the
Michel CamdesBue, "IMF in Africai Managing Director Michal 
CamdeBBUB AnBwera the Funds Critics: An Interview with Salim Lome" in Africa 
Aaeevrv. no.4, December 1967.
Adotey Bing, "Ghana; Adjusting the Social Conscience" in Afriea 
Beeeverv. vol.2, no.2, 1988, p.4-5, 31.
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Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, noted that despite the 
short-term macro-economic gains in these 'successful 
adjusters', the programmes have exacerbated urban poverty, 
eroded health care, and depreciated the incomes of food and 
export crop farmers. While welcoming PAMSCAD and the 
Senegalese job-creation programmes, the Report further 
concluded that both initiatives were insufficient in scope to 
reduce poverty."* This approach, while providing temporary 
palliative measures, nonetheless ignored the basis of the 
intensified critique of SAPs, which articulated the necessary 
treatment of vulnerable groups as subjects of Africa's 
recovery and development.
It was amidst these criticism of orthodox adjustment 
exercises, that the ECA in early 1989, building on the
Khartoum Declaration. adopted the African AlternatiYS
Programme to Structural Adiuetment__ Programmes. for Socio- 
Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAP-8AP1, challenging 
the existing hegemony of the neo-liberal market reforms. A 
radical critique of orthodox structural adjustment, AAF-SAP 
argued that the pre-occupation of market reforms with short­
term macro-economic improvements has exacerbated the socio­
economic decline in Africa and the living standards of the 
poor majority because they fail to appreciate the structural
"* Nil K. Bentflt-Enchill, "What's Wrong with SAPss U.S. Congrasa 
Report" in Afrioi RiLCQvrv. vol.3, no.1-3, 1989, p.25.
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roots of the crisis. In its presentation of the political 
economy of Africa, the Document highlights the disarticulation 
of production, the predominance of commercial activities, and 
the excessive dependency on a narrow range of export 
commodities."® In light of these 'structural 
characteristics, redress of the African crisis requires not 
simply 'adjustment', but rather 'adjustment with 
transformation'. Manifestations of the crisis, like the 
continued balance of payment difficulties, cannot be 
dismissed. However, the policy framework of adjustment which 
aims to correct these maladies must address the underlying 
structural roots which precipitated the economic decline. AAF- 
SÊE criticizes orthodox adjustment programmes and offers 
alternatives which among others include a gradual depreciation 
of domestic currencies, reduction of interest rates, selective 
subsidy removal, trade liberalization and privatization, the 
diversification of the export base and the simultaneous 
reorientation of production to satisfy internal needs.
The most significant contribution of the ECA's programme 
was its clear recognition of the political dimension of the 
crisis. Unlike the LPA. the ECA's publication also attributed 
the crisis in Africa to the authoritarianism and corruption of 
African governments and the resultant marginalization of the
"® ECA, Atrigaa . AUtrnAtlVA ■fyatMM.ork_ to _ fltjructural Adiuitmmnt 
for floeloelcQnottie Reflovfv and Davlopmtnt. (Addla Ababa; 
E/ECA/CM.15/6/Rev.3, 1989),
ECA, AAE SAP p.32-46.
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people in the process of development. The document concluded 
that,
.. .basic rights, individual freedom and democratic participation 
by the majority of the people are often lacking in Africa. This 
pervasive lack of democracy also makes mobilization and 
effective accountability difficult. This is one important sense 
in which Africa needs more democratic political structures in 
order to facilitate development.
Its new democratic agenda was explicitly articulated in the 
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and 
Transformation, a document adopted at the 1990, ECA-organized 
International Conference on Popular Participation in Africa, 
held in Arusha, Tanzania. Attended by a wide range of African 
peoples' organizations, governments officials, non­
governmental organizations, and United Nations agencies, the 
participants unanimously agreed that the continuing 
marginalization of the people is a major obstacle to the on­
going recovery process.Emphasizing the subjective 
dimensions of Africa's decline, the document expressed the 
urgent need to empower subordinate groups and democratize 
African societies in order to achieve economic recovery and 
long-term structural transformation. Popular participation as 
defined by the Charter, asserts that ordinary people must be 
involved in the development process, from the 
conceptualization of strategies and policies to the
eCA, AAr-SAP, p.5.
122 ECA, Afrioaa ChArfr_ for Popultr Participation in Pavzlopaant and 
Traniiformation (New Yorki U.N. General Asaembly, Forty Fifth Session, 
A/45/150, 1990), p.8. First adopted in Arusha, this document was subsequently 
endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly.
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formulation, implementation and monitoring of prescriptiona. 
To this end, the majority of the population would be mobilised 
in the development process, accept the pains of recovery and 
share equitably in the benefits of development.
In the interval since the ECA's declarations, the World 
Bank published two seemingly contradictory reports in response 
to the intensified criticism of neo-liberal reforms. A 
comparative assessment of adjustment experiences in Africa, 
the March 1989 report, Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 
1980s. concluded that countries which had implemented strong 
adjustment programmes achieved higher growth rates than 'weak 
or non-adjusters' in the same period. Notably silent on social 
impacts of the adjustment exercise, the Report reaffirmed that 
internal policy deficiencies of African countries remained the 
primary factor to the unabated socio-economic decline. The ECA 
quickly responded and published a preliminary study which 
based its assessment of SAPs on the Bank's own original, 
unpublished data. In contrast, this study argued that the GDP 
growth rates of 'strong adjusters' were no higher than those 
of 'weak or non-adjusting' African countries. The study went 
on to criticize the selectivity of the data presented, 
arbitrary choice of country case studies and variations in the 
reference periods applied.The positive grades which SAPs
Excerpts of World Bank, "Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 
1980s" and ECA, "Statistics and Policies: ECA Preliminary Observation on the 
World Bank Report: Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s" cited in 
anon., "Adjustment: ECA/Bank Debate the Record" in Africa Reoovrv. October, 
1989, p,36-37,
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received from the Bank's study seem to have been garnered to 
affirm preconceived conclusions and to deflect the mounting 
resistance within Africa against SAPs as well as the 
intensified criticisms of these programmes in international 
fora.
In late 1989, the Bank published Sub- Saharan Africa; 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective 
study(LTPS) as the basis of a long-term, human-centred 
approach for Africa's recovery and development in the 1990s. 
In contrast to the its previous optimistic assertions on SAPs 
performance in Africa, the Bank conceded that its successes 
had been limited. Departing from its usual technocratic 
approach to the crisis and recovery, the Report attempted to 
incorporate the widespread concerns and intensified criticisms 
from mainly the EGA and other UN bodies into a clear strategic 
agenda."" Now recognizing the political dimension of the 
continent's deepening socio-economic decline, the Report 
stated that a 'crisis of governance' underlay the persistent 
development failures."® The lack of transparency, the 
personalization of politics, the web of 'rent seeking' and 
patronage networks spawned, compounded by the coercive and
see the Forward by former Bank President Barber Conable, World 
Bank, Sub.Saharan Africa>-Frpm-Jxlsls-Jifl..Jbiij;ainab,le qrQWthi A..Lono«yt«n Parapactiva gtu^v. (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1989). While there remains îoêfundamental difference between the Bank's report and ECA's declaration, as we 
discuss later, the World Bank's Long-Term Perspective Study, appropriates the 
language of the EGA, and as Robert Browne has recently noted, virtually 
plagiarizes the document in places,
World Bank, p.60.
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arbitrary character of governance in Africa, attenuated the 
legitimacy of the state.
Renewed efforts must be made, the Report goes on to say, 
to build pluralist institutions and rehabilitate the judiciary 
in order to uphold contracts and the rule of law. Such an 
environment would protect press freedoms, human rights, 
encourage public debates and enhance the participation of 
ordinary people in the decision making process.^* The new 
democratic agenda of the Bank is developed further: It
advocated the empowerment of women's groups, farmers 
associations, co-operatives, grassroots communities and other 
segments of the 'non-modern sector' as a significant bulwark 
to delimit the state and unlock entrepreneurial energies in 
civil society.NGOs, as mentioned in Chapter One, are 
accorded an important, if not crucial, role in the Bank's 
concept of civil society. Noting that in recent years they 
have become the champions of the poor and have achieved 
impressive records in the implementation of micro-development 
projects, the Bank argues that NGOs are becoming indispensable 
intermediaries between the state and grassroots organizations 
and institutions. They can facilitate a broader spectrum of 
policy dialogue, while simultaneously keeping the state 
accountable to the majority of the population.
The report concludes by advocating the inclusion of
126
127
World Bank, LTPfl. p.6, 192. 
World Bank, LTPfl, p.6, 182.
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political conditionalities to the litany of economic policy 
stipulations attached to foreign assistance by the Bretton 
Woods institutions and donor communities. The World Bank 
boldly declared the advent of a broad consensus on Africa's 
developmental needs, based on governance and continued neo­
liberal market reforms in the 1990s."* Who are the social 
forces inside and outside Africa included in this consensus? 
Have subordinate social groupings in Africa agreed to the 
direction of development that the Bank proclaims? The 
remainder of this thesis attempts to answer these questions.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the predominance of the neo-liberal 
market reforms in African political economies in the 1980s 
have been treated at length, from its interpretation of the 
crisis, rationale of its policy prescriptions, its affect on 
the Nigerian economy and its shifting policy emphasis towards 
the end of the decade. Illuminating the limitations of the 
neo-liberal interpretations of the crisis, I have argued that 
holistic explanations of its origins and dimensions must 
appreciate the nature of dependency of colonial and post­
colonial accumulation in Africa. The crisis must also be 
situated in the internal structure of power and politics and
*̂* A critical assessment of the Bank's new policy direction will be 
provided in the closing of this exposition, in combination with the 1991 U.N. 
initiative, Maw Xaend* for DavelOBnent of Africa in the 1990s(tflWAPAfV and 
the new World Bank inspired consultative forum Global Coalition for Âtrio».
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the increasing hegemonic crisis faced by African states since 
the mid-1970s. While dismantling the state-led capitalist 
development model of the 1960s and 1970s and enthroning market 
forces, the abysmal failure of SAPs was detailed in the
assessment of Nigeria's adjustment experience. Rather than 
catalyzing recovery and development, SAPs have deepened the 
crisis and devastated the already depressed living conditions 
of the subordinate social groupings in Africa.
This discussion establishes a firm backdrop of the
material conditions which subaltern social groups have 
suffered and have struggled against in the 1900s as well as 
the immediate impetus to democratize African social formations 
in the 1990s. Coinciding with a favourable international 
situation, mainly the collapse of authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the 
advent of IPIs and bilateral donor's political 
conditionalities, while contributing to the intensification of 
movements for multi-party democracy, the current pace of
political change has varied. Nigeria provides an interesting 
case for this examination. While pre-dating the 
intensification of the continental wide impetus towards 
democracy, the recently aborted state-guided transition to 
Nigeria's Third Republic, exposed the precarious character of 
political transitions in Africa. It is also a sobering
reflection on the euphoria which underlay initial mainstream 
assessments. The second part of this chapter Investigates the
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individualized responses to cope with the economic crisis 
before returning to civil society's collective and political 
responses to structural adjustment and democratic agitation.
PART TWO
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ADJUSTMENT AND 
SURVIVALIST STRATEGIES IN CIVIL SOCIETY 
THE CASE OF NIGERIA
The d i e u t M  of ■utvival and tho foreaa of baliaf hava pivpallad tha 
raoonaeitutlon of daaoeraey In aaallar unlta. loonoaie ravivai In tha 
nonfonaal aaetor earriaa tha aaada of political ranawal. ixlatlng coping 
atrataglaa.. .hava ahown how groupa and organlaatlona hava oarvad out aoonoalo 
flalda In whloh thay can oparata, ha raaourcaa hava aooumulatad and akllla 
honad, thaaa atrueturaa hava garnarad a modicum of aeonomlo -■ and hanoa alao 
political apaea.'*’
Countarmarhata allow auhordlnata claaaaa to anjoy aoma of tha hanaflta that 
lllagal/ Informal practlaaa can of far. Thla la not to Imply that auch 
practlaaa mlalmlta Inaqualltlaa and undarmlna tha hierarchy of olaaa (and
Îandarli on tha contrary, corruption tanda to axacarhata aalatlng naqualltlaa and raproduea tha vary condltlona that ao aavaraly limit 
aubaltarna* llfachancaa. Countarmarhata do not oparata Indépendantly of atata 
aganta; In fact, thalr vary axpanalon hlngaa on tha complicity of govarnmant 
offlelala.'"’
Tha 'exit option' haa hacoma tha goapel of thoaa raaaarehara who hava aought 
to dethrone tha atata and to replaça It with tha producer and tha market, 
(amphaala la mine)
Deepening socio-economic decline in the era of IMF and 
World Bank policies have drastically reduced the living 
conditions of large sections of the intermediate and 
subordinate classes in civil society. The continued doldrums 
of state and economy and the attendant industrial closure, 
reduced capacity utilization and heightened casualization of 
labour, coupled with public sector cut backs, wage freezes and 
reductions, have accelerated public and private sector 
unemployment. Escalating inflation and state retreat from the 
social reproduction of marginalized groupings in civil society
Naomi Chaaan, "Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of 
Civil Society" in Larry Diamond et al. Democracy in fleymlppinq Countriai 
Volume Two I Atriem (Boulderi Lynne Rienner for the National Endowment for 
Democracy, 1968), p.130-132.
Robert Patton Jr., Predatory Rule> B t a t t , ClvlL 4ociAby_.io 
Africa. (BoulderI Lynne Rienner, 1992), p.64.
Janet Roitman, "The Politics of Informal Marketo in .Sub-Saharan 
Africa" in The Journal of Modern African Studies, vo).26, no.4, 1990, p.678.
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has led to a rapid decline of real incomes and forced the 
majority of people to find creative ways to survive the 
crisis. Thus, the pre-crisis processes of informalization 
intensified during this period. The dictates of social 
reproduction necessitated the straddling of multiple means of 
income-generation which transverse the formal and informal 
sectors of the economy. Neo-liberal analysts anticipated a 
rapid expansion of the informal sector and held this engender 
positive implications for economic recovery, development and 
democracy. Evading the repressive and predatory character of 
the state, ordinary people are said to be challenging the 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles of daily life by organizing 
an unofficial economy which compensates for the failures of 
the state and formal economy. It is postulated that the advent 
of market reforms would boost the growth potential of the 
informal sector. By providing inexpensive consumer goods and 
raw materials for formal sector manufacturing firms, the 
informal sector's abundant endowment of unskilled and semi­
skilled labour in conjunction with the low-level technology 
utilized, is expected to increase labour absorptive capacities 
and informal sector incomes. Simultaneously releasing dormant 
entrepreneurial energies and enhancing the arena of 
accumulation outside the purview of the state, this would 
decrease intra-ruling class contestation for 'rent seeking' 
opportunities while diminishing the use of patronage networks. 
Hence, informality is also deemed to sow the seeds for state
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delimitation, emboldening civil society and enhancing 
prospects for consensual democratic politics and popular 
participation.
Part One of this chapter analyzed the ruinous 
consequences of SAPs on the Nigerian economy and more 
importantly the disastrous impact of the programme on the 
lives of the poor majority. Section Five through Seven of Part 
Two of this Chapter, focuses on the differential impact of the 
SAP on various social classes in civil society, mainly the 
working classes, intermediate middle stratum and the 
subordinate rural classes (respectively) . The responses to the 
crisis at the level of economic and individualized survival 
strategies are illuminated, concentrating on the possible 
implication of informalization for the strengthening of civil 
society and democratic struggle. Like the differential impact 
of adjustment is dependent on class location and gender 
status, so too is the room to manoeuvre in ensuring economic 
survival. I accept the main elements of M. Castells and A. 
Portes definition of informalization, which is viewed as a 
process that involves unregulated production and exchange 
relations, in a political economy in which similar activities 
are regulated. The distinction between informal and criminal 
activities, while instructive, is however, unhelpful in this
Azarya, "Reordering", Chazan, "Pattern»", and de 8oto, The Other
tâÜk-
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investigation of the political significance of 
informality. Certainly, most individualized responses to 
cope with the crisis are within the realm of quasi-legal or 
non-legal activities. However, the unprecedented rise in 
extra-legal means of accumulation for the survival of broad 
sections of middle and subordinate stratums and the political 
implications of such dynamics for the transition and 
consolidation of democracy, makes necessary the appreciation 
of the sharpened contradictions and social anomie in civil 
society. The last section of this chapter therefore focuses on 
the contradictions of SAP and economic informality. Here, I 
argue that despite the vitality of informalization, the 
intensification of this process has unleashed contradictions 
inimical to the strengthening of civil society.
SECTION FIVE I SAP, INFORMALIZATION AND THE 
NIGERIAN WORKING CLASSES
The standard of living of the Nigerian working class 
rapidly declined over the last decade, particularly under the 
regime of devaluation, subsidy removal, social expenditure 
curtailment, etc. An important dimension of the arguments in 
favour of neo-liberal market reforms attributes post-colonial 
development failure in Africa to the parasitic activities of 
a privileged 'urban coalition', of which the working classes
Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, "World Underneath: The 
Origins, Dynamics and Effects of the Informal Economy" in A.Portes et al. 
ads,, Tha latoraal ■aenoavi Studies in Advanced and Lass Daveloaad Countries. 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University 1989), p.12-19.
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are an integral part. In manipulating the state to suit narrow 
'vested sectoral interest', the resultant distortion of market 
prices, in addition to the massive social expenditure 
demanded, fuelled inflationary pressures which precipitated 
rising unemployment, stagnating growth and balance of payment 
difficulties experienced in the 1980s. Accordingly, the SAP 
has consistently targeted the consumption patterns of the 
working class. The devaluation-induced inflationary spiral on 
goods and services in the environment of massive unemployment, 
compulsory leaves, devalued compensation packaged, unpaid 
salaries and wages and wage freezes have been borne heavily 
and disproportionately by workers, particularly the women in 
this social class. Unfortunately, the inconsistency and un­
reliability of official figures from the Federal Office of 
Statistics (FOS) inhibits an accurate account of employment 
trends, inflation levels, wage and salary rates and real 
incomes. The paucity in disaggregated data also limits 
quantitative assessments of the differential gender impact of 
the SAP in Nigeria. The class bias of SAPs and the 
patriarchical and class structure of the Nigerian state, 
economy and civil society, together with anecdotal evidence, 
however, provides a picture of the impact of the programme on 
workers and women.
The reductions in public expenditures, in conjunction 
with industrial closures, the restructuring of existing 
manufacturing firms, reduced capacity utilization and an
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increasing casualization of labour during the adjustment 
period have intensified public and private sector 
unemployment. With public sector rationalization and 
industrial restructuring, wage freezes and pay cuts have been 
commonplace. At the onset of the adjustment exercise, the 
government promulgated the National Minimum Wage Order (1986) 
designed to roll back the established minimum wage of N125 per 
month attained by fierce working class struggles in 1981. 
Under the decree, employers with a workforce of less than 500 
employees were exempt from minimum wage stipulations. Since 
nearly 80% of firms in Nigeria employed less than 500 workers, 
the decree amounted to a de facto rescinding of the previous 
minimum wage. Existing firms with a workforce in excess of 500 
employees, quickly moved to capitalize on the anti-labour 
decree, by downsizing at least to get under the government's 
new cap.
With women representing approximately 8% of Nigeria's 
formal sector workforce in 1984, public and private sector 
reorganization severely affected their level of employment. 
The most sought after form of work by women, wage employment 
opportunities in post-colonial Nigeria have been limited. They 
are usually concentrated in the service sectors (public and 
private), with a minority of women employed in manufacturing.
134 Steve Amale, "The Impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme on 
Nigerian Workers" in Adebayo Olukoshi Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian 
locnesv. 1991, p.120. (Workers agitation did compel the state to reinstate 
the minimum wage rate, consistently eroded however by spiralling inflation.
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With only one percent of women in the top echelons of state 
bureaucracies, women in the public sector typically have 
worked as teachers, nurses, secretaries, receptionists, street 
cleaners, among other occupations deemed 'suitable' for women. 
The structure of employment in the private sector is similar, 
with the majority of women pigeon-holed to 'pink collar' work. 
That is, women's work is ghettoized and is considered less 
valuable than that of their male counterparts. Confined to a 
vulnerable rung of employment, the imperatives of spending 
cuts in public expenditures and reversal of social benefits, 
among which include, maternal leave and tax allowances for 
children, coupled with patriarchical assumptions of a 'male 
bread-winner', have usually made working class women the first 
victims of labour restructuring. The impact of adjustment on 
single women, (divorced, separated or unmarried) is especially 
noticeable, as pregnancy has become tantamount to automatic 
job termination. Patriarchical assumptions of docility, 
compounded by the predominant view of women's work as 
supplementary household income, also contributes to the 
widening wage and salary gender gaps in this period. In the 
private sector the trend has been similar. For instance, in 
the manufacturing sector, pervasive gender discriminations 
further reduces women's incomes as the industrial crisis 
deepens. They are paid considerably less than their male 
counterparts engaged in comparable work. Assumed to be passive 
and less likely to unionize, they are relegated to menial work
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and subject to increasing uncertainty by TNC's casualization 
of labour, women have been relegated to largely temporary 
employment in this sector. The anti-working class policies of 
adjustment and the efforts to discipline workers, have created 
a vast pool of cheap labour, particularly comprised of 
women.
In the environment of contracting wage and salary 
earnings, the escalating cost of basic foodstuffs, housing, 
clothing and essential services have drastically reduced real 
incomes. Between 1981 and 1987, the prices of staples foods, 
such as gari, yams, plantain, beans, milk, rice etc rose by an 
average of 150% to 300%.*̂ ® In the weeks following the March 
1992 'shock treatment', in which the value of naira declined 
overnight by 80%, the prices of basic food items more than 
doubled. For many Nigerian households, food consumption has 
been reduced to one meal per-day. 'Suffering and smiling', 
sole daily meal-times are referred to by the formula, 1-0-0 
(breakfast), 0-1-0 (lunch), and 0-0-1, (dinner). As food
prices soar and working class Nigerians structurally adjust 
their stomachs, nutritional standards within these households 
deteriorate. Malnutrition related diseases are on the rise.
Sylvia Prederiei and Stella Ogbuagu, "Women and Work in the Urban 
Areas" in Women-in-Nigeria ed., The WIN Pecunanti Conditions of Women in 
Nigeria end Poliov Reeommendetione to 2000 A.P. (Zarias Ahmadu Bello 
University Press, 1992), p.17-21.
Yusuf Bangura and Bjorn Beckman, "African Workers and Structural 
Adjustment! A Nigerian Case Study" in Adebayo Olukoshi ed, The Polities of 
Btrueturel Adtuetment in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Heinemann) . Also printed in Dharma 
Qhat ed.. lMg_enii_the Southi The floeiel Imneet of Crieie end Adjuefeflieafe.
(London: Zed for UNRISD, 1991).
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For example, kwashiorkor and marasmus among children have 
reached levels unparalleled since the civil war. The 
deplorable housing conditions of the working class increase 
the susceptibility to a plethora of diseases. Expensive to 
build and rent, housing has become scarce and unaffordable to 
a rising number of households. With rents demanded months and 
sometimes years in advance, working class quarters are reduced 
to squalor by landlords. Refuse dumps in urban neighbourhoods 
are widespread. Poor sanitation and water quality create 
conditions ripe for the spread of diseases."' Nigerian 
hospitals have become worse than mere consulting clinics, with 
medical services becoming inaccessible to the poor. The 
escalating costs of pharmaceutical and medical treatment are 
out of reach for the majority of workers.
Other essential services in the SAP era have also 
witnessed an accelerated rise in cost. Spending cuts to 
transportation services, combined with the rising prices of 
imported spare parts and petroleum, have crippled the sector 
and elevated passenger prices. In most urban centres, 
particularly Lagos, experiences commuting to and from work and 
market places, have reached nightmarish proportions. With the 
decrease in commercial vehicles due to rising costs, urban bus 
stations are chaotic centres, where frustrated and weary 
passengers struggle to board vehicles which arrive
Mere Kiaekka, êt al., “Women and Health" in WIN ed,, thM.MtM 
Doeumant. p.64.
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sporadically.”® Declining real incomes make automobiles, 
even tokumboa (used and over-used vehicles) unaffordable to 
the majority of workers. Therefore, consigned to travel on 
dilapidated commercial vehicles, journeys, particularly in a 
molue (commercial bus), have become virtual death traps for 
commuters.
The fallout of the SAPs is turning access to education 
into the exclusive terrain of wealthy Nigerians. A combination 
of rising costs and devalued worth of education in the 
country, has led to declining enrolments in elementary, 
secondary and tertiary institutions. For instance, in 
elementary and secondary institutions, the impositions of user 
fees in this period have moved beyond levies on entrance 
examinations and tuition to now include fees for chalk, report 
cards, testimonials, etc. Unable to afford these levies, 
working class households lose interest in educating their 
children. University degrees are no longer a guarantee for 
gainful employment, affirmed by the thousands of graduates 
that pass through the National Youth Service Corp annually en 
route to join the swelling ranks of unemployed medical 
doctors, pharmacists, dentists, engineers among other 
graduates roaming the streets of major urban centres. In the 
calculations of most working class households, education is an 
expensive and unwise investment. The same scenario applies to
Jubr.ll Joe Obende, "All Mass and Still no Transit" in Afrioan 
guardian. January 11, 1993, p.11.
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elementary and secondary institutions, where appreciating 
costs force the withdrawal of numerous school children, which 
are then redeployed to assist in the immediate reproduction of 
the household.
Diminishing real incomes of salary and wage earners have 
intensified working class struggles, pushing the state to 
increase the existing minimum wage from N125 (by 1987, less 
than N25 in real terms) to N250 in 1991, and compelled the 
government to commit to a SAP relief package, designed to 
cushion widespread economic hardships. In the aftermath of the 
May 1989 anti-SAP riots, state concessions included, among 
others, a commitment to ease public transportation problems, 
the establishment of the National Directorate of Employment 
anticipated to create over 60, 000 jobs -- and the re­
alignment of public and private sector wage and salary 
structures (see below). In 1991, the government dismantled the 
unitary salary structure in the civil service and enjoined 
state and local governments to negotiate with public sector 
employees on new arrangements. State government's only began 
implementing new salary structures in October 1992, eighteen 
months after the initial federal government directive, with 
uneven implementation between the 30 states of the 
federation. However, the on-going depreciation of the 
naira continued to exert upward pressure on the prices of
Tajudeen Atitebi, "State Oovernmento Approve New Relief Package» 
for Civil Servante" in Naw»watch. September 28, 1992, p.45.
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essential commodities, eroding the real gains of these 
packages as quickly as they were agreed upon. Declining real 
incomes, a largely indifferent Nigerian state and the descent 
of millions into absolute poverty, have compelled the working 
classes to rely heavily on informal sector activities to 
ensure economic survival.
Estimated to occupy close to seventy percent of the 
working population in urban areas, the millions of new 
entrants now crowding the parallel economy adopt various 
strategies, often simultaneously, to survive the deteriorating 
material predicament. Individualized working class strategies, 
primarily centred on farming, transport services, and petty 
trade. When access to land is possible, most categories of 
workers, employed or not, resort to farming to meet 
subsistence needs. When surpluses exist they are sold to 
generate additional income. It has therefore become necessary 
for the working class to balance farming with wage employment. 
However, with the general inaccessibility to land, they seek 
to commercialize acquired skills and assets. Workers with 
mechanical skills, for instance, open repair shops when 
possible or pursue employment in existing informal sector 
enterprises. Operating below 10 percent capacity utilization, 
widespread job losses in the automobile sub-sector has 
contributed to the proliferation of roadside mechanics in this 
period. The study conducted by Bangura and Beckman on the 
automobile TNG, Steyr-Nigeria, in Bauchi State, notes that one
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response to massive lay-offti, saw workers establish small- 
scale enterprises (SSE) to service the company's vehicles."" 
Attempts to establish SSE by the working classes, however, 
generally remains blocked, due to capital constraints. The 
rising prices of motorcycles, tokumbos and spare parts, have 
made vehicles precious assets to middle and working class 
Nigerians. Not merely used for private convenience, 
motorcycles and cars are converted into commercial vehicles, 
a notable means of earning extra income in the era of 
adjustment. Nigerian vehicle owners frequent the plethora of 
'conversion engineers' 'panel beaters' and 'improvising 
mechanics' to cut costs and time, in order to maintain the 
operations of this important means of accumulation. Variously 
called, 'express', 'ina zaki', 'achaba', *okada', motorcycle 
taxi services are crucial second or third jobs, straddled with 
wage employment. While more frequent among middle class 
Nigerians, workers that own cars also convert their vehicles 
into kabukabu (unlicensed taxis).
Petty trading also has intensified as a survival strategy 
for the Nigerian working classes. Previously a woman dominated 
occupation in some cities, and the principal non domestic 
occupation of urban women, it includes market and street 
vending, often integrated with home based production."' The 
increase in cottage industries, generates alternative sources
Bangura and Beckman, "African Workers", p.84. 
Prederici and Ogbuagu, "Women and Work", p.lG,
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of household income. These forms of production range from 
dress-making, weaving and spinning to pottery-making, cloth- 
dying and food processing. These goods are largely transported 
to market and traded by women and their children. 
Hitherto, petty trading represented an alternative economy 
outside of state control and male domination. In recent years, 
however, the new male entrants have eroded women's autonomous 
power and incomes. This has occurred at a time when any male 
contribution to household incomes may have been significantly 
reduced due to job losses. Compounded by the vicissitudes of 
rising inflation, this has compelled longer working hours, yet 
continued downturns in incomes. Reproductive responsibilities 
of child care and domestic labour has doubled the working day 
of women. Diana Bison's seminal work on women and structural 
adjustment highlights the underlying gender bias of SAPs, 
which assumes women's reproductive labour to be infinitely 
elastic.Undervalued and invisible to macro-economic 
indicators, Nigerian women unevenly shoulder the burden of 
social reproduction. By and large, the working classes have 
exploited available opportunities in order to meet the demands 
of daily survival. However, informal means of accumulation
Glory Kilanko, "Feminine Industry : Towards a Sound Economy", Paper 
presented at the 1994 National Productivity Day Symposium: Lagos State 
chapter: on the theme Produotivltv for a Viable Polity in Lmao# 
February 21, 1994, p.3.
Diane Elson, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: 
Concepts and Issues", (Manchester: Paper presented at the Annual Conference 
of the Development Studies Association, 1987. Also reprinted in Bade On 1 mode. 
The IMF .■■the World Bank and African Debttt ThdBoeitl Impmch, (London: Zed for 
IFAA, 1989) .
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have been limited with incomes that are marginal at best.
SECTION SIX; SAP, INFORMALIZATION AND THE 
NIGERIAN MIDDLE CLASSES
Petty bourgeois classes have not escaped the hardships 
engendered by SAP. For large sections of the professional and 
entrepreneurial middle classes, the crisis, adjustment and 
closure of avenues for social mobility, tempered aspirations, 
as they are now engulfed in personal struggles to maintain 
past gains. The salaries of academic staff have not kept pace 
with runaway inflation. For example, a graduate assistant 
earns N6, 894 and a full professor N14, 280 annually, on
opposite extremes of the university salary structure (the pay 
structure was recently increased by 45% after a protracted 
struggles led by Academic Staff of Universities Union), 
Most Nigerian lecturers can no longer survive on their monthly 
earnings. Feeding their families, educating their children, 
and providing familial health care have become daunting tasks. 
The entrepreneurial middle classes have not fared much better, 
despite the optimistic expectations of SAP's proponents that 
envisaged significant informal sector growth and rising 
incomes in a deregulated environment. On the contrary, the 
policy framework of adjustment which is devastating productive 
sectors in the formal economy, as previously detailed, 
inevitably spawns adverse consequences for the informal
Dan Agbeae, "Man of the Yean Attahiru Jegat A Pen Portrait" in 
ttûWMwateh. vol,17, no.2, January 11, 1993, p.IS.
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sector. By virtue of the multiple interconnections with the 
dominant capitalist sector on which it depends for resources 
and access to markets, the informal sector therefore continues 
to be subject to the vagaries of the SAP.
To illustrate, neo-liberal assumptions of limited usage 
of formal sector commercial credit and non-import dependency 
in the operations of small-scale enterprises"^ have proven 
erroneous. Therefore, tight monetary policies and the 
devaluation of the naira converged to increase the cost of 
informal sector production. Despite the lower capital outlay 
for its operations, SSEs cannot compete with large formal 
sector films or even small-scale industries (SSIs), due to the 
exorbitantly high interest rates and stringent collateral 
stipulations. Often, educational background and comprehensive 
feasibility studies documenting profitability prospects are 
determinants which militate against SSEs finding access to 
formal sector credit."’ In any case, as mentioned in Part 
One, the general aversion of commercial and merchant banks to 
facilitate productive investment, when the environment created
Kate Meagher and Mohammed Bello Yunuaa, Limite to Labour 
AbmorntioA! Conceptual and.Mietorioal Background te Adinetment in MiamriA'e 
Orban Informal Sector. (Uppsala! UNRISD Discussion Paper no.29, December 
1991).
The distinction between small-scale enterprises (aSEs) and small- 
scale industries (SSIs), based on capital base below N500 000 and employing 
less than 50 worlcers is accepted here, see; David B. Elcpenyong and M.O. 
Nyong, email and Medium-goale Enterprises in Nieeria: Their Characteristics, 
Problems and floureea of Finança. (Nairobi; African Economic Research 
Consortium/ AERC Research Paper no.16, December 1992).
E)tpenyong and Nyong, Op.cit., see also A.W. Obi, "Prospects for 
Small-Scale Industries Development Under A Structural Adjustment Programme: 
The Case of Nigeria" in Africa Develocmeat. vol.xvi, no.2, 1991.
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by the SAP is so conducive to more lucrative speculative 
activities, has made formal sector financial credit even less 
accessible. Moreover, SSEs continued dependency for 60% of 
inputs from the formal sector and the skyrocketing of local 
and imported inputs have escalated production costs. 
Further constrained by the competing demands for local 
resources from speculators, new entrants and larger firms, raw 
material and input scarcity continues to raise the production 
costs of informal sector enterprises. Rising costs and 
shrinking markets due to the depressed purchasing power of 
wage and salary earners have constricted informal sector 
growth and the incomes of the entrepreneurial middle class. As 
with workers, the erosion of middle class living standards has 
precipitated multiple strategies to cope with the crisis. 
These survival mechanisms are generally not geared towards 
daily existence -- unlike workers -- but rather towards 
maintaining previous lifestyles; ie. available opportunities 
are exploited to generate supplementary income.
By virtue of professional skills, asset endowment and 
enhanced political networks, the middle classes have often 
found more reliable sources of income generation. More likely 
to own vehicles, the commercialization of private cars into 
kabukabu has been a common source of alternative income. Â 
rarity before the mid-1980s, the proliferation of kabukabu and 
recent attempts by state governments to regulate the their
148 Meagher and Yunuaa, Liaita to Labour Abaorotien.
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operations, reflects its growing importance as part-time 
work.^*® In addition, the continued rise in food prices and 
declining nutritional standards have transformed broad sectors 
of the middle classes into part-time farmers. Some university 
lecturers have succeeded in establishing large farms, for 
subsistence and profit. Similarly, backyard poultry farming 
activities have grown in recent years. Farming by middle class 
households in some cases provides a resource base for food 
processing. Beyond agrarian sources of supplementary income 
generation, a preferred mode of garnering earnings prevalent 
among the intellectual middle class, exploits clientele 
networks.Academics in large numbers vie for state 
contracts, political appointments, consultancies and 
placements in parastatals, where the opportunity is seldom 
lost to appropriate national income. They have also sought 
employment in commercial and merchant banks to capitalize on 
the exchange speculation bonanza. For the less fortunate, 
access to banks at least enhance the prospects of securing 
credit for the establishment of other means of accumulation, 
such as SSEs, when personal savings are often insufficient.
The swelling of the informal sector compelled traditional 
middle class entrepreneurs and the new entrants to also adopt 
methods to sustain the profitability of enterprises. The
Abdul Raufu Mustapha, "Structural Adjustment and Multiple Modes of 
Social Livelihood in Nigeria" in Peter Gibbon et al., Authoritarianism^ 
Paaeeraov and Adjuatwant. 1992, p.204.
Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, "Stories", p.7.
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production of lower quality, often faulty and occasionally 
counterfeit goods are common strategies to minimize costs. 
Paradoxically, the increasing consumption of often sub­
standard informal sector goods in this period, reflects the 
decline in real incomes of workers and large sections of the 
middle classes. Extended working hours ranging from 9-17 hours 
daily are yet another mechanism to cut costs, where SSEs 
intensify the exploitation of women's labour and apprentices 
recruited at younger ages.^®^ Due to the pervasive lack of 
formal sector employment, a growing number of unemployed 
university graduates have joined the pool of cheap informal 
sector l a b o u r ,  as SSEs seek to cut costs and increase 
working hours in order to cope with rampant enterprise 
closures and declining profitability and incomes. With the 
exception of pockets of vitality in this sector, the degree of 
accumulation, labour absorption and incomes has been 
negligible. The bulk of participants struggle for meagre and 
insecure livelihoods as the crisis continues unabated.
SECTION SEVEN: SAP AND SUBORDINATE RURAL CLASSES
Exchange rate deregulation was expected to benefit the 
majority of the peasantry, long neglected in the process of 
post-colonial development. By changing the structure of
151 Meagher and Yunusa, Limite to Labeur Xbeorptien. p.17.
A. Adejunmobi, Ccpina fltrateaiee for 8utvivaA Among gnMiploved
Miaerian Or#iuatee. (Ibadan: M1SËR Monograph Series No.12, 1991).
188
incentives from non-tradeable to tradeable goods and 
services/” market reform and an emphasis on the price 
mechanism would boost agricultural production and incomes, 
thereby shifting the balance of forces away from the rapacious 
'urban coalition' towards the hitherto exploited and oppressed 
'rural class.' Indeed, as envisioned by the advocates of 
adjustment, the production of major cash and food crops have 
increased from pre-SAP levels. Correspondingly, nominal 
producer prices rose in this period. For both export crop and 
domestic food producers, however, the SAP has created new and 
exacerbated pre-existing contradictions, deepening the poverty 
of the majority of rural farmers. Productivity gains and 
higher nominal producer incomes in the export crop sub-sector 
remain vulnerable to external constraints, where tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in the West, raw material substitutes, 
coupled with the simultaneous productive increases in 
structurally adjusting Third World countries, continues to 
exert downward pressure on the international prices of primary 
export commodities.
Furthermore, the abolition of state marketing boards 
militates against the growth of cash crop production and 
higher real producer prices, despite optimistic expectations. 
In certain agrarian export sub-sectors, cocoa for example, the
Tradeable refers to goods and service for which an international 
and domestic market exists. While the macro-economic environment of SAP is 
designed to increase agrarian productivity, export-commodity production is 
given privileged and priority status over domestic food production.
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state's retreat from the pricing and marketing of export crops 
and the ensuing non-inspection of produce, fuelled the rise of 
adulterated and under-weight commodities. With the resulting 
poorer quality goods, international demand and market prices 
for some Nigerian commodities declined in this period."* 
Rising rural incomes, expected to occur with the elimination 
of monopolistic marketing boards, have also been constrained 
by the entrance of new middlemen, exploiting the vacated 
regulatory space, and now mediating interactions between 
direct producers and the market."® The example of the so- 
called 'new breed' cocoa farmers, seeking to export capital 
from the unstable Nigerian economy by extracting surplus value 
from the peasantry was previously highlighted. Similarly, in 
the food sub-sector, escalating costs of transportation and 
storage facilities have opened up avenues for the intervention 
of middlemen. Often urban men, and usually displacing rural 
women traders, they charge rural producers exorbitantly high 
rates to haul their produce to markets."® Persisting 
speculative activities in this period increased the smuggling
154 Mustapha, "Multiple Modes", p.121.
"® A critique of the disastrous consequences which resulted from the 
abolishing of state marketing boards in the period of SAPs, in no way 
suggests a return to the Inefficient and corrupt institutions, which were 
largely unable to cushion rural producers from the vagaries in the global 
economy. He recognise these pre-existing limitations, however make a 
distinction in the stated regulatory role (which is still relevant today) of 
marketing boards, and its specific character in colonial and post colonial 
Africa. Marketing Boards are necessary buffer mechanisms for rural producers. 
The point is to restructure and democratize these institutions.
"® Saba Mebrahtu, "Women, Work and Nutrition in Nigeria" in Meredith 
Turshen ed., Women and Health in Africa. (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1991), 
p.90.
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of Nigerian foodstuffs into neighbouring Francophone African 
countries where, until the January 1994 devaluation of CPA 
currencies, higher prices were to be found, though this was 
seldom reflected in rural real incomes. Porous Nigerian 
borders further denied domestic food producers equitable 
remuneration, largely tempering any gains which may have 
accrued from the initial government ban on imported foods.
Undoubtedly, since the inception of adjustment, the 
rapidly declining naira value and the ensuing inflationary 
pressures this induced, has eroded the real income of the 
majority of rural farmers. While initially boosting 
productivity and nominal incomes, exchange rate deregulation 
simultaneously raised the cost of agricultural production. 
Merely serving as conveyor belts, rising incomes of small and 
medium-scale farmers are transferred to higher priced 
fertilizers, hoes, machetes and labour. Where the social 
reproduction of rural classes is dependent on the market, 
elevated production costs and soaring prices of food, 
transportation and other essential goods and services have 
threatened the economic survival of most rural households. 
Restricted credit access for most rural farmers has compounded 
matters. Despite stated commitments to increased sectoral 
credit allocations and concessional loans to rural producers, 
agrarian interests rates according to official government
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statistics increased from 10% in 1985 to 26% by 1989/®'' 
although anecdotal evidence places this figure between 30% and 
40%. At existing interest rates, formal sector financial 
credit became inaccessible. Unable to secure capital, 
agricultural productivity and incomes have subsequently 
declined. In 1990, the CBN abolished the so-called 
preferential access to loans which essentially formalized pre­
existing credit closure for the bulk of rural producers. 
The combined effect of devaluation, subsidy removals and tight 
credit policies, have deteriorated the living standards of 
most small and medium-scale farmers, with particularly adverse 
consequences for the majority of rural women."®
The aggregate data on female labour, in which rural women 
in Africa comprise 60-80% of the agrarian labour force and 
produce 80% of food for household consumption, holds true for 
Nigeria."® SAPs emphasis on tradeables and the primacy of
Excerpts of the joint study on the agricultural sector conducted 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigerian Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, cited in Tajudeen Atitebi "Cry, Thy Beloved SAP" in Kewswatch. July 27, 1992, p.35-36.
Atitebi, Ibid., p.35.
The specificities of region and ethnicity in part influence the 
character of contemporary rural sexual divisions of labour in Nigeria. Among 
the three dominant ethnic groups, for instance, Hausa women (North), usually 
engage in home based food processing due to the religious inhibitions of 
purdah, Yoruba women (South-West), are normally concentrated in trading 
endeavours, while Igbo women (South East), primarily engage in farming. 
Generally however, the productive activities of rural women, centres 
primarily around, planting, sowing, weeding, harvesting, while reproductive 
activities include, food preparation, cooking, cleaning, child-care, health­
care, fetching fuel and water, among others, see; Ayeshe Imam et al. "Women 
and Work in Rural Nigeria" in WIN ed., The WIN Document. 1992.
see chapter on Environment and Gender Issues, in Tade Akin Aina 
and Ademola T. Salau, The Challenge of Sustainable Develoement in Nigeria, 
(Ibadan: INTBC Printers for the NEST, 1992).
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export commodity production, has shifted 'traditional' 
agrarian sexual divisions of labour, with profound effects on 
rural women. In post-colonial Nigeria, women's productive work 
was concentrated in food production. In the period of 
adjustment, however, women are increasingly recruited to work 
with internationally tradeable crops, where their wages are 
lower in comparison to male counterparts. Simultaneously, 
women farmers must maintain food production, processing and 
trading activities in addition to daily reproductive 
obligations. Such intensification of women's work occurs in a 
climate which increases the impediments to their productive 
activities. The renewed emphasis on cash crop production, for 
instance, in the prevailing environment of vicarious 
usufructuary land rights for women, has often confined their 
land access to marginal and less fertile plots, as 
transnational and national agri-businesses and male-dominated 
small and medium-scale farmers appropriate lands previously 
cultivated by women to earn potentially higher incomes. The 
increasing incidence of encroachment onto school fields and 
median strips along some Nigerian highways, reflects the 
marginalization of women food producers, forced in recent
Anita Spring and Vicki Wilde, "Women Farmers, Structural 
Adjustment, and FAO's Plan of Action for Integration of Women in Development" 
in Christine Gladwin at al. eds., Structural Adiusfanfc and African Wcmen 
Farmers (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991), p. 399-393.
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years to wrestle food from available lands.”*
While constraints on land availability heightened the 
struggle to grow food for household consumption and profit, 
production costs concomitantly escalated with the inflationary 
spiral in the Nigerian economy. The general inaccessibility to 
formal sector credit further constricts women's productive 
activities. In the absence of formal land rights, women are 
often unable to secure loans from commercial banks due to 
collateral stipulations that usually make land ownership 
mandatory. Bola Akanji's recent study on domestic food crops 
and agrarian export commodities under SAP highlights the 
differential access to formal sector loans in which collateral 
requirements on food producers are usually extremely 
stringent.”* Building on existing gender biases, the primacy 
on export crop production further prevents women from securing 
credit when urgently needed to pay for higher priced tools, 
seed, fertilizer, transportation, storage facilities, etc. 
With these constraints on women's productive activities, the 
burden of daily reproductive functions has further increased.
Rising costs of basic goods and services have restricted 
women's access to timesaving technologies such as electricity, 
fuel, manufactured tools and appliances. As a result, the
*** U.M. Igbozurike, "The Impact of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme on Nigerian Agriculture", Paper presented at the NEST 1993 Annual 
Conference on SAP and the Nigerian Environment. Benin, Edo State, May 2-5, 
1993, excerpts in MKST Forum, vol.2, no.2, April-June 1993.
” * Bola Akanji, The Came of Cocoa and Yam.
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daily tasks of gathering water and firewood have intensified, 
as have the chores of food preparation, cooking and cleaning, 
among others. In many cases, the reproductive responsibilities 
of rural women have expanded. They are compelled to absorb the 
stresses of urban working and middle class households 
struggling to survive the crisis. Molara Ogundipe Leslie, 
notes that rural women "sometimes serve as havens and back-up 
systems for relatives ... retrenched or impoverished in their 
wage employment." In large numbers, she further states, 
"children are sent back to poor and struggling rural 
relatives, sometimes grandparents who themselves are trying to 
piece together a life."“  ̂ Here as with urban households, 
nutritional standards in the countryside have deteriorated. In 
some instances, rural households have turned to famine foods, 
such as dusa --a grain normally used as animal fodder --in 
Northern N i g e r i a . A  recent joint study by the CBN-NISER, 
concludes that the quality of life in rural areas have 
deteriorated in the last few years. Beyond food processing and 
petty trade, non-farming modes of income-generation have been 
restricted. The Report highlights the changes in rural 
household consumption, in which the elimination of certain 
expensive food items (eg. meats, eggs, rice, bread) make it
164 Ogundipe-Leslie, “Stories", p.12.
Comfort B. Olayiwole, "The Role of Home Economics Agents in Rural 
Development" in Northern Nigeria: The Impact of Structural Adjustment in 
Christine Gladwin et ml. eds., African Women fermer# 1991, p.369.
195
difficult to maintain basic nutritional standards/** 
Maternal mortality is on the rise and curable diseases and 
ailments are widespread. Whereas the SAP set out to improve 
the living conditions of the poor, oppressed rural masses, the 
programme has deepened the poverty and underdevelopment of the 
countryside.
SECTION EIGHT 1 ADJUSTMENT, INFORMALIZATION, CONTRADICTIONS 
AND SOCIAL ANOMIES IN CIVIL SOCIETY
The crisis, adjustment and the dictates of economic 
survival have given rise to creative and imaginative responses 
to cope with the deterioration of material conditions. Pre­
dating the crisis, the straddling of formal and informal forms 
of income-generation in the period of adjustment intensified, 
leaving the majority of Nigerians to now manage even scarcer 
resources. The extent to which the informal sector is thriving 
however, should not be exaggerated and idealized. Informal 
sector participation is not devoid of social struggles over 
access to resources, as power relations persist "which define 
and constrain individual or group strategies, as well as the 
nature and extent of straddling."^*’ Moreover, the heightened 
process of informalization, cannot be simplistically reduced 
to a wilful escape by subordinate groups from the predatory 
Nigerian state into an unencumbered social space. The retreat 
of large sections of working and middle classes into the
*̂* CBN/NISER Study cited in Atitebi, "Cry", p.35-36. 
'*’ Roitmar., "Informal Markets", p.691.
196
informais is generally involuntary, resulting from the 
inability to secure p 'living wage' in the formal economy and 
at a general level further reflects the determination of all 
impoverished Nigerians to survive the strains of SAP. Beyond 
limited areas of vitality, and the positive contributions of 
certain informal sector goods and services, the growth, labour 
absorptive capacity, incomes and development potential of the 
sector have been negligible. In the macro-economic environment 
created by SAPs, elevated production costs and deflated wage 
and salary earnings have hindered informal sector productivity 
and growth, although these have increased consumption of 
informal sector products in this period. As a consequence of 
these constraints and the enumerable entrance of new actors, 
pre-existing uneven remunerations in the sector have widened, 
with obvious ramifications for the majority of women. Informal 
forms of income-generating activities remain precarious, 
subject to the vicissitudes of monetary fluctuations and 
abound with contestations for access to scarcer resources. The 
majority of participants are barely eking out a livelihood.
The unprecedented level of negative social trends and the 
rapid rise in extra-legal modes of accumulation, have been an 
outgrowth of material decline and the closure of economic 
opportunities, even in the much-celebrated informal sector. 
With the escalating costs of education, in the socio-economic 
context which has pauperized large sections of the 
intellectual middle classes and swelled graduate unemployment,
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children by the hundreds of thousands are withdrawn from 
schools to assist in activities such as farming and street 
hawking, in order to ensure the daily reproduction of poorer 
households. Prostitution has increased. Often in full 
knowledge of parents, young girls line the streets of major 
urban centres soliciting customers. Street children abound, 
abandoned by their families due to the depth of poverty. 
Teenage pregnancy is rampant. Homelessness and panhandling 
have heightened. Carriers of the AIDS virus number over half 
a million, with Anambra and Lagos state leading in reported 
cases, 20 and 18 percent respectively.”® A recent conference 
on Essential Child-Care in the 1990a and Beyond concludes that 
the "Nigerian child is getting a raw deal not only from his 
[or her] family but from the society and nation. The abuses 
are truly legion, child labour, under-age marriage, rape, 
forced prostitution, destitution, battering, ...children are 
exposed to drugs, culminating in its abuse."”® Resorting to 
petty theft in order to survive, thousands of school-age 
children are languishing in Nigerian jails.
Corruption has permeated all levels of society. Reaching 
unprecedented proportions, brazen corruption and wanton 
displays of wealth among the ruling classes, together with 
deepened material deprivations, heightens extra-legal modes of
®̂® Julius Ihonvbere, "Beonomic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and 
Social Crisis in Nigeria" in World Development, vol.21, no.l, 1993, p.147.
Oladye Umarah, "Endangering Our Tomorrows" in Tell, no.51, 1992,
p . 21.
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accumulation among non-bourgeois forces. Public sector 
workers, from administrative clerks and low-level custom 
officials to toll gate attendants and court bailiffs, have 
exploited available opportunities to exact meagre fees to 
supplement declining formal incomes. Poorly paid police 
officers utilize the mounted road blocks which criss-cross the 
country to exhort monies from passing motorists. At most 
universities, public funds earmarked to improve the conditions 
of dilapidated facilities on campuses have been appropriated 
by school administrators, academics and non-academic staff. 
The search for state contracts and consultancies have been 
matched by extra-legal means of income-generation within 
campuses, where lecturers now levy private fees for university 
admission and make consistent monetary demands on students for 
routine advice, assistance and passing grades.
In an environment of decaying social institutions and 
declining real incomes, members of the intellectual middle 
classes have emigrated to Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and 
North America in startling numbers. Alarmed, the government 
commissioned the Ibidapo Obe Panel on Brain Drain, which 
simply reaffirmed the large-scale departure of Nigerians with 
technical and specialized skills. The exodus of doctors and 
nurses, for instance, is estimated to exceed over 1500 and 500 
respectively in the last five years.The vacuum created by 
the mass exodus of health care specialists, in the climate of
Ihonvbere, "Social Crieie", p.148.
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escalating costs for medical treatment, is being filled by 
quack doctors, herbalists, and home remedies. This is not to 
negate the valuable contributions of naturopathy, but rather 
to recognize the danger of incursions by unregulated medical 
practitioners and vendors. The sale of counterfeit 
pharmaceutical products, for example, has become a profitable, 
yet socially hazardous means of income-generation. In Oyo 
state alone, at least 800 drug vendors and 200 unlicensed 
chemist shops were operating in 1992."^
Wasting Nigeria's human resources, university graduates 
have joined the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed 
disgruntled youths and are increasingly recruited as couriers 
in the booming international narcotics trade, in which Nigeria 
has become an integral cog in recent years. Throughout Europe 
and North America, hundreds of Nigerians have been arrested 
for drug-trafficking. In 1988, in the United Kingdom alone 
"nearly 66 percent of all arrests... for the illegal 
importation of hard drugs were Nigerians...[they] also 
accounted for 33 percent of total seizures of heroine."̂ ''* 
Youth are employing every means possible to flee the country. 
The notoriety of the 'green book' which continues to subject 
even high ranking Nigerian officials to scrutiny at 
international airports, has led to a growing market for forged




visas and passports. In the social milieu which has come to 
glorify wealth, regardless of the means of its acquisition, 
criminal syndicates popularly known as '4-1-9', have set up 
elaborate and seemingly legitimate businesses for the sole 
purpose of duping foreign investors. Here again, the 
skills of students have been found useful, actively sought in 
these sophisticated, lucrative, yet dubious operations.
Urban crime, such as burglaries, assaults, rapes and 
murders have also risen phenomenally. Isolated nightly attacks 
on motorists in the 1970s have given way in the last decade to 
more numerous and brazen attacks by gangs of armed robbers now 
operating -- seemingly freely -- in broad daylight. Women 
increasingly are recruited to serve as decoys in car theft 
rings that have sprung up and stretch across Nigeria's three 
borders. The sources of sophisticated weaponry used in these 
and other operations continues to perplex the government. Yet, 
some police officials have brought attention to the booming 
underground market in arms, gained from national military 
armouries and often via soldiers returning from ECOMOO peace- 
monitoring activities in Liberia. The celebrated search for 
'king pins' Ishola Oyenusi and Lawrence Anini in the 1970s and 
1980s, have been paralleled by the quest for Shina Rambo in
Nigerian 'buainessmen' with etrong connections to the state, have 
developed an international reputation for fraudulent practices, Popularly 
called (after the state decree against fraud), hundreds of
international investors, anticipating huge profits, with of course minimal 
investment, have been lured into fake business ventures. Foreign businessmen 
have lost millions in these scams, prompting governments and leading business 
journals in Europe, North America and Asia, to alert nationals entering 
joint-ventures with Nigerians,
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recent years. Most urban centres are increasingly terrorized 
by so-called Area Boys, the gangs of disgruntled youth 
produced and fuelled by declining material conditions. Even 
the countryside has not been immune from the rise in crime, 
with the theft of food crops being particularly 
widespread.^’*
Countrywide the struggle to cope with the pains of 
adjustment has reduced able bodied Nigerians to scavenging. 
The impoverished now rummage in dump-sites -- particularly in 
urban centres --to transform the seemingly unconvertible for 
personal usage and sale. While it has been argued that such 
coping mechanisms reflect the vitality of the informal sector, 
this crude form of income-generation exposes the poor to 
noxious gases and diseases in the daily pursuit to stave off 
hunger. The limited prospects for economic survival from these 
meagre forms of accumulation is worsened by the exploitive 
role of middlemen who prosper from the resale of refuse. The 
closure of economic opportunities has propelled millions of 
Nigerians into abject poverty, while daily, a tiny minority of 
Nigerians continue to display their wealth and affluence.
Undisturbed by the deepening malaise, the impoverishment 
of millions and state withdrawal from the social reproduction 
of marginalized groupings, the ruling comprador bloc of the 
dominant classes continues to use state power to enhance its
"* Samuel Olukoya, et al. "Reign of The Robbers" in Mevewatch. 
vol.16, no.26, December 18, 1992, p.14-15.
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private accumulation, thriving in fact from the socio-economic 
decline. The economic crisis, the restructuring of the statist 
model of capitalist development, and the attendant 
constriction of avenues for accumulation has intensified the 
contestation among factions of the Nigerian ruling classes to 
gain access to contracting state resources. Already tenuously 
engaged in production, the constraints on domestic 
accumulation, exacerbated by SAPs, has propelled the ruling 
classes to strengthen traditional modes of appropriation, such 
as contract inflation, kickbacks, and the outright 
embezzlement of public funds. State access has also been 
utilized to buttress new extra-legal modes of private 
enrichment which have gained 'currency'. Usually operating 
through intermediaries, high ranking military and police 
personnel, government officials, politicians, central bankers, 
business professionals and judges have found new wealth, in 
currency trafficking, drug peddling and the multifarious 4-1-9 
activities.
Nonetheless, the beguiling song of neo-liberal analysts 
continues to encourage state withdrawal from economic 
activities and the freeing of market forces in order to reduce 
the premium on state power for private enrichment. Checking 
the hitherto endemic corruption which catalyzed the crisis, 
neo-liberal policies were to further maximize scarce 
resources, release dormant entrepreneurial energies and 
enhance domestic accumulation outside the state realm. Thus,
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the SAP would foster economic recovery and create a material 
base conducive to stability and consensual politics. Indeed, 
economic deregulation and liberalization have shrunk the 
public arena; yet, intra-ruling class struggles and the 
plunder of national wealth rose to new heights in this 
period.^’® Fraudulent practises in the private sector have 
also been enhanced by SAP. As Adigun Agbaje observes:
"the extent to which the terrain of the struggle for scarce 
resources is gradually shifting from public bureaucracies into 
private bureaucracies [occurs] without a complementary shift in 
the nature of such struggles and the role of the state as a 
major determinant of the terrain and essence of the 
struggle."*’*
To illustrate, exchange deregulation and the attendant free- 
fall of the naira has enhanced ruling class wealth and 
produced new billionaires and millionaires from currency 
speculation, which flourishes despite the Abacha regime's 
recent declaration to eliminate illegal foreign exchange 
transactions. Nigerian dailies are replete with documentation 
of the massive corruption in the banking industry. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, access to foreign 
exchange has been limited to factions of the ruling classes 
with strong ties to the state. A lucrative means of 
accumulation, numerous commercial and merchants banks have 
sprung up all over the country to capitalize on the 'exchange 
bonanza'.
Agbeae and Ihonvbere, "Corruption".
Adigun Agbaje, "Adjusting State and Market in Nigeria: The 
Paradoxes of Orthodoxy" in Afrlka aneotrun no.27. 1992, p.126.
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While the anti-statist logic of neo-liberal reforms 
reduces state prerogatives in maintaining even minimalist 
social amenities for the marginalized, the Nigerian state 
remains interventionist in promoting ruling class unproductive 
accumulation in the formal and informal economies. The 
unprecedented Nigerian involvement in the international trade 
of illicit drugs, which has produced a class of nouveau riche, 
prospers due to active state involvement. The recent public 
disclosure of unaccounted drugs seized by the National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), exposed the widespread 
corruption which has plagued the agency since its formation in 
1990. From the resale of seized drugs to the protection of 
known drug 'king pins', high and middle level officers of the 
NDLEA maintain strong links with drug syndicates in the 
country. State participation transformed the agency into a 
convenience store for drug barons and couriers, who preferred 
to obtain cheaper and low risk contraband at the N D L E A . I n  
the current investigation by the Miscellaneous Offence 
Tribunal, allegations abound which connect the former 
Attorney-General in the Babangida regime, Clement Akpamgbo to 
national drug syndicates. In likemanner, most '4-1-9' 
operations flourish with clear connivance of central bankers 
and high ranking government officials.
Rather than creating an unencumbered social space, the
Joshe Arinze et al. "NDLEA: Nigeria's Stinking Mouse of Drugs" in 
Tell. February 21, 1994.
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Nigerian state has had a determining role in the processes of 
informalization. With the relative closure of formal sector 
accumulation, the process of informalization has enhanced the 
avenue to amass wealth for the ruling classes. In his recent 
work, Robert Fatten concludes that,
...withdrawal diminishes the exposure of the ruling classes as 
they enter the murky alley of the black market. Hiding behind 
intermediaries to avoid direct personal participation and 
manipulating their strategic position within the state apparatus 
to enhance their opportunities, powerful government officials 
have indeed become dominant entrepreneurs of the underground 
economy. The state has retained its determining impact on the 
legal and illegal acquisition of status, wealth and power, 
however much it may ostensibly disengaging from society and 
markets.”*
Despite the massive increase in legitimate or ill-gotten 
wealth, rather than convert the surpluses into productive 
capital accumulation domestically, the majority of the 
Nigerian elite remain decadent, unproductive, expending scarce 
resources in conspicuous consumption and overseas investment. 
These deep-rooted contradiction have served to alienate broad 
sectors of civil society from the state. The state is viewed 
with hostility and continues to loses credibility, as a small 
minority of Nigerians, strongly attached to the state 
apparatus continue to flaunt their wealth amidst social 
squalor and decay.
With the accentuation of social inequalities, the tenuous 
legitimacy of the Nigerian state and mounting internal and 
external pressures, the Babangida government was compelled to 
implement measures to protect vulnerable groups. Coinciding
Fatton, gradatorv Rula. p.63.
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with the global clamouring to 'humanize' structural adjustment 
packages in the Third World, the government int?:oduced SAP 
relief packages for public sector workers, in addition to 
buttressing and initiating social programmes. Most notably, 
the Directorate for Pood, Roads and Rural Infrastructure 
(DFRRI), the National Directorate for Employment (NDE), the 
Better Life for Rural Dwellers (BLRD) and the Peoples Bank, 
were established. All these programmes seek particularly to 
alleviate the poverty and deprivation in rural areas. The 
DFRRI, for instance, was formed in February 1987 to develop 
and mobilize rural communities. Entrusted with diverse 
functions, the Directorate pursued projects in the area of 
basic rural infrastructure and food production, designed to 
stimulate agrarian activities. The NDE (1987), embarked on 
employment generation programmes, mostly encouraging, however, 
self-employment through the disbursements of small loans.”® 
The BLRD program (1987) (formerly Better Life for Rural Women) 
established by Maryam Babangida -- the former dictator's wife 
-- sought to ameliorate the hardships of rural life via 
programmes to enhance women's access to resources. Lastly, the 
Peoples Bank (1989) since its inception, set up branches in 
various parts of the country seeking to generate rural and 
urban employment. Mainly targeting rural villages and urban
1’® Dulue Mbachu, "NDB: Wanted: Vacancies" in Heweweteh. October 5, 
1992. p.22-24 The NDE has organized four programmes, which include vocational 
skills enhancement, agrarian development, public works initiatives and the 
promotion of small-scale enterprises, which specifically targeting the youth 
and tertiary institution graduands.
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slums, the programme disburses interest free loans pegged at 
a maximum of N2000.“®
These initiatives have largely failed to meet stated 
objectives and remain plagued by massive mismanagement and 
corruption. While state pronouncements continue to exalt the 
achievements of DFRRI, the programme has done very little to 
build or rehabilitate roads, electrify the countryside, or 
boost food production, in spite of the N2.5 billion allocated 
between 1986 and 1992. Independent assessments and even 
successive state monitoring teams, continue to discover the 
massive misuse of public funds, unearthing a plethora of ghost 
projects in communities listed as beneficiaries.^®^ In the 
same manner, the NDE and the Peoples Bank are beset by 
corruption and financial impropriety. True, both programmes 
have made contributions to reduce rural and urban 
unemployment. The emphasis however, on self-employment through 
small-loan allocations, in the context of spiralling 
inflation, makes a pittance of such disbursements before any 
ventures are embarked upon. These accomplishments are further 
diminished when the huge financial outlays, totalling N2.2 bn 
(1987-1992) and N520 mn (1989-1991) are considered. A task 
force set up by the Peoples Bank to investigate allegations of 
corruption, for example, has also been plagued by waste.
Special Edition on "The Money Guzzlers: DFFRI, MAMSBR, FRSC, NDE, 
FUMPT and the Peoples Bank" in Mswswateh. October 5, 1992.
Mike Akpan, "DFFRI: Miles of Performance, Inches of Evidence" in 
Newswatch. October 5, 1992.
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financial indiscretion and outright looting. Assessing these 
programmes, Gani Fawehinmi, asserts "that they are a ruse to 
hoodwink and mislead the unwary, the innocent, the aggrieved, 
the cheated, the persecuted and oppressed in our country. 
Similarly, the Better Life for Rural Dwellers program, despite 
the fanfare which accompanied project launchings, anniversary 
celebrations, national and international accolades bestowed on 
the former 'first lady' hailing the programme's successes, has 
done little to improve the plight of rural women. Popularly 
dubbed Better Life for Ruler Women and Setter [off] Women for 
Rural Life, the programme was essentially a public relations 
campaign for Maryam Babangida, the wives of former governors, 
and other elite women. So ineffective was the programme, that 
the National Commission for Women (NOW) established in 1990 to 
succeed the BLRD, concluded from its countrywide evaluation of 
the BLRD "that the programme did not have the sort of 
structures that would enable it to permeate down to the 
grassroots and cover a wide area (of initiatives)."'®^ 
Personalized by Maryam Babangida, the programme's hand-over to 
the NOW was consistently frustrated and has since collapsed 
wi th the exodus of the Babangida dictatorship in August 1993.
Sam Olukoya, "PEOPLES BANK: For the People, Minus the People" in 
Mawswateh. October 5, 1P92, p.29.
Mary Ette and Olu Ojewale, "Is Life Better After Five?" in 
Mwwatah. November 2, 1992, p.44-45. see also "Better Life for Rural




A recent examination of the social cost of adjustment 
succinctly summarizes, the impact of SAPs on the Nigerian 
civil society. Eight years after the programme was introduced 
by the Babangida regime, Ihonvbere notes that "the calm, 
harmony and trust which used to characterize the rural areas 
has disappeared... [and throughout the country] a general mood 
of distrust, suspicion, anger, disillusionment and cynicism 
has taken over from what was once an active, ebullient, 
innovative, creative and productive society.Against this 
backdrop of socio-economic decay, however, one positive and 
unintended by-product of the adjustment era has been the 
proliferation of organizations in the civic terrain. Socio­
economic decline, widening social inequities, widespread abuse 
and privatization of power, increasing suffocation of 
political space and the marginalization of the majority of 
Nigerians in the recently failed statist transition to civil 
rule, intensified popular struggles for democracy. 
Individualized and economic endeavours to survive the crisis 
have increasingly been matched by broader collective and 
political responses demanding restructuring of power relations 
and the improvement of material conditions. The collective 
responses in the civic terrain to economic decline and 
predatory rule is the topic of the next chapter.
Ihonvbere, Nigeria.
CHAPTER THREE
ADJUSTMENT, THE FAILED TRANSITION TO NIGERIA* S THIRD 
REPUBLIC AND POLITICAL RESPONSES IN CIVIL SOCIETY
...nay I may that tha laat aavan year# hava baan vary gataatrophlo In tha 
hlatory o£ our country and tha hlatory of Africa aa Nigaria ooouplaa a plaoa 
of prominanoa. Wa ara looking at tha two fundamantal programnaa tha Babangida 
Raglma haa lapoaad on tha country la. tha political tranaltlon and tha 
atruotural adjuataant prograanaa. Thaaa two prograaaaa I muat confaaa, hava 
aubvartad damooracy In our country and totally daatroyad tha futura of our 
youtha. If you look at tha political tranaltlon programma... tha whola caaa 
of damocracy that tha Babangida raglma plantad, I aay Mlgarlana hava not baan 
ancouragad to llva a damocratlc Ufa. Damocracy la balng Impoaad and It la 
mora Ilka aa If wa wara In tha barraoka wharaby ordara ara paaaad down, if 
you talk damocracy, paopla hava got to do It thalr own way. Thay ara bound to 
maka mlatakaa, but thay ara going to laarn along tha way. What will ba tha 
fata of damocracy whan BMbmiigidm laavaa tha atag#?' <amphaala mlna)
Fallow Mlgarlana, SBQUKi to tha raalgnatlon of tha tormar hand of tha IntarIm 
National OovarnmantdMO) and Commandar- In-Chlaf of tha Armad Forcaa Chlaf 
Bmaat Shonakan, and my aubaaquant appolntmant aa Maad of Btata and 
Commandar-ln-Chlaf, I hava had axtanalva conaultatlona within tha Armad 
Forcaa hlararehy and othar wall manning Mlgarlana, In a bid to find aolutlona 
to tha varloua political, aconomlc and aoelal problama which hava angulfad 
our balovad country and which hava mada Ufa moat difficult for tha ordinary 
cltlaana of thla nation. Many hava axpraaaad faara about tha apparant raturn 
of tha military. Many hava talkad about tha concarna of tha Intarnatlonal 
community. Kowavar, undar tha praaant elrcumatancaa tha aurvlval of our 
balovad country la far abova any othar conaldaratlon. Nlgarla la tha only 
country wa hava. Wa muat tharafora aolva our problama ouraalvaa. Wa muat lay 
a vary aolld foundation for tha growth of trua damocracy. Wa ahould avoid any 
ad hoc or tamporary aolutlona. Tha problama, muat ha addraaaad firmly, 
objactlvaly, daolaivaly, and with all alncarlty of purpoaa. Conaaguantly, a 
Conatltutlonal Confaranca with full conatltuant pcwara will ba 
aatabllahad...to datarmlna tha futura conatltutlonal atruotura of 
Nlgarla,...racommand tha mathod of forming partiaa, which will laad to tha 
ultimata racognltlon of political partiaa formad by tha paopla. Thla raglma 
will ba firm humana and daolalva. Wa will not oondona nor tolarata any act of 
Indlaclplina. Any attempt to taat our will, will ba daeiaivaly daalt witb.
Tha govaramant ia a abild of naeaaaity with a atrong datarmination to raatora 
paaca and Mttbillty to our country and on thia foundation, anthrona a laating 
and trua democracy.' (amphaala mlna)
On November 17, 1993, in an all too familiar speech, 
(second quote above) General Sani Abacha, head of the current 
junta, declared the reluctance, yet necessity, of the 
military's return to centre stage of Nigeria's political 
arena. The intervention, they noted, was aimed at arresting
 ̂ Femi Palana, cited in "The Babangida Years: What Legacy?" in African 
Gencord. vol.7, no,15, August 31, 1992, p.37.
* General Sani Abacha, "We Must Lay Solid Foundations", Maiden 
Broadcast of the Abacha Coup cited in Vanguard, vol.10, no.2760, November 19, 
1993, p.2.
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the deepening political and socio-economic crisis which had 
gripped the country, particularly in the last few months. 
Overnight, the eight year transition programme to Nigeria's 
Third Republic and all accompanying political institutions 
were terminated. The statist political transition programme 
(FTP) was initiated by the former Babangida regime (1985- 
1993) , concomitant with the imposition of the SAP. The 1986 
Budget proclaimed the complementarity of these programmes, 
asserting that they were designed to establish a self-reliant 
economy and truly democratic foundation for the Third 
Republic. Indeed reinforcing, the SAP and the FTP exacerbated 
the malaise in Nigeria, deepening the crisis of the state, 
civil society and economy.
From the onset, the so-called democratic transition was 
marred by massive state manipulation, constant electoral 
rigging by factions of the ruling classes, systematic 
exclusion of supposed 'extremists' and 'radicals', and the 
continuous alienation of the majority of Nigerians, treating 
them as mere objects of the political process. However, the 
June 12, 1993 presidential elections, marked a significant 
juncture in the country's post-colonial history. Beyond the 
choice of the two presidential aspirants and parties, M.K.O. 
Abiola (Social Democratic Party, SDP) and Bashir Tofa 
(National Republican Convention, NRC), and the resounding 
victory of the former, the election reaffirmed the resolve of 
a broad sector of civil society to determine the political and
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socio-economic landscape of the country. To this end, 'naira 
politics' and the often exploited ethnic, religious and 
regional cleavages were transcended in the quest for a new 
politics in Nigeria.
As an extension of state interference in the FTP, the 
results of the June 12 elections were subsequently annulled, 
despite widespread agreement, nationally and internationally, 
that they were the freest, fairest and most peaceful elections 
conducted in the country's history. The deepening socio­
economic and political crisis galvanized opposition from broad 
sectors of civil society. Organized under the leadership of 
the Campaign for Democracy (CD), trade unions, student and 
women's associations, radical intelligencia, and a plethora of 
human rights NQOs, joined by nationalist factions of the 
ruling classes and external pressures, intensified the 
protracted struggle which led to the capitulation of the eight 
year Babangida dictatorship. Mounting popular opposition 
challenged the surrogate Interim National Government (ING) 
appointed by the exiting Babangida regime. The current Abacha 
junta, in terminating the PTP simultaneously dispensed with 
the facade of the civilian-headed ING, -- which the military 
ostensibly controlled. A constitutional conference has since 
been declared, a 19 member commission (CCC) was recently 
appointed by the Abacha led Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) 
to organize the modalities of the conference. So, for the 
third time in the country's history, the military has
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arrogated to itself the role of democratic custodian and the 
decisive domestic force in shaping the direction of politics, 
economic recovery and development in the 1990s.
This chapter extensively examines the interplay of 
structural adjustment and the tumultuous and recently aborted 
political transition programmes in Nigeria. It seeks to assess 
the dynamics of Nigeria's emboldened civil society and the 
prospects for democratic development in the country. Examining 
the collective and political responses of various social 
classes and groupings in the civic terrain to the continuing 
crisis, adjustment and the defunct transition programme, we 
critically investigate which factors and forces strengthen 
and/or weaken civil society (particularly its popular 
organizations), their histories, democratic character, 
relations with the state, and demands and social project (s). 
Devoting attention to these critical issues and exploring the 
responses of popular forces in civil society to the unabating 
crisis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
alternatives advanced from below for democratic development in 
the last decade of the millennium. Here, I argue that while 
adjustment and state suffocation of civil society have 
paradoxically led to the proliferation of civic organizations 
campaigning to delimit the state and enthrone political 
democracy, the civic terrain is still weak, replete with 
economic, gender, ethnic, and religious contradictions and 
remains subject to state manipulation and domestication.
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Section one provides a background of the failed 
democratic transition to Nigeria's Third Republic. A brief, 
yet critical historical sketch of popular democratic struggles 
in Nigeria, in section two, will give an important contextual 
framework for analyzing the political contestations of what we 
call the tripartite alliance between workers, students and 
academic unions. This section also focuses on the collective 
responses of and internal conflicts within established 
professional bodies in the country, mainly the Academic Staff 
Union of Universities, Nigerian Union of Journalists and the 
Nigerian Bar Association. The dynamics of Nigeria's embryonic 
NGO community is the topic of section three. Here, the 
prevailing orthodoxy which accords non-governmental 
organizations with crucial democratic and mediating functions 
in civil society is critically assessed in the multiple tiers 
of NGOs in Nigeria. Giving specific attention to the strong 
contributions of both the NGO, Women-in-Nigeria, and some of 
the new human rights and civil liberties NGOs to grassroots 
empowerment and popular democratic struggles, I however 
maintain that generally the incipient NGO community has 
marginally influenced democratic struggles in the country. The 
concluding section revisits the June 12 elections, the 
attendant political crisis, military intervention and the 
continuing popular struggles for democracy.
215
SECTION ONE: UNDEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONSt A BACKGROUND 
OF THE FAILED MARCH TO NIGERIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC
The recently aborted political transition programme (FTP) 
was initiated by the former Babangida regime in 1986, 
concurrent with the advent of market reforms. Given the 
tenuous legitimacy of the Nigerian state and the alienation of 
broad sectors of civil society, aggrieved by declining 
material conditions and the draconian character of the Buhari 
regime, the new military administration adopted a human rights 
posture. The Babangida regime's^ quest for hegemonic control 
in civil society was also conditioned by the resolve to deepen 
the anti-working class and anti-popular recovery programme of 
its predecessor through the adoption of a standard IMF and 
World Bank SAP. In order to maintain a human rights and 
democratic demeanour, the government, through the auspices of 
the Political Bureau set up in early 1986 and headed by Samuel 
Cookey, launched a national debate on the country's political 
future. Nigerians were enjoined to participate, as was 
encouraged in the recently concluded IMF debates. While 
welcomed, responses were generally poor, particularly in 
contrast to the vibrancy which characterized the debate on the 
IMF recovery programme.* The apathy and indifference in civil
 ̂ Initially the Armed Forces Ruling Council (APRC) 1985-1992 and later 
reconstituted as the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) January - 
August 1993.
* Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Political Debate and the Struggle for Democracy 
in Nigeria" in ROAPM. no.33, 1966, Special Issue on "Oil, Debt and Democracy 
in Nigeria", p.41-42.
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society reflected growing popular dissatisfaction with the 
militarization of political life and widespread disdain over 
the military's dictatorial hold on the country's political and 
socio-economic policies. The general distrust and suspicion of 
military rule was reconfirmed by the decision of the Babangida 
regime to pursue the nationally rejected IMF recovery 
programme, albeit without the loan. The 17-member Political 
Bureau selected and sanctioned to co-ordinate the national 
political debate and collate the resultant view points, 
generally lacked popular appeal, despite the co-optation of 
prominent members of the Nigerian Left through committee 
appointments.® Notably, the Bureau found the preference among 
Nigerians for a two-party system of governance with the 
proviso that the country adopt a socialist ideology.
It should be made clear that, in spite of the national 
debate to determine the modality of governance, the FTP was 
resolutely state-controlled, replete from the onset with 
conflict, contradictions and crises. Where the grassroots were 
implored to organize and participate, the state systematically 
excluded the majority of Nigerians from the transition 
process. Where the PTP supposedly sought to uphold freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press and freedom to organize, the 
state consistently aimed to restrict the political space of 
popular groupings and muzzle the fourth estate. Where the PTP
® Abubakar Momoh, "The Philosophical and Ideological Foundations of 
the Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria" in S. Caron et al., Osaeoratie 
Transition in Africa. (Ibadan: CREDO, 1992), p.156.
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purported a willingness to attenuate the religious and ethnic 
divide, parochial suspicions and clashes reached heights 
reminiscent of pre-Civil War Nigeria. Where the programme 
claimed it would ameliorate the primacy of money in politics, 
the government's rampant infusion of money into the transition 
process encouraged the unprecedented use of 'naira politics' 
in the incessant intra-ruling class contestation to capture 
state power. Where numerous institutions were created to 
mobilize and foster political consciousness and a democratic 
civic culture as the crucial bulwark against state excesses; 
state repression, political thuggery, violence and 
assassinations characterized the transition process. Where a 
free and fair voting process was promised, the art of 
electoral malpractice and chicanery were taken to new levels. 
Where the rule of law was to prevail, the government 
consistently intimidated and manipulated the judiciary and 
also promulgated over 60 decrees on the PTP alone, often in 
direct contradiction to its own standing edicts. And where the 
SAP was to provide a material basis for stability and 
consensual politics, economic stagnation, mass poverty, 
political marginalization and predatory rule characterized the 
eight year transition programme. Overall, the PTP had very 
little to do with the objective interest of the majority of 
Nigerians. An overview of the salient features of the PTP will 
indicate that for the Nigerian ruling classes politics largely 
remains an investment. Historically incapable of settling
218
intra-class competition for scarce resources peacefully, the 
deepening crisis of accumulation served to intensify 
contestation for state power for the generally unproductive 
Nigerian ruling classes. Largely blinded by the insatiable 
urge to preside over state resources, the ruling classes have 
therefore been unable to incorporate the participation of 
subordinate groupings in national politics, empower the poor 
in the redress of declining material conditions or uphold 
limited civil and human rights.
The limited legitimacy which the Babangida regime might 
have initially enjoyed increasingly waned with the full 
implementation of its widely disapproved anti-working class 
and anti-popular economic recovery programme. The over- 
regimented and often manipulated PTP, equally weakened state 
legitimacy in civil society. Like the IMF debate, while 
enjoining the participation of Nigerians on the determination 
of the country's political future, the government subsequently 
rejected popular view points endorsed in the Report of the 
Political Bureau. For instance, the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) policy paper Towards a Viable and Genuinely Democratic 
Political Future: Nigeria's Workers Position(1986) contributed 
to the debate and strongly argued for the immediate lifting of 
restrictions on the .rticipation of organized labour in 
national politics. Hitherto constricted by successive 
government bans on the establishment of a political fund for 
workers, the Congress vehemently demanded the right of workers
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to contribute funds to the formation and operations of a
labour party it sought to create. Generally compliant to the
entire NLC submission, the Bureau recommended that,
a) Nigeria's labour laws should be reviewed in order to 
unshackle the trade union movement and enable it to play a 
constructive role in society, b) The NLC and industrial unions 
should be allowed to establish a political fund, and c) Five 
percent of the seats in the legislatures of the three tiers of 
government should be allocated to workers. These seats should be 
filled through nominations through political parties in 
proportion to their numerical strength.*
The policy paper of Women-in-Nigeria (WIN), Women and
Political Development: Awareness and Mobilization{1986) also
received a somewhat receptive hearing from the Bureau. The
paper identified religious and cultural inhibitions,
patriarchal attitudes and capitalist relations of production
at the root of the persisting marginalization of women from
socio-economic and political life. It further argued for the
extension of democracy "to include the grassroots majority ana
the elimination of all forms of exploitation, oppression and
subordination."’ In turn, the Bureau's Report proposed that,
The full involvement of women in politics is one method of 
defending women's interests in society. They can participate 
fully if they are members of the legislative and executive arms 
of government. For this reason, we recommend the allocation of 
five per cent of the legislative seats to women in all three 
levels of government. This five percent seats allocated to women 
is to be filled by nominations through the political 
parties...and the formulation of a national policy on women and
 ̂ Excerpts of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) policy statement, 
"Towards a Viable and Genuinely Democratic Political Future: Nigeria's 
Workers Position - 1966" cited in Adebayo Olukoshi, "Nigerian Marxist 
Response to the Formation of the Nigerian Labour Party" in Christian 
Neugebauer, Philosophie. Idéologie und Gesselshmft in Afrikm. (Frankfurt: 
Peter Lang, 1991), p.109.
’ Altine Mohammed and Bene Madunagu, "Win: A Militant Approach to the 
Mobilisation of Women" in ROAPM. no.37, 1986, p.103
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development.*
While the Bureau's report narrowed the core policy remedies of 
the NLC and WIN, the government's White Paper rejected most 
popular provisions of the Report. On the suggestion that a 
percentage of legislative seats should be allotted to workers 
and women, the APRC dismissed these measures as 
inconsequential. The government boldly declared its commitment 
to individual, gender and group equality, but rejected the 
special allocation of legislative seats asserting such 
measures amount to reverse discrimination by the state. Also 
dismissing the recommendation that called for the rescinding 
of restrictive decrees on trade union's contributions to 
political funds, the government deemed this measure 
discriminatory and dangerous. The impetus towards organizing 
a labour party did however proceed, only after the NLC was 
reconstituted under state appointed leadership; yet even this 
ultimately failed with the mass disqualification of political 
associations which followed. (see below) The APRC did 
enthusiastically accept the call for a two party system and 
the extension of the handover date from October 1990 to 
October 1992 -- with the caveat 'all things being equal'.
Guided by a timetable, the government adopted a number of 
measures to create a stable democratic polity. At the economic 
level, the structural adjustment programme was to provide the
 ̂ Excerpts of the Political Bureau's Report in Mussaina Abdullah, 
"'Transition Politics' and the Challenge of Gender in Nigeria" in KOAPM. 
no.se, 1993, p.28.
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material base for stable governance, while at the political 
level, numerous measures were established to pave the way for 
what was expected to be a painless transition to Nigeria's 
Third Republic. Decree No.19 (1987), was promulgated in order 
to curtail the participation of certain categories of 
Nigerians, deemed a threat to the survival of the new 
democratic order. Indicting 'old breed' politicians for the 
failure of the First (1960-1966) and Second Republics (1979- 
1983), public officials in this era, certain military and 
police administrators, politicians convicted of corruption or 
other crimes were summarily banned from participating in the 
transition process.® Expanding the initial edict, the 
Participation in Politics and Elections Prohibition Decree 
No.25, (1987), also disqualified so-called 'radicals' and
'extremists' from taking part in the PTP.
Keeping a firm grip on the transition process, the 
government hand-picked a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) 
to review the framework of the 1979 Constitution, and on that 
basis produced a draft. The Constituent Assembly (CA), 
subsequently formed to debate the draft constitution of the 
CRC was supposed to represent a cross-section of Nigerian
® The government blamed the failure of the First and Second Republics 
on the political practises of 'old breed' politicians. According to General 
Babangida, the old political order was symbolized by "tribalism, rigging of 
elections, violence and thuggery, the crippling influence of money in politic 
and the lack of a spirit of compromise and sportsmanship among politicians in 
the contest for office." With a subsequent ban on old breed politicians and 
state willingness to infuse money into the transition process, this was 
expected to deter 'naira politics' and help bequeath a stable Third Republic, 
(see Tell. August 31, 1992)
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society. The 567 member body of the CA was instead comprised 
largely of local government councillors with 117 members 
including the Chairman, the Deputy and Secretary appointed by 
the Babangida regime.The government decreed out of the 
purview of assembly debates sensitive but important aspects of 
national life, such as the question of a federalist structure. 
When the Anthony Aniagolu-led CA submitted the assembly's 
Report, it recommended the declaration of military rule 
criminal, the accountability of the presidency for economic 
action or inaction and state provision of free education and 
medical care. The government through the Presidential Advisory 
Committee, however, rejected such popular provisions of the 
CA's Report.^ The un-elected Babangida regime went on to 
arbitrarily include and omit areas of the draft constitution, 
which was later 'ratified' in April 1909.
To facilitate the transition process, the regime also 
established the National Electoral Commission (NEC, 1987) -- 
headed by Eme Awa (later Humphrey Nwosu) -- to organize and 
monitor the electoral process at all levels of government. In 
November 1991, the government increased the NEC's powers 
enabling the commission to screen and disqualify candidates 
without an explanation of its actions. To legitimize the state
Local government council elections were conducted in December 1987 
on a non-party basis. LGA Councillors comprised 75% of the membership of the 
Constituent Assembly, with the remaining 25% of representatives, hand picked 
by the Babangida regime.
Momoh, "The Philosophical".
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and its PTP, the Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic 
Recovery (MAMSER) was set up in 1987 to mobilize the populace 
and "inculcate in all citizens the values, the habits and the 
orientation which will lead, without coercion, to the 
emergence, out of disarray, of a great self-reliant civic 
society in which justice, duty, responsibility, and commitment 
to the nation shall hold sway. Under the leadership of 
Jerry Gana, (later Muhammadu Gambo) a political awareness 
campaign was launched nationally. As a prelude to the lifting 
of the ban on political activities, in April 1989 the 
directorate employed the services of popular musicians such as 
Majek Fashek, Sunny Okosuns and Dan Maraya Jos, on a 
nationwide tour to propagate the message of "peaceful, orderly 
and development-oriented democracy in Nigeria".Building on 
MAMSER, the regime also established the Centre for Democratic 
Studies (CDS) which in part duplicated MAMSER's functions, but 
also sought to train 'newbreed' politicians in the 'art of 
governance ' . ‘‘
With a constitution in place and institutional mechanisms 
established, in May 1989, the government lifted the ban on 
political activities inviting Nigerians to form associations
Muyiwa AkintJnde, "MAMSER: Worms in the Bole" in Newswatch. October 
5, 1992, p.15.
Akintunde, Loc.cit.
The NEC, MAMSER and CDS were the principal institutional measures 
adopted by the Babangida regimes. Other notables include, the aforementioned 
DPRRI, BLRD, NCW the Code of Conduct Bureau and the National Orientation 
Movement.
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to vie for the two state sanctioned parties. Despite the 
rigors of organizing nationally in the short three month time 
frame allotted, more than thirty political parties were formed 
in the first few weeks after the rescinding of the ban. The 
N50,000 non-refundable deposit and the over-regimented and 
costly documentation stipulated for registration, however, 
reduced the number of 'qualified' organizations to 
thirteen."' Empowered to screen the applicants, the NEC 
disqualified all thirteen associations arguing they were 
fraudulent and controlled by 'old breed' politicians. Indeed 
many of the political organizations jockeying for recognition 
to compete in elections were offshoots of the discredited 
political parties of the First and Second Republic, banned 
from participating in the transition process by Decree No. 25. 
However, the mass disqualification of the thirteen 
associations also prevented the realization of the historical 
formation of the Nigerian Labour Party (NLP), which sought to 
give expression to popular social forces, marginalized in the
In the short three month period allotted to form national political 
associations, independent sources place the total number of organizations 
formed at over fifty. The over-regimented registration procedure reduced the 
fail number of associations to thirteen at the deadline. The registration 
requirements essential served to disenfranchise the majority of Nigerians. In 
addition, to the N50, 000 stipulated, in the three month period, competing 
associations were required to establish well equipped offices in the then 43S 
local governments in the country, summit 25 copies of manifestos, provide 
photographs and personal details on no less than 200 members, and also 
answer, questions with regard to positions SAP -- Read; automatic 
disqualification if opposed to SAP Of course, to participate in the 
associations, the government required members to take a leave of absence from 
places of work. In the context, of the deepening struggle for daily survival 
for the majority of Nigerians, this stipulation in particular, and the 
generality of registration requirements excluded the mass of Nigerians from 
actively participating in the PTP.
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political process since 1960. On the basis of the NEC Report,
the AFRC rejected these associations, opting instead to impose
two 'grassroots' political parties, the then 'little to the
left' Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the 'little to the
right' National Republican Convention (NRG). These so-called
grassroots parties which 'belonged to everyone in general and
no one in particular' were treated like parastatals. The
government went on to write their constitutions and
manifestos, sanction their choices of candidates and under the
pretext of preventing the use of money in politics, funded the
two parties, built party headquarters throughout the country,
provided politicians with accommodation and sponsored
delegates to national conventions in 1990.
Veteran nationalist Anthony Enahoro commenting on the
state imposition of the two political parties, expounds on the
clear contravention of democratic precepts which the
government claimed to be fostering. He observed that,
...it does not seem to be sufficiently understood in some 
quarters , if it is understood at all, that democracy implies 
freedom of choice • freedom to argue, freedom to debate, freedom 
to propose your own solutions to the society's problems, freedom 
to persuade others to argue with you, freedom to associate with 
others of like mind, freedom to mobilize public opinion and 
organize political parties, freedom for such parties to contest.
A Nigerian kind of democracy which is deficient in these respect 
does not deserve to be called a democracy."
If Enahoro's illumination of the contradictions in
promulgating political parties in a transition process
purported to be democratic was lost on the government and the
Enahoro cited in Ademola Oyinlola, "Engineering of the Voodoo Kind" 
in yell. Special Supplement: IBB's War Seven Years That Shook the Nation, 
August 31 1992, p.21
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military's higher circles, the political class also accepted 
this arrangement with little opposition. While it may have 
been instituted to prevent the infusion of money into politics 
or perhaps to mitigate intra-ruling class contestation for 
power, it served to disenfranchise the majority of Nigerians, 
inhibiting the participation of marginalized social groupings 
in the transition process. Prominent Nigerian political 
economist Claude Ake, in his keynote address at the 
inauguration of the Obafemi Awolowo Foundation, highlighted 
the implications of the government's decision. Whatever might 
have been the intention of foisting two political parties on 
the country, Ake asserts, "the arrangement effectively 
precluded any chance of positive creative politics."” Rather 
than a voluntary process in which various social forces with 
a shared vision of how society should be organized, can freely 
come together and form political parties and on that basis 
contest for governance, parties decreed into existence, he 
further asserts,
can only... [lead] to anarchy of ambitions, unrestrained by 
principles or morality. It cannot be law abiding, it cannot 
raise issues about how society should be ordered, much less 
respond to them. It cannot know peaceful political competition, 
only the way of all against all, where every means is 
permissible and rights are co-existent with power."
From the formation of the sanctioned political parties and the 
multi-level electoral competitions, to the annulment of the
Claude Ake, "A Confused People", Keynote address at the 
inauguration of the Obafemi Awolowo Foundation in African Concord, vol.7, 
no.33, January 1993, p.12.
Ake, Loc .cit.
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June 12 election and the military's re-intervention in 
politics, the political class showed a lack of commitment and 
total disregard for the basic tenets of democracy, while 
exposing their endearment to democracy simply for its utility 
in providing an avenue for accumulation. That is why the 
political class acquiesced to the imposition of the two 
parties and consistent government tinkering with the 
transition process, readily abandoning the struggle for 
democracy in the wake of the June 12 annulment.
To illustrate, the July 1990 national conventions of the 
two parties were characterized by massive flaunting of wealth, 
where amidst conference deliberations money blatantly changed 
hands for support. In the factional jockeying for strategic 
party positions and leverage in upcoming elections, very 
little time was spent constructing party platforms which would 
address critical national issues. A debate on the unabated 
economic crisis and measures to revive growth and development 
did not feature prominently in convention discussions. In 
fact, as hard currency was visibly swapped in the 'politics of 
settlement', little attention was given to foreign exchange 
and other constraints faced by productive sectors of the 
economy. Certainly, the political class gave scant 
consideration to the impoverishment of millions of Nigerians 
which theoretically they sought to represent. Instead, the 
national convention of the SDP and NRC was dominated by 
intense debates on various zoning formulas supposedly to give
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the Nigerian ruling classes some semblance of cohesion. That 
is, electoral zonal formulas divided the country into regions, 
and in a power-sharing arrangement among the political elite, 
potential political offices such as the presidency, the vice 
presidency and national party chairman, were doled out on the 
basis of region and invariably ethnicity. Again violating a 
modicum of democratic rights, Nigerians were expected to 
choose political leaders not on the basis of past records in 
public office, history of personal probity, clarity on 
national issues and constructive measures, nor a history of 
support for subordinate groups, but rather on the basis of 
ethnic, regional and religious considerations.
The national conventions also exposed the banality of the 
government's policy of inundating the political process with 
money in the hopes of preventing the allure of 'naira 
politics' among the so-called 'newbreed' politicians it strove 
to foster. The converse of this policy which sought to curtail 
the presence of 'old breed' politicians by merely banning 
their participation in the transition process proved equally 
naive. Without looking at the deeper contradictions within the 
political economy, the military government failed to identify 
the underlying factors that encouraged the ruling classes to 
invest so heavily in politics. The government also erroneously 
assumed it could extricate the newbreed politicians from the 
socio-economic and ideological structures which reproduced 
incessant intra-ruling class struggles for state power. As the
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Nigerian ruling classes still retain a tenuous relationship to 
production, the state remains an indispensable instrument for 
capital accumulation and in the context of the crisis of 
accumulation exacerbated by SAPs, politics is conducted like 
warfare. Not surprisingly then, the 1987 ban on old breed 
politicians was ineffective. Surviving the 1989 
disqualification of political associations which they mainly 
controlled, dominant ruling class organizations were simply 
reincarnated in the two state decreed parties. The old breed 
politicians openly and actively consulted and sponsored 
newbreed politicians and managed to create influential blocs 
in the two political parties en route to taking them over.^® 
The elections to local governments (Dec.1990), 
gubernatorial and state legislature (Dec.1991), and the 
National Assembly (July 1992), clearly showed that politics in 
Nigeria had retained the political ills of the First and 
Second Republics, if not heightening them. In the battle to 
preside over the state and national resources, the mode of 
political mobilization of the ruling classes concentrated on 
'money politics', and the manipulation of region, religion and 
ethnicity. Political thuggery, violence, and widespread 
electoral malpractice characterized the elections at all three 
levels of government. In the interval of these elections, the 
government postponed the termination date of the PTP from
Pita Ogaba Agbeae, "The Impending Demise o£ Nigeria's Forthcoming 
Third Republic" in Africa Today. 3rd Quarter, 1990.
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October 1992 to January 1993 and in the wake of the 
gubernatorial elections rescinded Decree No.25 which banned 
the participation of old breed politicians in the transition 
process. In what was then anticipated to be the last stage of 
the PTP, the presidential primaries of August and September 
1992, again illustrated that the SDP and NRC had few notable 
differences, strikingly similar like "six and half-a-dozen" to 
use the colloquial. The conduct of candidates and party 
supporters during the primaries, on the admission of the 
contestants themselves, raised electoral malpractice to new 
levels. In the struggle to emerge as the presidential 
candidate for the respective parties, aspirants used numerous 
dubious methods to ensure electoral success. These included 
the 'settlement' of rival aspirants, open disbursement of 
money in voter queues, the encouragement of multiple voting 
among supporters, the issuance of fake accreditation cards, 
the recruitment of underage voters and even the transport of 
people from neighbouring states to illegally vote in 
sanctioned state primaries. When 'positive' inducements failed 
to secure electoral victory, slander, violence and 
assassinations were readily employed.*® A series of post­
voting measures were also utilized such as the over-inflation 
of election figures and the disappearance of polling station 
officials, who failed to register ballots at collation
Mercy Ette, "How to Rig Elections" in Mswawstch. October 19 1992, 
Gnome Oeifo-Whiakey, "Wild, Wild Politics" in Tell, February 3 1992, Emenike 
Okorie, "Presidential Primaries: Malpractice" in Wawswabeh. August 17, 1992.
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centres. This was the type of 'rig thy way' to democratic 
governance the defunct PTP fostered.
In this fraudulent electoral environment, the NEC 
suspended presidential primaries on two occasions.^ Unable 
to gain any form of cohesion among competing factions, or 
enough at least to ensure orderly political succession, the 
political class expended attention and resources on peace and 
survival meetings and deliberations for recovering squandered 
resources, instead of addressing questions of effective and 
accountable governance, economic revival and the betterment of 
the living conditions of the poor. While factions in the 
political class decimated themselves and showed their wanton 
greed and instrumentalist attachment to democracy, they 
continued to fall prey to the manipulation of the transition 
process by the military government. In his recent 
investigation of post-colonial political development in 
Nigeria, Julius Ihonvbere advances the argument that the 
persisting weakness and fragmentation of the ruling classes, 
the resulting inability to play consensual politics and the 
submergence of critical national issues to the unadulterated 
quest for power, made it easier for the Babangida dictatorship
Presidential primaries were twice annulled in August and September 
of 1992. The August primaries which were organized around five sessions 
covering the 30 states in the federation, were postponed after the first leg. 
Recommenced under a new three round format a month later, they were again 
postponed after the first round.
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to perpetuate its predatory rule/^ In November 1992, the NEC 
banned all 23 presidential aspirants, dissolved the national 
executive committee of the two parties, set out a new format 
for presidential primaries and again postponed the transition 
date to August 1993." The political class, as had been the 
case through numerous government manipulation of the PTP, 
showed little opposition and readily accepted the new 
arrangement. For popular forces in civil society, however, 
while recognizing the bankruptcy of the political class and 
near total irrelevance of the so-called democracy the military 
government was promoting, viewed in the postponement the 
continuance of machinations by a military dictatorship 
determined to succeed itself in power. With the PTP widely 
contested from the onset, the November 1992 shift in the PTP 
termination date galvanized social forces steadfastly opposed 
to the undemocratic transition programme of the Babangida 
regime. Increasingly, popular grievances over the erosion of 
living conditions under the SAP were linked to issues of 
widespread abuse of civil and democratic rights. Hereafter 
legal and political challenges to the state intensified in 
what Robert Patton Jr. has called 'civil society politics of
Julius 0. Ihonvbere, "A Radical View of Nigeria's Political
Development", Chapter contributed to Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., flovernanee and
Development in Nigeria# «semvs in Honour of Billv J. Dudley, mimeo:
University of Texas at Austin.
The disqualification of politicians from electoral competition, has 
been a common feature of the PTP, For instance, on the eve of the December 
1991 gubernatorial elections, the NEC banned 12 aspirants. Similarly, prior 




Workers, organized around the central labour umbrella 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) , linked issues of unemployment, 
low wages and poor working condition to demands for popular 
participation in national politics. Market women, in the 
tradition of resistance dating back to colonialism, protested 
against the decline in living standards. In the countryside, 
the pains of the crisis and adjustment on rural producers led 
to the proliferation of co-operatives and grassroots community 
development associations (CDAs), comprised significantly of 
women. At the national level, Women-in-Nigeria (WIN), remained 
the only vociferous and active women's organizations which 
mobilized working class and peasant women to redress the class 
and gender inequalities in the country. The irrepressible 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) maintained 
its history of political and militant activism, connecting the 
deterioration of the educational sector to the character of 
the state and political economy. Similarly, the Academic Staff 
of Universities Union (ASUU), struggled against insufficient 
educational funding, the near collapse of the university 
system and the poor remuneration for academic staff, all of 
which combine with issues of autonomy, academic freedom and 
democratic rights.
Hitherto conservative sectors of the professional middle 
classes also joined popular democratic struggles in the 
country. With declining living standards, the closure of
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opportunities for upward mobility and the trampling of civic 
and human rights, established professional associations, like 
the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) have been radicalized. New 
intermediate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also 
emerged. Notably vibrant in the human rights sector, NGOs such 
as the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), Committee for the 
Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), National Association of 
Democratic Lawyers (NADL), Constitutional Rights Project 
(CRP), Human Rights Africa (HRA) and the Universal Defenders 
of Democracy (UDD) have actively campaigned in defence of 
human rights and basic civil liberties. Heightened state 
clampdown on media houses, the persecution, detention, and the 
assassination of the first journalist in Nigeria's history, 
served to strengthen the Nigerian Union of Journalist (NUJ), 
which remains committed in the struggle for press freedom and 
democratic rights. Ethnic minorities, particularly social 
groups in the south-eastern oil communities, escalated their 
struggles against internal colonization. The Ogonis, 
represented by the Movement of the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), for instance, have vociferously agitated against 
regional inequities in the distribution of power and 
resources, linked solidly to the environment degradation of 
the area and transnational domination of the Nigerian oil 
sector and economy. In response to the deepening socio­
economic and political crisis in the country, in November 
1991, the Campaign for Democracy (CD) was constituted to
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provide an umbrella which unified broad aggrieved and popular 
sections of civil society. The historical formation of the CD 
strengthened democratic struggles by providing a political 
platform to articulate democratic alternatives beyond multi- 
partyism and statist programmatic transition. The remainder of 
this chapter takes a closer look at the anatomy of the 
Nigerian civil society, focusing on the collective responses 
of various social forces to adjustment and predatory rule. To 
provide s proper backdrop, the next section begins even if 
only briefly, with a historical sketch of democratic struggles 
in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.
SECTION TWO: ADJUSTMENT, STATIST POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 
AND POPULAR DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES 7N CIVIL SOCIETY
Stretching back to the colonial period, the Nigerian 
civic terrain has possessed vibrant organizations which have 
sought to advance civil and democratic rights, constantly 
posing a direct challenge to the state. Workers have remained 
integral to popular democratic struggles in colonial and post­
colonial Nigeria. During British colonial rule, trade unions' 
demands for higher wages, better working conditions and 
collective bargaining at the workplace inevitably drew workers 
into wider political campaigns challenging the illegitimate, 
racist and repressive colonial state.Limitations
Our brief historical sketch here on workers' struggles in Nigeria 
and the ensuing discussion of workers resistance to the crisis, SAP and the 
PTP, concentrates primarily on political contestations at the national level. 
Of courses workers resistance have been both hidden and overt, individualized
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experienced in wartime working class agitations against 
declining living standards, underscored the initiative by 
civil service and railway unions to form the Trade Union 
Congress of Nigeria (TUC, 1943), representing all sectors of 
labour in the c o u n t r y . the post-war period, the TUC 
explicitly adopted a political role emerging as an important 
force in the anti-colonial movement. Widespread strikes, 
lockouts and demonstrations of the 1940s, highlighted by the 
1945 general strike and the 1949 disturbances in the wake of 
the I va Valley massacre of 21 miners, rocked the colonial 
state and polity and compelled constitutional reforms which 
accelerated the process of decolonization. Whereas the 
Richards and Macpherson constitutions (1946 and 1951 
respectively) sought to reproduce foreign domination by 
institutionalizing a tripartite division of the country and 
was vehemently opposed by the TUC and other organizations, the 
constitutional changes opened the space for political 
participation and paradoxically hastened the end of colonial
and collective. Section one of this chapter has detailed, workers' 
individualized responses to economic decline focusing on survivalist 
strategies in civil society. Under SAPs, collective unionized responses at 
the workplace include struggles to institutionalize collective bargaining, 
strikes and demonstrations to disrupt production, among others. For detail 
case studies on workers' struggles at the workplace in the period of SAPs 
see: Gunilla Andrea and Bjorn Beckman, "Textile Unions and Industrial Crisis 
in Nigeria: Labour Structure, Organization and Strategies" in Inga Brandell, 
Workers in Third World Induetrializatlon. (New York: St Martin's Press for 
AKUT, 1991), Yusuf Bangura, "The Recession and Workers' Struggles in the 
Vehicle Assembly Plant -- Nigeria in ROAPI. no.37, 1987, Bangura and Beckman, 
"African Workers" and Olajide Oloyede, "Surviving in an Economic Recession; 
'Game Play' in a Nigerian Factory" in RO A M , no.55, 1992.




The TUC entered into informal and formal alliances with 
student and youth groups, artisans, market women, co­
operatives and professional bodies. The central labour body 
joined forces with the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), the 
radical Zikist Movement and the Nigerian Union of Students and 
was an initial affiliate of the National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens (NCNC) which emerged as the leading nationalist party 
in the country. The formation of the NCNC provided an umbrella 
for various anti-colonial forces in the country and a platform 
to strengthen the campaign for a liberal democratic political 
system. Highly skilled but underemployed indigenous 
professionals, became increasingly disgruntled with colonial 
rule and supported popular democratic struggles. For instance, 
the combative journalism of the indigenously-owned daily 
newspapers the Iî est Africa Pilot and The Daily Comet provided 
a critical voice against the colonial regime. Giving 
expression to workers grievances during the 1945 general 
strikes, both dailies were later banned, allegedly for 
inciting workers' agitation. The illegitimacy of the colonial 
state, the closure of economic opportunities and the abuses of
The major feature of the Richards Constitutions was the 
introduction of regional assemblies established in the East (Enugu), West 
(Ibadan) and North (Kaduna) with the federal seat in the Capital Territory of 
Lagos. Nearly fifty percent of the regional assembly members were hand-picked 
by the colonial state, with the assembly merely empowered to discuss proposed 
legislation and make recommendations. The nationalist movement, even its 
petit- bourgeois leadership viewed the constitutional changes as an instrument 
of divide-and-rule, but it was later embraced by the Nigerian elite as an 
arrangement which enhanced the arena of private accumulation. This measure 
institutionalized regionalism and ethnicity into the body politic in Nigeria 
and has been reproduced in the post-colonial period.
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civic and democratic rights, compelled journalists and other 
professionals in the country to coalesce around the NCNC, 
eventually dominating its leadership.
The competing class interests in the NCNC vying for 
hegemony on the direction of decolonization precipitated a 
split in the nationalist movement. While radical anti­
colonialiste generally viewed decolonization as the first step 
towards the restructuring of the Nigerian state and economy, 
for the petty-bourgeois leadership of NCNC, decolonization 
essentially became a means to acquire wealth. Thus, the 
emerging elites inevitably became hostile to the 
transformative social project of mass democratic movements and 
increasingly less committed to the liberal-democratic aims 
they had championed earlier. That is why, despite initial 
opposition to regionalist power structures, the NCNC willingly 
accepted the power sharing arrangement as embodied in the 
aforementioned constitutions, for it promised enhanced 
opportunities for accumulation. The incipient ruling classes 
formed Regional/Ethnic blocs such as the Ibo State Union 
(East), Egbe Omo Oduduwa(West) and Jamaar Mutanem Arewa 
(North, later popularly dubbed the Kaduna Mafia), to 
consolidate regional power bases en route to fierce intra­
class contestation for state power. They would constitute the 
basis of political parties in the First Republic. Along with 
the colonial state, the emerging Nigerian elite were, however, 
united in the coercion and suppression of radical elements in
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the nationalist movement.
In Nigeria's nascent civil society, popular groupings 
were organizationally weak, susceptible to opportunism, 
undemocratic practices and prone to the rising ethnic and 
regional chauvinism which pervaded the nationalist movement. 
Between 1945 and 1960, the trade union movement split thrice 
into competing 'radical' and 'conservative' labour centres on 
questions of trade union independence, international 
affiliations and once occasioned by the conflation of 
personality with issues.^ in the context of increasing 
politicization of region and ethnicity in this period, 
seemingly ideological differences on critical issues 
confronting the trade union movement, such as the NCNC 
affiliation debates, were often intermeshed with ethnic and 
regional considerations. A hot bed of 'cold war' politics, 
discourses on affiliation with international unions was also 
a divisive issue. Yet, debates were often unguided by 
principle, but rather based on financial calculations. 
Disaccord within the trade union movement further enabled the 
better organized domestic elite to play a determining role in 
the direction of decolonization. On the eve of political 
independence, despite internal acrimony, trade unions in the 
country remained the most organized of the popular groupings 
in civil society and an ardent voice for the expansion of 
civic and democratic rights.
Ananaba, Tr>d« JPnicna.
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Therefore, beyond the initial euphoria of political 
independence, the weak and repressive state bequeathed by 
colonialism lost legitimacy in the civic terrain. The early 
years of national independence, for popular forces failed to 
deliver the betterment of material conditions and the 
democratic participation of ordinary Nigerians. The First 
Republic (1960-1966) was marred by widespread corruption and 
chronic instability, as a result of fierce inter-ruling class 
struggles for state power. Dependent on the state for 
resources, politics became warfare. Where the loss of an 
election meant the ultimate erosion of the regional 
accumulation base, voting malpractice, political thuggery and 
violence were readily utilized electoral tools. Regionalist 
political parties coalesced around the United Progressive 
Grand Alliance (UPGA) and the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) 
in the elections of 1964, in order to enhance opportunities 
for their respective ar e a s . I n  the struggle for power, the 
rule of law, the respect of civil liberties and human rights, 
were readily trampled upon despite constitutional safeguards. 
A fragmented civic terrain remained too weak to delimit the
In the UPOA, coalition included the NCNC (East), the Action Group, 
(AG)(WEST) the United Middle Belt Congress and the Nigerian (previously 
Northern) Elements Progressive Union. The first three parties in the 
coalition, sought to capture federal state power in order to enhance the 
arena of accumulation for the elite of their respective regions, They forged 
a counterpoise against the growing strength of the Northern ruling bloc, 
represented by the Nigerian National Alliance. The NEPU, (the most radical 
political organization in this period) was mainly Northern based and provide 
a platform to agitate against the domination of the Northern aristocracy. The 
NEPU alliance with the Southern ruling bloc, deemed as 'progressive', was 
therefore view as strategic.
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State and advance democratic rights.
Perhaps a short lived but significant exception was the 
general strike of 1964 and its immediate aftermath. Although 
the trade union movement was now split into four rival labour 
centres, unity was achieved to challenge the encroaching 
predatory rule of the Nigerian state.*® With the balance of 
payments crisis of 1964 and the precipitate decline in living 
conditions of workers and other subordinate groups, the United 
Labour Congress (ULC), representing organized labour, demanded 
the review of wage and salary structures in the country. The 
government dismissed workers demands and instead sought to 
create a one-party state, while strengthening its repressive 
apparatus to contain increasing inter and intra-class 
contestation. The ensuing 13 day general strike paralysed the 
state and economy, galvanizing broad popular support to demand 
wage increases, the repeal of a proposed repressive detention 
act and popular participation in national politics. Typically 
in this period, professional associations were generally non­
participants in the nationwide protest. A privileged middle 
stratum, some professionals individually joined forces with 
subordinate groups in confronting material decline and wanton 
state abuse of civil and democratic rights. Collectively 
however, organizations such as the Nigerian Bar Association
Between 1962 and 1975 four rival labour centre existed in the 
country, mainly the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), United Labour 
Congress (ULC), Nigerian Workers' Council (MWC) and the Labour United Front 
(LUP).
242
and the Nigerian Union of Teachers were principally concerned 
with the advancement of the parochial interests of their 
membership, which in this period centred around demands for 
the indigenization of the public service sector.^
Compelling significant economic concessions to 
subordinate groupings, the national strike, also served, if 
only temporarily, to check state encroachment by forcing the 
retention of the multi-party system and halting the proposed 
detention act. In the wake of the successful strike action, 
the NTUC (formerly the TUC) formed the Socialist Workers and 
Farmers Party (SWAFP, 1964) to compete in the upcoming 
elections. Seeking to broaden the base of Nigeria's fledgling 
democracy and give expression to subordinate social forces at 
the national level, the prospects of an independent political 
organization for popular groupings in the country was 
undermined by the splinter Nigerian Labour Party, which broke 
off from the SWAFP. Beset by constant recriminations, the two 
parties failed to have an affect on the elections.The 
regionalism fostered since the colonial period, in the 
aftermath of 1964/65 elections, posed a serious challenge to 
the state and territorial integrity of the country. 
Intensifiv,u intra-ruling class struggles over scarce resources
Attahiru Jega, "Professional Associations and Structural 
Adjustment" in Adebayo Olukoshi ed., The Politics of Struetural Adiustmsnt iii 
Nigeria. (Ibadan: Meinemann, 1993), p.100.
Tajudeen Abdulraheem and Adebayo Olukoshi, "The Left in Nigerian 
Politics and the Struggle for Socialism: 1945-1905" in ROAPg. no.37, 1967.
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and heightened politicization of region and ethnicity deepened 
political instability which led to civil war in 1967.
The militarization of civil society throughout most of 
the 1970s was a set- back to popular struggles for democracy. 
As we discussed previously, the confluence of a successful 
federal prosecution of the civil war and shift in the 
country's accumulation base, gave the state the ideological 
and material resources to realize post-colonial assertions of 
economic nationalism. To mitigate intra-ruling class 
competition and provide some semblance of cohesion, the Gowan 
regime enhanced federal powers through the weakening of the 
four regions, brought about in part by the repartition into 12 
states. The state further sought to provide an enabling 
environment for domestic accumulation by restructuring the 
unequal relationship between transnational and local capital. 
Simultaneously, renewed attempts were made to subordinate 
labour through co-optation and repression. Tripartite bodies, 
such as the National Labour Advisory Council and the 
Productivity Prices and Incomes Boards were formed to control 
collective bargaining agreements through yearly wage and price 
guidelines/" Despite the huge resources released in the oil 
boom era, to redress the structural distortions in economy, 
meet basic needs, build enduring democratic foundations and 
mobilize and encourage the participation of subordinate groups
Tayo Pashoyin, "Nigerian Labour and the Military: Towards Labour 
Exclusion?" in labour. Capita1 and gooisty, vol.23, no.l, April 1990, p.22.
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in the process of development, the state relied inordinately 
on coercion to reproduce ruling class hegemony. A series of 
decrees was enacted which reinforced wartime stringent labour 
control. The Trade Union Decree No. 31 of 1973, for instance, 
prevented the application of unions dues towards the 
furtherance of political objectives, a matter I have already 
mentioned above.” Promulgating the Trade Disputes (Essential 
Services) Decree of 1976, the government also enhanced its 
control of labour by prohibiting strike actions in the 
strategic oil sector, among others. Striking unions in the oil 
and banking sectors shortly after the enactment were 
proscribed and union leaders detained. Some veteran radical 
unionists such as S. Bassey, W. Goodluck and M. Imoudu were 
banned from participating in the trade union activities in the 
country.
While consistently suppressed and unable to check the 
excesses of the state, popular struggles did force wage 
concessions in the Adebo (1971) and Udoji(1974) wage and 
salary awards and further compelled some redistribution of oil 
surpluses to subordinate groups through the expansion of 
social services. Retaining an aloofness on critical national 
issues and the plight of subordinate groups, the collective 
responses of professional groups were intermittent at beat. An 
exception was the Association of University Teachers (later
Austin Isamah, "Organized Labour Under the Military Regimes in 
Nigeria" in Africa Paveloemant, vol.XV, no.2, 1990, p.90,
245
changed to ASUU) which joined forces with trade unions in the 
post-Udoji agitations. Also noteworthy was the massive outcry 
in the journalist community, when a colleague was barbarically 
persecuted by the Rivers state military governor for 
publishing a story on planned strike actions by unpaid school 
teachers in the state. Deemed embarrassing to the governor, he 
ordered the reporter's head shaved by a broken bottle.^' This 
act reaffirmed the extent to which the military regime would 
go to suffocate opposition in civil society. Despite 
journalistic protests, for the most part the struggle to 
advance civil and democratic rights continued to be borne by 
principally trade union organizations, the National Union of 
Nigerian Students (NUNS, the student umbrella), radical 
intellectuals and women's groups. Through the period of 
Nigeria's oil boom, the political apathy of professional 
associations persisted as they were generally concerned with 
capitalising on the expanded public sectors and opportunities 
provided in multinational corporations. They also provided a 
pool of skilled labour, which the state utilized in 
implementing successive development plans.
An enlarged public sector and developing industrial 
sector, led to an increase in the Nigerian labour force and 
subsequently to the proliferation of trade unions in the 
country. By the late 1970s, in response to the heightened
Ray Ekpu, "Nigeria's Embattled Fourth Estate" in Journal of 
Danoeraov, vol.l, no.2, Spring 1990, p.114.
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militancy of workers, the state adopted drastic measures aimed 
at rationalizing industrial unions and bring them under state 
control. The Obasanjo regime seized the opportunity to 
disarticulate the precarious trade union unity forged in 1975, 
when competing labour centres formed a central labour umbrella 
to strengthen workplace and broader democratic struggles. The 
breakaway of the conservative ULC enabled the government to 
dissolve the newly formed Nigerian Labour Congress, 
promulgating Trade Union (Amendment) Decree No. 22 of 1978. 
Giving legal backing to its action, the Decree merged the over 
1000 existing unions into 42 industrial unions confederated 
into the NLC. The government's labour policy, also banned 
affiliation with international organizations, introduced an 
automatic wage deduction system to fund unions and initiated 
labour bureaucracies.^
The electoral victory of radical unionists in the NLC 
executive undermined government efforts to create a docile and 
malleable labour movement and again reinforced the 
determination of workers to realize the democratic right of an 
independent trade union movement free from state suppression 
and control. Even though state-imposed, a centralized labour 
front with branches in every state of the federation, provided 
a strong platform to advance workers demands. Indeed, the 
leadership of the NLC was instrumental in working class 
agitation to institute a national minimum wage in the early
35 Pashoyin, “Nigerian Labour", p.20-21
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1980s. However, the new NLC remained vulnerable to state 
machinations.3* The fragility of the NLC, for instance, was 
manifest in its tentative response to state massacres of 
students at the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) and University 
of Lagos (UNILAG) during the 'Ali Must Go' protest. The lack 
of a response to the proscription of the NUNS and detention of 
student leaders, in addition to the non-participation of the 
new central labour body in the nationwide protest of broad 
sections of civil society, is also within this context. 
Maintaining the delicate unity of various political tendencies 
within the NLC similarly informed the decision to comply with 
the 1979 constitutional restriction on trade union 
participation in national politics.
The brief interlude of the Second Republic (1979-1983), 
reaffirmed that the Nigerian ruling classes would not play 
consensual politics, empower ordinary people or build solid 
democratic structures in the country. Electoral competition 
remained marred by political thuggery and violence. Public 
office was simply a means to loot national resources. Debates 
on critical national issues stayed subservient to the 
imperative of private accumulation. Amidst increasing external 
balance of payment difficulties and simultaneous domestic
The Shagari regime, for instance, consistently sought to 
disarticulate workers agitation. During the NLC campaign for a national 
minimum wage, the government revoked the union dues system and encouraged the 
formation of an alternative labour centre in the attempt to cripple the trade 
union movement financially and organizationally. For a detail examination of 
the NLC in this period see: Dafe Otobo, "The Nigerian General Strike of 1981" 
in ROAF». October - December 1981.
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crises of accumulation, the mismanagement of public resources, 
corruption, and reckless spending on conspicuous consumption 
persisted. When the Shagari regime finally introduced some 
'belt tightening' measures, they were largely shouldered by 
the working classes, even as the political class continued to 
enhance its wealth. New political structures and institutions 
were unable to safeguard the consistent abuse of the limited 
civic and democratic right enshrined in the 1979 constitution. 
The legitimacy of the state continued to wane. Popular classes 
remained vulnerable to state co-optation and suppression. 
Organizationally weak, repressed and increasingly confronted 
by the daily struggles for social reproduction, civic 
associations and popular groups were unable to check state 
excesses and resist the encroaching predatory rule, which 
became full blown in the aftermath of 1983 Buhari coup.^'
In the short 20 month reign of the Buhari regime, no 
sector of civil society was immune from state repression, save 
factions of the ruling classes. With a crisis-ridden economy, 
the regime adopted an anti-popular programme for economic 
recovery. Massive lay-offs, onerous taxes, introduction of a 
wide range of user fees, a ban on strikes and the ruthless 
crushing of workers agitation were some of the measures 
introduced to further discipline labour and create an enabling 
environment for domestic accumulation. A series of decrees
For a comprehensive examination of the politics of the Second 
Republic, see Toyin Falola and Julius ihonvbere, Th# Rls# and fall of Nigeria's flaeond R#Dubllo,_ (1979-1944). (London: Zed Press, 1905).
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promulgated, further trampled upon civil and democratic 
rights. The declared 'War Against Indiscipline', to create a 
disciplined and sane society, provided the ideological plank 
to harass and detain workers, peasants, students, radical 
intelligentsia, women's groups, street traders, journalists 
and professional bodies, to curtail opposition against the 
state and its recovery programme. Student unions and medical 
associations were banned. Protesting lawyers, disturbed by the 
wanton abuse of the rule of law, were consistently attacked. 
Alienating broad sectors of civil society, the crisis-ridden 
state relied on repression to reproduce its tenuous hegemony.
Despite the unprecedented state onslaught against civic 
and democratic rights, a number of important developments held 
out promise for the strengthening of popular struggle in the 
civic terrain. The establishment within the central labour 
umbrella of the Nigerian Labour Congress Women's Wing (NLCWW) 
was one such positive and critical initiative. While belated, 
it gave tacit recognition to the long-history of women's 
participation in the trade union movement and the explicit 
expression of the views of radical women unionists and their 
counterparts, that trade unions inextricably incorporate 
gender issues in class struggle at the workplace and broader 
society. Similarly, the emergence of Women-in-Nigeria (WIN) 
provided an articulate and militant voice in support of both 
NLCWW workplace agitations and wider challenges to the class 
and gender character of the state, economy and civil society.
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Though constantly confronting opposition, even within the 
labour and popular movements, WIN remains an integral and 
front-line agitator for the advancement of civil and 
democratic rights (see below). The regime's determination to 
limit political space, together with the continuing economic 
malaise created the environment of the August 1985 Babangida 
coup.
THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE: THE POLITICAL RESPONSES OF WORKERS, 
STUDENTS AND ACADEMIC UNIONS TO SAP AND THE PTP: THE CASE OF 
NLC, NANS AND ASUU.
On coming to power the Babangida regime introduced 
measures to attenuate the alienation of the state from civil 
society. After months of the unyielding authoritarianism of 
the previous junta, the new regime's declared intention to 
uphold human rights was welcomed in civil society. The ensuing 
repeal of a number of draconian decrees, the removal of the 
ban on civic organizations and the mass release of detained 
public officials, journalists and the leadership of popular 
organizations was widely praised. To enhance the regime's 
credibility, the perennial tactic of co-opting radical 
elements into the government was employed. Some trade union 
and women's leaders, social critics, outspoken members of 
professional associations and radical intelligentsia found 
their way into ministerial positions, the presidential 
advisory council and a host of directorates, commissions and 
panels. The regime went further to build hegemony in the civic 
terrain. Early on, Nigerians were enjoined to participate in
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determining the direction of economic recovery and 
development. Committed to reaching an accord with the IMF, yet 
cognizant of popular opposition to the IFIs-sponsored market 
reforms, the government launched the now infamous national IMF 
debate.
Active campaigns by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) 
weeks prior to the national debate, demanding the 
discontinuation of all negotiations with the IMF on the basis 
of the hardship which the conditionalities of SAPs would 
engender, together with the reality of workers resistance to 
the regime's non-compliance, was the compelling factor which 
precipitated the seeming receptiveness of the government 
initiative for popular input. In its policy paper titled 
Towards National Economic Recovery -- NLC's Alternative, the 
NLC reiterated its opposition to adjustment and offered 
alternative prescriptions to redress the crisis. Similarly, 
the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) came out 
against the SAP. The policy document How to Save Nigeria, a 
blueprint adopted in 1984 by the ASUU, was also presented as 
an alternative programme for economic recovery. Nation-wide 
campaigns by NLC and ASUU among others, publicizing the 
implications of the government's proposed recovery programme, 
fuelled mounting popular opposition against one-sided 'belt- 
tightening' measures initiated since the late 1970s. Nigerians 
refused the government's proposal. The rejection of the IMF 
package was resolute, encompassing broad sectors of civil
252
society. Agreeing to refuse the IMF loan, the government 
nonetheless proceeded with the core policy recommendation of 
orthodox structural adjustment, now couch as a 'homegrown' 
programme. Amidst the national debate, the government averted 
a national strike when the NLC objected to the regime's 
unilateral decisions to institute wage cuts and freezes in the 
public and private sectors through the declared 18 month 
National Economic Emergency period. The retention of Decree 
No.16 (lay-off of workers without any justifiable reason) and 
Decree No. 17 (denial of retirement benefits and pension 
rights to workers) remained a source of increasing concern for 
the NLC. It became abundantly clear to the Babangida regime 
that efforts to implement SAP, 'homegrown' or not, would be 
fiercely resisted by workers and other social forces. To 
maintain the facade of democracy, while more importantly 
deflecting attention from its contentious economic policy, the 
government also opened up the question of the country's 
political future for national debate. Yet again, popular 
submissions were rejected.
One social group which vociferously opposed the Babangida 
regime when many popular organizations were initially 
receptive, was the National Association of Nigerian Students 
(NANS). Despite ceaseless attempts throughout the post­
colonial period to suppress student groups, they remained 
steadfast in expressing popular demands around immediate 
issues in the education sector and the wider society.
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Throughout the brief human rights and democratic pretensions 
of the Babangida government, the NANS maintained the position 
that the country's political and socio-economic woes cannot be 
resolved by an illegitimate military regime.^® This 
philosophy informed NANS contiguous opposition to adjustment 
and the political transition programme. In many respects, the 
unwavering commitment of NANS to popular democracy contributed 
to the radicalisation of the hitherto conservative ASUU. 
Indeed, the economic crisis, declining real incomes of 
lecturers and job insecurity were compelling reasons which 
encouraged ASUU to mount opposition against the crumbling 
educational sector, the decaying national economy and the 
restriction of political space.®® However, the indomitable 
role students have played in strengthening civil society, in 
no small measure has also driven ASUU to uphold its social 
responsibility to confront critical issues facing tl.e country.
The opposition of student groups, academic and trade 
unions to adjustment and predatory rule, has in turn, been met 
with consistent state repression. In 1986, for instance, 
Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) was again the scene ")f ruthless 
state violence. The immediate crisis began when r.niversity 
authorities and the government disapproved of students' 
ebullient participation at the May Day rally in Kaduna,
®® Interview with Segun Maiyegun, former National President of the 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Anthony Village, Lagos, 
January 13, 1994,
39 Jega '’Professional Associations", p.102.
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organized by the Kaduna State branch of the NLC. Banners and 
placards abounded condemning the government's so-called 
'homegrown' adjustment programme. Coming shortly after the 
nation-wide commemorative rally of the 1978 students massacre 
at ABU, the university authorities were further outraged by 
students' militancy. The ABU administration responded by 
taking issue with the entrance of male students into female 
hostels during mobilization campaigns to garner support for 
the May Day rally. Protesting students boycotted lectures and 
staged a demonstration against the artificiality of these 
claims. The mobile police force called in by the university to 
subdue the peaceful protest led to the massive assault on the 
participants and the killing of five defenceless students.'*" 
In the aftermath, an outraged university community and 
civil society, vocally led by the ASUU, NLC, and WIN condemned 
the atrocity. Student protest exploded on campuses throughout 
the country leading to more carnage at the University of Benin 
(UNIBEN) and UNILAG. The ensuing establishment of the Abisoye 
Commission by the military government to investigate the 
incident was boycotted by the NANS, ASUU and NLC who demanded 
an independent inquiry and the immediate removal of the ABU 
Vice Chancellor and the Police Commissioner of Kaduna State. 
Weakened by the decision of the ABU branch of ASUU to ignore 
the boycott and participate in the government's inquiry, the
A.s. Mohammed, "The Aftermath of the Ahmadu Bello University 
Students' Crisis of May 1986" in ROAPg. December 1986, p.98.
255
commission proceeded with its fact finding mission and 
subsequently absolved the police and university authorities 
from any responsibility for the incident. The crisis would 
deepen. A nation-wide march planned by the NLC to illustrate 
worker's outrage and support for students, was aborted by 
swift state action. Having grudgingly capitulated to workers 
demands for the reinstatement of the 1982 Minimum Wage Act, 
which the government sought to abolish a month earlier, the 
Babangida regime determined to curb further workers' 
agitation, parted with its democratic pretensions. The AFRO 
re-instituted the ban on public demonstrations and proceeded 
to enforce the notorious State Security Decree No.2 (detention 
without trial) enacted by its predecessor. On the eve of 
protest, the State Security Service (SSS) arrested and 
detained the leadership of the NANS, ASUU and NLC and occupied 
the offices of the latter in all state capitals.
The repressive state response to public outcry 
illustrated its preparedness to crush opposition to the regime 
and its contentious economic recovery programme. Reflecting 
ASUU'8 increasing militancy, the Babangida government accused 
the organization of inciting student and worker unrest and 
promulgated a decree disaffiliating the academic union from 
the NLC. Crippling university autonomy, a decree was also 
enacted empowering the state to arbitrarily inspect the 
finances and curriculum content of higher institutions. 
University administrations at ABU were implored to dismiss
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radical intellectual, for failing to instruct student on what 
they are paid to teach. The then president of ASUU, Dr. Festus 
lyayi, was later terminated from UNIBEN." The NANS was 
proscribed. Much like the 1978 'Ali Must Go Protest' , in order 
to de-legitimize opposition to a decaying educational sector 
and national economy, the state dismissed students' militancy 
as youthful exuberance, sheer adventurism, and lack of home 
training. The NLC was castigated for getting involved in 
student affairs, noting that the NANS was not a trade union. 
The SSS alleged a grand civilian conspiracy to overthrow the 
government, led by the NLC as the political party, NANS its 
youth wing and ASUU the intellectual vanguard. Despite 
unyielding state attempts to disarticulate and domesticate the 
alliance forged by NLC, ASUU, and NANS, through co-optation, 
infiltration and repression, they remain central forces in 
popular campaigns against adjustment and military rule.
One aspect of the adjustment programme, which remains 
strongly contested by these groups and other national and 
transnational forces is the question of the removal of oil 
subsidies. Since the early 1980s, this issue, particularly the 
alleged massive petrol subsidies, has been at the core of 
successive stalled negotiations between the Nigerian 
governments and the IMF. The removal of Nigeria's 'oil 
subsidy' is one of the prerequisite for IPI funding. Non- 
compliance with this stipulation, had prohibited the
41 Jega, "Professional Associations", p.lOS -106,
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government from receiving IMF Extended Fund Facilities and 
standby agreements (and its renewal), World Bank SALs, the 
rescheduling of external debt and had also precluded 
qualification for bilateral debt reductions, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two. On one side of the debate is the Nigerian 
government, via the parastatal Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and the IFIs, and on the other, the NLC, 
NANS, ASUU, farmers, and other democratic groups. It is argued 
by proponents of adjustment that petrol in Nigeria is heavily 
subsidized because local prices of petrol and petroleum 
products are well below regional and world market prices. The 
1986 Budget, in which SAP was launched, therefore moved to 
'get local oil prices right', by nearly doubling the price of 
a litre of petrol from 20 kobo (cent unit) to 39.5 kobo, said 
to represent an 80% reduction of the oil subsidy.
As the naira continued to depreciate and the alleged oil 
subsidy eroded correspondingly, the Nigerian government came 
under intense pressure form the IFIs and bilateral donors to 
adjust the price of petrol upwards. Visiting IMF monitoring 
teams had failed to endorse the country's adjustment programme 
because of 'slippage in programme implementation', again 
centred on the question of an oil subsidy. Failing to live up 
to the performance criteria of the SAP led the World Bank to 
withhold a US$500 SAL and the IMF to prohibit further standby 
arrangements and debt rescheduling, pending government
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initiative to redress primarily this concern/" With the 
impending expiration of an IMF standby agreement, in late 1987 
the Babangida regime resolved to deal decisively with the oil 
subsidy issue. Recognizing the mounting opposition to its 
economic recovery programme, the Babangida regime initiated a 
national campaign to soften the civic terrain for the new 
measure.
In the hope of deflecting civic resistance against the 
government, the state-owned NNPC (commercialized in 1991) ran 
advertisements in the national daily newspapers extolling the 
necessity of the subsidy removal and the developmental 'gains' 
of higher oil prices. One, entitled Oil Subsidy Facts, was 
widely publicized in the print and electronic media. It argued 
that :
For every barrel of petroleum used in Nigeria, we lose N65.24, 
at a conservative $ to N exchange rate of $ to N4.00. For the 
volume of crude oil consumed locally about 290,000 daily, the 
loss comes to N6.80 billion in one year. We suffer this loss 
because we sell cured oil at home for Nil.75 a barrel instead of 
N76.99 (abroad). The difference of N65.24 is what is called oil 
subsidy. If there was no subsidy, this NG.80 billion can b(-* used 
to make life easier and better for the majority of Nigerians by 
financing agriculture for more cheaper (sic] food, providing 
employment outlets, good mass transportation system, medicine 
and education for children etc."
Buttressing such arguments, the government maintained that 
where local oil prices were much higher in non-oil producing 
African countries, other OPEC nations and advanced capitalist 
countries, "Nigerians cannot hope to live alone in a fools
42 Bangura and Beckman, "African Workers", p.76.
S. Ogoh Alubo, "Crisis. Repression and Prospects for Democracy in 
Nigeria" in aoandinaviao Journal of Development Alternative#, Special Issue 
on Nigeria's Political Economy, vol.8, no.4, 1989, p.111.
259
paradise."4* That is to say, Nigeria could no longer afford 
to offer its populace petrol at prices below those of the 
international market. These cheaper domestic prices are also 
blamed for contributing to the smuggling of oil into 
neighbouring countries.
Nigerians were not convinced by this argument. The NLC, 
ASUU, NANS and WIN in conjunction with other groups argued 
that no subsidy exists on petrol or petroleum products. 
Prominent Nigerian economist Kayode Familoni, asserted that 
'•if the government grants concessions to the producer or 
seller of the product so that the price being charged to the 
consumer is below the cost of production, then a subsidy 
situation exists. . . [however] such a scenario does not exist in 
the oil industry."^® Supporting this position, Charles 
Njoku's recent examination of oil price trends under the SAP, 
maintained that "not only is there no subsidy but we 
Nigerian's are paying more than we should".*® At the time of 
the government's 1988 propaganda campaign, studies conducted 
by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of 
Nigeria (PENGASSAN) arrived at a similar conclusion. The 
central labour organ launched a counter-campaign, mounting
** Femi Olatunde, et al., "Fuel for Protest" in African Concord, 
vol.7, no,40, 1993, p.17.
Kayode Familoni cited in "A Recipe for Disorder" in African 
Concord, vol.7, no.40., 1993, p.16.
*® Sunny Ofili, "The Politics of Subsidy" in African Guardian, vol.8, 
no.4, 1993, p.23.
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posters throughout the country highlighting this argument and 
forcefully exposing the one-sidedness of the government's 
comparative analysis of world differential oil price levels. 
Noting the decline in real incomes of ordinary Nigerians, the 
NLC argued that an accurate comparative assessment must take 
due cognizance of differential wage levels. Moreover, the NLC 
argued that proceeds, supposedly earmarked for development 
purposes (or perhaps more accurately to settle external 
balances) from the first round of 'subsidy withdrawals', "did 
not make any positive impact on the lives of working class 
Nigerians and was never accounted f o r . W h e r e  the Babangida 
regime remained committed to sacrifice the living standards of 
the poor, the General-Secretary of NLC, Lasisi Osunde, 
asserted that "working class Nigerians were again being asked 
to subsidize the smugglers and elites who reap huge national 
resources".** Popular organizations attributed 'resource 
leakages' in the oil sector to the corrupt practices of a few 
Nigerians and their foreign partners. Inefficient production, 
smuggling, the massive mismanagement of the NNPC, over­
invoicing and transfer pricing of multinational oil firms were 
some of the abuses identified by Nigerians requiring immediate 
government redress.
Not surprisingly, the government was not swayed by the




argument of Nigerians and their organizations. State responses 
to the resistance of popular organizations was quick. In late 
1987, the NLC leadership was arrested and detained. The 
offices of the organization were ransacked. Sensing that these 
measures might not enough to disorganize the NLC, the 
government took further steps to weaken the Congress in order 
to ensure the smooth implementation of higher fuel prices. The 
Babangida government seized the opportunity when an internal 
rift developed within the NLC, occasioned by the controversy 
surrounding the Benin Quadrennial Delegates Conference of 
February 1988. In direct contravention of both the NLC's 
constitution and the government's Decree No.22, a tiny group 
of unions led by Takai Sharamang and the self-styled 
'Democrats' attempted to form a parallel labour centre. 
Failing to remain current on financial contributions to the 
Congress, the so-called 'Democrats' were constitutionally 
ineligible to participate in conference proceedings. The 
conference agenda items included the election of a new 
executive and the re-affirmation of its policy on the 
privatization programme and domestic petroleum prices.
Aggrieved by their legitimate expulsion from the 
conference, the Shammang group alerted the Federal Minister of 
Labour, Employment and Productivity of a supposed 'Marxist' 
conspiracy to dominate labour activities in the country. 
Receiving a receptive hearing from the regime, the breakaway 
faction would later present their case in court, calling for
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the dissolution of the NLC and the subsequent appointment of 
a sole administrator. Days before the NLC conference, the 
Shammang group went on to convene a parallel forum and 
elections, in contravention of Decree No.22 which sanctioned 
only one labour body in the country. The Benin Conference 
proceeded, democratically re-electing the incumbent Ali 
Chiroma and a new Executive Council under the observance of 
representatives of the Commonwealth Trade Union Council, 
International Labour Organization, Organization of African 
Trade Union Unity and Organization of Trade Unions of West 
Africa, to which the NLC is affiliated.Delegates also 
endorsed campaigns against the government's privatization 
programme and further petroleum price increases. By its 
inaction, the government gave tacit support to the brewing 
crisis within the trade union movement. The problems within 
the NLC provided the government with an opening to domesticate 
the trade union movement. Under the pretext of tempering 
labour fragmentation and ideological intolerance, the AFRC 
intervened and dissolved the democratically-elected executive 
of the NLC in March 1988. Interestingly, the government 
further justified its actions by deeming the NLC crisis 
inimical to the interest of individual workers and to the 
general detriment of national economic recovery and the PTP. 
Michael Ogunkoya was appointed the sole administrator to
For an analysis of the 1988 dissolution of the NLC see: A, Olukoshi 
and I. Aremu, “Structural Adjustment and Labour Subordination in Nigeria: The 
Dissolution of the Nigerian Labour Congress Revisited" in KOAPB. no.43, 1989.
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oversee the Congress' affairs and enjoined by the government 
to revise the NLC's constitution and supervise new elections 
within six months.
Less than a month later, on April 10, Nigerians went to 
the pumps to discover a 3 kobo (42.0k/L) increase per litre of 
petrol. Widespread anger over a seemingly insignificant rise 
in oil prices, in the context of declining real incomes and 
the inflationary impact of this measure, touched off a 
nationwide anti-IMF/anti-SAP rebellion. Again, immediate 
opposition began on the campus of one of the county's 
universities. At the University of Jos (UNIJOS) , the financial 
implications of rising transport costs, where university 
hostels are situated between 3-8km from lecture halls, 
triggered student protest. Students embarked on a peaceful 
procession to Plateau State Government House to deliver a 
letter addressed to General Babangida containing their 
demands. Artisans, market women, commercial drivers and the 
unemployed joined the march, where upon arrival, the state 
governor was said to compliment the students' maturity and 
requested they remain law abiding while awaiting a reply to 
their concerns. The response was swift. Mobile anti-riot 
police were summoned and overwhelmed the defenceless 
protestors at the university with tear gas and other 
instruments of coercion. The agitation spilled over into the 
city of Jos, and again the mobile police displayed their force 
by indiscriminately massacring demonstrators, independently
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reported at between 15 and 30. The murder of a nurse attending 
to the injured intensified popular anger and brought about the 
participation of nurses in the city, soon joined by tanker 
drivers, and trade unions. The city of Jos was paralysed and 
shortly thereafter campuses and major cities through the 
country were engulfed in widespread protest and work 
stoppages. Farmers were outraged by the higher transportation 
costs incurred in the delivery of produce to markets.
Universities across the country were closed down. 
Student, academics and trade union leaders were arrested and 
detained. Despite the increasing coercion, the agitation of 
popular groups spread. With a crumbling economy and deepening 
crisis of legitimacy, the government was compelled to 
negotiate with workers. The Babangida regime was, however, 
caught in the contradiction that "having decapitated the NLC 
there [was] no umbrella organization to negotiate with."®" 
Key industrial unions later assembled a negotiating team to 
address the crisis. The Ad-hoc labour committee demanded the 
restoration of pre-April 10th petroleum prices, the removal of 
the state-appointed NLC administrator, a review of the 
government's attitude towards NLC, NANS and ASUU, a review of 
the massacre in Jos, and the implementation of the Elongated 
Salary Structure (ESS) introduced in the 1988 budget as part 
of the proposed SAP relief package. The government agreed on 
the latter, but remained abysmally slow in implementing the
Alubo, "Crisis, Repression", p.114.
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proposed wage and salary increases. But of course, in spite of 
the loss of lives and destruction of property, the v.ew oil 
prices now allowed the government to qualify for multilateral 
and bilateral aid flows and external debt rescheduling, in 
line with the anticipated revival of economic growth and 
development. As the naira continued to plummet, the domestic 
prices of petroleum continued to rise. Revised upward on five 
occasions since the introduction of SAP, the price of a litre 
of petrol increased from 39.5 kobo/litre in 1986, to 42.0 
kobo/litre in 1988, to 60.0 k/L in 1989, to 70 k/L in 1991 and 
N3.25/L in 1993,
THE CASE OF THE NLC
State intervention in the NLC affairs, while failing to 
produce a docile and malleable trade union movement, 
illustrates the contradictory forces of co-optation and 
militancy at work within the trade union movement. Under the 
incumbency of the new NLC president, Pascal Bafyau, the 
efforts of the state and capital to placate the leadership of 
the Congress, juxtaposed by the counter-demands from 'below' 
for a democratic, accountable, loyal and militant NLC, became 
increasingly manifest when confronting critical issues at the 
workplace and in the wider society. For instance, the 
leadership of the NLC came under criticism by affiliate unions 
for the paltry SAP relief concessions reached in the 1992 
minimum wage negotiations. The Central Working Committee (CWC) 
of the NLC was empowered to demand a 200 percent increase in
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wage and salaries or a reversal to the pre-March naira 
exchange rate, rent freezes and greater sectoral allocation of 
foreign exchange to the productive sectors of the economy. 
However, the accord struck with the government not only 
reduced the wage increment demanded, but most significantly 
dismantled collective bargaining agreements. State and local 
governments where now enjoined to negotiate with independent 
unions." The agreement essentially enabled the federal 
government to deflect responsibility for salary reviews and to 
date the implementation of wage increases continue to vary 
across states and local government areas in the federation.
The abandonment of core policy positions of the NLC, the 
open support for the SAP, the advocacy for an extended PTP, 
and the distancing of the NLC from popular groupings under the 
Bafyau incumbency, seemed to support the allegation of 
collaboration with the government levelled against the NLC 
leadership. For instance, despite workers' agitation against 
the privatization of parastatals, Pascal Bafyau unilaterally 
campaigned for the allocation of one seat to the NLC on the 
Technical Committee for Privatization and Commercialization 
(TCPC), which oversees the process. A 'receptive' government 
allotted two seats. The members of the CWC condemned Bafyau's 
actions internally and publicly, but the loyalty of the NLC 
leadership continued to remain suspect. In June 1989, th • NLC
Yinka Telia, "Labour's agonistsi Discontent in the Ranks over 
Pascal Bayfau's Leadership" in African guardian, vol.7, no.32, August 31, 
1992, p.8-11.
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under suspicious circumstances abruptly withdrew an earlier 
clearance letter enabling the use of its Conference Hall for 
a symposium. Convened by human rights activists and popular 
groups, the seminar was to debate Alternatives to SAP. The 
seminar was later aborted, and the convenors, radical lawyer 
Chief Gani Fawehinmi, social critic Tai Solarin, and veteran 
unionist Chief Michael Imoudu were among those arrested and 
detained by the SSS for holding anti-SAP views. Even given 
this clear abuse of basic democratic rights, the NLC did not 
condemn the government for this act. The Nigerian Labour 
Congress Women's Wing, however, strongly criticized the action 
of the CWC and came out in support of the proposed seminar, 
arguing it "would be in the best interest of the people of 
this country that the government should allow people to 
suggest alternatives to SAP"Likewise, the NLC leadership 
distanced itself from the popular protest during the nation­
wide May 1989 and 1992 rebellions initiated by students. 
Openly denouncing the anti-SAPs and anti-military government 
agitations, the leadership of the NLC would later lay claim 
for the SAP relief concessions emerging from the agitation. 
Such contradictory tendencies of state co-optation and 
competing pressures from below for militancy, transparency, 
and accountability within the NLC, would manifest itself again 
in the response of the NLC to June 12 pro-democracy protests.
Kole Ahmed Shettima, "Women's Movement and Visions: the Nigerian 
Labour Congress Women' Wing" in Africa Development, vol.14, no.3, 1989.
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(see below)
THE CASE OF THE NANS
A testament to its organizational capabilities and firm
democratic structures, the NANS is perhaps one of the few, if
not the only, popular organization to consistently and
effectively resist state coercion and cooptation. Operating
under proscription for most of the last decade, the student
body remained resilient and unwavering in its commitment to
democracy, human rights and social justice. In its post-1986
ABU crisis review, in which the union was re-proscribed, the
NANS officially resolved to disregard any government ban and
resist all attempts to suppress student organizations.
Reflecting the tenacity of Nigerian students, the NANS
maintained "that an undemocratic government cannot be expected
to open up the political space, to enable civic groups to
organize and agitate f r e e l y . N o t  surprisingly then, the
NANS has continued to mount opposition against SAP and
predatory rule, and has often been the catalyst of popular
protests. Undeterred by heightened state coercion in the wake
of the April 1988 anti-SAP rebellions, the communique of the
NANS 8th annual conference a few months later not^d that,
NANS viewed with serious concern the total failure of the RhV 
imposed on the nation by the IMP and World Bank, Delegates hold 
that SAP, its components, FEM (inter-bank forex market) 
privatization and so-called debt equity-swaps are designed by 
Western countries as part of the conspiracy to subjugate the 
economic destiny of our country and subject our people to
Interview with Segun Maiyegun, January 1994.
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perpetual poverty and slavery,"
and resolved to launch a countrywide campaign resisting any 
further increase in petroleum prices. Later that year the NANS 
issued a six week ultimatum to the government, setting out a 
list of demands which included,
a) the immediate abolition of the SAP, b) stop [World Bank] 
rationalization of courses c) abolish examination fees d) 
increase the funding of education e) stop the invasion of 
campuses by security agents f) stop the panic closure of 
universities g) provide free health care for all Nigerians up to 
the age of 18, women and old citizens in the Third Republic 
constitution, and h) guarantee free education for all citizens 
up to secondary school level.®®
After the ultimatum lapsed, the UNIBEN branch of the NANS 
organized a seminar on the Pains of SAPs. University 
authorities countered by convening a symposium on the Gains of 
SAPs. Undaunted, students proceeded on a peaceful march "with 
a mock coffin and green leaves singing 'SAP MUST GO* we are 
dying of hunger in the name of SAP"®® The UNIBEN Anti-SAP 
processions escalated.
By the mere fact that NANS represented independent 
student unions in over 114 higher institutions as well as 
secondary schools, any action taken by the union is usually 
national in scope and invariably draws the support of various 
social forces in civil society. Such was the case of the May 
1989 Anti-SAP protest. The initial peaceful protest was 
further fuelled by the murder of 6 students at UNIBEN by the
Ekeocha and Amidu cited in Kole Ahmed Shettima, "Structural 
Adjustment and the Student Movement in Nigeria" in ROAPg. 1992, p.85.
Shettima, "Student Movement", p.86. 
Shettima, Ibid., p.86.
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mobile police and military, on a clear 'shoot at sight' 
directive from the federal government. Concurrently, the 
widespread allegation that General Babangida was the 3rd 
richest man in Africa and 7th in the world, further heightened 
popular anger. The protest spread, engulfing the whole country 
and involved school children, artisans, market women, farmers, 
workers and women's associations, joined by human rights 
groups. Universities throughout the country were closed down. 
The leadership of NANS was arrested and detained. At the end 
of violent clashes with the armed forces, over 100 people were 
killed nationally. In a tacit, yet costly recognition of the 
deepening impoverishment of Nigerians, the Babangida regime 
introduced its SAP relief package, which included among other 
concessions, wage and salary increases and the establishment 
of the NDE and the Peoples Bank -- alluded to earlier.
Another aspect of the adjustment programme the NANS has 
consistently resisted, is the rationalization of the 
university system -- the euphemism for phasing out 
departments, programmes and courses, downsizing academic and 
non-academic staff and increasing existing user fees -- under 
the tutelage of the World Bank. Having led nationwide 
campaigns for the abolishment of the adjustment programme, the 
NANS naturally agitated against the adverse consequences of 
the SAP on its immediate constituency. Therefore the NANS 
opposed the U.S.$140 million World Bank loan, accepted by the 
federal government in April 1990 for a 'Federal University
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Restructuring Exercise'.” As an editorial in a Nigerian
daily newspaper accurately noted,
...right or wrong, the World Bank and its affiliates in Nigeria 
are held responsible in no small measure for the nation's 
economic predicament. We recall the passion, indeed the
bitterness, that characterized the IMP debate in 1985 especially 
with regards to the conditionalities. Between them, the IMF and 
the Bank have advocated policies that would curtail rather than 
enhance access to higher education especially in the Third 
World. Thus any loan from these institutions earmarked for 
tertiary education was bound to be regarded with intense 
suspicion if not outright misgivings by the university 
community."
Indeed, a degree of rationalization is required within the 
Nigerian university system, particularly with regards to the 
proliferation of universities (now 31 with consistent 
clamouring for more) which serve more the political and
accumulation ambitions of the dominant classes than
educational pursuits. Certainly, a case can be made for the 
amalgamation of certain universities. However, efforts to 
produce an efficient and cost effective university system 
through the policies advocated by the World Bank, merely treat 
the symptoms of the problems which confront the educational 
sector in the country. With a clear understanding of the roots 
of the current educational crisis, the NANS maintained that 
since the conditions of the education sector are subsumed 
within the general crisis of the Nigerian state and economy, 
the redress of the sector's decay must be inextricably linked 
to the restructuring of the state and economy.” The 9th
” shettima, "Student Movement", p.89.
The Guardian cited in Shettima, Ibid., p.90. 
Interview with Segun Maiyegun, January 1994..
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annual conference of the NANS therefore took a strong position 
against the loan. Illuminating the contradictions of the World 
Bank's conditionalities, the association noted that whereas 
the stipulations demanded an increase in expatriate staff 
salaries, they concurrently called for the massive lay-off of 
Nigerian staff. Challenging the proposed cost cutting 
measures, the NANS further argued that the policy of phasing 
out departments and programmes and increasing user fees, 
amounted to the recolonization of the Nigerian university 
system by narrowing the content of education while also making 
it increasingly inaccessible to the majority of Nigerians. 
Starting from the campuses of the ABU, agitation against the 
World Bank loan proliferated to other universities, but they 
were abruptly halted by the failed Orka Coup of April 1990 and 
the heightened state clampdown on popular protests in its 
immediate aftermath."
Unable to curb students' militancy and co-op the 
leadership of their organizations, the Nigerian state has 
relied heavily on intimidation and coercion to subdue the 
movement. In the wake cf the 1989-Anti SAP riots, the 
Babangida regime promulgated Student Decree No.47 (Control and 
Regulation) enhancing the power of the state to ban unions and 
expel student activists. The edict also limited student unions
shettima, Ibid., p.90.
For an in depth and critical look at the failed April 1990 Orka 
Coup, see Julius Ihonvbere, "A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in 
Nigeria" in The Journal of Modern African gtudias, vol.29, no.4, 1991.
273
to individual campuses and made student union membership 
voluntary, in the attempt to break inter-campus networks and 
reduce membership. State security agents are ever present on 
most university campuses. Students and student union leaders 
are frequently harassed and assaulted. Many student activists 
have been expelled and rusticated from campuses. Increasingly, 
the government and university authorities have sponsored 
organizations such as the New Breed, Third Eye, and Peace 
Movements, to form a counterpoise to radical unionism. 
These unions have launched propaganda campaigns attempting to 
discredit militant student unions.
One outgrowth of the condition of violence and 
militarization on campuses is the growing phenomenon of secret 
cults. From relative obscurity in the 1970s, when alternative 
student unions were able to curtail their activities, in the 
pervasive environment of state clampdown on radical student 
unions, secret cults have mushroomed on every university 
campus in the federation. Representing a fringe element of 
right-wing forces on campuses, cults such as the Black Axe, 
Black Beret, Buccaneers, Eiye, Mafia, Pyrates and Vikings have 
nonetheless contributed greatly to the environment of fear, 
intimidation, thuggery and uneasiness which now exist on 
campuses. The modus operand! of these cults is simply to 
terrorize the student community. The extortion of money from 
students is rampant. Exorbitant protection fees ranging from
Shettima, "Students Movement", p. 68.
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N5,000 to N10,000 are levied on students and even lecturers, 
to avoid attack. The majority of cults are well armed, with 
the source of weaponry subject to on-going debate.Theft 
and armed robbery on campuses continued to rise. Cult related 
murders and violence have reached un-precedented proportions. 
Female students have been particularly vulnerable to gangs of 
thugs who freely roam Nigerian universities. Incidents of rape 
have therefore risen. Femi Adelakun, chairman of UNIJOS 
chapter of ASUU recently noted, that "although it is glaring 
that cases of rape occurs on campuses daily, it has been 
difficult to keep good statistics, because most assaults go 
unreported.
While the government's Student Decree No.47 of 1989, 
outlaws cults and exacts a penalty of five yea^s imprisonment 
and N50,000 on offenders, the government and university 
authorities have done very little to curb the proliferation of 
cults and their criminal activities. This has contributed to 
the predominant view within NANS that secret cults are state 
sponsored and encouraged to disarticulate and subdue radical 
student unionism. Secret cults openly and actively recruit on 
campuses, urging students to join without rebuke from 
university officials. They have grown in strength, such that 
secret cults now sponsor candidates during student union
Chinedu Ezeanah, "Blood Feud on the Campus" in T#ll, October 26, 
1992, p.19.
64 Sam Olukoya, "Cult War" in Nawawatch, March 28, 1994, p. 13.
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elections in hope of taking them o v e r . "  goth the ASUU and 
the NANS have vociferously called on the government to lift 
the ban on student unions and political activities on 
campuses, in order to check the rampant criminal activities of 
secret cults. Since the government and universities 
authorities have remained unreceptive to these demands and 
campus security and the police seem powerless by their 
generally failure to intervene to prevent the rampant 
killings, rapes and rabid lawlessness of secret cults, student 
unions have resolved to independently address the issue on 
respective campuses. The NANS has adopted a policy which 
called for stronger and militant student unions capable of 
rebuffing any act of violence on campuses. As the current 
national president of the NANS, Nasser Ja'far, recently noted 
"only force and mass action can dislodge secret cults...[who 
are now] in possession of lethal weapons."" Para-military 
associations have been formed to protect student leaders and 
the wider student community, particularly focusing on measures 
to provide greater security for female students.®'' Whether or 
not the secret cults are directly state sponsored, the 
consistent state suppression of an array of alternative voices 
has created an environment conducive to the rise and 




Olukoya, "Cult War", p.15 
Olukoya, "Cult War", p.17.
Interview with Segun Maiyegun, January 1994.
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resiliency, heightened cult activities have largely failed to 
dampen the militancy of student unionism nationwide.
The crisis-ridden Nigerian state has also sought to 
divert the concrete struggles of the NANS by attributing 
students' agitation to manipulations by political saboteurs, 
'old breed' politicians, banned political aspirants and 
disgruntled former beneficiaries of the import-licensing 
system, all bent on subverting the SAP and PTP. For example, 
a former Minister of Communication under the Babangida regime, 
reached this conclusion during the April 1988 oil crisis, when 
he noted that "after all students cannot go on the rampage 
just because of a 2.5 kobo increase in fuel prices. How many 
students own cars?"®® In the same vein, the root causes of 
the 1989 student-led Anti-SAP protests was attributed by the 
federal government to the machinations of Nigerians "who felt 
the transition to civilian rule could not go without them."®® 
Using the pretext of SAP, students were said to be manipulated 
in order to cause havoc in the war to destroy government 
credibility. Despite such opposition to the NANS and the rise 
of retrogressive organizations on campuses, increasingly in 
tandem with a growing faction of student groups seeking to 
simply limit the student agenda to educational issues 
affecting individual constituencies, the NANS remained the 
principal student organization. It continued to link issues in
®® Shettima, "Students Movement", p.87, 
Shettima, Loc.cit, p.87.
277
the educational sector to wider struggles in civil society. 
Acting nationally, in spite of an unrecognized apex body, the 
NANS has remained at the forefront of the agitation against 
SAP and the PTP, even within the informal tripartite alliance 
forged with ASUU and the NLC. The May 1992 NANS led nation­
wide protest, explicitly linked the demand for the abolition 
of SAP to the resignation of the Babangida junta and the 
immediate convening of a Sovereign National Conference. In no 
small measure, the consistent struggles of the NANS in this 
period was a contributing factor which gave rise to the CD, 
the broad civil society coalition which emerged in late 1991 
to advance the struggle for human rights, social justice, and 
national self-reliance.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL RESPONSE 
OF THE ORGANIZATIONS' OF ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS AND LAWYERS
THE CASE OF THE ASUU
Like the NLC and the NANS, campaigns by the ASUU against 
the SAP and PTP in the wake of the 1988 Anti-SAP protest has 
been countered with increasing state attack. With the reality 
of declining real incomes of the intellectual middle class and 
the closure of opportunities for upward mobility, ASUU could 
no longer ignore the unabating crisis of the economy, 
especially as manifest in the educational sector. The 
cumulative effect of the crisis, wanton state neglect, the 
rationalization drive under the auspices of the World Bank, 
the culture of anti-intellectualism fostered by successive 
military regimes intermeshed with the current deification of
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money, contributed to the dilapidation of the university 
system and the general rot of the educational sector. The 
appalling state of university decay is uniform between first 
generation institutions, such as ABU, Obafemi Awolowo 
University (OAU, formerly Univ. of Ife), University of Ibadan 
(UI), UNILAG and the University of Nigeria (UNN, at Nsukka) 
and those founded in the 1970s and 1980s. The physical 
infrastructure of campuses has deteriorated. Buildings are 
decrepit. There is a widespread shortage of lecture halls, 
office space, student hostels and staff housing. Many of the 
classrooms have no chairs or most are broken and have been 
neither repaired nor replaced. Classrooms are so overcrowded 
that students now stand up to receive lectures.Students 
are often compelled to write examinations on the floor. In the 
faculty of science, laboratories are without equipment or 
function with outmoded instruments. Available library books 
were published in the 1960s. It is a rarity to find books 
published as recent as 1985. Complete and current journals are 
unheard of. Electricity and water supplies are at best, very 
erratic. The living conditions of Nigerian students are 
particularly alarming. Hostels are so congested that finding 
less than 10 students living in a room designed for two is 
quite rare. Housing shortages are such that a bed space which
Yakubu Mohammed et al., "Collapse of Universities: Tower Without 
Ivory" in Newswatch. Special Supplement on Nigerian Universities, September 
21, 1992.
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went for N90 in 1979 now costs between Nl,400 and N2,000.” 
The material conditions of universities illuminated in brief 
here, are replicated throughout the polytechnics, colleges of 
education and medicine and primary and secondary institutions.
Against this backdrop of degeneration, ASUU has 
vociferously agitated against the gross under-funding of the 
educational sector, intertwined with issues of declining 
incomes of lectures, job insecurity and abuse of university 
autonomy. In 1988, after a prolonged eight month stalemate in 
its industrial dispute lodged with the government over the 
non-implementation of the ESS, ASUU together with the Senior 
Staff Association of Universities, Teaching Hospitals, 
Research Institutes and Associated Institutions (SSAUTHRIAI) 
and the Non-Academic Staff Union of Universities (NASU) went 
on strike. The strike action largely halted teaching 
activities in tertiary institutions throughout the country. 
The then Minister of Education and long-time Professor of 
Cardiology, Jibril Aminu, appeared on national television 
declaring the ASUU-led agitation irresponsible and 
unreasonable, warning lecturers that the government would 
terminate the employment of those not returning to work within 
48 hours.Shortly thereafter the ASUU was proscribed. The 
former national president Dr. Festus lyayi, the incumbent and
Mohammed, "Tower without Ivory", p. 13.
Muyiwa Akintunde and Tony lyare, "'Ideas, Not the Person, Interest 
Me'" in Nawawateh. Interview with Attahiru Jega, 'Newswatch 1993 Man of the 
Year', January 11, 1993, p.12.
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current national president of ASUU Dr. Attahiru Jega, among 
other top officials of the union were arrested and 
incarcerated. Branch officers of the ASUU were harassed and 
intimidated, forced to submit their passports to the SSS and 
report daily to security offices. Government's independent 
meeting with SSAUTHRIAI, led the union to call off its strike 
action, serving to isolate the ASUU.’-* The ASUU was then 
summoned to appear before the Industrial Dispute Panel, which 
in turn ordered lecturers back to work before negotiations 
could commence. After 7 days, the ASUU called off the nation­
wide strike and reentered fruitless negotiations with the 
government.
Again in 1991, the ASUU filed an industrial dispute with 
the government. Learning from the limitations of the 1988 
experience, the union broadened its demands beyond bread and 
butter issues, to now include among its grievances issues of 
educational sector under-funding, academic freedom and 
university autonomy. With a two month stalemate in 
negotiations, in May 1992 the ASUU embarked on a more 
effective strike action which enlisted the support of NANS, 
human rights groups and other democratic organizations. The 
then Minister of Education and professor of education Aliu 
Babatunde Fanfunwa, denounced the action of his 'colleagues' 
with the same litany of adjectives used to delegitimize 
popular demands. The former Vice President Admiral Augustus
73 Jega, “Professional Associations", p.107.
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Aikhomu issued a 24 hour ultimatum for lecturers to vacate 
their university quarters. The ASUU, for the second time in 
four years was proscribed (the ban on the union was first 
rescinded in April 1990). A battle-ready academic union, 
anticipating this manoeuvre from a crisis-ridden state, 
quickly re-emerged as the National Association of University 
Teachers (NAUT), rendering the ban virtually ineffective. A 
desperate government called on traditional rulers to mediate 
the impasse. Peace talks mediated by the Sultan of Sokotc, 
Ibrahim Dasuki, brought the two sides back to the negotiation 
table. An agreement was reached in September 1992 and was 
generally commensurable with the ASUU's demands. University 
salary scales and allowances significantly increased. The 
composition of university councils and the process for 
appointing vice chancellors were democratized. The growing 
influence of state agencies, such as the National University 
Commission and the Joint Admission and Matriculation Boards, 
in university affairs was curbed. Further democratic demands 
such as the lifting of the proscription of NANS and ASUU to 
enable both to organize freely was, however, rejected.'"' It 
did not take long for a breach in the September 3rd agreement. 
Professor of constitutional law, Ben Nwabueze, Secretary of 
Education in the short-lived Shonekan-led Transitional 
Council, touched off another fight among his 'colleagues' when
Tony lyare and Nats Agbo, "The Gains of ASUU" in Newswatch. 
September 21, 1992, p.14-15.
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in March 1993 he declared the agreement invalid and unbinding 
on the government. In May, the ASUU went on strike in protest 
of the abrogation of the accord. Support was again garnered 
from the NANS, human rights groups such as the Civil Liberties 
Organization and the Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights, who further condemned the government for 
undemocratically nullifying an agreement to which it was a 
signatory. To break the strike, the state dismissed students, 
academic and non-academic staff from certain universities. The 
ASUU grudgingly called off its strike actions, in 
consideration of restive students left generally unproductive 
for over five mouths. Having aborted the strike under undue 
duress, the ASUU made it clear to the federal government that 
actions would recommence if outstanding grievances were not 
sufficiently redressed.’®
The persistent of the ASUU in confronting the 
undemocratic policies in the educational sector and wider 
society has led to the emergence of a militant and relevant 
academic union, in the forefront of defending civil and 
democratic rights and agitating for the improvement of living 
conditions of subordinate groups. The radicalization of the 
ASUU, its commitment to delimit state power and the building 
of meaningful democratic structures which ensure popular 
participation should not be exaggerated. Like other groupings
Johah Achema, "Back in Claea" in Mawawteh. September 20, 1993, 
p. 16. and Moses Omogbomoh, "End, at Last, to a Long Strike" in African 
guardian. September 20, 1993, p.11.
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in Nigeria's civic terrain, the ASUU remains susceptible to 
state coercion, manipulation and cooptation. Despite a shift 
in the balance of forces within the union in favour of
progressive elements, the ASUU is particularly vulnerable to 
state machinations by virtue of the inherent middle class 
aspirations of its membership. The participation of the 
majority of Nigerian academics in union activities is minimal 
at best. With the notable exception of discussions around 
strike actions, lecturers rarely participate in ASUU.
Labelling union leaders 'hot heads', 'radicals' 'subversives' 
and 'socialists', they show an instrumentalist attachment to 
the organization, participating only insofar as the ASUU may 
be able to extract monetary concessions from the state. The
majority of the intellectual middle class do not survive on
university incomes and therefore do not feel compelled to 
engage in struggles for wage increases, much less campaigns 
for university autonomy, academic freedom and broader 
agitation in defence of human rights and social justice. In 
fact, the government's 1986 decision to remove the automatic 
salary deduction for dues to the ASUU, ostensibly designed to 
cripple the union financially and thus organizationally, was 
welcomed by many Nigerian academics.
The general disposition of Nigerian intellectuals could 
be accurately gauged in their social relations with students. 
Julius Ihonvbere candidly noted, that
...for many, a lecturer has no business fraternizing with
students and students cannot have the same struggles with
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lecturers. In fact students are only good when it comes to 
buying useless and poorly worked-out hand-outs which they copy 
in the secrets of their bedrooms from books written by others.
They are generally blind to or unsympathetic to the 
deteriorating conditions in which students live and study. Over 
ninety percent of Nigerian academics never go near the student's 
hostels to see for themselves the conditions of squalor, filth 
and disease in which their students live and study. [Moreover] 
female students are simply objects of sex in most cases. There 
exists gangs of lecturers whose jobs are basically to exchange 
sex for grades. Issues of sexual harassment are hardly addressed 
and students have no rights in the majority of the cases. In 
fact, given the deepening economic crisis female students find 
it more convenient to exchange sex for grades than spend their 
time reading; And in an extremely chauvinistic society, sexual 
harassment is often taken lightly.’*
Since the so-called enlightened intellectual middle class
reproduce the social hierarchies in their immediate theatre of
influence, it is not surprising to find a general disinterest
towards popular struggles in the wider society among
academics. In like manner, the parochialism of region,
religion and ethnicity which has characterized national
politics in the post-colonial period and continues to inhibit
the institutionalization of consensual politics, often enters
into the calculation of intellectuals, influencing their
participation in the ASUU and positions on critical national
issues. It is uncommon to find support for lecturers when the
leadership of the union is harassed, intimidated, arrested
and/or detained. Not only is collegial solidarity an
exception, some Nigerian lecturers have been exposed for
actively "spying and reporting on their colleagues and union
Julius Ihonvbere, "The State and Academic Freedom in Africa: How 
African Academics Subvert Academic Freedom”, Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the African Studies Association, St.Louis, Missouri, November 
1991, mimeo; University of Texas at Austin, p.24.
285
leaders."’’ Therefore, with the ASUU's growing militancy in 
the wake of the 1988 agitation, the politics within the union 
has been
characterized by intra-union factional struggles between those 
who thought that the association was devoting too much of its 
energy and resources to national politics rather than the 
specific interests of the members, and those who believed that 
the relevance of the association was only to the extent that it 
is perceived and strived to solve the problems of its members in 
the context of the broader struggles for the resolution of other 
ongoing national problems.”
The general susceptibility of the intellectual middle 
class to the "politics of poverty" remains a constraint on the 
organizational capabilities of the ASUU, since even radical 
elements can be coopted through political appointments. 
Nigerian intellectuals have continued to serve as a reservoir 
of skilled labour, easily enticed and readily acceptant of 
various appointments to commissions, directorates and 
ministerial posts by even a corrupt and dictatorial military 
regime. The three former Ministers of Education, Aminu, 
Fafunwa and Nwabueze, all of which have come from the 
university community are such examples. While they may not 
have had a history in defence of civil and democratic rights, 
nor actively campaigned in the ASUU around issues in the 
educational sector, on ascending to public office they simply 
forgot the realities in which they had lived and worked. 
Rather than attempting to utilize their new found powers and 
influence to begin to improve the decaying educational sector.
”  Ihonvbere, "Academic Freedom".
Jega, "Professional Associations", p.107.
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if not for the majority of Nigerians, at least for their 
colleagues, they contribute to the reproduction of the general 
crisis by using public office for their own private 
accumulation. Despite the contradictory forces at work within 
the university community and the ASUU, it would seem that 
under the incumbency of the late Dr Mahmud Tukur, lyayi and 
Jega, the ASUU has emerged as an important organ of popular 
struggles in the civic terrain. The closure of upward mobility 
and the increasing proletarianization of large sections of the 
intellectual middle class, while it may lead to increasing 
opportunism and state cooptation within the ranks of ASUU, may 
also compel --as seems to be occurring -- Nigerian academics 
to actively join the on-going popular struggles for civil 
rights, democracy and self reliance.’®
Much like the Academic Staff Union of Universities, other 
professional associations have seen the material conditions of 
their members adversely affected by the continuing crisis. 
Cumulatively aggrieved by the closure of upward mobility, the 
increasing unemployment and underemployment of professional 
classes and wanton state arbitrariness, organizations of 
journalists and lawyers, have similarly been galvanized to 
agitate both in the interest of their respective 
constituencies and for the strengthening of the wider civic 
terrain. Increasingly, sections of the Nigerian press and its
This section in particular, and the case studies on professional 
associations in Nigeria, has greatly benefited from the work of Attahiru 
Jega.
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organizations, such as the Nigerian Union of Journalists 
(NUJ), have used this medium to struggle in defence of civil 
liberties and in the interest of subaltern classes. The 
established association of lawyers, the Nigerian Bar 
Association (NBA), has also become more principled and openly 
combative in agitating for an independent judiciary and the 
rule of law. These professional associations have gained 
strength with the proliferation of civil liberties and human 
rights NGOs in recent years. Of course, the mass media has a 
long history of combative journalism stretching back to the 
colonial period.®® In the face of post-colonial state 
onslaught on limited democratic rights, the vibrancy of the 
'free press' is often cited by neo-liberal analysts of 
Nigeria's political economy, as indicative of the resilience 
of the Nigerian civil society.
Throughout much of the post-colonial period, the NBA
(formed in the 1950s) and the NUJ (in the 1970s) , however,
"remained virtually indifferent... to the erosion of the
socio-economic well-being and democratic rights of the
majority of Nigerians."®^ Indeed, independent private media 
houses intermittently highlighted cases of state excesses and
®° Excluded from the colonial system, journalists such as Herbert 
Macauley, Nnamdi Azikwe and Anthony Enohoro floated independent news dailies 
like the West African Pilot and the Daily Comet. As previously mentioned the 
indigenous fourth estate was an instrumental medium in providing a critical 
voice against the colonial regime. It gave expression to workers' agitation 
and was an important organ in the national liberation struggle, despite 
constant state attempts to suppress combative journalism.
81 Jega, "Professional Associations”, p.100.
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arbitrariness. Yet, the collective response of the NUJ against 
the pervasive deterioration of social economic and political 
conditions was minimal at best. Similarly, the NBA generally 
showed an indifference towards state restriction on limited 
democratic rights and was largely preoccupied in the 1960s and 
1970s with the narrow interests of its membership. 
Specifically, the overriding concern of the NBA was the 
advancement of the private legal practises of its 
constituents. The crisis of the state and economy during the 
1980s and widespread hardships from which the middle classes 
were not immune, however, led to an increasing concern on the 
part of these organizations about the declining material 
standards and heightened misuse of state power. The draconian 
character of the Buhari regime further intensified the 
struggles of these groupings. During the 20 month reign of 
this dictatorship, the curtailment of democratic rights, the 
trampling of any notion of the rule of law and limits on press 
freedoms reached unprecedented levels. Through Decree No.4., 
for example, journalists, editors and publishers in any way 
critical of the government were arrested and detained. The 
notorious Decree No.2 sanctioned the incarceration of persons 
deemed subversive by the regime for up to three months without 
trial. Decree No.3 endorsed the formation of military 
tribunals to litigate hearings of individuals the state 
defined as security threats. An aggrieved NBA, under the 
leadership of Bual Ajibola, boycotted these tribunals because
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of the arbitrariness.
The ascendency of the Babangida junta was a welcomed 
relief for the much afflicted fourth estate and legal 
community. There was a general euphoria among journalists when 
the new regime abrogated Decree No.4. Similarly, the 
journalistic community was pleased with the presidential 
pardon of Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, journalists 
incarcerated for a year for publishing stories which the 
Buhari regime deemed 'subversive.' The repeal of Decree No.3 
was also widely praised. Especially for these communities, the 
immediate execution of these measures in the early days of the 
Babangida regime heralded the dawn of a new era which promised 
to uphold civic and democratic rights. Yet, the regime had 
retained the sinister Decree No.2. The appointment of Ajibola, 
the erstwhile champion of human rights as the new Minister of 
Justice, and other outspoken members of four estate into 
ministerial posts, further served to enhance the government's 
democratic pretence. As we have shown, this facade was short 
lived. The tenuously legitimate Nigerian state increasingly 
relied on the repression of opposition forces in civil society 
to reproduce itself and to implement the anti-popular 
adjustment exercise.
THE CASE OF THE FOURTH ESTATE
The media remained an important 'watchdog' in civil 
society, exposing and criticizing state excesses. The apparent 
honeymoon between the press and the Babangida regime ended
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over the fervent reporting of the government's self-inflicted 
crisis, occasioned by the 1985 Organization of Islamic Unity 
Debacle.®^ While the government did not openly show it 
disproval of the media coverage, the attitude towards the 
press in the immediate aftermath and throughout the eight year 
junta was more repressive than any previous regime. Even 
though the state owned the majority of newspapers and until 
recently all the radio and television networks (the electronic 
media was partially privatized in 1992) , the private media, in 
no small measure, has provided Nigerians with accurate 
accounting of events and critical analysis of national and 
international issues. The popular appeal and quality of these 
magazines has forced the official print media to enhance its 
correspondence, such that its proprietor has increasingly 
become alarmed by critical exposes. In 1988, for instance, the 
then Chief of Army Staff, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu cautioned 
executive officers of the federal and state media houses that 
"henceforth [they would] be held responsible for any adverse 
stories published by their organs.. .It would be an offence for 
any of their organs to criticise government policy."" The 
critical and independent stance of the private media has also
In 1905, Nigerians were outraged by the APRC's unilateral decision 
to enlist the country as a full member of the OIC, which abrogated the 
country's seventeen year observer status, the secularity of the Nigerian 
state, and thereby fuelled religious antagonism in the country.
Aikhomu reported in African Coneord. August 16, 1988 and cited in 
Jibrin Ibrahim, "The Transition to Civilian Rules Sapping Democracy" in A. 
Olukoshi, The Politics of Adjustment In Kloetie.. 1993, p.132.
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been met with state reprisals. A combination of oppressive 
laws such as the Official Secret Act and Defamation Act, 
extra-legal options like threats, harassment, arbitrary 
detention, and outright murder, have been utilised by the 
Nigerian state to muzzle the press.
To illustrate, the Newswatch premises were swarmed and 
sealed by mobile police in April 1987 when the higher circles 
were informed of the leading weekly magazine's planned cover 
story, which provided excerpts from the yet unreleased report 
of the Political Bureau. The state proceeded to ransack the 
offices, arrest and detain the co-founders and editors of the 
magazine, Dan Agbese, Ray Ekpu and Yakubu Mohammed. It froze 
all accounts of Newswatch Communication Ltd and proscribed the 
publication of Newswatch for six months.®^ In May 1988, a 
mere cartoon in the National Concord portraying the 
collaboration of the Babangida junta and Western powers in the 
imposition of the anti-popular SAP, landed the animator 
Osazuwa Osagi in detention for one week."® Again, the 
Babangida government disturbed by the media coverage of the 
failed April 1990 Orka Coup, clamped down on the media and 
journalists. A number of newspapers such as the Newbreed. 
Punch and the Vanguard were closed down. The editors of these 
newspapers and magazines, namely Chris Okolie, Chris Mammah
Ray Ekpu, "Nigeria's Embattled Fourth Estate" in Journ>l of 
Pamocracv. 1993, p.ill.
Ibrahim, "Sapping Democracy", p.132.
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and Chris Okogie (respectively) were arrested and detained. In 
total, *
four daily newspaper and two weekly newsmagazines were shut down 
by the government for a total of 195 days. Twenty-two 
journalists, publishers and media workers were detained for no 
reason other than those connected with their professional 
duties. Two journalist were arraigned in court on charges of 
sedition/incitement; three were physically banned by soldiers 
from performing duties; one had his accreditation to the State 
House withdrawn; and another was severely beaten by soldiers in 
the course of work."
A year later, the Guardian Express was sealed up for its
coverage of state brutality against protesting students at
Yaba College of Technology, in which two students were killed.
Even 'soft sell' magazines have not been immune form
state suppression. For example, the printing plates and ten
thousand copies of Quality, a magazine from the Newswatch
consortium, was seized in December 1992 when the government
received an advance copy featuring an interview with radical
democrat and lawyer Fem.i Falana. Unfortunately, this trend
would continue. The recently released 1993 report of the NUJ,
titled Violation of Press Freedom in Nigeria, chronicles the
assault on the fourth estate during the Babangida junta.
Imbued with words and phrases like intimidation, arrest,
detention, violation of press freedom and the closure of media
houses, the document revealed that in 1993 alone, "88 persons
i.icluding journalists, vendors and publishers were arrested,
questioned and detained. In some cases, two women and children
were arrested on account of their husbands' and fathers'
olisha Agbakoha, "Loosening Legal and Political Constraints on 
NCOSiThe Case of Nigeria" in R. Sandbrook and M. Halfani, gmpowrlno People. 
1993, p.121.
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[profession]."®'' The report goes on to state that although 
more than twenty journalists were charged under Penal Code 417 
through 419,®® none were prosecuted. The NUJ concluded that 
the government never intended to prosecute, but mainly to 
detain critical journalists and intimidate the community, 
"because court cases never [proceeded] beyond arguments for 
and against bail".®®
One dramatic development in the journalism community 
which requires further discussion is the 1986 assassination of 
the co-founder and editor-in-chief of Newswatch. Dele Giwa, 
and the continuing struggle over seven years later to bring 
his assailants to justice. The first such incident in the 130 
year history of Nigerian journalism, the fourth estate and 
indeed the generality of Nigerians were outraged by the 
gruesome nature of the killing. Murdered by a parcel bomb 
delivered to the Giwa home, the package reportedly had the 
insignia of the Nigerian Coat of Arms and the inscription from 
the office of the C-In-C (Commander-in-Chief). First 
chastised by SSS agents over a column he wrote critical of the 
SAP, in the weeks prior to his death. Dele Giwa was again
® NUJ, 1593 Report: Violation of Prmm# in Nigeri*. excerpts
cited in Reginald Opara, "Muzzling the Press" in African Coneord. April 18, 
1994, p.38-39.
®® These penal codes are against the publication of 'false' information 
with the intent to incite dissatisfaction against the government and causing 
hatred among classes of people with the intent to endanger public peace
®® Opara, Loc. cit., p.38.
90 Ray Ekpu, "Fourth Estate", p.110.
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rigorously and more routinely interrogated and threatened by 
the SSS and the Directorate of Military Intelligence. 
Allegedly, Giwa had refused to allow security forces to 
suppress a story that, if published, could destroy the tenuous 
legitimacy of the state. While debates continued to rage over 
the particular expose that posed a threat to the state, the 
groups at the centre of the agitation for a judicial inquiry, 
vehemently maintained that Giwa was assassinated for insisting 
on exposing a narcotic trafficking network which involved the 
former President, his wife and other members of the higher 
circles." Indeed, Giwa's personal communication with his 
lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi, days prior to his death and the 
government's refusal to hold an inquiry into the 
assassination, strongly suggests state involvement.
What is of particular importance here is not just the 
extent to which the Nigerian state will go to muzzle critical 
journalism, but more importantly the responses of the fourth 
estate to state onslaught and its implication for on-going 
democratic struggles. While in the immediate aftermath of Dele 
Giwa's death, the press was vigilant in its coverage of the 
circumstance surrounding the murder, efforts to combat the 
state through the pen, beyond an intermittent revisiting of 
this issue, were largely unsustained. Collectively, media 
organizations did little to challenge the state legally or
Dapo Olorunyomi, "The Giwa Affair" in The New#. Special Issue: on 
Dele Giwa the Untold Story of a Murder, October 25, 1993.
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politically. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that 
the initiatives to prosecute Giwa's alleged murderer(s) and by 
implication the advancement of an important struggle for press 
freedom, have been largely shouldered by Chief Gani Fawehinmi 
and the organization of the same name. Frustrated by the 
inability of the Office of Public Prosecutions to secure 
indictments of the then heads of military intelligence Col. 
Halilu Akilu and Lt. Col. A.K. Togun, the case was given a 
boost when in December 1987 the Supreme Court upheld the right 
of private litigators to try criminal cases not taken up by 
the state. Henceforth, the suppression of Fawehinmi's 
activities intensified. He was regularly harassed, arrested 
and detained. In June 1988, 500 copies of a book he wrote 
documenting the circumstances surrounding Giwa's death were 
seized by the SSS. A year later, Gani was charged and 
convicted of libel and ordered to pay in excess of N6 million 
naira to the two security officers. Ironically, the journalism 
community and the Newswatch family largely stood idly by in 
this important civil rights struggle. Initial cooperation of 
the press to strengthen and advance the agitation quickly 
dissipated. The editorial staff from the magazine consistently 
sought to divert the line of inquiry Fawehinmi was pursuing, 
by suggesting alternative stories Giwa may have been 
investigating. In a recent interview with The News, Gani 
noted, that from the onset of the case, the Newswatch
Jibrin Ibrahim, "Sapping Democracy", p.134.
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editorial staff "developed hostility towards me and thereafter 
they disowned what I was doing."" The press of Newswatch was 
enticed by the government, with some editors receiving state 
contracts. The new marriage between the hitherto antagonistic 
institutions was further buttressed when the magazine 
pronounced Babangida 'Man of the Year' in 1988. While the 
magazine's editors held a number of interviews with the ousted 
dictator during this period, Babangida was never questioned 
about the Giwa murder. One of the editors would later become 
a paid biographer of the life and times of Ibrahim
Babangida."
Highlighting the tragic murder of Dele Giwa and its 
aftermath underscore the vulnerability of the Nigerian press
to suppression and co-optation by the state and private
proprietors, despite the general proclivity of the four estate 
to expose state excesses. Undaunted by the economic crisis and 
state interference, the number of news publications have
proliferated. In 1987 alone, the country had 23 dailies, 39 
weeklies, 9 vernacular newspapers, 54 magazines, 29 radio 
stations and 32 television stations." Yet, it is important 
for a resilient and combative mass media to not just seek to 
function as the critical 'watchdog' on state arbitrariness
Gani Fawehinmi, "Akilu Is not Innocent" in The New#. October 25, 
1993, p.21.
" Olorunyomi, "The Giwa Affair", p.28.
"  Ibrahim, "Sapping Democracy", p.132.
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through the pen, but also to collectively challenge, legally 
and politically, state attempts to curtail press freedoms. 
This should be the legacy of Dele Giwa's murder. Unfortunately 
to date, the NUJ has largely failed to actively support 
continuing campaigns for a judicial inquiry into this issue, 
as an integral part of popular struggles for civil liberties 
and democracy.
THE CASE OF THE NBA
The frequency with which the Nigerian state disregarded 
any notion of the rule of law in this period and the 
increasing 'cash and discharge' character of the dispensation 
of justice, prompted the NBA to take a combative stance in 
defence of judicial independence. Under the Babangida regime, 
court decisions were flagrantly disobeyed with unparalleled 
regularity. While doing away with the rule of law at every 
turn, the military junta was equally unwilling o abide by its 
own standing decrees. The regime habitually contravened 
standing decrees and often enacted edicts retroactively in 
order to legitimize state arbitrariness and repression. 
Through jurisdictional ouster clauses attached to decrees, the 
government was largely able to prevent the litigation of cases 
in any way related to its 'legal' promulgations. Frustrated by 
state machinations, in May 1989 the NBA, in an unprecedented 
action, went on strike in protest over the interference in a 
court decision by the governor of the then Gongola state.**
96 Jega, "Professional Aaeooiations", p.109.
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Met. with state rebuke, the new confrontational NBA remained 
undaunted and continued to challenge state judicial 
manipulation while routinely coming to the defence of 
persecuted human rights activists. For example, in 1991 the 
NBA denounced and protested the government's dismissal of a 
court order granting bail to student and human rights 
activists Segun Maiyegun, Femi Falana, Beko Ransome Kuti and 
Baba Omojola, arrested and incarcerated during the nationwide 
May anti-SAP protests. The Bar association was further 
incensed by both the detention of Gani Fawehinmi, for simply 
representing these activists, and the ensuing refusal of the 
government to abide by the ruling of Justice Afolabi Balogun, 
granting Fawehinmi's immediate release.” In 1992, the NBA 
again came out in support of the same five human rights 
agitators, now charged with treason after the countrywide 
anti-SAP/anti-military government protest in May. In protest, 
the organization of lawyers boycotted court appearances and 
vehemently called for the resignation of the then Attorney 
General and former NBA president, Clement Akpamgbo.
A number of factors can be adduced to the NBA's 
increasing combativeness. In addition to the aforementioned 
catalytic impact of declining material conditions of Nigeria's 
middle classes, the emergence of a plethora of civil liberties 
and human rights NGOs, in many ways galvanized this body. It
Stevie Waidor-Preghbagha, "Human Rightsi Celebrating the Supremacy 
of Might" in JtU, August 31, 1992, p.26-29.
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was largely the previous conservatism of the NBA which 
prompted the formation of organizations such as the Civil 
Liberties Organization (CLO) and the Committee in Defence of 
Human Rights (CDHR). In turn the steadfast agitation of these 
groupings fuelled a movement within the NBA campaigning for an 
accountable and principled association committed to the rule 
of law, human rights and social justice. The election and 
unanimous re-election of Alao Aka-Bashorun to the presidency 
of the NBA in 1987 and 1988 was a clear manifestation of this 
yearning. Under the incumbency of Aka-Bashorun, the 
association actively campaigned "against Decree No.2; against 
government arbitrariness and interference in the dispensation 
of justice in the country; on issues of human rights; and 
against the Structural Adjustment Programme".’® With the 
balance of forces seeming to shift towards progressive and 
democratic lawyers, the state intensified efforts to foster an 
acquiescent legal body. Every annual national executive 
committee (NEC) election since the late 1980s has been 
bitterly contested, with the state consistently seeking to 
determine its outcome.
At the 1989 annual conference and NEC elections, for 
instance, the government mobilized huge resources, to use for 
the displacement of 'radical' and 'extremist' elements, it 
deemed to have captured the leadership of the NBA. Throughout 
the country, it therefore, sponsored lawyers to attend the
96 Jega, "Profeeslonal Associations", p . 109,
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conference with all expenses paid, in order to garner support 
for their preferred candidates. While the two-term limit of 
the incumbent president Aka-Bashorun had expired, thus making 
him ineligible to compete, the character assassination of the 
outgoing president carried out by the state media weeks prior 
to the conference, intensified once it had convened. The 
speeches of both the Attorney General (AG) and Chief Justice 
of the Federation condemned the Aka-Bashorun 'style' 
leadership and lamented how the 'august body' had been damaged 
under his tutelage. The reported government candidate Charles 
Idehen, emerged as the new president. Throughout his tenure he 
sought to promote dialogue rather than confrontation between 
the NBA and the government.** Allegations of cooptation and 
financial improprieties against Idehen continues to 
reverberate among members of the Bar.
The intensification of intra-union contestations plunged 
the NBA into a crisis at the controversial 1992 Port Harcourt 
annual conference, from which it has yet to recover. 
Ironically, the convention organized around the theme Towards 
a Stable Third Republic saw the yearly NEC elections marred by 
*naira politics', electoral rigging, the manipulation of 
region and ethnicity, political thuggery and the violence 
which all have historically dominated the content and 
character of electoral politics and was so glaringly exhibited
** Jega, "Loc.cit., p.109.
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in the so-called newbreed politics of the now defunct PTP.*”” 
The opposition which the NBA continued to mount against 
judicial interference, heightened the challenge to the new 
leadership under Priscilla Kuye, who emerged as the president 
of the NBA in early 1992.^“̂ The government was said to have 
thrown its full support behind Bashir Dalhatu in order to 
counteract the growing militancy of the Bar. A familiar 
candidate, Dalhatu had been the recipient of state patronage 
for over two decades. Under the Babangida regime, he was among 
the few privileged Nigerians hand-picked to serve on both the 
Constitutional Review Committee and the Constituent Assembly. 
At the conference, addresses by both the then AG Clement 
Akpamgbo and Chief Justice Mohammed Bello denounced the 
increasing combativeness of the NBA and by implication the 
Kuye ticket. The seemingly ideological conflict which pitted 
'radical' against 'conservative' factions was complicated by 
the manipulation of region and ethnicity. Public utterances of 
then Governor Saleh Michika of Adamawa State, stating that a 
Northern must emerge as the Bar's next president, further 
fuelled antagonisms.^®* Ethnic and regional calculations
Yinka Telia, "As the Court Pleases" in ACrican Guardian. August 
24, 1992, Arthur-Martins Aginam et al. "When Learned Men Fight" in African 
Coneord. September 14, 1992, Ademola Oyinlola, "Fury, Fists and Fiasco" in 
Tall. September 14, 1992. Yinka Telia, "Battle of the Wigs", August 31, 1992.
Priscilla Kuye became president (first woman) of the NBA in early 
1992, four mouth after the incumbent Clement Akpamgbo, was appointed the 
Attorney General of the Federation.
Arthur-Martins Aginam et al. "When Learned Men Fight" in African 
Coneord. September 14, 1992, p.31.
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rather than ideology, legal merit and/or history in defence of 
the rule of law, largely determined the alignment and 
realignment of forces within the associations. For instance, 
many legal practitioners with Southeastern (Igbo) origins, 
supported the preferred government candidate from the North. 
Aggrieved by the NBA's principled demand for the resignation 
of Akpamgbo under Kuye's leadership months earlier, an 
alliance with Dalhatu was said to check the Yoruba (Southwest) 
affront against the Igbo AG. Many Southeastern lawyers were 
therefore prepared to sacrifice the NBA's legal and human 
rights gains under the incumbent president to defend Akpamgbo 
in the AG office, in spite of the escalated onslaught on the 
judiciary during his short tenure.^”
Allegations and counter-allegations were vociferously 
exchanged by the two camps, insinuating financial 
indiscretions and the fraudulent accreditation of voters. 
Commenting on the conference, the coordinating secretary of 
the Constitutional Rights Project, Chuma Nwosu, noted that 
from the onset "tension was palpable all over and people were 
just talking elections, elections and elections. There was a 
complete absence of issues such as [would] be expected of a 
body like the NBA."^°^ Sensing the probable explosiveness of 
an election, a group of lawyers led by Femi Falana sought and
Ademola Oyinlola, "The Case Against Akpamgbo" in Tell. October 11, 
1993, p.20-22.
Ademola Oyinlola, "Pury, Piste and Fiasco" in Tell, September 14,
1992, p.13.
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obtained an interlocutory injunction from the Port Harcourt 
High Court preventing any member or officer of the 
organization from "dissolving the offices of the national 
officers or from conducting any elections of officers,"^'”' 
pending further judicial deliberations. While the injunction 
halted the elections, fractions of the conservative faction, 
led by J, Okonkwo unilaterally formed a caretaker committee, 
serving to contravene the anti-dissolution court order. A 
panel led by Chief Rotimi Williams was however, later set up 
by the incumbent NEC and empowered to recommend measures to 
strengthen the Bar, in order to resolve the crisis and prevent 
its recurrence.
The controversial Port Harcourt conference clearly 
highlights the vulnerability of the NBA to state interference, 
regional and ethnic manipulation and the sheer opportunism of 
some of its memberships. While the NBA had actively agitated 
in defence of the rule of law, the country's legal 
practitioners paradoxically failed to maintain this 
rudimentary democratic precepts in the electoral competition 
within the Bar. Though all NEC offices are financially 
unremunerated, the level of exposure, access to state 
contracts and potential for class ascendency has given rise to 
all sorts of opportunists jockeying for posts in the NEC. For 
example, both Attorney Generals under the Babangida junta, 
Ajibola and Akpamgbo, were former NBA presidents. Even the
105 Aginam, "Learned Men", p.35.
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erstwhile human rights campaigner, Ajibola and outspoken 
critic of the Buhari junta, was easily coopted by the 
Babangida government, only to contribute to the unparalleled 
assault on the judiciary. He has since been elevated to the 
bench of the International Court of Justice at the Hague. In 
the context of constricting avenues for upward mobility and 
the precariousness of many private practices, the NEC posts 
are widely sought after. Democracy and accountability may 
increasingly be dismissed in power contestations, making room 
for the politics of region and ethnicity within the Bar. While 
the report of the Williams panel recognized these constraints, 
and aptly recommended among other things, that incumbent 
presidents neither seek or accept any government 
appointments”®, the NBA must go further to democratize its 
internal structures in order to remain relevant in civil 
society struggles for democracy and social justice. The 
principled agitation of most incipient human rights and civil 
liberties NGOs may contribute to this process. Nigeria's 
nascent NGO community is the topic of the next section.
SECTION THREEt NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN NIGERIA
Above, we have highlighted the colonial and post-colonial 
development of trade unions, student movements and 
professional associations and the contemporary intensification
“̂® Yinka Telia, "NBA: A New Beginning?" in The African Guardian, 
February 1, 1993.
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of social struggles for civil and democratic rights. The 1980s 
has also given rise to a plethora of informal and formal non­
governmental organizations seeking to empower grassroots 
communities. Of course, many of these organizations have their 
antecedents in the pre-colonial and colonial period. In 
various pre-capitalist social formations, associations and 
institutions emerged to protect collective interests. Age- 
grade associations, for example, were the mechanism through 
which community needs and problems were addressed and communal 
projects implemented. These traditional mechanisms formed the 
basis of the various ethnic welfare associations that emerged 
during colonialism and provided a defence against the colonial 
state and amenities in the absence of social safety nets. The 
colonial era also led to the proliferation of first generation 
international NGOs (INGOs) , which were primarily welfarist and 
relief oriented. Largely made up of missionaries, who hitherto 
facilitated the penetration of colonial capital through their 
'proselytizing' endeavours, the activities of various 
Christian mission such as, the Methodist, American Baptist, 
Scotland and Anglican Missions in the areas of food provision, 
shelter, and medical and education services also provided a 
rudimentary social safety net for the poor majority. Off­
shoots of international relief organizations, like the ked 
Cross society also emerged to provide some minimal relief
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measures.
In the post-colonial period, indigenous community 
development associations (CDAs) also mushroomed. Most of these 
associations were ethnic based self-help organizations, 
village assemblies, welfare groups and town unions, 
undertaking development projects and programmes to improve 
living conditions in the countryside. For instance, 
infrastructural development in the area of roads, schools, 
community centres, churches and hospital construction were 
often initiated by CDAs. Services rendered also enabled the 
unemployed to cope, helped to send students to higher 
institutions and provided assistance to the widowed. Other 
forms of CDAs included market women's associations, farmers 
cooperatives, youth associations and social clubs. One such 
grouping is the multiple informal thrift and credit 
associations which are variously called esusu, adaahi, bam in 
different parts of the country. They function essentially as 
'mobile banks' providing members with loans and credit 
facilities to finance the education of children, pay medical 
bills, as well as access to investment capital for agrarian 
activities and start-up funds for informal small-scale 
enterprises.^* The importance of CDAs is not simply
M.I. Okunola, "Historical and Future Projections of Nigeria's NGO 
Situation", Paper delivered at the NGO Leadership Training Workshop, Ibadan, 
May 19-23, 1993.
Dele Oluwa, S.Bamidele Ayo and Bola Akande, "Community Development 
Associations" in LocalInstitution# and National Developmentin Nigeria, 
(lle-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press for the Research Group in Local 
Institutions, 1991).
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utilitarian. They also reflect the pervasive sense that 
personal individuality is defined in relation to ones ethnic 
group. Town unions and village assemblies have largely 
displaced the state as they also serve as organs of community 
governance and adjudication. Though internal hierarchies do 
exist, these forums function democratically based on cultural 
values of co-operation, community solidarity and seek to 
protect the collective interests of local constituencies.
The oil boom years of the 1970s which left the rural area 
greatly neglected, further fuelled the formation of CDAs. 
Successive national development plans contributed marginally 
to the betterment of material conditions in the countryside. 
State programmes such as Operation Feed the Nations and the 
Green Revolution, together with World Bank-sponsored 
Integrated Rural Development Programmes also failed to improve 
the lives of rural dwellers. With negligible state 
contribution to rural social welfare, the bulk of rural 
dwellers have no loyalty to the state. Since it was (and 
continues to be) the ethnic community which largely assisted 
in providing access to resources for agrarian activities, 
health care, education and the development of infrastructure, 
therefore ethnic identity often superseded national identity. 
As Claude Ake recently noted, "the state in Africa, is 
uncaring and most ordinary people experience it as a hostile 
force...much of the development that has occurred, resulted
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not because of the state, but in spite of it.̂ °® For example, 
post-civil war Southeastern Nigeria has been reconstructed 
mainly by the endeavours of CDAs. The majority of rural 
dwellers have therefore come to rely heavily on CDAs to 
provide social welfare and catalyze local community 
development.
The widespread hardships and mass suffering experienced 
in the 1980s also led to the proliferation and growing 
importance of CDAs. Despite optimistic expectations from 
proponents of market reforms, that the rural sector would 
benefit from trade and exchange rate deregulation, the 
impoverishment of the majority of rural dweller continued 
unabated. The impact of various state programmes to mitigate 
rural poverty, such as DFRRI and BLRD, have been negligible, 
as the CDAs remain the principal mechanism to cushion socio­
economic exigencies. An array of new formal NGOs have also 
emerged in recent years. Regional and national in scope, they 
are said by some neo-liberal analysts to be modeled on the 
democratic precepts of the CDAs and act as a conduit between 
grassroots organizations and the state. For instance, 
intermediate NGOs provide technical and material support to 
CDAs and in turn make policy representation to government on 
their behalf. Since the late 1980s, CDAs and intermediary NGOs 
(indigenous and international) have become the new panacea for 
Africa's developmental and democratic problems in the 'policy
109 Ake, "Rethinking" p.38.
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world' of the IFIs and donor communities. It is maintained 
that the proliferation of NGOs reflects the vitality of the 
rural grassroots and the novel and creative survivalist 
strategies which have emerged to cope with material decline. 
Strongly embraced by multilateral/bilateral agencies and neo­
liberal analysts, NGOs are commended for their comparative 
advantage over an inefficient and bloated African state in the 
facilitation of micro-development. Within the context of the 
on-going neo-liberal market reforms, recovery and development 
in Africa in the 1990s for the IFIs now requires good 
governance, empowerment, participation and greater public 
accountability.
Integral to the new African agenda for democratic 
developmental are NGOs. They have been accorded the critical 
'watchdog' role which is to ensure government transparency and 
accountability. The prospects of state delimitation is 
emboldened by the activities of NGOs through their capacity to 
empower vulnerable groups and catalytic part in strengthening 
civil society. Michael Bratton, whose work on NGOs in 
Africa has become influential, argues that NGOs promote a 
democratic political culture and "by building independent 
organizations at the community, regional and national levels, 
NGOs in Africa have already helped to pluralize the 
institutional l a n d s c a p e . I t  stands to reason then that
World Bank, p.61-62.
Michael Bratton, "Government-NGO Relations", p.S85.
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NGOs can potentially reconcile the disjuncture between what 
Peter Ekeh has called the civic public and primordial public 
realms of civil society.That is to say, NGOs through 
conscientization and mobilization campaigns may foster harmony 
between individualized civic rights and communal or social 
collective rights. While degenerating, the principles of group 
rights, cooperation and social responsibly is still strongly 
embedded in the collectivist relations, culture and traditions 
of rural communities. Incorporating these principles into the 
democratic project takes cognizance of the specificities of 
Nigerian and African social formations and the need to tailor 
democracy to the prevailing realities. Rather than retaining 
an urban-based and ruling class character, which historically 
has mechanistically implanted Western institutional frameworks 
to safeguard civic and democratic rights, NGOs may help 
incorporate indigenous cultural values and practises into the 
democratic project. Then they may able to firmly draw the bulk 
of grassroots organizations into the on-going popular 
democratic struggles by building "links horizontally and 
vertically into mass movements that will provide organized 
countervailing powers to the s t a t e . I t  is this category 
of intermediate non-governmental organizations that is of 
particular interest here. The remainder of this section
Peter P. Ekeh, "The Constitution of Civil Society in African 
History and Politics" in B. Caron et.al. Démocratie Transitions In Africa. 
1992.
Alan Fowler, "Agents of Democratization", p.334.
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provides a sketch of Nigeria's NGO community then takes a 
closer look at the democratic impact of NGOs.
Unlike other countries in Africa, notably in the Eastern 
and Southern sub-regions, formal indigenous NGOs in Nigeria 
are weak and a very recent phenomenon. Equally distinctive is 
the relative absence of INGOs in Nigeria, which is attributed 
to the country's resource endowment and the mirage that the 
huge oil surpluses, statism and economic growth of the 1970s 
translated into equitable distribution of wealth during the 
oil-boom years. The new NGOs vary in areas of endeavour and 
mode of activities. Vast numbers of service-oriented NGOs are 
in existence, such as the National council of Y.M.C.A. and 
Y.W.C.A., Islamic Youth League, The Boys/Girl Guide Movement, 
National Council of Disabled Persons, International Social 
Service, the National Council of Social Services(NCSS), World 
Council for the Blind, Lions, Rotarians and Zontas. Several of 
these NGOs predate the 1980s and are generally off-shoots of 
INGOs. The notable exception is the National Council of Women 
Societies (NCWS). Formed in 1959, NCWS serves as an umbrella 
organizations for non-political women's NGOs and has branches 
in all states of the federation. Typical of its nationwide 
programme, the Oyo State Branch provides adult education and 
training and a range of social, recreational and vocational 
activities. The community hall established by the NCWS makes 
free space available for women in the state to house cottage 
industries. The core objective of the Council is to promote
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'good citizenship' among women and enhance their participation 
in social and community activities.
Development-oriented formal NGOs, in contrast, are newer 
phenomenon and include a wider range of women's NGOs such as 
the Community Women and Development (COWAD) and the Country 
Women Association of Nigeria (COWAN). Both organizations 
emerged in the wake of the 1981 OAU conference on the African 
crisis and resultant state initiatives to encourage CDAs and 
intermediate NGOs. Formerly the Committee on Women and 
Development, a unit of the Ministry of Social Development, 
COWAD began in 1982 as a government agency sanctioned to 
examine women's role in development, strengthen women's 
participation and foster harmonious NGO-Government relations. 
In 1989 COWAD became a voluntary development-oriented NGO 
seeking to improve the socio-economic conditions of rural 
women and to promote their general welfare.^* Unlike the 
genesis of COWAD, the Ogun State-based COWAN (1982) was non­
governmental from its inception, but shares the same goal of 
empowering rural women and improving living conditions. Both 
COWAN and COWAD, attempt to enhance women's access to services 
and productive inputs. They pursue an array of community 
development projects and programmes from health and child care
Interview with Chief (Mrs) Soyege, Oyo State Branch President of 
the National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS), Agbowo, Ibadan, Oyo State, 
January 17, 1994.
Interview with Ms. M.A. Feyisayo, National President of the 
Community Women and Development, Agbowo, Ibadan, Oyo State, January le, 1993, 
and COKAD Nigeria Tenth Annivertarv Brochure. 1993.
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services, food crop production and processing, education and 
training, cottage industry promotion, and revolving loan 
schemes which provide credit facilities to small-scale women 
entrepreneurs.^* COWAN and COWAD are currently based in 
Southwest Nigeria (the former Ondo State and the latter Oyo 
and Osun state), yet resolved to form branches throughout the 
federation. Others development-geared NGOs include among 
others, the Farmers Development Union, Ideke Co-operatives and 
the Food Basket Foundation International.
At the level of international NGOs, one of the few and 
oldest INGOs in post-colonial Nigeria is the Canadian-based 
CUSO (originally known am the Canadian University Service 
Overseas), which began its operations in 1962. The first 
generation of CUSO-Nigeria focused almost exclusively on 
technical assistance to the educational sector in the form of 
training teacher and placing expatriate co-operant in 
secondary schools. Geographically, COSO's activities were 
concentrated in Northern Nigeria, reflecting the educational 
needs of this region -- a by product of uneven development. 
The crisis of the 1980s, cut-backs in government's educational 
sector spending and the resultant lay-offs of indigenous 
secondary school staff, compelled CUSO to transform its 
programming to now support the development of informal
Chief (Mrs) Bisi Ogunleye, "Country Women Association of Nigeriai 
A Background" in MAVDO MBWfl. vol.l, no.l, 1993, p.6. see also Chief (Mrs) 
Bisi Ogunleye, "The Empowerment of Rural Women: The Experience of Country 
Women Association of Nigeria" in Sandbrook and Halfani, Ittpawring Baenle.
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enterprises in 1985. Mediated through CDAs, in the interval 
between 1985 and 1987 CÜSO engaged in micro-development 
projects providing financial and material resources to small- 
scale entrepreneurs. As formal indigenous NGO's emerged, CUSO 
provided administrative and financially assistance to these 
organizations and entered into collaborative programming. With 
depleting financial aid allocated from the Canadian 
International Development Agency (the source of 80% of CUSO 
funding), CUSO has reduced its activities considerably in 
recent years. From four regional offices (North-Kaduna and 
Kano, East-Calabar and West-Ibadan), CUSO now co-ordinates its 
Nigerian programme from its only remaining office in Ibadan. 
The new thrust of CUSO, concentrates on networking and 
coalition and capacity building with other Nigerian NGOs.“’ 
A number of research centres have also emerged, 
specifically to act as a resource base for NGOs. They include 
the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA) and the Women's 
Research and Documentation Centre (WORDOC). IFAA-Nigeria, is 
a branch of the London based apex-body, formed in 1987 to 
facilitate participatory research and enunciate alternative 
policy prescriptions to the current African crisis. The 
regional office was established in 1991 and some of its 
activities include educational training programmes for women's 
cooperatives, trade union officials and unemployed youth. As
Interview with Ms. Eva Murray. National Director of CüSO-Nigeria, 
lyaganKu ORA. Ibadan. Oyo State, December 16. 1993.
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a policy research and advocacy centre, IFAA mainly organizes 
workshops, seminars and conferences on themes such as the debt 
crisis, SAPs and democratization.“® In the same vein, WORDOC 
is a fairly new national institute for research, training and 
the dissemination of information on gender issues. WORDOC was 
launched in the aftermath of the 1985 WISER Conference on 
Women and Development, in recognition of the urgent need to 
collate and coordinate research activities on women in the 
country. WORDOC has sponsored various research projects on 
women in Nigeria and periodically convenes workshops 
addressing gender and development issues. The centre also 
holds seminars to train NGOs on the drafting of project 
proposals. Currently, WORDOC is coordinating a national 
research project on women and agriculture, seeking to document 
women's productive activities in the agrarian sector, in order 
to ascertain the differential policy implications on women in 
various parts of the country.
Another category of NGOs which has proliferated in the 
last few years is environmental groups. Indeed, a number of 
environmental non-governmental organizations such as the 
Nigerian Field Society, Forestry Association of Nigeria 
(1970), Ecological Society of Nigeria (1973), Nature Club of 
Nigeria (1980) and the Nigerian Conservation Fund (1982) have
Interview with Prof. Ba(" Onimode, national director of IFAA- 
Nigeria, University of Ibadan, Oyo State, December 10, 1994.
Interview with Prof. Bolanle Awe, Chairperson of WORDOC, Institute 
of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Oyo State, December 10, 1993.
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been in existence for sometime. Yet, most of these 
organizations, individually or collectively, had little 
influence on increasing public awareness around environmental 
issues nor much of an effect on government policy in this 
area. The combination of increasing global concern for 
sustainable development, together with the accelerating 
environmental degradation in Nigeria has hastened the growth 
of NGOs and environmental activism in the latter half of the 
1980s. The adverse ecological consequences of the macro- 
economic regime of adjustment, the continued devastation of 
oil communities and the increasing dumping of toxic waste in 
the country have heightened popular awareness and concern for 
environmental issues. Highlighting the ecological impact of 
adjustment, the communique of a recent NGO conference on SAP 
and Nigerian Environment, noted that the unregulated emphasis 
on cash crop and food production has failed to improve the lot 
of farmers' in spite of the massive environmental degradation 
and loss of bio-diversity engendered by increased acreage. The 
closing statement also illuminated the disastrous ecological 
consequences of the unfettered drive towards creating local 
sources of raw materials. Condemning the blanket 
liberalization of trade, the communique maintained that the 
mass dumping of tokumboa and engines was leading to an 
increased discharge of noxious gases and other pollutants into 
the atmosphere. Together with the creative strategies adopted 
by ordinary Nigerians to cope with deepening impoverishment,
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the NGO conference concluded that the intensified exploitation 
of natural resources since the inception of the SAP was 
unsustainable.The list of new environmental NGOs, notably 
include the Nigerian Environment Study Team (NEST, 1987), 
Nigerian Environmental Society, (NES, 1987) Nigerian Society 
for Environmental Management and Planning (1987), and the 
Green Croc Foundation (GCF).
The increasing environmental degradation of riverine and 
oil communities has also spawned the formation of 
environmental NGOs. In recent years, the plight of Nigeria's 
oil communities has received international attention from the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission as well as human rights 
and environmental NGOs such as Africa Watch, Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace.The heightened struggle by 
minority groups for power and equitable resource allocation, 
led by the Movement of the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
and the newly formed Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of 
Africa (EMIROAF), headed by Ken Saro-Wiwa, has linked 
agitation against internal colonization to the ecological 
degradation, largely caused by the indifference of 
transnational oil companies in consonance with the Nigerian
NEST, text of the conference on Sap and the Nigerian Environment 
cited in the NEflT forum, vol.2, no.l, January-March, 1993.
Kenneth B. Noble, "Atop a Sea of Oil, Nigériane Are Mired in 
Misery" in New York Time#, September 9, 1993.
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3tate.“* Not only have pollutants destroyed water sources, 
aquatic life, forests and agrarian lands, but the emission of 
air and water borne toxins have contributed to rising 
incidents of skin rashes, allergies and diseases. NGOs such as 
the Friends for the Preservation of the Delta Environment 
(FEPEN, 1992), were established in direct response to the 
degradation of oil communities.
Lastly, the ever present ecological consequences of the 
activities of "toxic merchants of death", was largely 
unbeknownst to most Nigerians until the 1988 Koko debacle 
which brought the issue of toxic waste dumping and 
environmental degeneration to public attention. The small 
rural community of Koko in Delta state (formerly a part of 
Bendel State) in close proximity to the obscure port of the 
same name, was the recipient of the 10,000 tonnes of toxic 
waste dumped by an Italian businessman. Using the Nigerian 
based-Iruekpen Construction Company, which he claimed to 
represent, he argued that the company had decided to 
'diversify' its operations by installing a dump for toxic and
Space does not permit an in depth analysis of the struggles for 
minority rights and resistance of ethnic minority communities to intensified 
repression by the Nigerian state. For further investigation see: Sylvester 
Olumhense, "The Ogonis March to Protest their Neglect by Government" in Tell. 
February 1, 1993, Bniola Bello et al., "Angry Oil States: Renewed Protest for 
Better Deal" in African Conoord. August 24, 1992 and Adegbenro Adebanjo et 
al., "This is Genocide" in Tell. January 31, 1994.
Interview with Prof. Sotonye Amakiri, national secretary of the 
Friends for the Preservation of the Delta Environment, Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State, January 7, 1994.
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noxious gases."* By no means an isolated incident, Koko was 
only the first publicly covered incident in Nigeria and has 
replicated episodes throughout the sub-region and other parts 
of the continent. In fact, the now infamous internal memo 
written by a World Bank Vice President, Lawrence Summers, 
which sought to give economistic credence to the export of 
Western toxic waste and dirty industries to 'vastly under­
polluted' African and the Third World countries, gave tacit 
recognition to a long established tradition of environmentally 
hazardous World Bank sponsored development projects to the 
South."® While the combined response from the Koko community 
and national and international bodies forced the removal of 
the toxic waste dump by the Italian and Nigerian governments, 
burgeoning indigenous environmental NGOs were generally non­
participants in the agitation. The Koko saga did however, 
increase public awareness on environmental issues and 
contributed further to the formation of NGOs."*
"* For an in depth and insightful analysis of the Koko toxic waste 
saga, and state and community responses see: Julius Ihonvbere "Environmental 
Degradation and Community Responses: A Study of Environmental Consciousness 
in Koko, Nigeria", Paper presented at the Workshop on Whose Knowledge Counts; 
Relations Between Formal and Informal Institutions and Resource Users, co­
hosted by the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the Council for 
Economic and Social Research in Africa, Dakar, January 18-21, 1992.
"® Tunde Akingbade, "Toxic Wastes Are Coming" in African Concord, 
Special Report, November 30, 1992.
The Koko saga and clear absence of an environmental policy, 
compelled the Nigerian government to promulgate the Harmful Waste (Special 
Provision) Decree No.42 of 1988 (banning the importation of toxic waste) and 
Decree No. 58 of 1988, establishing the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (FEPA) as the governmental environmental monitoring and enforcement 
body. The government is also signatory to U.N. Basel Convention of 1989, 
which attempts to protect countries from the dumping of hazardous waste. 
Dissatisfaction with the protection rendered for African countries under the 
U.N. convention led to the 1991 Bamako Convention, which seeks to tighten the
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The NEST is perhaps the most active and vociferous among 
the emergent environmental NGOs with a far-reaching programme 
which seek;
1. To collect basic and comprehensive information and data on 
the status of the Nigerian environment; 2. To investigate and 
document additional areas of potential hazards, with a view to 
identifying gaps in knowledge and promoting specific projects 
that may arise in the course of study; 3. To analyze patterns of 
human behaviour, social relations and cultural preferences as 
these effect the environment; 4. To stimulate debate and help 
intensify awareness in Nigeria of the environmental consequences 
of our socio-economic activities; and 5. to place at the 
disposal of all relevant groups and government, information and 
perspectives which cculd assist in the formulation of policy for 
rejuvenating and conserving the Nigerian environment.
In it short existence, the NEST has gone a long way to
document areas of environmental degradation, including issues
of desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, decreasing
bio-diversity, oil and aquatic pollution.^* The NEST
functions as an advocacy agency to increase public awareness
on environmental issues through seminars, workshops and
popular conscientization campaigns. It is one of the few NCOs
which has sought to bring the message of environmental
awareness to the grassroots, using the training of school
teachers and learners at all levels and the sponsoring of
Waste Generation and Management Workshops in various local
loopholes in the former.
Ademola T. Salau, "Address from NEST" in D.U.U Okali ed., The 
Nigerian gnvironment: Non-Qovernmentml Action. Proceedings of the NEST 
Workshop, UNILAG, October 1989, (Ibadan: Intec Publishers for NEST, 1991) .
To date NEST has produced several books, research reports and 
workshops which notably include (1991) Sustainable Development, in Nigeria's 
Dry Belt» prahlmmm and Proapecti. (1991) Nigeria's Threatened Nnvironment* A 
National Profile, (1991) The Nigerian Environnentt Non-governmental Action 
and (1992) The Challenge of Sustainable Development in Nigeria. The NEST also 
publishes a quarterly newsletter titled NEST Porun. which disseminates 
information on the environment and development and also serves as a mechanism 
to network and build NGO networks inside and outside the country.
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government areas throughout the federation, as the vehicle to
do so. 129
Given the various activities of the NGO community in 
Nigeria, efforts have been made to form both sectoral and 
national apex bodies in order to co-ordinate activities and 
enhance cooperation. In the environmental sector, for example, 
the Nigerian Environment and Development Network (NEDNET) was 
founded by 12 groups in late 1992. A loose coalition of 
environmental NGOs, the new umbrella seeks to organize a truly 
national workshop on the environment and development, and 
transform the network into an effective lobby group for 
achieving equitable national development. Similarly, CUSO 
has launched an endeavour to form a coalition with a sectoral 
range of NGOs who share a commitment to social justice, are 
considered democratic in structure, sensitive to gender 
issues, and adopt a participatory research approach in their 
activities. The resultant seven member alliance which 
coalesced to establish the Nigerian Participatory Action 
Research Network (NIPARN) in early 1994, while still 
embryonic, reflects the efforts towards greater NGO 
cooperation.
The most far-reaching initiative within the NGO community 
to build coalitions was the formation of the Nigerian
2̂9 Interview with Mb . Rita Ayaegbu, Programme Assistant of the NEPT, 
Bodija, Ibadan, January 18, 1994.
2̂0 D.L. Umali, "NEDNET is Born" in KIST rerum. October-December, 
1992, p.11.
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Association of Voluntary Development Organizations (NAVDO) in 
1987. Spawned by the formation of the continental NGO apex 
body, the Senegal-based Forum of African Voluntary Development 
Organizations, NAVDO seeks to unite all NGOs in the country 
under one umbrella in order to forge a collective NGO voice on 
national issues. Comprised of both intermediate NGOs and CDAs, 
since its 1991 national NGO conference held in Kaduna (capital 
of Kaduna state) NAVDO has sought to give the body more 
cohesion and coherence by establishing 11 sectoral apex 
organizations delineated by areas such as health, women, 
youth, environment, human rights, social and humanitarianism, 
community development, cooperative development, culture, 
children and education. The conference also resolved to form 
a Nigerian NGO Consultative Forum to further strengthen the 
efforts of NAVDO. The central body has convened workshops and 
seminars for the purpose of training NGOs on effective 
leadership skills. It also publishes a quarterly newsletter 
NAVDO NEWS to further facilitate communication within the 
sector. One project NAVDO is currently pursuing in this 
direction, is the establishment of a "computerized information 
data bank on VDOs, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral Agencies, 
donor organization, etc. for the benefit of VDOs in Nigeria 
and their benefactors"Seeking to strengthen intra-NGO 
networks, NAVDO also aims to serve as the liaison between 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies and donor
131 KAVPO Brochure. Ojoo, Ibadan, Oyo State, 1993.
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communities, in order to ensure vertical and horizontal 
dissemination of information. Also forging continental and 
extra-continental NGO alliances, NAVDO remains an affiliate 
with the African NGO apex body FAVDO, and represented the 
Nigerian NGO community at the 1991 International Conference on 
Popular Participation held in Arusha, Tanzania, which was 
widely attended by African and International NGOs. Recently, 
NAVDO along with the NCWS, NEST, and NCSS were part of the 
Nigerian NGO delegation which participated in the May 1993 
(Banjul, The Gambia) workshop convened by the Commonwealth 
Liaison Unit to discuss ways to improve collaboration among 
NGOs in the sub-region.Given the increasing continental 
linkages between NGOs and efforts towards greater networking 
nationally, it is instructive to investigate the response of 
the Nigerian NGO community to the SAP and their impact on the 
democratization process in the country. While the newness of 
the NGO community limits a comprehensive treatment of this 
inquiry, I critically assess the general dynamics of NGOs, 
SAPs and democratization in Nigeria below.
The underlying assumption of NGOs 'grassrootness', based 
on the widely held view of NGOs as the conceptual embodiment 
of the interest of local communities and the agents of civil 
society, has led to the growing uncritical support for NGOs. 
Their operations are ascribed with grand developmental and
Interview with A.V. Yahaya, Administrative Secretary of NAVDO, 
Ojoo, Ibadan, Oyo State, December 17, 1993,
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democratic potential for poverty-stricken, underdeveloped and 
predatorily governed African and Third World countries. 
Indeed, there are many NGOs in Nigeria which have contributed 
to poverty alleviation through micro-development projects. 
Income-generation and job creation projects, training 
programmes for the unemployed and revolving credit schemes for 
rural farmers, have given vulnerable groups and grassroots 
communities access to resources as the Nigerian state 
continues its retreat from the social reproduction of the 
poor. Similarly, in some cases NGOs have made efforts to join 
forces and raise the consciousness of rural dwellers and 
communities. While NGOs may have become indispensable allies 
to the Nigerian grassroots in their daily struggles for 
survival and may catalyze empowerment, their encouragement and 
support must be tempered with critical appraisal. That is to 
say, it is necessary to take due cognizance of the capacity of 
NGOs to achieve the ascribed role of empowering ordinary 
people and strengthening civil society as well as the 
contradictory forces of state co-optation, local and 
transnational elite domination, corruption and parochialism 
within the NGO community.
While widely anointed the defenders of civil society, 
NGOs in Nigeria have largely failed to live up to the 
democratic billing they are now accorded. In order to share 
ideas and information, maximize resources, enhance the 
prospects for empowering the grassroots, influence public
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policy and strengthen on-going democratic struggles; 
networking, collaboration and coalition building is generally 
recognized as important, if not crucial for a relevant
national and transnational NGO movement. Yet, despite efforts 
to strengthen institutional frameworks, the NGO community in 
Nigeria remains weak, fractionalized and largely suspicious of 
building coalitions. The majority of intermediate NGOs, even 
when based in the same city or region of the country, operate 
side by side largely unaware of what the other is doing. 
The extent of co-operation seems to be centred on a mutual 
understanding between NGOs to accept invitations to
conferences and present papers. Beyond participation at these 
forums, very few concrete endeavours are jointly pursued. To 
be sure, many NGOs hold that escalating costs and poor 
communication facilities in the country continues to militate 
against greater cooperation. The unreliability of postal
services and telecommunication systems together with
prohibitive costs has constricted the activities of individual 
NGOs, not to mention collaborative initiatives. Yet, the logic 
of fostering greater NGO networks is also to minimize costs 
and the duplication of activities in the environment of 
constricting resources. Cognizant of these limitations, our 
research however, suggests that in many cases the desire of 
NGOs to maintain privileged access to resources dictates their 
degree of linkage with other groups.
M.I. Okunola, "Nigeria's NQO Situation", p.4,
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One such example is found with the NCWS, the long­
standing umbrella body for women's NGOs. The recipient of 
annual federal government subventions and the officially 
recognized non-governmental women's organization, the Council 
is acknowledged in ruling class circles as the 'premier' 
women's organization in the country and is often the accepted 
women's voice on national issues. Given the relative access of 
the Council to state resources and decision making, a feeling 
of prestige and indeed condescension exists within the largely 
middle-class leadership of the organization. Commenting on the 
proliferation of NGOs, the Oyo State branch coordinator of the 
NCWS, while recognizing the drawbacks of non-coopérâtion 
within the sector, nonetheless adopts a paternalistic attitude 
towards nascent women's NGOs, stating that "results will 
ultimately come through us [the council].""* Instead of 
articulating areas in which the Council may be able to foster 
linkages with new NGOs, the state coordinator rather implies 
that the agenda and activities of NCWS can meet the practical 
and strategic gender needs of the majority of women in 
Nigeria. Indicative of the suspicion in forming NGO alliances, 
Charles Akindiji Akinola's recent presentation on the 
inhibitions on broadening interrelationships among NGOs, 
further supports this argument. He notes, that NGOs often have 
a negative attitude towards cooperation because:
Interview with Chief (Mrs) Soyege, Oyo State Branch President of 
the NCWS, January 1994.
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i. the self Interest on the part of the NGO leadership sometimes 
brings to the fore the issue of who takes credit for joint 
achievement, ii. in some quarters interrelationship is viewed as 
dependency... others see cooperation as tantamount to 
compromising organizational identity, focus and principles iii. 
fear sometimes exists that the NGO might be losing their 
"exclusive" funding base to other organizations involved in 
interrelationships, and iv. fear also exists that 
interrelationship might lead to the loss of personnel to the 
other organizations."*
The inability to network is starkly manifest in the fragility
and organizational weakness of the seven year old national NGO
umbrella body. Many of the NGOs interviewed appear on the
official NAVDO list as an affiliate, but were generally
unaware of NAVDO's existence or only vaguely familiar with its
operations. An amalgam of intermediate NGOs, (transnational
and national) and an array of CDAs, an interesting debate has
emerged on the issue of the relationship of independent
NGOs/CDAs with NAVDO. Certainly fruitful, the debate which
initially raised questions on the autonomy of NGOs to the apex
body also extended the discourse to issues of membership
autonomy within intermediate NGOs and CDAs. While unclear how
these pertinent questions were resolved within NAVDO, the
issue of NGO/CDA autonomy remains a reverberating theme within
the NGO sector and has militated against attempts to foster
greater collaboration.
The lack of cohesion within the NGO community can be
further attributed to the fact that NAVDO first emerged at the
Charles Akindiji Akinola, "Broadening Institutional 
Interrelationships: An Agenda for the Nigerian Voluntary Development Sector", 
Paper presented at the Workshop on NGO-Povernaient Colleboftionr A Critieel 
Appraisal. organized by the NAVDO, Ibadan, May 20-21, 1993, p.9-10.
Akinola, "Broadening", p.10-11.
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national level and then sought to spread throughout the 
sector. Given that the formation of the apex body was inspired 
by a resolution adopted in 1987 by FAVDO, rather than a bottom 
up process in which networks developed from the grassroots to 
eventually crystallize into a national body, the top-down 
process of NAVDOs advent and ensuing efforts towards 
consolidation may also account for the pervading suspicions 
and non-collaborâtion of most NGOs. However, it is interesting 
that the Nigerian government and international agencies seem 
to be playing the predominant role in fostering NGO networks. 
The 1991 Kaduna Conference on NGO-Government Cooperation was 
co-sponsored by the Nigerian government and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The communique noted that "the 
workshop was the climax of efforts and initiatives by the 
government and the UNDP to promote understanding among 
NGOs."”’ While government motives were unclear to NGO 
participants, most NGOs in attendance agreed that such 
collaboration should not result in their exploitation or 
colonization.”® What is equally obscure however, is how the 
NGO community seeks to prevent state cooptation, particularly 
when one of the 10 resolutions adopted specifically enjoined 
the "government [to] help promote inter NGO collaboration by
Charles Akinde, "NAVDO Holds Leadership Workshop" in NAVDO NEWS, 
vol.l, no.l, p.l.
138 Agbakoba, "Loosening Legal", p.123-124.
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facilitating and supporting networking among NGOs."”® 
Potentially an invitation for cooptation, Akinola pointedly 
asks, "who should really take the primary reaponalbllity for 
promoting inter NGO collaboration? la it the Government? What 
should be the specific roles of NGOs themselves, apex 
organizations like NAVDO or the Government in this 
r e g a r d s ? " (emphasis mine)
Yet, the current mythology surrounding NGOs assumes their 
autonomy from the state and a subsequent status as the 
critical 'watchdog' in civil society. Despite the paradox that 
Nigerian NGOs increasingly depend on government subventions 
and official aid, it is also ironic that the Nigerian state 
plays such a prominent role in fostering NGO collaboration. In 
some respects this is not surprising. In 1988, the Babangida 
regime, seeking to control the burgeoning NGO sector, adopted 
the Company and Allied Act compelling NGOs to register with 
the federal government in order to have access to state 
resources. The decree established a number of stringent 
criteria for government recognition. For instance, the 
government required:
...organizations which operate on a national basis [toi 
have...branches in at least more than half [the] total number of 
states in the federation and the organizations (presumably that 
operates at the state level) shall have branches at least in 




Okunola, "Nigeria's NGO Situation", p.6.
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While some intermediate NGOs may have clear national 
objectives and aspire to broaden activities countrywide, with 
very few exceptions, Nigerian NGOs (self- titled as national) 
have been unable to meet this criteria. The same policy also 
indicates the government's intention to establish a national 
body for the promotion and co-ordination of voluntary 
organizations -- if not control. To further buttress legal 
measures to control this growing sector, NGOs are required to 
register with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The cumulative 
impact of these measures enable the Nigerian state to monitor 
and control the blossoming of NGOs more effectively. For 
example, the Babangida regime used the registration process to 
frustrate the official recognition of NGOs critical of the 
regime. Such was the case with one of the leading human rights 
organization in the country. Since its formation in 1987, the 
Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) has been denied state 
recognition, in spite of having met all stipulated 
criteria.While the government may have failed to foster 
a completely subservient NGO sector, the obligatory non­
political status required for NGO registration has largely 
contained critical individual or collective responses from the 
NQO community on its on-going adjustment programme and the 
FTP.
Very few NGOs in Nigeria have challenged the wanton abuse 
of state power, the repression of popular groups or the
142 Agbakoba, "Loosening Legal", p.123,
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extroverted model of development. At best, NGOs in the country 
have highlighted the socio-economic impact of SAPs on 
vulnerable groups and environmental implications in various 
fora, but have rarely politically contested the policy 
direction of adjustment or predatory rule. In fact, some NGOs 
such as the NCWS publicly supported the dictatorial Babangida 
regime, its undemocratic transition programme and embraced the 
neo-liberal market reforms. The pro-government posture of the 
NCWS on critical national issues has earned the organization 
the popular nickname 'AGIP' meaning 'Any Government in 
P o w e r N G O s  have largely been non-participants in the 
intensified democratic struggle in the country. The majority 
of NGOs did not take a public position against the annulment 
of the June 12 elections and even remained on the sidelines 
throughout the pro-democracy protests that engulfed the 
country in its immediate aftermath. Most NGOs have also failed 
to forge even informal alliances with civic associations and 
mass democratic movements and are poorly represented in the 
broad civil society coalition merged in the Campaign for 
Democracy.
The responses of most NGOs to building networks with 
other social forces in order to advance civic and democratic 
struggles, range from openly dismissive to a general 
apprehension on compromising the non-political status they are 
accorded for official recognition. The representative of
Abdullah, "Gender in Nigeria", p.33.
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NAVDO, for instance, noted that while the organization valued 
democracy, it was felt that efforts by the CD centred around 
carrying placards and chanting slogans, and was therefore an 
ineffective mode of challenging military dictatorship. 
Instead, NAVDO perceived itself to be more constructive in 
advancing democratic struggles, citing "we are closer to the 
government, we know how to sensitize, we know how to lobby, we 
know how to play our advocacy role more effectively than 
holding placards and going on the streets. The point here 
is simply not a matter of different strategies nor NAVDO's 
simplistic relegation of the political programme of the CD to 
mere banner waving. What is important to note, is that while 
the CD and its allies have consistently challenged state 
repression, the corrupt and decadent character of the ruling 
classes, the impoverishment and marginalization of majority of 
the Nigerians and in no small measure have contributed to the 
empowerment of ordinary people, NAVDO, though prepared to 
dismiss these efforts, has done very little to conscientize 
and mobilize the grassroots towards challenging predatory rule 
and growing inequalities in the country. As noted earlier, the 
agitation of workers, students, women, academics and their 
organizations, at the core of popular contestation against the 
direction of economic recovery, compelled the state to concede 
some minimalist measures to protect vulnerable groups from the 
'pains' of adjustment. Again, it is the platform of the CD
Interview with A Y. Yahaya, December 17, 1993,
333
which has served to check state abuses, seeking to hold the 
political class and the government accountable to the 
grassroots. Mobilizing broad sectors of civil society it was 
the organizational leadership of the CD, as we discuss later, 
which forced the eight year Babangida dictatorship out of 
office. A study on the NGO community in Nigeria and Ghana, 
recently conducted by Eboe Hutchful, shows that with the 
exception of NGOs involved in human rights activities, "many 
organizations self-consciously defining themselves as NGOs, 
had either completely abstained from any involvement in the 
political transitions going on in their countries or had no 
clear idea what role to play. Hutchful attributed the 
ambivalence of several NGOs towards pro-democracy struggles to 
a perception that multiparty politics will disrupt existing 
NGO-State networks and may have negative ramifications for 
future NGO activities. Whereas military juntas are principally 
interested in controlling the upper echelons of the state and 
have largely failed to penetrate the grassroots, Hutchful also 
maintained that NGOs, (even those self-titled 'popular') 
perceived party politics as a threat to their operations and 
predominance over the local political space.
Opportunism and increasing corruption in the Nigerian NGO 
sector cannot be down played. The unabating crisis, in 
conjunction with the increased visibility of NGOs has provided
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation, p.29. 
Schmitz and Hutchful, Loc.cit,, p.29.
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opportunities for self-interested individuals seeking personal 
riches and self-aggrandizement. The current romance with NGOs 
seems to have given legitimacy to several sophisticated '4-1- 
9' operations, where the ability to write good proposals and 
make state and external contacts can garner resources assumed 
to be earmarked for the empowerment of the grassroots. The 
leadership and membership of the majority of intermediate NGOs 
are middle-class, often "subsist by cultivating privileged 
links with and funding from the state and donor agencies (both 
of which encourage an apolitical p o s t u r e ) , I n  a recent 
conference on the theme Building Community and Civic 
Associations in Africa, Tade Akin Aina, m-'kes a similar 
assertion on Nigeria's NGO community, noting that while some 
NGOs "might be concerned with popular empowerment, others are 
concerned with realizing their leaders' professional, 
humanitarian, and political goals and ideals outside the 
immediate grip of the government."“® The organizational 
structure of most of these NGOs are hierarchical. Several of 
the NGOs in the country revolve around one predominant leader. 
The evolving of a participatory, transparent and democratic 
internal structures has not been a priority for many NGOs. 
Such an undemocratic environment increases the susceptibilitv 
of NGOs to opportunism, corruption, and state cooptation.
We have been particularly critical of the embryonic NGO
Schmitz and Hutchful, Loc.cit,, p.29.
Akin Aina, "Empowering Environmental NGOs", p.141.
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community in Nigeria. It may be argued that our analysis must 
recognize the constraints which newness engenders in evolving 
a democratic NGO movement dedicated to popular participation, 
social justice and national self-reliance. Taking due 
cognizance of the infancy of the sector, these limitations are 
highlighted lest intellectual dishonesty masks the potential 
of a non-combative NGO community to contribute to the 
reproduction of the country's underdevelopment. Some NGOs as 
mentioned, have made consistent efforts to empower the 
grassroots, build networks with other NGOs and have joined 
broad popular civil society alliances, serving to strengthen 
on-going democratic struggles. Our research mainly suggests, 
that in general NGOs have contributed marginally to pro­
democracy movements. Moreover, we note that the current 
romance with NGOs has also given rise to several NGOs posing 
as friends of the grassroots. The general 'non-political' 
approach taken by most NGOs towards their activities may 
render NGOs mere agents in reproducing state and ruling class 
hegemony. Though undertaking grassroots humanitarian, welfare 
and development projects that assuage conditions of poverty, 
NGOs have generally failed to challenge the structural roots 
of underdevelopment. Together with the increasing reliance of 
NGOs on state subventions and official aid -- whether the 
latter is channelled directly through donor agencies or 
mediated by way of INGOs --an uncritical NGO community may be 
reduced to third millennium missionaries, merely mitigating
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the social costs of the accumulation project of national and 
transnational capitals.
MILITANT WOMEN'S NGO#: TIIB CASE OF THE WIN
One NGO, however, that remains integral to popular 
contestations for democratization in the country, is the 
group. Women-in-Nigeria (WIN). Since its formation in 1983, 
WIN has set out to "organiz[e], women to fight for their full 
social and economic rights in the family, in the workplace and 
in the society in general, as a necessary part of the 
continuing democratic struggles to create and develop a just 
society for a l l . I n  the tradition of hidden and overt, 
individualized and collective indigenous feminist resistance 
dating back to the pre-colonial period, WIN maintains a 
militant approach to the mobilization and conscientization of 
women in challenging patriarchical and class domination. 
Therefore quite unique from most, if not all, women's and 
popular organizations, WIN adopts a political ideology which 
recognizes the interconnection between gender and class in the 
emancipatory struggles of women and oppressed groupings in the 
country. Differing from the majority of NGOs, WIN actively 
confronted the dictatorial Babangida regime and in particular 
the government's contentious SAP and FTP. From the 
inauguration of the national IMF loan debate, WIN in alliance 
with other popular groups campaigned against the adverse 
consequences of the recovery programme on the Nigerian
Mohammed and Madunagu, "WIN: A Militant Approach", no.37, p.103.
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economy, the majority of women and other subordinate
groupings. Similarly, WIN was at the fore-front of popular 
opposition to the regime's undemocratic transition to Nigeria' 
Third Republic and also challenged the various discriminatory 
policies of the now defunct state legislatures.
To illustrate, in early 1992, WIN mobilized women's 
organization in Katsina State to petition against a bill 
introduced in the House of Assembly that proposed to expel all 
unmarried young women from the state. In clear violation of 
the 1989 Constitution, the United Nations Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, --to which Nigeria is a signatory -- WIN 
was outraged by the subsequent passing of the bill. WIN called 
on all women's organizations and popular groups to speak out 
against this retrogressive policy that violated the basic
constitutional rights of women to exist free from
discrimination based on gender and marital status. WIN also
challenged the new legislation in the courts. Similarly, in 
Delta State WIN initiated campaigns to protest the defeat of 
a bill abolishing female circumcision. A commentary on the 
type of democracy which was under construction, state 
legislators resolved to protect their own narrow interests, 
rather than legislate against this cultural practise that 
engenders physical and psychological health problems on young 
girls and women. While calling on the Delta State House of 
Assembly to repeal its decision, WIN continued to promote
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campaigns to heighten public awareness on the dangers of 
female circumcision and gender discrimination.^®®
The emergence of WIN marked a significant advance for 
civic and democratic struggles in Nigeria. Through the 
leadership and agitation of WIN, gender issues are 
increasingly being recognized by trade unions, civil 
associations, mass movements and NGOs as central to democratic 
struggles in the family, at the workplace and in the wider 
society. For example, the existence of an independent and 
militant women's organization has strengthened the workplace 
agitations of the Nigerian Labour Congress Women's Wing 
(NLCWW). Indeed, the historically male dominated trade 
unionist movement remains suspicious of the ten year old 
NLCWW. The NLC continues to resist the incorporation of issues 
affecting women at the workplace and broader gender issues 
into its agenda in confrontations with the Nigerian state, 
local and transnational capital. In 1985, WIN lamented the 
apparent reluctance of the NLC to rally around women's issues. 
Noting that the hostile environment towards gender issues led 
to women's general apprehension to participate in trade union 
activities, WIN vehemently called on the NLC "to become -- 
contrary to their present practice -- more sensitive to 
[women's] problems, more ready to protect their rights and
Text of a Presa Conference addreaaed by the national co-ordinating 
aecretary of Women-in-Nigeria (WIN), Mra. Glory Kilanko at the NUJ Social 
Centre in Somolu, Lagos, October, 27, 1993.
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more willing to accommodate their needs. Former
chairperson of the Lagos State Branch of the NLCWW (1988-1992) 
and the current national president of WIN (1993-) Glory 
Kilanko, recently commenting on her four years incumbency, 
similarly observed that there was an "obvious determination of 
the men not to let go or give any room for women to articulate 
issues that exclusively concern women workers, which they 
alone ought to decide how beat to address
In spite of these constraints, the NLCWW with WIN's 
support continues to struggle around issues of equitable 
remunerations and benefits, training and promotion, maternal 
leave allowances, child-care facilities, sexual harassment and 
sexual and marital discrimination at the workplace and in 
trade unions. To strengthen its organisational capacity, the 
NLCWW has sought
i. the formation of a women's wing in all 42 industrial unions,
ii. the constitutional recognition by the NLC, iii. allotment of 
seats to women in important Congress organs such as the Central 
Working Committee of NLC and iv. the launching of Women Workers 
Charter of Demands."'
Networking with the NLCWW, WIN has augmented the activities of
the women's wing by establishing WIN chapters in various trade
unions. To date, WIN has chapters in trade unions in Bauchi,
Benue, Delta, Kaduna, Plateau and Lagos State. Entering in
joint programming with the NLCWW, particularly in education.
Kilanko, "Feminine Industry", p,4, 
Kilanko, Loc.ait., p.4.
Shettima, "Women's Movement", p.96.
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WIN also encourages the participation of market women's 
associations and other women's organizations."* WIN 
continues to maintain that such collaboration of women workers 
with women's organization in the broader civic terrain will 
not only strengthen workplace women's agitation, but also 
gender struggles, and by implication democratic struggles in 
the wider society. However, the activities and organizational 
capabilities of the NLCWW has been inhibited by the absence of 
constitutional protection in the Congress and its financial 
dependency on the NLC. These factor largely precipitated the 
recent setback in the struggles of women workers. At the 1993 
delegates conference of the NLC, the Congress resolved to 
change the status of the NLC women's wing to a women's 
committee. According to Kilanko, this shift constricts the 
organizational autonomy of women workers and reproduces male 
domination of the NLC.
The financial limitations confronted by the NLCWW are 
also faced by WIN and has negatively affected its ability and 
organizational effectiveness. In its eleventh year of 
existence, WIN has conducted a series of workshops, seminars 
and national annual conferences on specific themes such as 
Women in the Family, Women and Education, Women and Health, 
Women in Rural and Urban Areas, Child Abuse, Violence Against 
Women, Women and Politics and Women and the Transition to
®̂* Interview with Glory Kilanko, National Co-ordinating Secretary of 
the WIN, Yaba, Lagos, January 12, 1994.
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Democracy. These national forums are paralleled at the state 
level and serve to heighten public awareness on women's 
issues. Often collating conference proceedings for 
publication, the lack of financial resources has inhibited the 
wide distribution of these materials. In addition to 
workshops, seminars and educational campaigns, WIN also 
operates health clinics in some states, provides legal aid for 
women and has launched a number of community development 
projects such as the Bomo Income Generating Project in Kaduna 
State and a Rural Revolving Loan Scheme in Kano State. Again, 
the inadequacy of funding has limited the sustainablility and 
expansion of these initiatives.^* Moreover, the lack of 
financial resources has impinged on the effective co­
ordination of WIN'S activities from the local to the national 
level, since the group continues to operate without a national 
secretariat. While striving to establish national and state 
headquarters, WIN currently functions from the personal 
offices of incumbent officers. Given its radical and pro- 
people orientation, state subventions and resources has not 
been forthcoming to alleviate these financial obstacles. To be 
sure, determined to retain its organizational autonomy, WIN 
has made a conscious effort to refrain from obtaining state 
funding. Similarly informed, WIN until recently resisted 
funding from donor communities. Resolved to prevent any undue
Hajara Usman, "Win in Nigeria: Issues, Problems and Prospects" in 
R, Sandbrook and M. Malfani ed., Enpowrino Peool#, p. 123-124.
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influence on its operations WIN however, closely scrutinizes 
funding sources to ensure that no strings are attached. By and 
large, WIN depends on membership dues, donations and the sales 
of publications to fund its projects and programmes. Added to 
the above, the increasing hardships and intensification of 
women's work in the workplace and in the household has made 
voluntary work arduous on women WINners. Since all WIN posts 
function on a part-time basis, the handling of administrative 
work and monitoring of projects and programmes, often cannot 
receive adequate attention.
In addition to these largely material constraints, 
pervading patriarchal notions continue to undermine the WIN 
project and have intensified with WIN's heightened activism 
and gender conscientization campaigns. With the persistence of 
gender hierarchies in the state and civil society, gender 
attitudes and perceptions propagated by the ruling classes and 
imbibed and reproduced by women and oppressed classes, make it 
difficult to mobilize women and popular groups to agitate for 
gender and democratic rights. This is manifest in the regional 
weakness of WIN and its inability to find allies in civil 
society around gender issues. For example, WIN is often 
perceived as an urban middle class organization. Indeed, the 
majority of WIN chapters and all 21 state branches are based 
in urban centres. Reflecting, the strong constituency from the 
academic community, WIN also has chapters in most universities 
and polytechnics in the country. A rural and regional
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imbalance persists. Particularly glaring in the predominantly 
Islamic Northern Nigeria, WIN is organizationally weak, 
largely due to the pervading religious and cultural belief 
(though not specific to this region) such as the practice of 
purdah (the seclusion of women) that restrict women's 
activities. Conscious of these limitations, WIN since its 
inception has taken steps to broaden the base of the 
organization to include poor rural women. The organization has 
sought to mediate and articulate the view of local women's 
organizations on critical national issues. During the 1986 
national debate on the country's political future, WIN was 
perhaps the only NGO to take concrete steps to involve the 
rural grassroots in the democratization process by holding a 
series of workshops in English and Indigenous languages. 
Throughout the defunct transition programme, WIN called for 
"the expansion of democracy to include the grassroots 
majority; and the right of all to participate in the control 
and management of the country's economic resources.
To redress the unevenness in the organizational 
capabilities and strength of regional state branches and 
chapters, WIN has sought to target projects and/or programmes 
within specific locales and regions in order to increase its 
visibility and mobilize women. In response to the rampant rise 
in the cases of Vesico Vaginal Fistula (WP) and Recto Vaginal
Glory Kilanko, “WIN and the Democratic Project", Paper presented 
to the conference on Expending Nigeria'# Democratic Space, at the Nigerian 
Institute for International Affairs, December 15-17, 1993.
344
Fistula (RVF) particularly in the North, WIN has aimed to 
strengthen the branches and chapter in this region. The 
cultural and religious tradition which seeks to control 
women's sexuality by favouring the forced and early marriages 
of young girls, has led to an increase in maternal death and 
incidents of WF/RVF. The weakness of the pelvic bone in young 
girls, causes the shattering of the vaginal membrane from the 
urethra and sometimes the rectum during child birth. 
Consequently, an affected young girl or woman loses control of 
her bladder and/or stool causing excretion to leak through the 
vagina.^®’ WIN currently operates a number of health clinics 
for WF/RVF patients, in collaboration with other women's 
groups and state governments in the North. It has also 
launched public awareness campaigns around the physical and 
psychological health dangers of this cultural practise. 
However, WIN has largely been unable to gain support from 
popular groups to strengthen agitation around the WF/RVF 
issue. Although there exists cross membership of WINners in 
student, civic and human rights associations, most popular and 
democratic organizations in Nigeria, as Hussaina Abdullah 
recently noted have "refused to form an alliance with WIN on 
gender issues".^®® Allying with popular groups in on-going
Gabriel Agbonika, "Hope for W P  Patienta" in African Concord. 
February 21, 1994. See also: Dan Ede, "Man Made Affliction" in African 
Concord. July 27, 1992 and Obenga Amusan, "Dying Mothers" in African Concord. 
Special Report on maternal mortality, July 20, 1992.
Abdullah, "Gender in Nigeria", p.36.
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democratic struggles, WIN has consistently struggled to 
heighten awareness within broad-based coalitions on the 
interconnectedness of gender and class in the popular 
democratic project.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs: THE CASE OF THE CLO
The emergence of numerous civil liberties and human 
rights NGOs in recent years is another promising development 
in Nigeria's NGO community and perhaps the most clear 
indication of the growing strength of Nigeria's civil 
society."9 These NGOs notably include the Civil Liberties 
Organization, (CLO) the Committee for the Defence of Human 
rights (CDHR), the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), the 
Gani Fawehinrai Solidarity Association (GFSA) the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL), and the Universal 
Defenders of Democracy (UDD), and are mostly led and comprised 
of young professionals -- mainly academics and lawyers. 
Organizations like the CLO and the NADL, were formod by 
increasingly restive and frustrated younger members of the 
NBA, then seeking to evolve a credible and active alternative 
to the history of conservatism of the established body of 
lawyers. Broadly, human rights NGOs have contributed to 
democratic struggles in the country through legal challenges 
to the Nigerian state and numerous popular awareness and legal 
rights education campaigns in civic society. The CLO (1987) is
Julius Ihonvbere and Timothy Shaw, "Comparative Governance: 
Nigeria", Forthcoming chapter contributed to W.P Shively ed,, Coaparativ 
Governance. (McGraw Hill, 1994).
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the oldest and most active of these groupings. In its short 
existence, the CLO has evolved an 'impact litigation' 
programme aiming to "address novel points in public interest 
litigation with a view to sharpening popular awareness of the 
potential of the law protecting its rights".^®” To strengthen 
this initiative, the CLO launched an 'impact journalism' 
campaign. Pursued in collaboration with the sections of the 
fourth estate, the joint programme seeks to disseminate 
information on the objective of the CLO and its courtroom 
activities.
Through persistent litigation and publicity campaigns, 
the CLO compelled the state to amend the notorious State 
Security Decree No.2 of 1984 (detention without trial) which 
remains an often utilized 'legal' weapon to repress popular 
sectors of civil society. Symbolic of the CLOs agitation, in 
1990 the Babangida regime also released to Olisha Agbakoba, 
CLO president, one of the "then...longest serving (over five 
years) detainees, [Monday Ogbanna] . On another front, the 
CLO has also been successful in forcing the state to initiate 
prison reforms. The closing of the horrific Ita-Oko island 
prison and the commission of a Prison Reform Committee in 
September 1990 were directly precipitated by the CLO's efforts 
(the prison has since been re-opened). Recently, the CLO has
olisha Agbakoba, "Human Rights Groups and Legal Aid in Nigeria" in 
Sandbrook and Halfani, lapowrina People. 1993, p.41-42.
161 Agbakoba, "Human Rights", p.43.
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mounted investigations into suspicious killings, by publishing 
reports which list victims that have died mysteriously while 
in police custody. The organization has sought to reinvoke the 
long standing, yet, unenforced Coroners Law, with the aim of 
convening public inquests. Collectively, these initiatives 
have in no small measure contributed to combating state 
arbitrariness.
Seeking to conscientize and mobilize the grassroots, the 
CLO and other Human Rights NGOs have undertaken civic 
education campaigns to "attack the ignorance that predisposes 
people and their society to the violations of their rights 
and, thus, to empower them to take their respective destinies 
into their own h a n d s . T h e s e  programmes, like much of the 
NGO community, continue to be hamstrung by the lack of 
financial resources. With the combative posture of most human 
rights NGOs, they are largely non-recipients of state 
subventions. However, the low level of coordination between 
NGOs also inhibits resource maximization -- through the 
duplication of programmes -- and thus further constrains 
organizational effectiveness. The inability to build 
participatory networks horizontally and vertically, between 
NGOs and the grassroots leaves human rights NGOs prone to 
opportunism and state cooptation. The recent appointment of 
long-time human rights activist and democratic lawyer Olu 
Onagoruwa, to the position of Minister of Justice and Attorney
Agbakoba, “Human Rights", p.42.
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General in the Abacha junta is a case and point. Devoid of 
sound democratic structures and a mass base, the largely 
middle class leadership of these NGOs, even its radical 
elements, remain susceptible to the 'politics of poverty and 
settlement'. Cognizant of these limitations, the November 1991 
initiative to form the Campaign for Democracy (CD) as a mass 
democratic front is probably the single most important
development for popular struggles in recent years. Uniting 
human rights NGOs and broad sections of civil society under
one umbrella, the CD has given expression to marginalized
social forces in the country.
Contradictions abound in Nigeria's nascent civil society. 
We have tried here, to move beyond the limitations of much of 
the emerging literature on civil society and democracy in 
Africa, which often treats the civic terrain as an 
undifferentiated and unproblematic whole. By concretely
analyzing in this chapter, the dialectics of state and civil 
society and focusing on the histories, contradictions, 
constraints and limitations of trade and student unions, 
women's organizations, professional associations and the 
incipient NGO community, we can now properly assess the impact 
of the civic terrain on the prospects for democracy in 
Nigeria.
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SECTION FOUR: THE ANNULLED JUNE 12 ELECTIONS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY POLITICS OF PROTEST
In the continuum of popular contestations for civil and 
democratic rights which date back to the colonial period, pro­
democracy struggles swept the country in the aftermath of the 
cancellation of the June 12, 1993 elections. Civil society's 
unparalleled democratic outburst was an immediate response to 
the deepening economic woes and the sharpening of 
contradictory impulses of state suppression of limited 
democratic rights, in a transition process purported to be the 
politically inclusive and stable antecedent for the Third 
Republic. Notwithstanding popular reservations about the 
precarious and largely non-participatory political structures 
that emerged from the statist FTP, expectations were generally 
high that the military regime would leave political office in 
January 1993. When the presidential primaries were nullified 
in November 1992 and the expiration date of the FTP was yet 
again shifted to August 1993, the chasm between the state and 
civil society widened. It became clear to popular forces that 
the Babangida junta was determined to perpetuate its rule. 
Henceforth, 'IBB MUST GO' campaigns intensified, propelling 
the Nigerian state into its worst post-civil war legitimation 
crisis. Indeed, the formation of a twenty-nine member civilian 
dominated Transition Council, chaired by Ernest Shonekan, gave 
the regime a semblance of legitimacy and the impression that 
the FTP was still on track. Through the reconstitution of the 
AFRC into the NDSC and the announcement of a new timetable,
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the Babangida regime was temporarily able to attenuate its 
hegemonic crisis. True to form, the political class accepted 
the new arrangement, with little opposition to this latest 
manipulation of the democratic process. While enjoying for 
months, at public expense, the luxuries of the Nicon Noga 
Hilton and Sheraton hotels in the federal capital territory, 
Abuja, it never occurred to the senators and assembly-persons 
that they were dealing with a 'Military Political Party' bent 
on clinging to power. Simply welcoming the opportunity to 
contest for political office in the bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e ,  
the ensuing inauguration of the National Assembly was enough 
to convince the political class of the government's commitment 
to the FTP. It was not surprising therefore that new and old 
breed politicians alike, easily acquiesced when the national 
assembly was rendered legislatively impotent. A new state 
edict stripped the assembly of legislative power by 
establishing restricted areas and subjecting all policy 
prescriptions to a final review by the military dominated NDSC 
and of course. General Babangida -- the highest law-making 
body.
Though inaugurating the National Assembly and forming a 
Transitional Council, the legitimacy of the state among 
popular sections of civil society continued to wane. Given t.if.
After much internal acrimony within the political class on the 
zoning formulae for political seats in the upper house of the National 
Assembly, lyorchia Ayu and Albert Legogie of the SDP emerged as the senate 
president and deputy senate president (respectively). In the House of 
Representatives, Agunwa Aniekwe and Rabiu Musa (also of the SDP) were elected 
speaker and deputy speaker (respectively).
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consistent tinkering with the FTP, on the whim of a regime 
which readily contravened its own edicts, these initiatives 
generally did not convince Nigerians that the military would 
voluntarily relinquish power. The intensification of campaigns 
by anti-democratic forces agitating for a four year extension 
of the Babangida regime, only reaffirmed widespread suspicion 
that the General was harbouring a 'hidden agenda' to succeed 
himself in power. Groups such as the Association for Better 
Nigeria (ABN), the Third Eye, Committee of Elder Statesman and 
the Committee of Concerned Citizens, represented the same 
conservative faction of the ruling class which had dominated 
Nigerian politics for three decades. At the vanguard of this 
movement, the ABN, led by Arthur Nzeribe, was in fact state 
sponsored and enjoined to create Organized Confusion in the 
FTP, to use the words of Abimbola Davis, a high ranking member 
of the organization. Such a tumultuous environment would thus 
enable the government to rationalize yet another extension in 
the name of safeguarding democracy.The CD, human rights 
associations and other democratic groups, resolved to launch 
a mass action campaign as the only recourse in removing the 
dictatorship from power. A combination of massive state
On the admission of Abimbola Davies, a high ranking member of the 
infamous ABN, General Babangida and top government officials orchestrated a 
plan to destabilize the transition process and sponsored and funded the ABN 
as it chief organ. The organization's principal ideologue, Arthur Nzeribe 
would later admit to this relationship and plan with the ex-dictatorship, 
see: Abimbola Davis, "Coup against the Civilians: My Role, My Regrets", Text 
of press statement printed in the Atriean querdien. July 26, 1993. see also 
Ademola Oyinola, "ABN: An Association to Bastardise Nigeria?" in ZfU> July 
5, 1993. and "The Grand Strategy" in Newsweteh. (Part 1 of an interview with 
Arthur Nzeribe, December 20, 1993,
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oppression and the capitulation of the political class to 
state designs, however curtailed these campaigns before they 
began in earnest.
For example, a planned 'Vigil for Democracy', organized 
by the CLO, was repressed by police and security forces in 
late 1992. In the same period, a conference convened by the CD 
to launch a nationwide signature campaign to support demands 
for the termination of military rule on January 2, 1993, was 
disrupted by the security forces. The clampdown continued on 
every popular section of civil society. A symposium organized 
by the CLO on Taxation and Women's Legal Rights was quickly 
suppressed by the armed forces. On the same day the National 
Assembly was installed, mobile police seized the venue of 
another seminar on Human Rights in the Third Republic, 
convened by the CLO. On December 10 the locale for a 
conference organized by CDHR to mark a declared Human Rights 
Day, was scaled off by security forces before it had 
commenced. The state and university authorities continued 
to expel students from tertiary institutions, particulary 
after the 28th NANS Senate Session which had resolved to 
protest the extension of the PTP nationwide. The assault on 
the fourth estate escalated; numerous copies of magazines, 
such as Quality, were seized by security forces. Critical 
journalists were harassed and intimidated. The indiscriminate
Ayodele Akinkuotu, "The Crackdown Begins" in Tall. January 4 1993,
p . 10-11.
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wave of arrest and detention of the leadership and rank of 
file of pro-democracy groups continued. Some human right 
activists were arrested while distributing 'Babangida Must Go' 
pamphlets and posters. A printer, Panaf Olakanmi was arrested 
by SSS agents and accused of printing seditious material in 
his workshop.^* To further paralyse the pro-democracy 
movement, the government sought to foster exploitable 
contradictions within the ranks of these forces. For example, 
posters titled, Gani Fawehinmi for President purportedly 
issued by the CD and CLO were widely circulated in major urban 
centres, designed to foment internal tensions."' Implying 
that the two democratic groups had resolved to unilaterally 
foist Fawehinmi into the presidency, the desperate attempt by 
the state to divide opposition forces failed.
The Nigerian state also promulgated a number of decree to 
prevent any legal challenge to the regime. This was in direct 
response to a complaint filed by the CD at the Lagos High 
Court challenging the latest postponement to the PTP. A clear 
indication of a panicky and desperate regime, Femi Falana 
noted, that "if the Attorney-General of the Federation had 
done his home work, he would have discovered that there are 
over 60 decrees containing such ouster clauses which have
Danlani Nmodu, "There is No Transition", Interview with Femi 
Falana in Tall. January 4 1993, p.14-15.
Nmodu, "No Transition", p.15-16.
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never enabled the regime to cover up its illegal actions,"^®® 
Undaunted by these legal obstacles and heightened state 
repression, the CD was prepared to continue its campaign to 
depose the Babangida junta. In a recent interview, the 
President of the CD, Beko Ransome-Kuti, recalled that "long 
before June 12, as far back as last year (1992) we had been 
trying to mobilize all kinds of Nigerians because of our 
belief that Babangida was not prepared to leave office. 
However, the CD's proposed nationwide campaign was thwarted by 
the inability to gain support from the political class and in 
particular disqualified presidential aspirants who readily 
accepted the new turn in the PTP. With a reworked timetable 
and a seemingly innovative procedure to conduct the 
presidential primaries, called 'Option A4', the transition 
process proceeded.
Despite widespread concerns that the new system to elect 
presidential candidates had a built in proclivity towards 
naira politics, the NEC vehemently maintained that the self­
dubbed 'Option A4' de-emphasized the use of money, encouraged 
grassroots participation and checked electoral rigging. The 
NEC- sanctioned procedure produced an incredible 288 aspirants 
at the Ward round within a four-tiered system to elect the 
presidential flagbearer of the respective parties. With the
Nmodu, “No Transition", p.15.
Beko Ransome-Kuti, "Abiola Not Organized" in Ths News December
13, 1993.
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winners rising through successive rounds at the Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) and State levels, a reduced field of 
62 candidates representing one NRC and SDP contestant from 
each of the 30 states and federal capital territory now vied 
for the presidential candidacy at the national party 
conventions.^" The respective elections were conducted 
without a major crisis and were generally devoid of the 
electoral chicaneries characteristic of the two aborted 
primaries, To be sure, voting contests remained a 'cash and 
carry affair' , The political class still devised novel ways to 
manipulate the election processes and yet managed to avoid the 
explosiveness of the previous primaries. One such strategy, 
utilized by wealthy aspirants, sought to eliminate at the Ward 
rounds possible rivals at higher levels of competition.”  ̂
Through a process of cross-elimination, dominant political 
factions sponsored alternative candidates in Ward elections. 
So even though each Ward election was supposed to be 
autonomous, affecting only party members in that Ward, in 
practice several presidential aspirants faced opponents from 
other Wards. Dominant power-brokers in other ridings 
strategically backed candidates in various Wards to defeat 
candidates viewed as a potential threat at the LGA, state and
Godwin Agbroko, "The New Agenda" in Newawtch. November 30, 1992, 
p.14-16. Wale Akin Aina, "Will Option A4 Work?" in African Guardian. February 
1, 1992.
Edwin Madunagu, "Problems and Prospects (Part 3)" in Tha Guardian, 
April 29, 1993, p.23.
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national levels. However, upon winning the client would remove 
him/herself from the race, thereby facilitating a less 
competitive race for the patron at the next electoral round. 
This strategy was replicated at the LGA and state levels. For 
example, multi-millionaire Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa, who 
finally emerged as the NRC's national candidate, is said to 
have ensured the defeat of Aminu Wali (Kano) and former head 
of state Yakubu Gowan (Zaria), through the use of this method. 
Similarly, Alhaji Mohammed Goni is alleged to have entered the 
crowded race simply to terminate the presidential ambitions of 
Baba Gana Kingibe in the Maiduguri Ward of Borno State. 
However, Goni lost the Ward round of elections and Kingibe 
later emerged as the Vice-Presidential running-mate to MKO 
Abiola on the SDP ticket.
Less than 36 hours before the presidential elections the 
ABN filed and obtained an interlocutory injunction from 
Justice Bassey Ikpeme in Abuja High Court, restraining the NEC 
from holding elections on June 12, contrary to State Decree 13 
(1993) which prevented the judiciary from halting any 
elections.The government pressured the NEC to respect the 
illegal judicial decision and to thereby cancel the upcoming 
elections. However, internal and external responses to the 
latest attempt to confound the PTP was swift. The Director of
Madunagu, "Problems", p.IS.
Steve Ofluju, "The Night Judgement" in Atrioan Guardian. June 21, 
1993, p.11-13.
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the United States Information Service in Nigeria, Michael 
O'Brien, issued a statement on behalf of the U.S. government 
stressing that another extension of the elections would be 
totally unacceptable. An offended Nigerian government, 
conveniently objecting to external interference in domestic 
arrangements, ordered the immediate expulsion of the United 
States Information Service and withdrew the accreditation 
issued to eight American diplomats to observe the elections. 
With the government's room to manoeuvre constricted by the 
U.S. threat, even a seemingly independent declaration from the 
NEC scuttling the elections could no longer conceal state 
machinations. Hence, the regime grudgingly accepted, if only 
temporarily, to stay on course. On June 12, Nigerians finally 
went to the polls and overwhelmingly voted MKO Abiola (SDP) 
over Bashir Tofa (NRC) as the civilian president for the Third 
Republic. The electoral victory of Abiola was unofficially 
confirmed by June 14, when all results from the country's 110, 
ODD voting centres, -- made available to the two parties, the 
major media organizations, the Nigerian Election Monitoring 
Group (NEMG), the International Observer Team (lOT), and other 
local and foreign electoral observers, -- projected he had won 
a significant majority. The NEC officially disclosed the 
results of only 14 states and the federal capital territory, 
in partial deference to a number of interlocutory injunctions 
halting election pronouncements. The NEC declared MKO Abiola 
the winner in 11 of 14 states and the federal capital
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territory, but suspended the announcement of the remaining 
results.^* Nationally however, independent publications from 
domestic and foreign media, observer bodies and democratic 
groups like the CD, did show that Abiola won outright in 19 
states of the federation and Abuja. Scoring the mandatory one 
third vote in 28 of the 30 states, the nation-wide tallies 
gave the SDP 58.4% (8.3m) and the NRC 41.6% (5.9m) of the 14.2 
million votes cast On June 26, the regime confirmed the 
widespread allegations of a 'hidden agenda' that had followed 
its eight year transition programme. Insinuations days earlier 
of a major policy change by the Information Secretary, Uche 
Chukumerije, were now verified by the President. In a 
nationwide broadcast, the Babangida regime cancelled the 
results of the presidential election, suspended the NEC, 
banned the two presidential aspirants and abrogated Decree 
No.3, Decree. 52.(1992) and Decree No.13 (1993) all guiding 
the transition to civil rule. Henceforth, the Nigerian state 
and civil society were embroiled in a grave and dangerous 
political crisis.^*
In his nationwide broadcast on June 26, General Babangida 
lamented over the 'un-envisaged' turn in the transition
Joseph C. Okorcji, "The Nigerian Presidential Elections" in ROAPB, 
1994, p.126.
Abiodim Adenji, "A Huge Joke" in African Concord, July 26, 1993,
p.13.
Adenji, "A Huge Joke", p. 12-19. see also Fred Ohwahwa, 
"Babangida's New Agenda" in African Guardian July S, 1993.
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process, but maintained that the government's latest 
intervention was consistent "with the avowed commitment of the 
administration to advance the cause of national unity, 
stability and democracy."”' After much diversion into a 
self-praising review of the regimes record in power, self- 
pontification gave way to the official explanations for the 
annulment of the June 12 election. The General made enormous 
claims surrounding electoral malpractice and the widespread 
use of money, the manipulation of the NEC through financial 
inducements, conflict of interest between the presidential 
aspirants and the government, the manipulation of ethnicity by 
the president-elect, and the intimidation of the judiciary by 
vested interest in the country.”* Specifically highlighting 
the abuses. General Babangida acknowledged that much of these 
breaches of the electoral process were known to government 
prior to the June 12 elections and included:
i. a) allegations of irregularity and other acts of bad conduct 
against the presidential candidates, b) proof as well as 
documented evidence of widespread use of money during the party 
primaries as well as the presidential elections, c) evidence 
available to the government put the total amount of money spent 
by the presidential candidates at over N2.1 billion, thus 
undermining the electoral process, d) a huge array of election 
malpractices virtually in all the states of the federation 
before actual voting began; ii.a) authenticated reports of 
election malpractice against party agents, officials of the NEC 
and also members of the electorate, b) proof of manipulation 
through offers and acceptance of money and other forms of 
inducements by officials of the NEC and members of the 
electorate, c) evidence of conflict in the process of 
authentication and clearance of the presidential candidates;
iii. moral issues involving cases of documented and confirmed
177 Ohwahwa, "Babangida's New Agenda", p.19.
Gnome Oaifo-Whiskey and Ayodele Akinkuotu, "A Dance on the 
Precipice" in Tall. July 19, 1993, Anthony Enahoro, "No Case for Fresh
Elections" in Tall. July 19, 1993.
360
conflict of interest between the government and both 
presidential aspirants which would compromise their position and 
responsibilities were they to become president; iv. MKO Abiola 
won block votes in Southwestern (Yoruba) states and as such 
would end up being a Yoruba president and encourage a "campaign 
of divide and rule amongst our various ethnic groups"; v. the 
courts had become "intimidated and subjected to the manipulation 
of the political process and vested interest" and "the entire 
political system was in clear danger".*’*
Given the regime's legacy of manipulating and prolonging the
transition process, there was little doubt among Nigerians
that Babangida's pronouncements were yet another attempt to
rationalize and perpetuate his dictatorial rule. After all,
the regime which maintained an authoritarian hold on the
transition process, consistently showed not just complicity,
but also an active involvement in reproducing the financial
waste, corruption, violence and other abuses that have
historical plagued national politics and electoral
competitions.
The General's broadcast, fraught as it was with 
contradictions, still shocked most Nigerians and baffled even 
interested observers of Nigerian politics. Astounded by the 
regime's latest assault on the transition programme, Beko 
Ransome-Kuti, asserted that,
we knew...the man was treacherous. But we also assumed that he 
had some self-respect and would not openly lie to the nation and 
the world. It is a reflection on his poor leadership qualities 
if he was in this country, was aware of the so-called breaches, 
but decided to let the nation waste so much money and time 
before annulling the elections. These are mere afterthoughts.
Compiled from Julius Ihonvbere, "The Generals Take Over Again: 
Explaining the Abacha Coup and The Remilitarization of Politics in Nigeria", 
mimeo! University of Texas at Austin, and Osifo-Whiskey and Akinkuotu, "A 
Dance".
180 Beko Ransome-Kuti cited in Ihonvbere, "The Generals".
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As we have detailed above, the PTP from the onset was infused 
with state revenue and had been plagued by political thuggery, 
violence, electoral chicanery and the prevalent use of money. 
Beyond the periodic and often opportunistic banning of 
political aspirants, the government did little to discourage 
these rampant abuses. In fact, the Babangida regime gave 
implicit support to these malpractices, since at no point did 
it arrest and indict known members of the political class who 
readily contravened decrees guiding the transition process. 
More importantly, the regime strongly contributed to the 
reproduction of the culture of 'settlement' and the warfare 
character of ruling class politics, since it had resolved to 
limit the participation of ordinary Nigerians in national 
politics. By banning and repressing so-called 'radicals' and 
'extremists' from the PTP, the state discouraged the political 
participation of social forces which had the greatest 
propensity to halt the manipulation of ethnic, regional and 
religious cleavages and the wanton infusion of money in 
electoral contestation for power. The totality of these 
actions and inactions strongly suggests a conscious attempt by 
the state to foster an environment of chaos and disarray in 
order to provide an excuse to legitimize the extension of the 
PTP and thus its own power.
The last stage of the reconstituted PTP, which commenced 
in late 1992, further supports this conclusion. For example, 
when human rights and civil liberties organizations among
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others groupings denounced the decision to adopt Option A4, 
noting that it invited the use of money, the government 
maintained that the new electoral mechanism would dissuade 
corruption and pave an immutable path to the Third Republic. 
Yet, when reports on the conduct of presidential primaries at 
the Ward, LGA and State rounds substantiated popular claims 
that Option A4 was no more than Auction A4 or Option 4-1-9, 
the government remained silent in the fac. of documented 
incidents of electoral abuses. Furthermore, in the aftermath 
of the Jos (SDP) and Port Harcourt (NRC) national conventions, 
in which the respective party presidential posts were 
auctioned to the two multi-millionaires Abiola and Tofa, the 
government remained quiet amidst repoits from its security 
forces detailing wanton impropriety. At no point prior to its 
post-election broadcast did the Babangida regime even condemn 
these electoral violations, nor the convention activities of 
its erstwhile supporter Arthur Nzeribe. The leader of the ABN 
and the IBB-Must-Stay-Four-More-Years .mpaign, who openly 
claimed to have used over NlOO million to participate in the 
bazaar, went uncensured at a time when Nzeribe and both 
presidential aspirants should have been arrested and indicted 
for contravening PTP decrees. When national presidential 
campaigns began in earnest, the state accepted the widespread 
use of money, and indeed, actively encouraged it. Rather than 
seeking to ameliorate these abuses by at least introducing 
laws limiting campaign expenditures, the state facilitated the
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process with its donation of N80 million of national revenue
to each of the aspirants only days before the elections.
The general resistance of ordinary Nigerians to
mortgaging their votes to the highest bidder, made General
Babangida's allegations of election day malpractice untenable.
By and large the polling stations nationally were devoid of
the malfeasance which historically characterized Nigerian
elections. The lOT, the government-sponsored NEC, MAMSER, CDS
and NEPG, the CD and other local and international monitoring
groups were all united in the adjudication of the June 12
election as the freest and fairest in the country's history.
Even the official spokesperson of the Army, Brigadier-General
Fred Chijuka, described the elections as 'free, fair, peaceful
and successful.' The scores of sanctioned and unsanctioned
observer groups commended the NEC and the Nigerian electorate
for the conduct of the elections. As Ihonvbere noted,
the NEC pronounced it the very best elections it had conducted 
thus far. The international Observer Team had praises for the 
NEC, the parties, candidates, security forces, and noted in 
particular the "maturity and decency" of the campaigns. The 
[Nigerian] Election Monitoring Group (NEPG) which had been set 
up by the government to oversee the elections also declared that 
it was "administered...with meticulous precision." It commended 
the NEC for its "diligent, dutiful and in the main, patriotic" 
handling of the exercise. To the NEPG, the June 12 elections was 
devoid of the "pathologies of previous electoral commissions" 
and this was a positive sign "for the future of elections in 
Nigeria." The Director-General of the Government supported 
Centre for Democratic Studies also declared that the "elections 
was the best the nation had and should be accepted." The 
Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy noted that "the elections 
were very orderly. It was .a vote for the presidential candidate 
as well as a clear demonstration of the resolve of Nigerians 
that they would not give Babangida the excuse he wanted to 
derail the transition to democracy.
Ihonvbere, "Generals" p.10-11.
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In addition to the falsity of a financially and materially 
induced electorate, from all documented accounts the
government's charges of a manipulated and 'hijacked' NEC are 
therefore also unsubstantiated. If at all, it was the regime - 
- from the sacking of Eme Awa through to the eleventh hour 
attempt to coerce the NEC and Humphrey Nwosu into cancelling 
the presidential elections -- that curtailed any semblance of 
autonomy the NEC might have initially enjoyed. Equally comic, 
was the General's moral indignation over the probable
compromise of the integrity of the presidency, adjudged by the 
conflict of interest between government and both aspirants. To 
begin with. President Babangida and the AFRC/NDSC -- its total 
mismanagement of the economy under its so-called 'homegrown' 
SAP, its institutionalization of nepotism and corruption, and, 
its unparalleled trampling on civic and democratic rights -- 
had long since destroyed the tenuous credibility of his office 
and legitimacy of the Nigerian state. Indeed, it was well 
known in Nigeria that both multi-billionaires had long been
beneficiaries of inflated state contracts, kickbacks and
donations among other dubious practises that continue to drain 
scarce national surpluses towards private ends. Where access 
to the state remains the principal avenue of accumulation 
among large sections of the ruling class, it is not surprising 
that the two candidates had built up extensive networks with 
the regime. Predictably then, the emergence of Abiola and Tofa 
as party presidential aspirants, is as Anthony Enahoro
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suggests,
the natural consequence of the moral decay promoted by squalid 
policies and practices, over a period of more than seven years, 
where policies and programmes of inordinate donations, 
"settlement" inflated contracts, oil transactions, extra- 
budgetary payments, etc, all now culminate in an electoral 
process tailored specifically to produce billionaire 
candidates
But for all its incursion on the autonomy of the NEC, the 
regime said nothing publicly months earlier when the NEC 
screened and cleared the candidacy of Abiola and Tofa for the 
June 12 elections. Moreover, to introduce the 'ethnic card' in 
the struggle to reproduce its tenuous hold on state power, at 
the historical moment when Nigerians en masse refused to 
succumb to the politics of region, religion and ethnicity, 
clearly exhibits the bankruptcy and desperation of the 
government. The June 12 elections were remarkable in the 
geographical spread of the SDP victory and statistically 
debunks the government's claim of the exclusive Yoruba 
candidacy of MKO Abiola. Even if the electoral results from 
the core Southwestern (Yoruba) states of Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and 
Osun were removed from the national SDP tally of 8.1 million 
votes, the SDP still won outright in other states of the 
federation and Abuja. Perhaps the most insidious of the 
General's allegations which outraged most Nigerians, was the 
regime's new found concern for the independence of the 
judiciary and the rule of law. Under the Babangida regime, the 
use of judiciary ouster clauses in military edicts became
Enahoro, "No Case for Fresh Elections", p.25-2G.
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legendary. The readiness to contradict its own decrees and 
contravene well over 60 decrees on the FTP alone, cannot be 
said to exemplify any respect for the rule of law. The regime 
without much hesitation consistently sought to co-opt and 
suppress the militancy of the numerous human rights groups 
struggling against state arbitrariness. The unparalleled 
repression of popular groups, its retention of the notorious 
Decree No.2, and the unprecedented levels of state-sponsored 
murders under its tenure, are but a few examples which further 
show the government's disregard for the rule of law and 
judicial independence. The NDSC after all, sat by quietly 
while the illegally functioning ABN, banned by the Lagos High 
Court from taking part in the FTP, sought to judicially derail 
the transition programme only 36 hours before the June 12 
elections. Having provided translucent excuses to rationalize 
the annulment of the elections. General Babangida's nationwide 
broadcast also introduced a new transition programme which 
maintained August 27 for the transfer of power to an elected 
civilian government, but was replete with pitfalls which 
virtually ensured its failure.
In announcing a fresh electoral process to have commenced 
on July 31, the NDSC also took measures said again to ensure 
the emergence of a patriotic, honest, and visionary 
leadership. The criteria for presidential aspirants included, 
an age restriction of no less than 50 years; candidates who 
believed, "by act of faith and practise, in the corporate
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existence of Nigeria; have no prior record of crime; possess 
no "record of personal or corporate business interest that 
conflict with the national interest; and, must "have been a 
registered member of either of the two political parties for 
a least a year prior to the e l e c t i o n . B y  the short time 
period involved -- where primaries, nationwide presidential 
campaigns and national elections were all expected to be 
conducted in a four weeks period -- this would have certainly 
ensured the extension of the programme. The new standards for 
choosing presidential aspirants served to divide the political 
class and was enough to provide the regime with some space 
towards resolving the impasse in its pre-determined direction. 
For example, the age stipulations which eliminated the 
candidacy of Tofa, aggrieved his close supporters but was of 
little or no consequence to the NRC, who simply welcomed the 
opportunity to compete for power in fresh elections. In a 
similar manner, factions within the SDP jockeyed positions to 
capitalize on the new arrangement. Indeed, the bulk of the 
membership of the SDP initially maintained a commitment to the 
sanctity of the popular mandate. Moreover, a seemingly 
progressive faction of the SDP, led by the president-elect, 
would continue to agitate for the sanctity of June 12 
elections. But for some powerful factions within the party, 
particularly the Shehu Yar'Dua led 'Patriotic Front', the new 
stipulations were compatible with its aspirations, viewing the
Osifo-Whiskey and Akinkuotu "A Dance”, p.17.
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prospects of new election as another opportunity to strengthen 
factional positions in contestations to lead a new government. 
Theoretically though, the one year membership criterion -- 
which eliminated the mandate of the president-elect and the 
SDP -- disqualified all members of the political class. Having 
in November 1992 dissolved the NEC of both parties while 
simultaneously stipulating a re-registration drive, the regime 
seemed to have been 'unwittingly' producing an uncontestable 
election, since even the longest serving member of either 
party could not meet this requirement at the time of the 
General's broadcast. In furtherance of the desperate ploy to 
divide the political class, the NDSC lifted the ban on the 23 
presidential aspirants only months earlier barred for 
improprieties and criminal acts then deemed inimical to true 
democracy in Nigeria. Now comfortable with the democratic 
credentials of these candidates, the NDSC inclusion of these 
aspirants also fuelled internal conflicts within the political 
class.
Though showing a general proclivity towards an acceptance 
of new elections, the political class did temporarily oppose 
the government's abrogation of the June 12 mandate. Within the 
ranks of the military, opposition also mounted over the latest 
NDSC manoeuvre, in an apparent concern over the battered image 
of the institution. A number of high-ranking officers sought 
voluntary retirement, citing the government's mis-handling of 
the political impasse. Even long-time supporters of General
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Babangida, such as Col. Abubakar Umar, resigned in protest of 
the annulment. Undaunted by the protestations among factions 
of the ruling class, the NDSC presented the political class 
with a 72 hour ultimatum to either participate in new 
elections or accede to an Interim National Government. Both 
options would clearly terminate the June 12 mandate and 
perpetuate the junta since new elections would prolong 
military rule, while the ING path would have led to the 
dissolution of existing political structure. The initial NRC 
stance, demanding fresh elections and the SDP's maintenance of 
the inviolability of June 12 elections, soon gave way to a 
mutual acceptance of the government's ING option. A joint 
statement by the national executive council of the SDP and 
NRC, only two weeks after the annulment, stressed the resolve 
of both parties to co-operate fully with the Babangida 
dictatorship to solve the political crisis. To be sure, the 
June 1? mandate continued to be contested by factions of the 
political class, in spite of this declaration. But by and 
large we highlight the internal competitions within and 
between the political and military factions of the ruling 
classes to illustrate quite clearly the largely opportunistic 
responses of the higher circles to the PTP, through the 
disregard for the rudiments of democracy in both the build up 
to and immediate aftermath of the historic verdict of the June 
12 elections. In a typical response through successive state 
abuse on the transition process, the political class simply
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looked for the easiest arrangement that promised enhanced
access to the state and its resources. While the ruling
classes tried to sort themselves out, popular sectors of civil
society struggled fiercely to uphold their sovereign right to
elect the country's leadership and more importantly, to have
a determining impact on the impasse and Nigeria's political
future. The nationwide civil disobedience rallies that
followed the cancellation of the elections was unprecedented
in Nigeria's history and far surpassed the political
mobilization witnessed on the eve of national independence.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE JUNE 12 ELECTIONS AMD COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSES IN CIVIL SOCIETY
In a recent article examining civic responses to 
Nigeria's failed march to the Third Republic, Sakah Mahmud 
argued that the strong support for MKO Abiola and the 
intensity of struggles to defend the June 12 mandate can be 
interpreted as parochial, since democratic forces had 
steadfastly maintained an opposition to the PTP. The 
inconsistency in principles Mahmud suggested, is one of the 
major weaknesses of the emerging human rights NGO sector, 
which continues to diminish the credibility of these groups 
and the ability to mobilize and empower the grassroots in 
defence of civic and democratic rights.^®" Obviously, Mahmud 
is right to suggest that a wavering stance on critical
Sakah Mahmud, “The Failed Transition to Civilian Rule in Nigeria: 
Its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights" in Africa Today, 4th Quarter 
1993, p.93.
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national issues by pro-democracy forces will constrict their 
ability to strengthen civil society and evolve meaningful 
participatory political structures, a point we return to in 
the conclusion of this exposition. However, his scant reading 
and interpretation of civic responses to the aborted June 12 
elections, misses the historical significance of the electoral 
verdict and the consistency in popular agitation to uphold the 
sanctity of the elections. The June 12 election was not simply 
a choice of governance between Abiola and Tofa or the SDP and 
the NRC. It has been forcefully argued in this exposition, 
that the state-created parties had very little noticeable 
differences. At the level of mutual disinterest on critical 
national issues, the paucity in policy prescriptions advanced 
to resuscitate the economy, the warfare character of intra and 
inter-party politics, the improbity of party and candidacies, 
and in the general indifference towards the economic plight 
and political marginalization of ordinary Nigerians, the NRC 
and the SDP were strikingly similar. Rather than a contest of 
parties and presidential aspirants, Nigerians went to the 
polls to choose between the continuance of a corrupt and 
dictatorial military junta, or the ineptitude of the political 
class. Confronted by the choice of a political class that has 
repeatedly shown an interest in democracy only insofar as it 
conforms with the opportunity to enhance state and resource 
access, and a military autocracy determined to extend its rule 
indefinitely, the Nigerian populace opted to throw out the
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military junta, but without choosing the political class. That 
is to say, in the first instance, Nigerians were firmly 
resolved to demilitarize politics and strengthen civil society 
by resisting the allure of election day monetary inducements 
and similar incentives to engage in acts of political thuggery 
and violence, which would have surely provided the junta with 
an easier pretext to extend, if not abrogate the PTP, In the 
second instance, the overwhelming electoral support for MKO 
Abiola, which cut across region, religion and ethnicity, 
showed a sophisticated discernment between contestants, 
without actually endorsing the president-elect or the SDP.
To be sure, Abiola was solidly identified with the higher 
circles. Through successive regimes, Abiola had built up 
extensive networks with the state and had accumulated heavily 
from lucrative yet unproductive activities. Widely alleged to 
have sponsored the Babangida junta in 1985, Abiola known to 
have amassed huge wealth through his personal and business 
relationship with the former dictator. Furthermore, it is also 
acknowledged that MKO Abiola had developed dubious 
partnerships with transnational capital. As Chairman of 
International Telephone and Telegraph for Africa and the 
Middle East, Abiola further cultivated international 
connections. Seemingly impressive during this tenure, Abiola 
was acclaimed in these circles for his tenacity, though he 
largely failed to improve telecommunication services in
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Nigeria -- in spite of a lucrative N400 million contract.'"® 
Together with Abiola's history of indifference towards the 
plight of the majority of Nigerians and lack of experience in 
public office, he was generally felt to be an inappropriate 
candidate for the office. Despite these liabilities, Abiola 
convincingly defeated Tofa, largely because the latter to most 
Nigerians represented the entrenched ruling class interest 
which had presided over the state and undermined the nation's 
stability, economy and development for personal gains over the 
last thirty years. Moreover, Othman Tofa was felt to be the 
least likely of the two presidential aspirants to confront the 
Babangida dictatorship if in fact (and indeed when) the 
sovereign right of Nigerians was undermined by the junta. This 
is mainly why Nigerians supported the Abiola candidacy on June 
12.
Popular groups supported the sovereignty of Nigerians to 
elect a president without deviating from their opposition to 
the PTP, as Sakah Mahmud suggested. Since the annulment of the 
election was merely a continuation of the types of 
contradictions which had characterized the transition process, 
it followed that democratic forces resisted the latest attempt 
to derail the PTP and repress civil society. For popular 
groups, as Segun Maiyegun asserted, “every socio-political 
occurrence or event in society will present opportunities for
Julius Ihonvbere, "Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria" in 
and Damoaraev Nawm. vol.vii, no.2, 1993/4, p.26. see also: Odia Ofeimun, 
"June Twelvers Dilemma" in The H e w . June 12, 1993, p.25.
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popular and mass organizations to agitate and increase the 
level of support and aid in the conscientization of ordinary 
N i g e r i a n s . Thee defence of the June 12 verdict was then 
a struggle to uphold the sovereignty of the Nigerian people, 
expand the democratic space and mobilize ordinary Nigerians, 
and not simply a campaign to enthrone MKO Abiola. The 
organized responses in civil society to the cancellation of 
the elections were swift. The NLC's statement on the political 
impasse rejected the annulment of the elections and implored 
the junta to "avoid a senseless crisis by releasing the 
remainder of the results."^®' The NLC further maintained 
"that Nigeria cannot afford another presidential election with 
its attendant wastage, apathy, controversy, lack of faith and 
credibility,"“® and warned that workers and trade unions 
would challenge the legitimacy of the military by a set of 
strike actions.^®® Similarly, WIN called on Nigerians to shun 
another poll or the ING option in defence of the sanctity of 
the June 12 results which transcended ethnic or religious 
leanings. In a press statement after the annulled elections, 
WIN noted,
that never in our history from colonial rule to present times
has our collective intelligence been subjected to such insults.
®̂® Interview with Segun Maiyegun, January 1994.
®̂® NLC's official position on the June 12 elections cited in Adeniji, 
"A Huge Joke", p.17.
188 Adeniji, "A Huge Joke", p.17.
'®® Adeniji, Loc.cit.
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By hie own admission General Babangida closed his eyes to 
alleged corruption and electoral malpractice by the two 
presidential candidates allowed them to emerge from the election 
primaries, embark on a long and costly campaign spending public 
and personal funds, allowed over 14 million Nigerians to queue 
under the rain and sun to vote, only to turn around to give self 
serving reasons why he should perpetuate his personal 
dictatorship."'
The ASUU, Human Rights NGOs, other professional associations 
and democratic groups made similar pronouncements and enjoined 
Nigerians to defend the rudiments of democratic rights. The 
Senate Session of the NANS also condemned the government's 
cancellation of the elections. The Association of Nigerian 
Authors (ANA) called on Nigerians to mount and sustain
internal pressure to force the military out of power. In like
manner, press releases from the NBA and its national
president, Priscilla Kuye, denounced the government's gross 
abuse of the constitutional process by annulling the June 12 
poll, and warned of a nationwide court boycott by the 
association until full electoral results were publicly 
released.Speaking on behalf of the CLO, Abdul Oroh, the 
Executive Director, viewed the cancellation of the June 12 
elections as a deliberate assault on the Nigerian people and 
a clear violation of the right of Nigerians to select a leader 
of their choice. The CLO representative further maintained 
that the cancelled election "is a sinister and diabolical 
attempt by a power-hungry despot and a small clique of
WIN, "WIN and Campaign for Democracy" in WIN N#wml#tt#r, April-
December 1993, see also WIN press release on the annulment of the June 12
elections issued on June 27, 1993, p.6.
Dave Aite-Oshoribhor "Lawyers Boycott of Courts" in African
Guardian. July 25, 1993, p.13.
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fascists, who are bent on destroying the Nigerian nation to 
satisfy [themselves] and to misappropriate its resources,"'"-’ 
and appealed to Nigerians to make the country ungovernable in 
order to throw out the junta. New groupings like the 
Association for Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria 
(ADGGN) -- a group of ex-dictators, supposedly reformed 
militarist and several prominent members of the political 
class, -- initially insisted on the inviolability of the June 
12 elections. The Movement for National Reformation (MNR) led 
by some veteran nationalist and progressive members of the 
political class also condemned the government's latest affront 
to Nigerians.
Under the umbrella of the CD, popular groups launched 
three successive nationwide demonstrations and civil 
disobedience rallies in July and August of 1993. The first 
round of political mass action organized between July 5 to 9, 
received widespread popular support. The CD in alliance with 
the CLO, issued and distributed several statements calling on,
1. the students, workers, youth...to mobilize their communities 
for mass rallies and protest marches to the State and LOA 
Secretariats demanding that they transfer their allegiance and 
support to the civilian president elect. 2. Pull down and 
destroy all the pictures and symbols of Babangida and his 
regime. Make bonfires and form barricades. Lock up all gates 
leading in and out of streets and neighbourhoods, block all 
roads with heavy objects like concrete blocks, abandoned cars, 
buses, etc to make the roads impossible to move about and to 
prevent police from stopping the protest. 3. That in support of 
this action all workers should stay away from work, market women 
and traders should lock up their stalls, tanker drivers, taxi 
drivers and commercial vehicle drivers should stay off the roads 
for a period of one week in first instance and subsequently 
whenever such solidarity actions are necessary. 4. That MKO
Abdul Oroh cited in anon. "On June 12 We Stand" in 1, July 29,
1993, p.22.
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Abiola should immediately name his cabinet and for his 
government, 5. Nigerians, Africans and other lovers of democracy 
worldwide should take part in any other appropriate measure 
deemed necessary to make the country ungovernable for the 
Babangida regime.
The week long mass protests rendered Nigeria near ungovernable 
and was a direct result of the organizational leadership of 
the CD and its allies. Posters and hand bills were distributed 
nationwide. A World Cup qualifying match at the National 
Stadium in Lagos days prior to scheduled mass action, provided 
pro-democracy groups with the opportunity to distribute 
leaflets and publicize the campaign to the well over 80,000 
people in attendance."* Several meetings were held between 
the CD, its 42 affiliates, and other democratic groups to gain 
support for the protest. The CD and especially the WIN 
"mobilized women country-wide, including grassroots women, 
market women, artisans and the unorganized sector to 
participate in the mass protest.""® Before and consistently 
through the CD-led campaign, pro-democracy groups sent a 
number of special messages to participants. The CD made the 
clear distinction that the "protest was not for Abiola as an 
individual though at the moment he represented the democratic
CLO, "Time to Throw Out Babangida", leaflet issued by the 
Directorate of Campaigns and Organization of the CLO, June 29, 1993.
*** Bolaji Adebiyi »b ml. "June 12: The Peoples Fury" in Cltimmn. July 
12-18, 1993, p.20.
Osa Director, "We Shall Fight Abacha", Interview with Glory 
Kilanko, National Coordinator of Women-in-Nigeria, in Tell. May 30, 1994, 
p. 24.
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desire of Nigerians who gave him the popular mandate, but 
rather a protest to prevent the continuation of collective 
suffering under a corrupt and dictatorial military junta. 
The call to uphold the June 12 mandate was solidly linked to 
on-going demands for a broad-based Sovereign National 
Conference (SNC) as a forum to openly debate and tackle the 
country's extant social, economic and political issues, and 
the mechanism through which Nigerians would decide on the 
future of governance. In addition, people were "warned not to 
loot or burn public or private properties and to note that the 
struggle was not between North or South or between ethnic or 
religious groups or political parties... [and] Nigerians were 
implored not to attack fellow Nigerians from other parts of 
the country."^®®
The nationwide demonstration was most effective in 
Southwestern Nigeria and Lagos state in particular. The 
regional imbalance in the protest has led many to view the 
pro-democracy campaign from a narrow perspective. It was 
maintained that the predominance of the civil disturbances in 
this region was largely a consequence of the ethnic background 
of MKO Abiola, rather than a principled rallying point for the 
advancement of democracy. Indeed many of the organizations 
which the June 12 crisis gave birth to were motivated simply
Ihonvbere, "The Generals", p.16, 
Ihonvbere, "The Generals", p.16. 
Ihonvbere, "The Generals", p.15-16.
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by ethnic calculations. Invariably, these groupings were 
organizations of the higher circles and aspiring members of 
the middle stratum, who viewed the political ascendency of 
Abiola as an opportunity to enhance access to state power. But 
the primary reasons why civic protests were concentrated in 
the Southwest can be attributed to the organizational weakness 
of the CD in other parts of the country. Additionally, with 
Lagoa remaining the economic and commercial nucleus of the 
country with a more developed civil society in this locale, it 
is not surprising that Lagos was the epicentre of the 
nationwide protest. Most major cities and towns, from Lagos to 
Kaduna and from Benin to Aba, were paralysed by the 
demonstrations. In Lagos commercial activities grounded to a 
near halt. Banking and other strategic sectors of the economy 
were reduced to a stand still. Barricades and bonfires lined 
several core streets and highways. Commercial vehicles were 
sparse on Lagosian roads. Private vehicular traffic barely 
moved on intra and inter-state roads. En masse, workers stayed 
away from their places of employment. Market places were 
deserted. A mass rally organized by the CD at Obafemi Awolowo 
Way was attended by several thousand Nigerians. Placards 
abounded carrying messages such as 'IBB MUST GO', 'IBB STOLE 
OUR VOTE*, 'ENOUGH OF MILITARY RULE* and 'INSTALL ABIOLA NOW*, 
Mock coffins bearing the inscription 'IBB IS DEAD* were also 
commonplace. Several visible symbols of the regime and the
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Nigerian state were destroyed.^* The mass action gained 
critical support from the legal community. Numerous branches 
of the NBA in the Southwest initiated a boycott of the courts 
and resolved to stay away until the June 12 verdict was 
officially announced. Chapters and branches of the Bar in 
Kwara, Rivers and Kaduna state, and Abuja, soon joined the 
boycott action.^0 Concomitantly, the June 12 faction of the 
SDP, led by Abiola and Kingibe filed a legal suit in Lagos 
High Court, which sought a judicial verdict nullifying the 
government's abrogation of Decree 13 and 52 guiding the PTP 
and the presidential elections.
Mounting internal pressure on the Babangida regime was 
augmented by external responses, from the Nigerian diaspora in 
the West and the international community. Associations of 
Nigerian nationals in Britain, such as the International 
Movement for Democracy in Nigeria (IMDN), issued several 
declarations calling on the Nigerian government to release the 
June 12 results and to immediately execute the investiture of 
Abiola as president. The IMDN also organized protest rallies 
at the Nigerian High Commission in London, said to have been
Adebiyi et al, "The Peoples Pury", p.20. See also: Osifo-Whiskey 
and Akinkuotu, "A Dance".
Dave Aite-Oshoribhor, "Cost of Protest" in African Guardian. July 
26, 1993, p.15.
p.18,
Okey Ekeocha, "A Legal Tangle" in African Guardian. July 26, 1993,
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comprised of over 2,000 participants. Condemnation of the 
annulled elections also reverberated through Nigerian 
communities in the U.S. Groupings such as the Organization of 
Nigerian Citizens (Baltimore, Maryland), Organization of 
Nigerian Nationals (ONN, Dallas-Forth Worth, Texas) and the 
Organization of Nigerians in the Americas (ONA, Houston, 
Texas) launched similar protests, which further gave crucial 
support to the activities of the CD at home. Underscoring 
the apparent commitment to human rights and democracy from the 
international community in recent years, many global bodies 
and Western government's condemned the June 12 crisis in 
Nigeria. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, described 
the annulment as 'bad news' and an unfortunate attempt to 
'subvert democracy' by "people at the top in Nigeria who 
decided some time ago that they didn't want to leave hold of 
the levers of power. The U.S. State Department
characterized the political developments in Nigerian "as 
outrageous". Commenting further, the U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State for Africa, George Moose, asserted that "the regime's 
so-called 'managed transition' to democracy is dead, the 
victim of a military clique unwilling, in the final analysis,
Osifo-Whiskey and Akinkuotu, "A Dance", p.13.
Biodun Lapedo, "Nigerians in the U.S. Accuses Embassy of 
Misinformation on June 12 Elections", first published in The Bftltlmore Sun. 
June 23, 1993 and reprinted in The Guardian, July 2, 1993, see also: 
Ihonvbere, "The Generals", p.19.
"Nigeria Deserves Better than this, says Hurd", text of BBC 
interview with British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, reproduced in The 
Ouerdien. June 25, 1993, p.3.
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to let the people exercise their sovereign right. He 
later depicted the ING option as "a stalking horse", simply a 
means for perpetuating the military d i c t a t o r s h i p . The 
Canadian, French, German and Japanese governments also lent 
their voices to the growing international condemnation, 
calling on the government to release the election results.^®' 
In the same vein, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Emeka 
Anayoku, described the cancelled polls as "a serious set back 
to the cause of democracy. In another stern reaction to 
the political crisis in Nigeria, the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Advisory Commission issued a brief statement condemning the 
annulment of the elections and strongly recommended to the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government to disallow the attendance of 
General Babangida at its annual summit later that year.^“'
Public utterance from Western governments in the wake of 
the General's June 26 broadcast, were soon followed by 
diplomatic and military reprisals and the threat of economic 
sanctions in the ensuing weeks. Within 48 hours of the NDSC
Text of a press statement of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa, George Moose, reprinted as "The Military Must Hand Over" in Tempo. 
August 3 0 1993, p.23.
206 Moose, "The Military" p.23.
Ima Nibodo, "The New Transition Game" in African Guardian. July 5, 
1993, p.23 and Kunle Oyatomi, "Canada Sanctions Nigeria's Military" in 
Vancuard. Saturday Special August 21, 1993, p.l.
anon., "U.S., Britain List Sanctions Against Stifling of 
Democracy" in Tha Guardian, June 25, 1993, p.1-2.
p.39.
Kayode Soyinka, "Slap on the Wrist" in Nawawateh. July 26, 1993,
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announcement voiding the election results, both Britain and 
the U.S., imposed military sanctions on the country. The 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office quickly announced the 
cancellation of training programmes for members of the 
Nigerian Armed forces, withdrew existing military cooperation 
offers, suspended financial assistance to the Nigerian War 
College, denied entry visas to members of the armed forces, 
the national guard, state security and intelligence officials 
and their families, and in addition rescinded the special 
status on visa applications from officials of the federal 
government, state government, and parastatals. While ruling 
out a complete freeze on economic assistance to Nigeria, the 
British government withheld a pending L14.5 million aid 
package/"^ The European Community in response to the British 
action and pressure, also suspended military cooperation, 
placed restrictions on visas from government officials and 
pledged to impose stronger sanctions in light of new 
developments in the political crisis. Taking similar 
actions, the U.S. government expelled Nigeria's military 
attaches in the U.S. and recalled its own from Nigeria, froze 
a $22.8 million aid package and threatened to freeze the 
accounts of military officers in the U.S. and Europe -- 
estimated at several billion dollars -- until power was
anon., "Stifling of Democracy", p.2. 
Soyinka, "Slap on the Wrist", p.39.
384
handed-over to a civilian government.To register its 
disdain for the military junta, the Canadian government also 
suspended the training eligibility for the Nigerian military 
and police and stayed the visit of military personnel from the 
latter, to International Strategic Studies Institutes in 
Canada.
With intensified external and internal pressures, the 
crisis-ridden Babangida regime relied increasingly on 
cooptation, deceit, manipulation and inordinately on 
repression to disarticulate popular and opposition forces in 
order to resolve the political impasse. Within the NLC, for 
example, the June 12 crisis and ensuing response of the 
Congress, sharpened and manifested the competing pressures of 
state cooptation and militancy from below. The passive 
response of the NLC to the CD-led nationwide protest is 
indicative of persisting state infiltration of the central 
labour body and the cooptation of its leadership, particularly 
since the 1989 dissolution and reconstitution of the Congress 
under state control. While the Nigerian state managed to 
render the NLC politically impotent during the nationwide 
protest, independent sectoral unions and state branches in the 
Southwest, in addition to those in Abia, Anambra, Akwa-Ibom, 
Cross Rivers, Delta, Enugu, Imo and Rivers state, condemned
anon., "US, EEC may Freeze Military officers' Account" in Th# 
Daily Champion. July 8, 1993, p.l.
Oyatomi, "Canada Sanctions" p.l, 5.
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the apex body and resolved to remain a relevant force in 
determining the direction of political developments in the 
c o u n t r y . i n  like manner, the moribund NDSC doled out 
monies to prominent members of the political class, 
traditional rulers, and also attempted to bribe some pro­
democracy activists in its desperate attempt to build hegemony 
in civil society. Several members of state legislatures 
throughout the federation, were 'settled', and in many cases 
induced to introduce and pass resolutions -- as in Katsina, 
Kaduna and Bauchi State -- calling on the Babangida regime to 
stay in power. The dying regime also resorted to the often 
efficacious strategy of ethnic and regional manipulation. In 
a two-pronged approach, the NDSC tried to pit the ruling 
classes from different regions and ethnicities against each 
other and also sought to disarticulate popular forces by 
portraying the pro-democracy movement as sectarian. In the 
first instance, the regime bribed members of the Eastern 
bourgeoisie and enticed them with further financial support to 
run in fresh presidential elections and thus abandon any 
commitment to defend the June 12 mandate of their so-called 
Western arch-rivals. Barkening back to post-independence and 
particularly pre-civil war ethnic suspicions between East and 
West, the regime further attempted to lure Eastern elites in
Osifo-Whiskey and Akinkuotu, "A Dance”, p.16.
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support of the regime and its predetermined designs.While 
the promise of enhanced access to state power and resources 
was enough to enamour the opportunistic and conservative 
faction of the Eastern elite towards the regime -- even if it 
meant reproducing largely artificial social cleavages -- state 
efforts to exploit the ethnic divide was met by fierce 
collective resistance from even elite factions from this 
r e g i o n . I n  the second instance, the regime mobilized the 
state-controlled media -- mainly the Nigerian Television 
Authority, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria the Dailv 
Times and the New Nigerian -- and augmented its resources with 
a N30 million subvention in order to buttress campaigns aimed 
at portraying the pro-democracy movement as ethnically 
motivated. While using the electronic and print media to 
dissuade Nigerians from supporting the CD and its activities, 
the government is alleged to have also sanctioned and funded 
the formation of rival human rights grouping to endorse the 
extension of the PTP.^^’
In the main however, the government depended on the 
coercive arm of the state to resolve its self-created crisis
Ademola Oyinlola, "Babangida'b Death Game: Now Plays the Ethnic 
Card" in T»ll. August 2, 1993, p.10-13.
A meeting of prominent members of the Eastern (Igbo) elites, 
convened by Sam Mbakwe, Ralph Obioha and Ezekiel Izuogu, resolved to stand up 
against the annulment of the June 12 elections and resist Babangida's 
machinations. See Josh Arinze, "Coup Against the People" in Tell. August 16, 
1993, p.12.
Akin Adesokan, "His Master's Double" in Tempo. August 16, 1993,
p.18-19.
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and reproduce its tenuous hold on power. The CD-led nationwide 
non-violent protest was brutally crushed by the armed forces 
and mobile police, on a clear shoot-at-sight directive from 
the then Secretary of Defence, General Sani Abacha. In many 
cities armoured tanks were rolled out to confront protestors. 
The newly created National Guard of the Babangida regime was 
deployed to major urban centres nationwide. State 
authoritarian responses to the July protest left over 200 
protesters dead.^^® As usual, the SSS used Decree No.2. to 
arrested and detained pro-democracy activists, student leaders 
and journalists, such as Gani Fawehinmi, Pemi Palana, Beko 
Ransome-Kuti, Segun Maiyegun, Mike Ozekome, Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
Yinka Telia, and chased countless others into hiding. The 
secretariats of the CD, CLO, the CDHR and the NADL were 
routinely raided and besieged by security forces, often 
arresting office assistants and harassing their families. The 
emergency 30th Senate Session of the NANS, (held in Enugu) 
convened to deliberate student responses to the political 
impasse, was also disrupted by security agents. Over 25 
students were reported by the student body to have been seized 
and detained by police en route to the meeting. The 
journalist community was also subjected to heightened state 
clampdown. Numerous media houses, which included the National
Osifo-Whiskey and Akinkuotu, "Dance", p.16.
Ody Chukwube, "NANS Calls for Release of its Members" in Dailv 
chaaBlon. July 0, 1993, p.6. See also: anon., "The Students have Spoken" in 
Afticaa QuardUn. July 26, 1993, p.8.
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Concord. African Concord. Abuia Newsday. The Sketch. The 
Punch, and Ogun State Broadcasting Corporations were sealed 
off by the SSS for allegedly publishing articles inimical to 
the PTP, while the premises of the Tell and Duality were 
regularly raided. The recently launched critical weekly 
magazine the NEWS was likewise proscribed and thousands of 
copies of the maiden edition of the affiliated weekly, Tempo, 
were seized. In the desperate attempt to muzzle the press, the 
NDSC even sacked the editors of the political desk of the 
state-owned Dailv Times, again for writing stories allegedly 
favourable to pro-democracy forces. Several journalists, 
editors and their families were harassed, dismissed, arrested 
and/or detained for similar reasons. In the cases of the Daily 
Champion, the proprietor Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, a long-time 
supporter of the Babangida regime, terminated the employment 
of the newspapers' managing director, editor, and political 
editor for publishing an article alleging, as the title read, 
the US, EEC may Freeze Military Officera Accounts, in protest 
over the June 12 annulment. In perhaps the greatest assault on 
the fourth estate since the colonial period, the regime 
introduced a number of retrogressive press decrees to produce 
a monolithic media under statist control. For example, the 
Newspaper and Magazine Decree No.48 of 1993 (Proscription and 
Prohibition from Circulation) empowered the state to ban or 
seize copies of any publication which the authorities deemed 
as hostile to the PTP. Seeking to effect further state control
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of the mass media, the regime promulgated Newspaper Decree 
No.43. which compelled proprietors to formally register 
publications with the government and made mandatory the 
notification of appointed of editors to security forces. In 
typical fashion, both press edicts of the NDSC were made 
retroactive to legitimize the proscription and/or seizure of 
the aforementioned publications.
State heightened clampdown on civil society intensified 
popular struggles for human rights and democracy. Again, it 
was the organizational leadership of the CD which gave popular 
groups and ordinary Nigerians direction in responding to the 
deepening political crisis. Strongly objecting to the 
government's attempt to now form an ING, deemed as another 
attempt to perpetuate the transition process, the CD organized 
two successive nationwide protests in August 1993 to force the 
regime out of power. The second round of civic demonstrations 
was launched to coincide with the August 27'̂*’ termination date 
of the military junta. Learning from the limitations of the 
July mass action, which led to the massacre of over 200 
people, the CD enjoined Nigerians to stay away from work, 
marketplaces, schools and to remain off the roads in certain 
towns and urban centres. The apex body for pro-democracy 
forces made strong efforts to strengthen its organizational
Tunje Asaju, "War Against the Press" in Hewiwateh. August 2, 1993. 
Mercy Ette, "The Big Noose" in Nawswabch August 30, 1993. Delu Ogunade, "The 
Noose" in Newswatah. August 30, 1993. Chile Oshadipe, "The Hammer Palls" in 
Tampo. August 30. 1993.
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capacities and mobilization outside the Southwest.^' Civic 
actions were generally effective. With the balance of forces 
shifting towards radical elements in the NLC, trade unions 
came out more forcefully in support of the pro-democracy 
campaigns. Pressure from state branches and powerful 
independent unions, such as the strategic National Union of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) , compelled the apex 
body to issue an ultimatum to the federal government, 
demanding the investiture of a constitutional government based 
of the June 12 elections by the August 27th or face nationwide 
strike actions.Major urban centres across the country 
were desolate from the CD action. To prevent any further 
extension of the PTP, millions of Nigerians stayed away from 
work, registering their protest over the intransigence of the 
junta. Commercial and civic activities again ground to a halt. 
The country became increasingly ungovernable for a regime 
which rapidly lost any credibility among the p o p u l a c e . A  
radicalized civil society insisting on the enthronement of
Interview with former CD, General Secretary, chima Ubani, "We 
Shall Confront Babangida Again" in Tempo. August 16, 1993, -i.lG.
Toye lyare, "Labour's Threat" in Wowswateh. September 6, 1993. see 
also Chinedu Offor, "Labour Picks Up the Gauntlet" in African Guardian. 
August 30, 1993. Chinedu Offor, "Labour for Democracy" in African Guardian. 
September 6, 1993. Despite another state attempt to fractionalize the NLC by 
threatening to make union affiliation to the central labour body and union 
dues voluntary, most independent trade unions remained vigilant, and were 
resolved to even bypass the wav ring stance of the NLC leadership to struggle 
in defence of the June i2 mandate.
T. lyare, "Storm of Protest" in Kawawateh. August 30, 1993.
S.Osuji, "Power of Passive Protest" in African.Guardian, August 23, 1993. 
Kenneth B. Noble (1993) "Millions of Nigerians Stay Home in Protest" in My» 
York Timaa. August 13, 1993. AP, "Lagos Brought to a Halt as City Heeds 
Strike Call" in The Toronto fltar. August 13, 1993.
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democratic rule, augmented by growing external opposition, 
constricted the political manoeuvrability of the Babangida 
regime and forced General Babangida to relinquish power on 
August 27. In his valedictory speech, the General's cited his 
'personal sacrifice to step aside' in order to "provide the 
nation with a new face to complete the...final transfer of 
power to a democratically elected President.
The so-called 'new face' came in the form of a 32 member 
Interim National Government. Headed by the former chairman of 
the Transitional Council, Ernest Shonekan, comprised of some 
military notables and mainly hand picked by the exiting junta, 
the new governing body -- though civilian dominated -- was all 
too familiar to Nigerians. A divided and opportunistic 
political class, by and large accepted the ING and dispensed 
with the June 12 struggle. In turn, the political class sought 
to capitalize on the new arrangement by jockeying for 
political posts in the ING.̂ ^̂  The ING option did not solve 
the political malaise, nor attenuate the legitimation crisis 
of the Nigerian state. The inaugural period of the ING was 
greeted with widespread condemnation form the international 
community and a cross section of the Nigerian civil society. 
The ascendency of the ING also renewed nationwide strikes and
Text of an address by General Babangida printed as "Enough is 
Enough" in Tempo. March 17, 1994. see also Kenneth B. Noble, "Nigerian Ruler 
Cede Power to Civilians" in New York Times. August 27, 1993.
While resisting a last minute attempt by General Babangida to 
intimidate the National Assembly into accepting his headship of the ING, the 
political class jockeyed for posts in the ING, rather than supporting the 
inviolability of the June 12 elections.
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mass demonstrations, although short-lived and less effective 
than their predecessors. Indeed, the regime was able 
disarticulate pro-democracy forces through the introduction of 
some popular measures. For instance, a compromised NLC 
leadership, which only grudgingly accepted to embark on the 
political action to install a constitutional government, 
easily capitulated on this demand when the Shonekan government 
offered some tentative economic concessions to trade unions in 
the country.The regime went further to build hegemony in 
civil society. Some detained political activists and 
journalists were released from detention. The regime reached 
an agreement with the ASUU on its five month old strike 
action, which then paved the way for the reopening of most 
universities. Moreover, the ING announced that an 
'appropriate' bill would be initiated in the National Assembly 
for the repeal of all laws muzzling the press, and also set up 
a panel to investigate the annulled June 12 elections.
Notwithstanding popular praise of some of these measures, 
the ING still faced a serious crisis of credibility. The 
worsening of the already grave economic predicament 
concomitant to the political stalemate, and the inability of 
the ING to grapple with the unabating socio-economic downturn, 
deepened the legitimation crisis of the new government. From
A unilateral decision to call off the political strike action by 
the NLC leadership, who settled for economic concession around a tentative 
agreement of the ING to retain the domestic price of petroleum (it would be 
later abrogated) was met with widespread condemnation from independent trade 
unions, particularly the strategic NUPENG.
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the inception of pro-democracy protests in the wake of the 
June 12 annulment, through to the early weeks of the ING, the 
impact of the political crisis on the declining economy is 
said by leading Nigerian economist to have cost the country 
over N2.45 billion daily/"" The banking sector faced a 
serious liquidity squeeze. Depositors withdrew their funds 
from banks at unprecedented rates. Demands for foreign 
exchange escalated. Disturbed by the political uncertainty, 
transnational capital scaled backed investments considerably 
and converted their funds into hard currency. With the 
diminishing financial confidence in the naira, the small 
percentage of Nigerians with substantial savings also 
converted their monies into hard currency to forestall or 
minimize long-term losses. Nigerians and foreigners fleeing 
the country added to the demands for foreign exchange. With 
increasing financial withdrawals by depositors and shortfalls 
in exchange needs, several banks tottered on near collapse. 
Capital flight caused by the political crisis put enormous 
pressure on the exchange rate in the parallel market. While 
the official exchange rate hovered around N22 during this 
period, the autonomous market rate drastically depreciated to 
N45 from an average of N30 prior to the June 12 c r i s i s . O f  
course, for the those few Nigerians with access to foreign
Chinedu Offor and Prince Ovwagbedia, "Down on her Knees" in The 
African Ouardian. September 13, 1993, p. 15.
Godson Ukpevo, "Doomsday Ahead" in Mewawatch. July 26, 1993.
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exchange, huge profits were realized through speculative 
activities which put further downward pressure on the value of 
the naira.
For the productive sectors of the economy, long since 
staggering under the regime of adjustment, the impact of the 
political crisis was disastrous. In the manufacturing sector, 
political uncertainty increased production costs and created 
havoc in the planning of production and the distribution of 
goods. As a consequence, the process of deindustrialization, 
manifest in the closure of firms and reduction in capacity 
utilization, accelerated in this period. The apex bodies for 
productive capital, such as the MAN, the Organized Private 
Sector (OPS) and the National Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (NACCIMA), vociferously 
highlighted the constraints on domestic capital accumulation 
created or exacerbated by the crisis. Such obstacles included, 
the sharp rise in the cost of credit, the closure of credit 
lines and spiralling inflation which led to the build up of 
unsold stock in warehouses. Such a business environment, it 
was further maintained, not only quickened the disinvestment 
of transnational capital, but also almost ruled out new 
capital inflows and discouraged investments by domestic 
capital.The mismanagement of the economy was also a major 
source of concern. With the 1993 Budget, introduced by .he
Organized Private Sector (OPS), "The Political Situation in 
Nigeria" in the Miaarian ieonemiat. September 27, 1993, p.29.
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Shonekan-led Transitional Council, already overspent by N48 
billion by mid-1993 and extra-budgetary spending rapidly 
rising as scarce resources were expended to contain the 
political crisis, Nigeria's debt continued to increase. In the 
context of a drop in world oil prices to $14.50 per barrel, in 
contrast to the projected price of $17 per barrel of petroleum 
in the budget, the constricted resources had negative 
repercussions for the productive sectors of the economy. 
Needless to say, the pains of the economic malaise continued 
to be unequally borne by subordinate classes. Unemployment in 
the country grew at a frightening pace. The price of basic 
commodities skyrocketed. The cost of essential services also 
witnessed a precipitous rise as a consequence of the political 
stalemate. Compounding the economic downturn and particularly 
its impact on subordinate groupings, the Shonekan government 
increased the prices of petroleum at the insistence of an 
IMF/World Bank monitoring team, who claimed yet again that the 
domestic prices of petroleum and petroleum products were 
heavily subsidized. Fuelling the economic crisis, in early 
November 1993, Nigerians went to the pumps to find a dramatic 
700% increase in the price of a petroleum. The overnight 
inflation in the prices of a litre of petrol -- from NO.70 to 
N5.00 -- and the obvious implication of such a sharp rise for
the standard of living and survival of ordinary Nigerians, 
sparked off nationwide demonstrations which deepened the
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credibility problems of the ING.̂ °̂
A combination of heightened economic instability and the 
inability of Nigerian state to redress the socio-economic 
malaise and mediate intensified intra and inter-class 
political contestations, created an environment historically 
conducive for the men bestowed with the legitimate monopoly of 
the instruments of coercion to intervene in the political 
landscape. Some specificities at the political level on the 
eve of the Abacha coup made such an intervention especially 
inviting to the military and strongly suggested that the 
dissolution of the seemingly democratic structures built up by 
the PTP was imminent. These require elaboration: First, the 
political class became increasingly polarized between pro-ING 
forces, comprised of the tripartite alliance between the ABN, 
the Yar'Dua faction of the SDP and the NRC, and on the other 
side of the divide, the June 12 faction of the SDP led by MKO 
Abiola. The latter was vehemently opposed to ING proposals for 
local government and presidential elections slated in February 
1994, but continued to lose ground in the political 
contestation over the June 12 issue. When a principal defender 
of the electoral mandate within the higher circles, lyorchia 
Ayu, was unconstitutionally removed from the senate 
presidential seat by anti-democratic forces in the National
230 anon., "This is Armageddon" in Tell. November 22, 1993.
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Assembly, intra-ruling class antagonisms intensified.^^ As 
expected, the resolve of the SDP members defending the June 12 
mandate waned, particularly after the president-elect 
unilaterally decided to leave the country on a 53 day Euro- 
North American mission to gain external support for pro­
democracy forces at the height of the crisis. For the most 
part, the position of the pro-June 12 faction of the political 
class on the pro-democracy struggle was always wavering, as 
they seldom came out in full support of the CD and its 
democratic activities. Abiola, also vacillated in his response 
to the political debacles and was clearly disorganized and had 
no political strategy to realize the popular mandate. Given 
that he came from the ranks of the ruling classes, Abiola was 
always susceptible to all sorts of inducements to protect his 
objective interests. The weakening of the seemingly 
progressive faction of the ruling class, together with the 
inability of the political class to sort themselves out 
peacefully, in no small measure also enabled the military to 
determine the direction of political developments, as we have 
shown earlier.
Second, internal acrimony within the military faction of 
the ruling classes also around the June 12 issue, left the 
armed forces increasingly divided into different groups vying 
for hegemonic control. Already, the dominant forces led by the
Chukwuemeka Gahia, "Grace to Grass" in Mawwatch. November 15,
1993.
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then Secretary of Defence of the ING, Sani Abacha, sought to 
strengthen its position by retiring loyalists of the ex­
dictator and redeploying into less sensitive posts members of 
the military hierarchy supportive of the June 12 verdict. An 
allegedly faixed coup of mainly middle and junior ranking 
officers which sought to reinstate the June 12 mandate and 
dépoliticize the armed forces, served to intensify internal 
tensions within the armed forces/"^ it became increasingly 
clear that the dominant faction would intervene more 
decisively in national politics and do away with the contrived 
ING which it ostensibly controlled. Third, the October 25"' 
1993 hijacking of a domestic Nigerian Airways flight from 
Lagos to Abuja, which eventually landed in Naimey the capital 
of Niger, was a manifestation -- although somewhat crude --of 
popular grievances in civil society to the political 
stalemate. Though popular groups distanced themselves and 
condemned the Movement for the Advancement for Democracy (MAD) 
who orchestrated this action, they strongly supported the 
issues enunciated by the MAD. The popular demands of the MAD 
included among others,
the immediate hand-over of power from the illegal and 
unconstitutional National Interim Puppet Arrangement to a well 
constituted authority that is the National Assembly... and the 
immediate civil trial of the military and their civilian 
collaborators for treason, ... looting of the economy of
Seye Kehinde, "A Coup Aborted" in The Hewa. November 1, 1993. see 
also Ademola Oyinlola, "Testy Moments for the Military" in T#ll, November 1, 
1993.
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billions of dollars into foreign accounts.
Although the hijacking crisis was quickly brought to an end 
without the resolution of any of these grievances, it sent a 
clear message to the military that the government had lost all 
political, moral, legal, cultural and social authority in 
civil society. Fourth, the legitimation crisis of the Nigerian 
state and the new government intensified when a ruling by 
Justice Dolapo Akinsanya in Lagos High Court declared the 
formation of the ING unconstitutional. This legal victory for 
pro-democracy forces and the immediate popular agitation for 
MKO Abiola to form an alternative government discredited the 
ING and sent shock waves throughout the military's top brass. 
The impetus this development provided for the realization of 
the June 12 mandate and to the demilitarization of the state 
and civil society gave the generals added incentive to strike 
quickly.
One of the most compelling reasons for the Abacha coup 
and coup d'etate historically in Nigeria as elsewhere on the 
continent, is the continued fragmentation of civil society. 
Without a doubt, the June 12 crisis and its aftermath was the 
clearest indication in recent years of the growing strength of 
the Nigerian civic terrain. The principled position of the CD 
and its allies and their catalytic role in mobilizing ordinary 
Nigerians certainly boded well for the delimitation of the
Ima Nibodo, "Whodunit and Why" in African guardian. November 8,
1993.
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State, the enthronement of 'meaningful, participatory and 
transparent political structure in the country which would 
provide structural and institutional mechanisms to ensure that 
the military stays out of the political terrain permanently. 
Indeed, an alliance reached between the CD and NLC on the eve 
of the November 17 coup also strengthened popular democratic 
struggles, since despite a compromised leadership in recent 
years and the resultant aloofness of labour on critical 
national issues, trade unions remained the most organized and 
national civic force. The apparent rapprochement of these 
groups to advance democratic agitation did, however, remain 
precarious with both sides embroiled in mutual suspicion and 
susceptible to state efforts to prevent such an alliance. Such 
a situation where civil society is weak and unable to delimit 
state control has invariably made military intervention quite 
easy. But perhaps unlike the eve of other coups in Nigerian 
history, some pro-democracy groups, centred around prominent 
activists like Gani Fawehinmi, unilaterally and indeed quite 
naively advocated the military's intervention in defence of 
the June 12 mandate. In addition, a divided civil society at 
the height of political contestation then provide the military 
with sufficient incentive and opportunity to intervene in the 
political impasse. On November 17, the tumultuous and 
expensive -- said to have cost in excess of N50 billion -- 
road to Nigeria's Third Republic was halted by a palace coup 
led by General Sani Abacha. The ING and all of the seemingly
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democratic structures produced by the transition process were 
unilaterally dissolved. In addition, the NEC, the two statist 
political parties and all political associations were banned 
by the junta. Popular struggles for democracy faced a serious 
setback with the remilitarization of the state and the civic 
terrain.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have examined in considerable detail, 
the long ignored subjective factors of African and Third World 
development. Established mainstream and even radical schools 
of thought have treated development as technocratic and/or 
statist, or resigned it in recent years to the magic of the 
market, while paying little or no attention to collective 
responses of civic groups. The new intellectual renaissance 
with the dynamics of civil society within the respective 
schools, while welcomed, still largely treat this realm 
uncritically and often conceptually examine it through 
romantic, non-conflictual and benign lenses. Our concrete case 
study of the popular responses in Nigeria's civic terrain to 
SAP and the tortuous PTP underscores the need to analyze the 
dialectics of state and civil society and the contradictions 
and conflicts herein, in order to better understand the 
prospects for African development centred around the 
participation of the grassroots. The concluding chapter of 
this thesis examines some of the competing interpretation of 
adjustment, informalization, civil society and democracy. In
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addition, we draw some conclusions from the Nigerian case 
study, ascertain the implications for democratic struggle in 
the country and the continent, make some future projections, 
and enunciate some policy alternatives from below for 
democratic development towards the end of this millennium.
CHAPTER FOUR
ADJUSTMENT, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: SOME CONCLUSIONS 
FROM THE CASE STUDY ON NIGERIA AND FUTURE PROSPECTS AND 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Africa'# «conoaio problem# #r# rooked in it# politic#, e daaocretic 
revolution i# inovitebl# beoeua# it i# the only route to eecepe from the 
crieia. African# ere reeking democracy partly a# a condition of aurvival, 
from the realisation that they must fend for themselves or 
perish. .• .desMcracy will not necessarily put more food on the table, cure 
diseeses, provide shelter or ensure higher prices for primary commodities.
The democracy which the movement is groping for is a fusion of the economic 
and the political, an arrangement by which the people become the means as 
well as the ends of development potential in their own interest.*
...empowering people could not be more relevant to the current crisis in 
Africa, particularly the continent-wide awvement for political freedom and 
liberal democracy. For what underlies the current historical movement is not 
simply a desire to end the gross abuse and misappropriation of power by the 
various despots who have held sway on the continent during the past three 
decades. Behind these powerful political movements lies a deeply-felt need by 
the peoples of our continent, the common people, to heve a real say in the 
shaping of their lives and societies. People wish to participate fully in the 
effairs of their countries in order to address and solve the real problems of 
poverty, hunger, disease, education, political oppression, economic 
dependence and development.'
This exposition has examined the interplay of the two 
most salient features of Africa's political economy over the 
past two decades, namely the neo-liberal market reforms and 
the intensified struggles for democracy on the continent. The 
1980s began with the majority of African countries tottering 
on the brink of massive economic decay, political instability 
and social disarray. Africa's multifarious crisis continued 
to deepen throughout the decade. In no small measure, the 
decline was exacerbated by the disastrous socioeconomic impact 
of the IMF/World Bank guided structural adjustment programmes 
a opted by most African countries in the integrum. A neo­
liberal response to the Third World debt crisis, this economic
' Claude Ake, "As Africa Democratises" in Afriom Forum, vol.2, no.2, 
1992, p.13-14.
 ̂ Afflpaw "Political Liberalism", p.36.
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policy sought to restructure the pattern of state capitalist 
accumulation blamed for precipitating the post-colonial 
development crisis in Africa as elsewhere. Emphasizing the 
primacy of the market mechanism, the now familiar policies of 
devaluation, the removal of subsidies, privatization and trade 
liberalization, the economic reforms sought to curtail state 
intervention in the economy, increase export earnings, promote 
the efficient use of resources and balance external deficits. 
These reforms were expected to foster greater domestic 
accumulation, higher rates of economic growth, employment and 
incomes; and to ameliorate widespread poverty while catalyzing 
political liberalization and democracy in the process.
Against these expectations generated by proponents of 
market reforms, African countries witnessed declines in all 
major indicators of development. Average annual GDP growth 
rates dropped from 3.8% in 1980 to 1.8% in 1991.  ̂A late 1980s 
comparative assessment of the performance of 'strong', 'weak' 
and 'non-adjusting' countries, concluded that despite 
relatively larger amounts of foreign aid infused in support of 
favoured adjusting countries by the IFIs and bilateral donors, 
this category of countries experienced an overall negative 
annual GDP growth rate of 1.5% between 1980-1987, while the 
latter categories achieved a rate of 1.2% and 3.1%
 ̂ World Bank, World Tabla#. (Baltimore: The John Hopkina Univeraity 
Preas for the World Bank, 1993), p.22-23.
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(respectively) in the same period." Average annual HNP per 
capita incomes on the continent fell from US$600 in 1981 to 
US$350 in 1991, a figure which is below the World Bank's 
definition of absolute poverty.® Industrial production on the 
continent continued on a downturn, while in the agrarian 
sector, initial productive gains for certain food and export 
commodities tapered off or declined. In the second half of the 
1980s, export earnings dropped by US$50 billion, despite 
annual increases in export volumes of 2.5%.® Africa's total 
external debt more than doubled from US$109 billion in 1980 to 
US$276 billion in 1991,  ̂with debt servicing as a percentage 
of export receipts now hovering between 35% and 45%. As scarce 
foreign exchange was significantly earmarked for debt 
obligations, exchange allotment for the importation of 
essential consumer and capital goods for production process 
fell drastically. Basic infrastructure has deteriorated, and 
public expenditure in the areas of education, health care and 
transportation have precipitously declined. The pains of 
adjustment continued to be unevenly borne by subordinate 
classes. Unemployment increased at a rapid pace, coupled with
" UNBCA, AAF-SAP, p.21-23.
® World Bank, World Table#. p.2-3.
® Douglas Helllnger, "US Aid Policy in Africa: No Room for Democracy" 
in ROAPB. no.55, 1992, p.84.
African Development Bank, Afrlotn.Develooaent Report 1993. (Abidjan: 
CDEP for the ADB, 1993) p.A-22
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a wage decrease of 30% during the 1980s.® Africans fortunate 
enough to have jobs in the formal sector have seen their real 
incomes constantly eroded by spiralling inflation, as have 
rural producers who were expected to benefit from the 
adjustment programmes. The prices of basic commodities and 
essential services skyrocketed. Food shortages continued to be 
endemic, leading to widespread malnutrition. Curable diseases 
still claimed the lives of millions of Africans yearly. Child 
and maternal mortality rapidly increased. Most people had to 
straddle multiple modes of income generation just to eke out 
a meagre livelihood. Therefore, the 1980s were indeed the lost 
decade of African development. Already housing the bulk of the 
poorest countries in the world, in this period, Africa 
increased its share of the impoverished and now holds the 
dubious claim of having 24 of the 36 poorest developing 
countries in this region.®
Yet, all is not gloom in Africa, in spite of this brief 
portrait of an unabating decline in objective conditions. 
Since the late 1980s, popular contestation in Africa's nascent 
civil society around the disastrous direction of economic 
recovery has increasingly been linked to agitation for 
democracy, human rights, empowerment and popular participation 
as the necessary pre-condition and accompaniment of economic
® Helllnger, "U.S. Aid Policy", p.84.
® George B.N. Ayittey, "Why Structural Adjustment Palled in Africa" 
in yrtttiAfriee Porum. Summer 1991, p.44.
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development. Popular democratic protests on the streets of 
Abidjan, Cotonou, Lagos, Lusaka, Nairobi, etc, to the adverse 
consequences of SAP and seething authoritarianism, together 
with 'high-level' criticisms of adjustment from international 
bodies and a dramatically changed global political economy 
with the end of the 'cold war', have brought into sharp focus 
the politics of economic reforms. If the development discourse 
in the 1980s was preoccupied with questions of economic 
reforms, in the 1990s grassroots empowerment, the 
strengthening of civil society and popular participation have 
become emphatic themes, if not new panaceas for recovery and 
sustainable development in Africa. Even the World Bank, --at 
least rhetorically -- now calls for the empowerment of 
ordinary people, the pluralization of decision-making and 
state transparency and accountability to its citizens. "Africa 
needs not just less government but better government,... 
[which] requires political renewal. . .and means the empowerment 
of women and the p o o r , s o  extolled the Bank's landmark 
1989 Long-Term Perspective Study (LTPS) on Africa. With an 
apparent policy shift in multilateral circles towards a 
recognition of the political dimension of the crisis, the Bank 
boldly declared a rapprochement between itself and its African 
critics. Despite continued national and international 
opposition to SAPs, a broad consensus on Africa's development 
needs in the 1990s based on governance and further neo-liberal
World Bank, ÏJÎM, p.5-6.
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market reforms was declared by the Bank in the LTPS. However, 
this raises question of whether democracy is really on 
Africa's developmental agenda for the 1990s in the circles of 
the Washington-based international financial institutions, 
since the impetus for redemocratization in Africa and the form 
and content of the democratic project for those whose 
democratic participation is most at stake seems to contradict 
the Bank's declared consensus.
The lessons drawn from the Nigerian experience are 
instructive of the challenges for democratic development in 
Africa in the 1990s. The concluding chapter of this thesis 
will sum up the case material on Nigeria and reiterate my main 
arguments, while relating it to the experiences of other 
African countries. The first section will revisit the 
competing explanations of the politics of adjustment from 
differing schools of thought in relation to an investigation 
of the impetus for redemocracization in Africa. Here again I 
maintain that in the period of neo-liberal market reforms, 
mass campaigns for civil liberties and democracy have little 
to do with what appears to mainstream scholars as a two-fold 
struggle for economic and political liberalization. Rather, 
the intensification of popular democratic struggles is in 
response to the failure of post-colonial development, the 
deepening socioeconomic malaise associated with SAPs and the 
growing authoritarianism and restrictions on civil society in 
this period.
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The first section of this chapter will sum up and re­
examine the competing interpretations of state-civil society 
relations and the factors and forces ascribed to the 
strengthening of the civic terrain and democratic renewal in 
Africa. Here, I argue that in deciphering the complexities of 
Africa's social reality and the problematic of civil society 
and democracy, it is important to recognize the 
interconnection of objective and subjective factors and 
forces, and appreciate the dialectical unity of the state and 
civil society, transversed as they are by social 
contestations, contradictions and conflicts. I further argue 
that received neo-liberal theories which emphasize market 
reforms, the process of informality and destatization as the 
necessary support for the fortification of civil society and 
democratic renewal are simply not borne out by the African 
evidence. Instead, I maintain that democratic renewal and 
consolidation is not only a question of strengthening civil 
society. While crucial, democratic consolidation in Africa 
will depend on the level of organization and autonomy of the 
civic realm and the manner in which popular force influence 
state power and dictate the content and direction of 
development in their own interest.
In section three, the continued contestation over the 
direction of economic recovery and development is highlighted. 
On this issue the focus is on the 'high level' policy debates 
between the IPIs and UN organizations as to Africa's
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development needs in the 1990s, juxtaposed with alternative 
development approaches articulated from within the popular 
sector of Africa's civil societies. I conclude the chapter and 
this thesis, by proffering some projections on the prospects 
for democratic development in Africa in the late 1990s.
SECTION ONE: THE POLITICS OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE IMPETUS 
TOWARDS REDEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA
It is widely held that the recent strengthening of
Africa's civil society, the intensification of pro-democracy 
pressures, and the unprecedented democratic transitions in 
Africa, were largely unanticipated by scholars and analysts of 
this region. While disillusioned by statist capitalist and 
socialist development models in Africa, several prominent 
Africanists in the raid 1980s argued that the prospects for
democratic development in Africa were indeed bleak. In a
review article Beckman succinctly summarized the obstacles to 
liberal democracy in Africa highlighted by some liberal 
analysts, which, inter alia, included the "depth of poverty, 
the violence of politics and the anti-democratic practice 
inherited from colonial rule and the process of
decolonization."^ To have expected a vibrant African 
democracy in this context would have amounted to 'historical 
blindness', or so argued Patrick Chabal." Samuel Huntington
Beckman, "Whose Democracy?", p.87.
Patrick Chabal ed.. Political Demination in Africa: Reflection# onthe Limit# of Power. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.S.
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boldly declared that "with a few exceptions, the limits of 
democratic development may well have reached its limits. 
Resigning Africa to the fate of predatory rule, some analysts, 
such as Sandbrook, presented the alternatives of governance as 
between authoritarianism and efficient authoritarianism. The 
best feasible option under African conditions, he noted, was 
a "decent, responsive and largely even-handed personal ruler" 
and governance of Houphouet Boigney was said to be 'infinitely 
preferable' to that of Idi Amin.^
While some radical African democrats had paid 
considerable attention to popular democratic struggles for 
some time, they too were pessimistic about the prospects for 
democratic development. The economic determinism of the 
dependencia variant had long ruled out democratic alternatives 
in Africa. As an extension of the unequal exchange thesis, it 
was argued that as long as development in the periphery was 
simply a result of the will of capital in the centre, 
autonomous development in these countries was blocked. 
Additionally, the comprador nature of the state and 
bourgeoisie in the periphery meant that it could only 
reproduce itself through authoritarianism." This led Samir 
Amin to argue that since a pattern of autocentric accumulation
Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" in 
Political Science Quarterly, no.99, 1984, p.218.
" Richard Sandbrook, Tha Politic# of Africa*a gconomic Stagnation,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.157.
15 M. Mamdani et al.. Social Movaaanta. p.4.
412
was immutably obstructed in the periphery, so too was 
bourgeois democracy." Other radical intellectuals took 
cognizance of the struggles for liberal democracy insofar as 
they curbed state repression and expanded the constitutional 
space for popular forces to demand greater equality and social 
justice, but, citing the greater constriction of political 
space in the period of harsh neo-liberal economic reforms were 
circumspect as to the possibility of liberal democratic 
governance." An editorial in a leading radical journal on 
the political economy of Africa also noted that the changing 
global context --in which the collapse of Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union had opened the way for Africa's further 
integration and subordination into a hostile and unequal 
international division of labour -- reduced the prospects of 
'bourgeois' democracy. In light of the exogenous constraints 
and the on-going endogenous drive towards market reforms, the 
editorial further maintained that rather than democratic rule 
"more probable are various forms of authoritarian regimes with 
strictly limited political p l u r a l i s m . O n e  thread which 
united liberal and radical democrats in the general pessimism 
on the question of African democratization was the low level
" Samir Amin, “The State and the Question of Development" in Peter 
Anyang' Nyong'oed., Popular Struggle# for Democraov in Africa. (London: Zed 
Press, 1987).
17 Beckman, “Whose Democracy?".
Lionel Cliffe, "Editor : Africa in a New World Order" in RQAPI, 
no.SO, 1991, p.10.
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of material development on the continent, the distorted nature 
of state and class formation, and in particular the absence of 
a 'proper bourgeoisie' to champion the struggle for the rule 
of law, civil liberties and democratic governance." In a few 
short years, however, this pessimism gave way to an 
intellectual renaissance based on the emergence or irruption 
of civil society, voluntary associations, non-governmental and 
grassroots organizations, and a renewed faith in the 
potentialities of democratic development in Africa. An 
avalanche of writings now paid increasing attention to the 
subjective factors of development and the manner in which 
subordinate classes individually and collectively sought to 
overcome constricting objective parameters, in order to 
transform their societies in a democratic direction.
The factors and forces that have galvanized Africa's 
civil society to increasingly demand a voice in determining 
the political and socio-economic landscape in their respective 
countries are both historical and conjunctural, remote and 
proximate. A prominent neo-liberal school of thought, notably 
excluded from the widespread negative prognostic 
interpretation on democratic development, had seemingly 
predicted the recent democratic outbursts in Africa. Previous 
chapters have alluded to the position held by its chief 
proponent, Larry Diamond. Before the wave of mass democratic 
movements throughout the continent, these analysts held that
Beckman, "Post-Colonial State*'.
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the increasing move away from statist economic policies and 
structures was the single most significant contributor to 
democratic renewal in Africa. Presented as the aine qua non 
for recovery and development, the shrinking of the role of the 
state and the free reign of market forces were seen as highly 
positive developments, curtailing the tendency towards rent- 
seeking and corruption, and curbing the process of primitive 
accumulation of capital, concomitantly creating an autonomous 
arena for capital accumulation outside the ambit of the state. 
Thus, civil society once freed from the intrusion of the 
state, propelled the creation of actors an.̂  institutions and 
alternative centres of power to ensure state transparency and 
accountability. While giving attention to the plurality of 
autonomous associations in the civic arena, particular focus 
was paid to the authentication of a domestic bourgeoisie, who 
once nurtured and liberated by market forces, was seen as the 
driving force behind internal democratization. It was expected 
that the expansion of the private sector engendered by SAPs, 
would reduce intra-ruling class contestation over rent-seeking 
opportunities, diminish the use of state patronage networks, 
and in the process catalyze a 'bourgeois constituency' to tame 
the state and enthrone liberal democracy.
Of course, there is nothing new in this proposition. A 
host of liberal democratic theorists have maintained a 
causality between economic and political liberalization. 
Prominent among them, Milton Friedman, argued in his seminal
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work Capitalism and Freedom, that:
the kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom 
directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes 
political freedom because it separates economic power and 
political power and in this way enables the one to offset the 
other."
The centrality of a market economy to democratic change has 
been reiterated by Lindblom and more recently by Berger, Kim 
et al. and Fukuyama, with the demise of Eastern European and 
Soviet state socialism in the vein of ideological triumphalism 
over the supposed "unabashed victory of economic and political 
liberalism".21 Lindblom, in this context, argued that "only 
within market-oriented systems does political democracy 
arise."22 while these analysts agree that "not all market- 
oriented systems are democratic, every democratic system is 
[said to be] market oriented."2̂  Similarly, Barrington Moore, 
some years ago contended, that a "vigorous and independent 
class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in 
the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeoisie, no
2“ Friedman cited in Richard Sandbrook, "Liberal Democracy in Africa: 
A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective" in The Cansdisn Journal of African 
Studies, vol.xxii, no.2, 1988, p.255-256.
21 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" in The National Interest, 
no.16, Summer 1989, p.3.
22 Charles Lindblom cited in Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and 
Constraints of Democratization in Africa" in Afrioen Affairs, vol 91, no.362, 
1992, p.23.
21 Peter Berger, "The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism" in 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 3, no.3, July, 1992. Also see similar views in Kim 
and Fukayama in this special issue on Capitalisa. Socialism and Demooraov.
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democracy."^ But what is new as Harsch recently noted, is 
the resonance in which this quintessential liberal assumption 
is being applied to Africa. A mechanistic relationship between 
structural adjustment, civil society, and democracy has become 
dogma in neo-liberal interpretations of the process of 
political and socio-economic change in Africa.
However, received neo-liberal postulates which see market 
reforms bringing about social and political freedoms at the 
level of the state and civil society, are simply not upheld by 
the African evidence. Our case study offers a unique and 
instructive backdrop for such an examination. Nigeria is one 
of the few --if not the only of Africa's countries -- where 
the state inextricably linked the SAP to democratization; yet 
the country's experience challenges the validity of neo­
liberal assumptions. Rather than the liberalism of SAP 
providing the impetus towards African democratization, it has 
been popular reaction to the harshness of the economic regime 
and the increasing authoritarianism the programme engendered 
that gave the immediate spark to social movements struggling 
for democratization. This has been the case with most 
countries that are 'adjusting' in the region. Over the past 
decade, Anti-SAP and Anti-IWF popular rebellions across Africa 
have been prolific. Usually popular protests have been 
spontaneous, even though they often spread nationwide and were
Barrington Moore, SocialOrigin# of Dictatorahip and O«mocracv. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p.418.
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normally ignited by specific features of the adjustment 
package -- ie. devaluation, wage deflation, subsidy removals, 
increases in user fees -- underscoring the widespread 
grievances over declining living conditions.^" Some notable 
cases of grievances included rising prices of wheat in Egypt, 
rice in Sierra Leone and maize-meal in Zambia, wage reductions 
and educational sector rationalization in Benin and Niger and 
increased taxation of public and private sector workers in 
Cote d'Ivoire. The Nigerian case has shown that mass 
demonstrations against socio-economic conditions have 
intensified in the adjustment period. They have been touched 
off by the recurrent devaluation of the naira (1990, 1992) and 
the intermittent removal of the 'subsidy' on domestic 
petroleum products (1988, 1989) .
Popular protests in Africa have often been met with state 
suppression. In Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia the 
state regularly flexed its repressive muscles in order to 
sustain the course of neo-liberal market reforms.^ Most of 
the contributors to a recent edited volume on 
Authoritarianism. Democracy and Adjustment, agreed that 
authoritarianism has been an indelible feature of the 
adjustment exercise. Whether interpreting state repression as
Thandika Mkandawire, "Democratic Pace", p.309.
Bjorn Beckman, "Empowerment or Repression? The World Bank and the 
Politics of African Adjustment" in Africa Development, vol.IS, no.l, 1991, 
p.60-61. also reprinted in Gibbon et al., Authoritarianiem. Demooraov and 
Adimtttant.
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an outgrowth of SAPs or attributing its intensification to 
SAPs, they all concurred that the adjustment period engendered 
authoritarian relations between the state and civil 
society.̂ '' Keeping with the general African experience, most 
mass protests in Nigeria were short-lived and were often 
brutally crushed by the state in an attempt to dissuade 
opposition to its recovery programme. Rather being 
characterized by political liberalization, dialogue and 
consensus building the adjustment project for economic 
recovery has entailed increasing authoritarianism. While the 
Nigerian state occasionally made economic concessions to the 
subordinate classes, and consistently sought to co-opt the 
leadership of popular groups to support its programmes, it 
relied inordinately on suppression as the mode of social 
regulation and control. The regular banning of the NANS and 
ASUU, the 1988 dissolution and reconstitution of the NLC under 
statist control and the frequent arrest and detention of the 
leadership of trade, students and academic unions and women's 
groups and human rights NGOs are but a few Nigerian examples 
replicated elsewhere. The Nigerian experience is particularly 
interesting in that the state, a few years before the 
continent-wide wave of democratic transitions, launched a 
political programme to return the country to civil rule. The 
1986 AFRC decision to embark on the FTP to Nigeria's Third 
Republic in tandem with the SAP, showed an acute awareness on
27 Peter Gibbon et al., Authorifritnlam. Pi«ocr»ey «nd Adluitttiaik.
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the part of the new military junta of the strength of popular 
forces on the ground. Indeed, with the firm coalition of 
different factions of national and transnational capital in 
support of the SAP, popular sectors of civil society were too 
fragmented and organizationally weak to make a political 
impact on the direction of economic recovery. Yet, the 
strongly embedded civic perception of military rule as an 
abberation, together with the widespread opposition in civil 
society to 'one-sided' austerity measure dating back to the 
late 1970s, compelled the state to open the question of the 
country's political and economic future to national debate.
Despite popular rejection of the neo-liberal market 
reforms and popular imprint on the proposed PTP, the state 
proceeded with the SAP and a statist PTP. The Nigerian 
experience has shown that the now defunct PTP of the Babangida 
regime, rather than entailing a transition to democracy was 
simply a coercive strategy to regulate political opposition to 
the government's contentious economic recovery programme, 
rather than a transition to democracy. From the inauguration 
of the 1986 national PTP debate through the annulment of the 
June 12 presidential elections, the transition programme was 
characterized by over-regimentation, manipulation, anti­
democratic ills and the truncation of political space. The 
purported democratic transition, sapped (or zapped) civil 
liberties, press freedoms, the rule of law and political 
participation. But the attempt to hijack democratic impulses
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in the civic terrain through the imposition of a top-down,
guided, and sham PTP, could not quell contending forces from
below in agitating for popular democracy. Commenting on the
recent Nigerian experience, Olukoshi argued, that
the politics of the transition...generally fed into and [were) 
reinforced by the politics of the market reforms process and 
both...combined to produce, at the level of civil society, a 
growing struggle for popular democracy and, at the level of the 
state, an increasing disposition towards, intolerance, 
authoritarianism, and repression.”
State repression tends to illicit various hidden and overt
forms of resistance from civil society. In seeking to impose
its hegemony in civil society through coercion, the state only
alienated the majority of the people and intensified popular
opposition. Individualized and spontaneous responses to the
'pains' of adjustment were increasingly transformed into
collective, organized and broad-based campaigns against the
SAP, but now they were linked to demands for civil liberties,
human rights, accountability and popular participation. To be
sure as Bangura rightfully noted, "struggles to protect living
standards in the context of crisis and adjustment tend to take
on a democratic character.Towards the end of the 1980a,
popular democratic struggles in Africa, which stretch back to
colonialism, took on an explicitly political direction and a
more vibrant expression. The increasing strength of democratic
Adebayo Olukoshi, "General Introduction! Prom Crisis to Adjustment 
in Nigeria" in Olukoshi ed., Th# Politioe. 1993, p.10.
Yusef Bangura, "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A 
Theoretical Discourse" in Gibbon et al,, Authoritarianism/ DemocraflV and 
Mluitaint. 1992, p.66.
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forces led to an unprecedented number of political transitions 
away from autocracy not seen at such a scale since the period 
of decolonization.
But the bourgeois constituency expected by neo-liberal 
analysts to benefit from market reforms such that the 
strengthening of the accumulation base outside the ambit of 
the state also mitigated intra-ruling class rivalries, 
enabling them to play consensual politics and thereby lead 
democratic struggles have been unwilling and unreliable 
'democrats'. It is true that adjustment policies of 
devaluation, privatization, and trade liberalization have 
moved factions -- if only tiny -- of the African ruling 
classes into productive activities, particularly in 
agriculture. With the initial price incentives which 
devaluation gave for accumulation in Nigeria's agrarian 
sector, several high ranking retired and. serving military 
officers directed resources appropriated from the state into 
productive investments in agri-businesses. Some factions of 
capital have also benefitted from the on-going 
commercialization and privatization programme and are engaging 
in productive activities. However, in the social contestation 
within the higher circles over the benefits of the SAP, some 
sections of the capitalist class have prospered while other 
have dissipated or collapsed.
Chapter Two highlighted the disastrous impact of 
adjustment on industrial development and the acceleration of
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pre-SAP processes of deindustrialization. The apex 
organizations of productive capital, such as the MAN, OPS and 
NACCIMA, continues to oppose key policy instrument of the 
recovery programme. Issues of interest and exchange rate 
deregulation and trade liberalization remain hotly contested 
among the dominant classes. While the productive activities of 
sections of domestic capital are constricted by a hostile SAP 
environment, huge profits still accrue to the dominant 
commercial or comprador faction together with their 
transnational allies. The market reforms and the process of 
informalization have also given birth to or nurtured an 
entirely new faction of emergency bankers, currency 
speculators, smugglers, drug traffickers and 4-l-9ers. In the 
second chapter we detailed these new lucrative, yet 
unproductive extra-legal modes of accumulation which thrive in 
the parallel economy through access to the state. Exhibiting 
parallels with Eastern European and Latin American countries 
undergoing market reforms, the SAP in Nigeria has fostered an 
unproductive 'paper' capitalism.
Conflict over scarce resources and the direction of SAP 
in Nigeria has sharpened intra-ruling class divisions and 
contradictions. On this point, Agbese noted that the oil rents 
of the 1970s and statist intervention through the policies of 
ISI and indigenization programmes had sought to foster a 
productive ruling class and encourage its material and social 
cohesion, but that the on-going crisis of accumulation eroded
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the fragile unity which local elites may have enjoyed in the 
post-civil war period.^" With decreasing state largesse and 
constraints on domestic accumulation, the internal struggle 
over state power for private ends intensified. As a result, 
traditional ruling class modes of accumulation, such as 
contract inflation, kickbacks, and the outright embezzlement 
of public funds have been strengthened and state patronage, 
nepotism and corruption have reached new heights. In the 
fierce competition over scarce resources, the historical tools 
of ethnic, regional and religious manipulation were readily 
mobilized. The acute struggle over the sale of prized state 
parastatals, in which the government's privatization programme 
continues to be beset by ethnic and regional conflicts, is 
indicative of this tension.
Nowhere was the intensity of ruling class conflict for 
state power more glaring than in the largely opportunistic 
responses of the political class to the PTP. At every stage of 
the transition process the political class reaffirmed its lack 
of commitment to democracy. Politics still remained an 
investment. The widespread infusion of money into the 
electoral competition, the readiness to exploit ethnic, 
religious and regional cleavages, the ease with which 
political thuggery and violence were encouraged was indicative 
of their collective democratic resolve. Neither crisis
Pita Agbese, "Impeding Demise", p.37. 
Olukoshi, "General Introduction".
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management meetings, various zoning formulas apportioning 
political office on the basis of region and ethnicity, nor the 
much utilized 'settlement politics', could mitigate these 
tensions. The divisions and crass opportunism within the 
political class reduced their overall political weight and 
enabled the dominant military faction to manipulate and 
control the PTP. This is why the political class acquiesced to 
the impositions placed on the two statist political parties 
and the constant government tinkering with the PTP, and it is 
why they were divided on the popular verdict of the June 12 
presidential election after its annulment by the military 
junta. Rather than leading, or at the very least supporting 
pro-democracy struggles to uphold the sanctity of the 
elections and expansion of the democratic space, they largely 
divorced themselves from the mass activities organized by the 
CD. When the June 12 mandate increasingly seemed unrealizable 
they jockeyed instead for posts in the ING. Later, a faction, 
which included the president-elect, MKO Abiola, even went so 
far as to invite the military to intervene in the political 
impasse. Solidarity visits by the president elect and other 
members of the political class welcoming the Abacha junta, 
after the coup had dissolved all democratic institutions 
together with the co-optation of elected public official into 
the new military regime are more indications of the 
opportunism of the political class. There is, therefore, very 
little evidence from the Nigerian experience of a 'proper'
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bourgeois class being engendered by adjustment to galvanize 
democratic struggles. This remains the case notwithstanding 
the renewed agitation by factions of the political class to 
realize the June 12 mandate. In spite of the recent formation 
of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) -- which 
provided a platform for the political confrontation against 
the Abacha junta -- and the apparent resolve of MKO Abiola to 
be relevant in this contestation, the political class has 
consistently exposed its instrumentalist endearment to 
democracy as an avenue for gaining access to the state for 
private accumulation.
The renewal of demands for democracy have also been 
attributed to the impetus given by the end of the 'cold war' 
and the democratic convulsions in other world regions. This 
interpretation has gained particular resonance in the Western 
journalistic literature. Changes in Africa are said to be 
conditioned by "the modernizing impact of an expanding global 
economy... and of successful democratic revolutions, mainly in 
Eastern Europe.Adduced to a universal historical process 
and a 'diffusionist effect', recent democratic transitions in 
Africa are seen to merely mimic or even stem directly from 
Eastern European upheavals. Closely associated with mainstream 
analysis which emphasizes the exogenous causes to current 
political developments in Africa, some analysts, such as
Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, “Popular Protest and 
Political Reform in Africa" in Comparative Polities, vol.24, no.4, 1992, 
p.419-420.
426
Munslow and Williams, asserted that much of the drive towards 
the restoration of multiparty politics is derived from the 
pressure exerted by Western governments utilizing the leverage 
given by Africa's debt peonage.“ An editorial in the 
publication Africa Confidential made a similar observation, 
noting that "the principal causes of Africa's wind of change 
is the World Bank and donor countries."""
Since the early 1990s, donor communities have added 
political conditionalities to the litany of strings attached 
to foreign aid disbursements and debt relief concessions to 
Third World countries. In part, the change in perception over 
the political dimension of the African crisis was prompted by 
the collapse of the Second World, which seemed to vindicate 
Western value systems. In the context of ideological 
triumphalism and the jubilant intellectual atmosphere that 
surrounds the American-declared 'New World Order', the cloud 
of cold-war rivalry which had rendered democracy unfeasible in 
the Third World, now revealed a silver lining, as the West 
sought to consummate its global hegemony. To be sure, other 
than the ideological imperative to the recent Western advocacy 
of democratic reforms in Africa, the new policy position was 
a tacit recognition of the sharpened contestation within and 
outside of Africa around the abysmal performance of neo-
Barry Munslow and A.B. Zack-Willlams "Editorial: Development and 
Democracy" in R0AP8. no.49, 1990, p.5-6.
anon., "Africa: The Roots of Reform" in Africa Confidentiel, 
vol.31, no.15, 1990, p.3.
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liberal market reforms. The 1989 World Bank LPTS. in which the
Bank appeared to shed its 'apolitical' cloak by strongly
calling for civil liberties, human rights and democracy, was
a placating response to the Bank's critics but seemed to
signal the beginning of a new shift in policy dialogue between
the IFIs and African countries. In a review of the Bank's 1989
Report, Gibbon observed that the study,
performs an intellectual balancing act between acknowledging 
that economic conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa have deteriorated 
sharply in the 1980s, and claiming that the structural 
adjustment had been a success. As such it had to address, at 
least indirectly, the question of why the structural adjustment 
framework had proven an inadequate instrument of stabilisation 
in some countries at least."
However, the Bank did not reconcile the contradiction between
its pronounced success of SAP in Africa and the glaring
economic evidence to the contrary; nor did it fully address
the mounting criticisms from the ILO and UNICEF, among others
that highlighted the disastrous impact of SAPs on vulnerable
groups. But the Bank did have to contend with the growing
evidence, stressed by the UNECA, NGOs, domestic social
movements and radical critics, that SAP engendered increasing
authoritarianism. The IMF/World Bank monitoring teams who
intermittently visited 'adjusting' countries observed the
intensified agitation around adjustment and predatory rule. If
not prompted to now show a concern for democracy on the basis
of glaring evidence, these economists at the very least had to
Peter Gibbon, "Structural Adjustment and Pressures towards 
Multipartyism in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Peter Gibbon et al., Authorltarlanisa, DeaeqyacY. iad Adiuetmgnt, 1992, p. 139,
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address the opposition to SAP from below and the implications 
this had for the sustainability of neo-liberal market reforms. 
This is a crucial, but seldom recognized objective impetus 
which inspired the policy shift of multilateral and bilateral 
donors towards the issue of 'good governance.' It is important 
to appreciate the underlying imperative behind the call from 
outside Africa for multiparty democracy.
As we argue below, the attachment of governance criteria 
to further neo-liberal market reforms begs the question: how 
much does the new donor policy position reflect a long-term 
commitment to people-centred democratic development in Africa 
versus an opportunistic initiative to foist a temporary 
'managerial' democracy in order to sustain and consolidate the 
structural adjustment programme?
In the short-term, several speeches, policy statements 
and declarations by Western governments and aid agencies, 
particularly from the U.S. and Africa's major colonial powers, 
Britain and France, seemed to reconfirm the new Western stand 
on democracy. Speaking in June 1990 at the Overseas 
Development Institute (GDI), the British Foreign Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, announced that the British government would 
"consider potential recipients of aid in light of certain 
criteria [which inter alia included]... a shift towards 
pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law,
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human rights and market principles, A year later, this 
view point was enunciated in detail by Lynda Chalker, Minister 
of Overseas Development and the Foreign Office Minister of 
State responsible for Africa, when she delivered a keynote 
address on Good Governance and Aid Prograimes to the ODI in 
mid-1991.^’ In the same policy direction, Francois Mitterand, 
the French President, disclosed at the biannual French/African 
Summit of Heads of State at La Baule in June 1990, that 
"France will link its contributions (aid and debt relief) to 
efforts designed to lead to greater liberty and democracy.^® 
Similarly, the United States became an ardent proponent of 
political conditionalities. Now unable to legitimize its 'cold 
war' support for authoritarian regimes in the name of curbing 
an encroaching 'communist threat' the U.S. linked aid to 
political indicators. Observance of human rights, press 
freedoms, and pluralist politics were central themes in the 
1990 policy statement titled Democracy Initiatives, released 
by the United Agency for International Development (USAID)
At the 1991 Commonwealth Conference, Canada in tandem with 
Britain vehemently linked aid to good governance. Later that
Douglas Hurd cited in Stephen P. Riley, The Democratic Transition 
in Africa: An End to the One Pmrtv State. (London: Conflict Studies no.245, 
published by the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 
1991), p.10.
USAID cited in Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation, p.23.
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year, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
published a policy document Africa 21: A Vision of Africa for 
the 21*̂  Century which also called for good governance but 
lacked the forcefulness of public pronunciations from the 
External Relations Department, linking Canadian foreign aid to 
human rights and democracy/" Scandinavian countries also 
issued similar statements. In 1990, the Monde Declaration of 
Nordic Ministers for Development Cooperation stated that "lack 
of progress in the democratization process will effect the 
willingness of donors to provide aid."'" Correspondingly, 
organizations of advanced capitalist countries, such as the 
OECD, also released reports to this effect. The OECD/DAC 1990 
Report began by declaring that "allocation decisions 
henceforth will be more influenced than in the past by the 
country's record on human rights and democratic practices."^ 
Recently, the European Union (EU) has linked democratic and 
free market criteria to its aid dispersement to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (AGP) countries. Manuel Marin, the EU 
Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,
CIDA, Africa 21: A Vlaion of Africa for th« 21" Century (ot-tawa: 
CIDA: Africa and the Middle East Branch, 1991). See also an address by the 
then Canadian Minister of External Relations, Monique Landry, at a Round 
Table discussion in Ottawa, June 1991, reprinted in full in Africa Raeovrv. 
vol.5, no.2-3, 1991, p.50-51.
Bard-Anders Andreassen and Theresa Swinehart, "Promoting Human 
Rights in Poor Countries: The New Political Conditionality of Aid Policies" 
in Bard-Anders Andreassen and Theresa Swinehart eda., Human Richta in 
DavaloninQ Countriaa: Yearbook 1991. (Oslo: Scandinavian University press, 
1992} , p.vii.
Andreassen and Swinehart, "Promoting Human Rights", p.vii.
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stated that the aid conditionalities would feature prominently 
in Lome IV (1990-2000) , the recurrent trade and aid convention 
between the 12 EU and 70 AGP countries." In like manner, the 
world's largest aid donor Japan -- surpassed the US in 1991 -- 
and growing player in African development, has also made good 
governance a central principle of its aid policy. The recently 
released Tokyo Declaration adopted in October 1993 at the 
Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 
stipulated that Japan's aid to Africa will be tied to 
military, environmental and democratic criteria."
Of course, recent political transitions in Africa are not 
totally unrelated to changes in the global economy nor to the 
overwhelming and strong demands by donor communities for human 
rights and democracy, as highlighted above. The collapse of 
state socialism in Eastern Europe had serious implications for 
many African regimes. At the level of the state, the demise of 
Eastern European socialism and the end of the 'cold war' meant 
that African countries could no long play upon superpower 
rivalries for military, technical and financial aid to prop up 
and reproduce their predatory rule. While the influence of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Africa was always 
more apparent than real, as indicated by the low level of aid
Shada Islam "Europe Toughens Terms for ACP Countries" in Afries 
Recevrv, December 1993-March 1994, p.21.
R.C.F Sweinnerton, "Japan Raises its Profile in Africa" in Africa 
Hacovarv. December 1993-March 1994, p.34. See also "Japan Spotlights Af 
Development" in the same volume.
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disbursements, trade, and investment in this region,their 
dramatic collapse did lead to an ideological and deeper 
economic crisis for the handful of African state socialist 
regimes. In like manner, the end of the 'cold war' also 
'orphaned' the majority of the authoritarian regime in Africa 
which had been supported by the West. Dictators could no 
longer be backed by Western patrons in the name of curbing 
Soviet incursions, nor internal popular contestation for 
democracy delegitimized "as the Trojan horse for Soviet 
subvention.
At the level of civil society, the psychological effect 
of democratic struggles in Eastern Europe may have impacted on 
African democratic movements. Indeed, many popular groups, 
NGOs, and civil organizations have symbolically drawn on these 
experiences to fuel the on-going domestic democratic 
struggles. However, it is erroneous and indeed Eurocentric to 
attribute recent democratic changes in Africa to a knee-jerk 
reaction to Eastern European experiences. The latest and 
intensified phase of democratic contestations in Africa not to 
mention its historical antecedent, began long before the 
Eastern European state socialists denouement. Popular 
opposition movements at the current stage of democratic
Julius Ihonvbere, "The Dynamics of Change in Eastern Europe and 
Their Implications for Africa" in Cosxistsncei A Jeurnsl of «âst-Wsit 
Relations. 1991.
Mahmood Mamdani, "Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic
Struggles" in Dissent. Special edition on Africa) Summer 1992, p.312.
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struggles in Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Zaire, Zambia, and 
Nigeria existed well before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. 
Moreover, popular forces have drawn on experiences closer to 
home. The Palestinian * Intifada' of the West Bank and Gaza, 
the Sopi (Change) youth rebellion in Dakar, Senegal/" the 
popular struggles in South Africa and the resultant lifting of 
the ban on the ANC, PAC, SACP, etc., and the release of Nelson 
Mandela and other political prisoners were more of an 
influence on African democratic struggles than those emanating 
from other contexts.
Similarly, the influence of Western political 
conditionalities should not be exaggerated. While it is true 
that the drastic reduction in Africa's geo-strategic relevance 
in recent years has tempered this imperative in the policy 
consideration of donor communities towards this region, the 
internal struggles for democratic development in Africa 
predate Western pressures. As just alluded to, constraints on 
post-colonial popular democratic struggles in Africa have 
often come from Western support and "direct complicity. . .which 
sustained and gave legitimacy to most of the authoritarian 
regimes in Africa.Throughout the 1980s favoured one-party 
and no-party states continued to receive the support of donor 
communities. The 29-year-old dictatorship in Zaire was
Mamdani, "Democratic Theory", p.312.
Thandika Mkandawire, "North-South Links and Democratization in 
Africa" in Development, Journal of SID, no.3/4, 1991, p.39.
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inaugurated by the US. The US government for most of this 
period shored up this regime along with the country's two 
other major patrons, France and its ex-colonizer Belgium. For 
decades, the aged tyrant Mobutu Sese Seko and the kleptocracy 
surrounding his regime were tolerated by Western patrons keen 
on maintaining access to the resource-rich country, which was 
also strategically located as a base to supply rebel forces 
fighting the then Marxists-MPLA government in neighbouring 
Angola.** Similarly, Britain for several years overlooked the 
wanton abuse of human-rights in Kenya and Malawi where it had 
strong economic and geo-strategic interests. Consistent with 
other advanced capitalist countries, France up until 1990 
intervened to prop-up corrupt and dictatorial regimes in 
Francophone Africa. The squalor and tyranny of 'Emperor 
Boukassa's regime in the Central African Republic and the 
equally decadent and dictatorial rule of the 'Wise Old Man of 
Yamoussoukro', Houphouet-Boigny's regime in Cote d'Ivoire was 
supported by the French government for several years.''" 
France had also periodically intervened in Chad and Togo and 
was reported in March 1990 by the publication Africa 
Confidential, to have agitated against the introduction of 
multiparty politics in Benin and Gabon, on the eve of 
pronouncing its new found commitment to human rights, liberty
** Shawn H. McCormick, "Zaire II: Master of the Game?" in Currant 
Hiatorv. May 1994, p.224.
anon., "Africa: The Roots of Reform" in Africa Confidential vol.31, 
no.15, 1990, p.3.
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and democracy.^ The outright support of African 
dictatorships given legitimacy by the logic of the 'cold war' 
also received intellectual credence from developmental 
circles.
In the first chapter, I illuminated the established
tradition in Western academic circles which advocated for 
authoritarian forms of government in the Third World, as an 
unfortunate, but necessary sacrifice in the process of
development. There was a shared belief among international 
development students, development economists, project 
managers, technocrats, aid agencies and the IFIs, that
dictatorial regimes were conducive to economic growth and
development.
While the shift by donor communities towards issues of 
governance and human rights has been welcomed by many African 
democrats, NGOs and popular groups, they remain sceptical of 
the new Western aid policy given this historical antecedent. 
Already such suspicions have been validated by the West's 
inconsistent application of the new aid conditionally on human 
rights performances and democratic principles. Despite the 
general devaluation of Western strategic interests in Africa, 
in many cases the West has shown ambivalence toward long- 
favoured 'friendly tyrants', although is some cases the West 
has attenuated its outright support. Britain, for example.
Africa Confidential, March 9, 1990, cited in Riley, Oaaiooratio.
p . 9.
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before the recent electoral ouster of the octogenarian and 
sycophantically staunch ally and self-styled Life-President, 
Kamuzu Hastings Banda of Malawi, was treated with 'velvet 
gloves' for a couple of years after Britain's 1990 declared 
commitment to human rights, manifest simply by mere diplomatic 
prodding to hold multiparty elections, although along with the 
U.S and the European Union it later froze all economic 
assistance in 1992."
In like manner, Britain and other donors continued to 
maintain aid to Kenya, amidst widespread documented accounts 
of massive abuse of human rights and repression of opposition 
groups by the Arap Moi regime, all taking place in the new era 
of political conditionalities.” Later the West's did stop 
the disbursement of aid to Kenya and together with internal 
popular contestation compelled the regime to hold multiparty 
elections in December 1992. But President Moi manipulated the 
transition process and rigged his way back into power, 
although aided by a fractionalized civil society and a divided 
and opportunistic political class.”
In Zaire, this scenario has been all too familiar. Four 
years after Mobutu's 1990 announcement of a one-year political 
transition programme (PTP) from one party rule to multiparty
John Edlin, "Banda's Ohastly Legacy" in Maw African. July/August 
1994, p.24. See also Baffour Ankomah, "Good Might, Dr. Banda" in Maw African, 
July/August 1994, p.8.
Andreassen snd Swinehart "Promoting Human Rights", p.xvii.
anon., "Spliu Decision" in Africa Raport. March-April 1991.
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democracy, he still comfortably holds the reigns of power. 
Superseded perhaps only by General Babangida of Nigeria, he 
has masterly manipulated the PTP, co-opted and divided the 
opposition, fostered and exploited ethnic cleavages and 
outrightly repressed popular leaders and groups. Unilaterally, 
the Mobutu government has constantly suspended and abrogated 
the decisions of the sovereign national conference (SNC), the 
democratic mechanism to guide the PTP. Composed of 2,840 
delegates, the SNC, which represents all social classes and 
strata in civil society, in August 1992 elected Etienne 
Tshisekedi as Prime Minister and head of a transitional 
government; and it also sanctioned the formation of a 453- 
member High Council to draft and ratify a new constitution, 
which was later nullified by the ruling government. Although 
the U.S., France and Belgium publicly condemned Mobutu's 
documented human rights abuses and the regime's arbitrary and 
regular suspension of the SNC, they seemed reluctant to exert 
strong and sustaining pressure on the recalcitrant 
dictatorship.^
The West has given credence to these actions and 
legitimacy to Mobutu's regime, by failing to impose punitive 
sanctions and instead advocating new talks between Mobutu and 
the opposition. Indeed, the U.S. Clinton Administration and 
their French and Belgian counterparts reduced aid
Georges Naongola-Ntalaja, "Zaires Moving Beyond Mobutu" in Currant 
History. May 1994, p.219.
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disbursements in order to compel Mobutu to liberalize the 
political terrain. Likewise, the World Bank ceased aid 
allotments in November 1993,“ In the case of the Bank, 
however, this reprisal was motivated by Zaire's failure to 
produce US$ 25 million in debt arrears rather than any 
democratic consideration. Currently, the US is again showing 
its complicity with the Mobutu dictatorship. It has 
unilaterally decided that Prime Minister Tshisekedi is not fit 
to lead the interim government despite his overwhelming 
support from the SNC and equally firm civic base of the Union 
for Democracy and Social Progress, the party he represents. 
Just like the inconsistent US response to the three year old 
Haitian crisis and the occasional tyrannical portrayal of the 
militarily deposed but popularly elected President Aristide, 
the US and Zaire's other Western patrons seem more interested 
in a compromise candidate, malleable as Mobutu and agreeable 
to factions of transnational and national capital.^'
Similarly, with the end of the 'cold war' hopes were 
renewed that the cessation of superpower rivalry fought on 
Angolan soil would lead to the end of the 16 year civil war 
between the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA), the former Marxist government and the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the rebel forces
“  McCormick, "Zaire II", p.227.
See excerpts of statements made by Herman Cohen, former US 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs cited in McCormick, "Zaire 
II", p.226.
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again tested Western commitment to democracy and political 
conditionalities. While in light of the changing global 
political economy, both Cuba and the former Soviet Union 
ceased financial and military support to the MPLA, the US 
maintained its commitment to UNITA and the 'democratic freedom 
fighter' Jonas Savimbi that it and the former apartheid regime 
in South Africa created and fuelled in the struggle to curb 
'Soviet incursions' in Southern Africa.®® Right up to the May 
1991 Bicesse Peace Accord ending the civil war, the U.S. 
continued to support UNITA and in the ensuing period showed an 
ambivalence towards the peace process and its sustainability. 
Where the U.S committed an estimated $75 million to UNITA in 
the preceding years before the cease-fire, a paltry $14.5 
million in aid was disbursed to support the transition to 
multiparty rule and the demobilization and unification of 
government and UNITA forces.®® When in September 1992, UNITA 
refused to honour its resounding defeat in elections judged to 
be free and fair by national and international monitors and 
subsequently renewed the civil war, the U.S seemed unable or 
unwilling to exact punitive sanctions on its long-time client 
for derailing the peace process. While initially unable to 
bring UNITA to the negotiation table, the Bush Administration
®® James 0. Blight and Thomas 0. Weiss, "Must the Grass Still Suffer? 
Some Thoughts on Third World Conflicts After the Cold War" in Third World 
Quarterly, vol.13, no.2, 1992.
®® Dcepa Ollapally, "The South Looks North: The Third World in the New 
World Order" in Current History. April 1993, p.179.
4-iO
refused to recognize the MPLA government, giving tacit 
encouragement to UNITA to continue the war.** In like manner, 
the new Clinton administration initially resisted conferring 
the MPLA regime recognition and had no clear policy towards 
Angola, although it did send across the television and radio 
waves in Angola a strong message to UNITA, warning its former 
allies not to attack property owned by Americans, and in 
particular the lucrative and strategic US dominated oil 
installations in the northern enclave of Cabinda.*' In mid- 
1993, in the wake of the breakdown of the Abidjan peace talks 
largely instigated by UNITA, the US did belatedly officially 
recognize the Angolan government, but it remains ambivalent 
towards the persisting civil war, which again brings into 
question the U.S. commitment to human rights and democracy in 
the post-cold war period.
Perhaps nowhere is the Western resolve and commitment to 
the new political conditionalities in Africa more transparent 
and catastrophic than in its response to the current Rwandan 
crisis. Long before the BBC and CNN daily broadcasts brought 
into Western living rooms graphic pictures of mass slaughter 
of civilians" in the renewed civil war in Rwanda following
** Andrew Meldrum, "Two Steps Back" in Africa Report. March-April, 
1993, p.46.
*'■ Meldrum, "Two Steps Back", p.46. See also Chris Simpson, "The 
Undemocratic Game" in Africa Raeort. July/August 1993.
Conservative figures on civilian casualties are estimated at 
500,000, while over 2 million refugees have fled the small landlocked country 
of 6 million during the recently ended four month civil war.
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the April 6, 1994 killing of the Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana, the West was quite complacent about the 
restoration of democratic rule to the country. Of course the 
crisis in Rwanda has historical roots and proximate causes, 
internal and external dimensions, but of immediate concern 
here is the reaction of the West, particularly that of France 
to the crisis since 1990 when the civil war began. One 
commentator has pointedly noted that "Rwanda has no strategic 
significance, no wealth, too many people, and not enough 
land."" Indeed, Rwanda has no resources of significance for 
global accumulation. Its chief export commodity, coffee, is 
produced in abundance globally and the country ranks among the 
most densely populated in the world. In spite of having little 
or no economic relevance to the West, since the colonial 
period, Belgium (Rwanda's ex-colonizer) and later the U.S. 
have shown a strategic interest in Rwanda, largely for its 
proximity to resource-rich Zaire. Over the last three decades, 
the French also sought to influence events in Rwanda, again 
with an eye towards Zaire. Much like its 1991 military 
intercession in support of the ruling dictator Omar Bongo in 
Gabon, its backing of the electorally ousted, but equally 
'friendly tyrant' Paul Biya in Cameroon and its general 
indifference to the recalcitrance of the initially deposed 
despot Gnassingbe Eyadema in Togo, Prance in its intervention
Lindsey Hilsum, "Settling Scores" in Africa Report. May-June, 1994,
p. 16.
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in Rwanda has been consistent in its commitment to maintain la 
francophone in Africa, and in spite of its stated unequivocal 
support for democratic change in the region.
After the signing of the August 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, 
the agreement reached between the ruling National 
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) and 
the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) ending the three year civil 
war -- which laid out a power sharing arrangement and a PTP to 
have culminated in multiparty elections in 1995, the French 
and the West did not withdraw foreign aid to pressure the 
corrupt, dictatorial and increasingly recalcitrant ruling 
government.^ Despite an impending military defeat and some 
international diplomatic pressure, the authoritarian and 
ethnic-based MRND government remained bent on subverting the 
peace accord in order to retain its power and privileges. 
Instead of strong Western reprisals, the French continued to 
support Habyarimana -- who was also a close personal friend to 
President Mitterand and family -- through financial 
assistance, military aid and training, as it had done over the 
years.®® In the era of political conditionalities, the French
®® Francois Miaser and Alan Rake, "Battle for Francophone Africa" in 
New Africa, February 1993, p.12-13.
®® Hilsum, "Settling Scores", p.16.
®® France was a major supplier of weapons to the Rwandan army during 
the civil war (1990-1993) with French paratroopers also providing military 
training to Rwandan troops and commandos. Of course, French armaments have 
fallen into the hands of government sponsored local militia, an integral cog 
for much of the current genocidal operation against Tutsi citizens and the 
massacre of political opponents, see Francois Misser, "Belgium and France Beg 
to Differ" in New African. June 1994, p. 15. See also Hlleum "Settling Scores", 1994
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ignored the wanton abuse of human rights, the massacre of pro­
democracy and human right activists, journalist, opposition 
politicians (both Bahutu and Watutsi), by the Presidential 
Guard as well as the state sponsored and supported death 
squads, known as the "Zero Network". For three years before 
the current embroglio the French remained supportive of the 
ruling government's desperate machination designed to cling to 
power. Amidst growing state manipulation of ethnic cleavages 
and widespread documentation of the indiscriminate killing of 
minority Twa and Watutsi civilians, by state sponsored and 
Bahutu dominated local militia, the Interahamwe (Those who 
Attack Together) and the Iwpuzamugambi (Those who have the 
Same Goal), the French government remained largely silent.” 
France and the West have distanced themselves from the Rwandan 
debacle. Despite the 'cold war' strategic interest in Rwanda, 
in the new global conjuncture Rwanda proved 'too poor, too 
remote and too Black' to deserve the type of Western response 
exhibited towards geo-strategic regions, such as Eastern 
Europe. Amidst the genocidal killings of Tutsi civilians, the 
UN first reduced its 5,000 UNAMIR-I troops to 500 and got 
caught up in bureaucratic inertia after the security council 
decided a month into the renewed conflict to send a UNAMIR-2
and "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade In the Rwandan Civil War", Human Rights Watch Arms 
Project, January 1994,
anon., "Operation Genocide" in New African, July/August 1994. See 
also: Anver Versi, "Rwanda's Killing Fields" in New African, June 1994. and 
anon., "Why Rwanda?" in Weet Africa, June 27-July 3, 1994.
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force to the country. To be sure, the humanitarian INGO
community have been mobilized, setting up refugee camps in
eastern Zaire. Similarly, the French established a UN
sanctioned security zone in southwestern Rwanda to provide a
safe-haven for refugees, though it is currently pulling out of
the region. Likewise, Western governments have sent food and
medical aid, although not nearly in sufficient quantities. The
response of the West to the Rwandan conflict has been
ambivalent at beat, stemming from a crisis which in no small
measure it exacerbated, if not engendered.*"
These are but a few examples to clearly exhibit the
contradictions in the application of political
conditionalities in Africa today. Rather than a genuine
commitment to democratic development in this region, Riley
suggests "that examples may only be made of unimportant
countries, ex-left-wing regimes, or states which matter little
to the West"*® in the enforcement of democratic criteria
attached to aid. In support of this position the African
Confidential also observed, that
the selectivity with which these new criteria are being applied 
suggests that an insistence on good governance could be used as 
an excuse to abandon those countries considered basket cases 
while maintaining leverage over the more interesting ones, with
At the renewal of the conflict between the MRND and RRF in April 
1994, the UN peacekeeping forces, the UN Mission of Assistance to Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) was reduced from 2500 to 500 troops. The U.S. (through neighbouring 
Burundi) Prance and Belgium (directly) sent troops into the country solely to 
rescue their nationals from the conflict.
*® Riley, Démocratie Transitions, p.12.
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lesB regard to the standards they adopt.
In any case, Ake has argued that political conditionalities 
are more apparent than real. He maintained that since "Western 
resources available for Africa have diminished with the 
economic and strategic marginalization of [the region], so 
has... Western leverage. While it is true that official 
development assistance to Africa has diminished in recent 
years, dropping from 19.7 billion in 1990 to 12.1 billion in 
1992,72 I disagree with Ake's inference that Western leverage 
in the region may be declining. It is true that Ake's position 
can be further buttressed by the African Confidential's 
position that political conditionalities may give the West the 
pretext to reduce resource flows to Africa. But, Africa's debt 
peonage provides sufficient leverage to impose trade sanctions 
and prohibit access to commercial credit among other reprisals 
to enforce the democracy criteria on 'choice' countries. 
However, I do agree with Ake' observation that the Western 
commitment to political conditionalities is suspect, not even 
to mention its catalytic impact on democratic change in Africa 
since donor countries are now "leaving its [administering] to 
its multilateral agencies, the World Bank and IMF who
70 anon., "The Roots of Reform", p.3-4.
7̂ Ake, "Democratises", p.14.
'2 World Bank/UNECA statistics cited in Tim Wall, "Africa Agenda Needs 
Stronger Support: UN" in Africa Recovery. December 1993-March 1994 p.36. See 
also Roy Laishley, "Africa Faces Aid Cuts" in Africa Recovery. November 1992, 
p. 3.
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apparently have no feeling for democracy."^ Already, we are 
seeing the revival and increasing intellectual currency of at 
least an indifference towards authoritarian rule, if not its 
advocacy in Western academic and policy circles. Despite the 
recent emphasis on good governance and the overwhelming 
evidence discrediting the developmental record of
dictatorships, Ernest Marsh's recent article cited an argument 
in support of the ancien regime advanced by Carol Lancaster, 
the US Clinton administration appointee as deputy
administrator to the USAID. She argued that,
where a democratically elected government proved weak, inept, or 
corrupt, its replacement by a competent military government 
could, in the long run, lead to more rapid development and the 
prospect for a better standard of living for that country's 
citizens...Where a new military government appears stable and 
competent, the United States should continue financing on-going 
aid projects
Also, within multilateral finance policy circles "a 
courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government. . .to 
ride roughshod over the newly created special interest 
group"’̂ in the Third World, remains a much preferred 
political framework for the anti-popular neo-liberal market 
reforms. This position advanced by Deepak Lai -- an
influential World Bank policy adviser --at the inception of 
the adjustment drive in the Third World, according to Toye was
Ake, "Democratises", p.14.
Carol Lancaster cited in Ernest Harsch, "Structural Adjustment and 
Africa's Democracy Movement" in Africa Tcdsv. 4th Quarter, 1993, p.27. See 
also Carol Lancaster "Reform or Else?" in Africa Report, July August, 1990.
7S Deepak Lai cited in Mkandawire, "North-South", p.40,
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widely acclaimed and seems to endure until today.Returning
to Gibbon's assessment of the 1989 World Bank LTPS. he noted
that because of the difficulties in finding monitorable
performance indicators, the danger which 'conditionality
overload' or 'fatigue' may pose for the sustainability of
economic reforms, in addition to the intellectual preeminence
of received neo-liberal wisdom which sees democracy as
'slowing things down', the Bank may well revert back to its
technocratic and apolitical posture.” Another commentator on
the LTPS. Robert Browne had observed that
the LTPS...is just a Bank publication...in World Bank circles it 
is perceived as leaning towards the radical side because of its 
tentative tone as regard SAPs, its call for involvement of non- 
professional persons and organizations in the development 
process, its open allusion to corruption among recipient 
governments, and for other heresies. Merely because the forces 
of enlightenment succeeded in obtaining publication of the 
document does not guarantee that the bureaucracy will be 
mobilized to implement it.”
The 'enlightened forces' of the World Bank seem to have
retreated from the vehement governance call of the LTPS. in
its latest study of the region Adjustment in Africa; Reforms.
Results and the Road Ahead (1993). In a volte-face from the
LTPS. the 1993 Report noticeable treats the question of good
governance, empowerment and grassroots participation with a
John Toye, "Interest Group Politics and Implementation of 
Adjustment Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Gibbon et al.,
Authoritarianism. Demooraov and Adjustment. 1992, p.109.
Gibbon, "Multipartyism", p.143.
Robert S. Browne, "The Continuing Debate on African Develop.i.îi.ï " 
in TranaAfrica Forum, vol.7, no.2, 1990, p.34-35.
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passing interest.''^ It again reflects the contestation around 
political conditionalities in Washington policy circles, and 
the erroneous analysis which attributes democratic change in 
Africa to Western democratic resolve and pressure.
Beyond political changes in East European, beyond Western 
political conditionalities, and beyond the democratic drive of 
a bourgeois constituency born out of the neo-liberal 
mechanistic union of economic and political liberalization, we 
must look elsewhere for an explanation of the impetus towards 
African democratization. I have argued and exhibited with 
specific reference to Nigeria that a continuity exists between 
democratic agitation dating back to the period of 
decolonization and the reinvigorated popular struggles in 
recent years. The basis of these agitations are in response to 
the failure of post-colonial development, the corrupt and 
repressive character of the state and to the marginalization 
of popular forces in the development process. It underscores 
the widespread desire for a new popular politics to provide 
the political framework for democratic development and the 
betterment of life chances of the poor majority. I have also 
attributed the proximate causes of the renewed democratic 
agitation to the social economic exigencies of SAPs and the 
increasing authoritarianism the programme engendered. While 
Eastern European state socialist denouement and Western
World Bank, Adiuatmant in Africa: Reform#, and th» Ro»d
Ah##d. (New York) Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993).
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political conditionalities may have provided a favourable 
international environment for and a belated recognition of 
these struggles, if we are to fully understand the form and 
content of the democratic project being articulated from 
below, it is important that due cognizance is taken of the 
underlying factors behind the popular movements. The 
following sections draw attention to the alternatives for 
democratic development in Africa in the 1990s and the 
challenges ahead.
SECTION TWO; AFRICA'S NASCENT CIVIC TERRAIN; 
CONTRADICTIONS, CONFLICTS AND NEW HOPES
In spite of increasing political liberalization in recent 
years, which culminated with the removal of some erstwhile 
authoritarian regimes, Africa's democratic map remains very 
patchy. In countries currently undergoing a transition toward 
multiparty politics, the process has been replete with 
contradictions and conflicts. In other countries where a 
democratically elected government has been installed and 
constitutional reforms instituted, democratic gains remain 
contested and far from consolidated. While the diversity of 
African countries and the incompleteness of recent political 
development, make it difficult to provide an all encompassing 
typology of the pattern of political change, most democratic 
transitions in the region fall into one of three categories. 
The specificities of the recent and successful democratic
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transitions in Eritrea and South Africa after decades of 
national liberation struggles against Ethiopian domination and 
apartheid (respectively) provide two notable exceptions to our 
classification. But from the promising to the catastrophic, 
liberalizing transitions in Africa can be characterized as 
either (1)'success£ul', ( 2)'problematic * or
(3)'disintegrative'.
Several African nations have undergone successful 
transitions to democratic rule. In countries such as Benin, 
Cape Verde, Congo, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe and Zambia, 
popular agitation has compelled entrenched dictatorships to 
initiate institutional reforms on the way to introducing 
competitive multiparty elections. Although in many instances 
the transition process was top-down, (ie. Cape Verde and 
Zambia) a presidential aspirant from the opposition parties 
(Carlos Veiga and Frederick Chiluba) defeated the incumbent 
despot (Aristedes Pereira and Kenneth Kaunda) in elections 
generally adjudged by national and international monitors as 
free and fair.®° Providing a contrasting transition model to 
democratic rule, popular forces in certain countries in 
Francophone Africa (Benin, Niger, Congo) have initiated an 
innovative and bottom up modality to catalyze political
Riley, Demeeretie Treneition.. See also Carolyn Baylies and Morrie 
Szeftel, "The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia" in KOAPI, 
no.54, 1992.
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restructuring.®' The realization of a sovereign national 
conference (SNC) offered a novel transitional mechanism. 
Fatten has described the SNC as representing the "culmination 
of civil society's revenge against bankrupt, unpopular and 
corrupt regimes... and the cahiers de doléances of the 
disenfranchised."®^ Giving a forum for the assemblage of a 
broad cross-section of civil society, the SNC has created a 
national cathartic moment where formerly suppressed political, 
social and economic issues of critical national importance are 
debated on a national platform by conferees. Often lasting 
several months, delegates from the onset declared the 
sovereignty of the conference to supersede all institutional 
powers. Commonly, the conference dissolves the existing 
government, strips the age-old tyrant of most of his powers 
and sanctions the formation of a transitional government which 
later oversees national elections. To be sure, these 
conferences have not been without fierce and destructive 
contestation. In Gabon, Togo and Zaire for example, the 
country's dictator Omar Bongo, Gnassingbe Eyadema and Mobutu 
Sese Seko (respectively) subverted the sovereignty of the 
conference by consistently contravening its authority and
Harsch, "Democracy Movement". See also, Jibrin Ibrahim, "Democratic 
Political Succession in Niger Republic: The 1993 Elections" in CODESRIA 
Bulletin, no.2, 1993. see also Ibrahim "From Political Exclusion to Popular 
Participation: Democratic Participation in Niger Republic" in B Caron et al. 
Daaooratio Transition in Africa. 1992.
82 Fatten, Predatory Rule, p.104.
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decisions, and thus rendered the SNC politically 
ineffective,®^ In Benin, Congo and Niger, however, the 
conference reduced the long-standing dictators Mathieu 
Kerekou, Denis Sassou Nguesso and Ali Saibou (respectively) 
into ceremonial heads of state, en route to their electoral 
ouster in competitive multiparty elections held l a t e r , I  
have characterized these transitions as sucoaBsful, since 
unlike most African countries the PTP here has been stable, 
competitive multiparty elections were widely judged as free 
and fair, and the transfer of power to the new democratically 
elected government was peaceful. Again, the democratization 
process remains fragile and far from consolidated.
Contrary to optimistic mainstream expectations which held 
out transition processes in Benin and Zambia as beacons of 
political liberty soon to be replicated throughout Africa®®, 
the majority of democratic transition in this region have been 
problematic. Transition programmes in these countries have 
generally been top-down, over-regimented and characterized to 
varying degrees by manipulation, electoral chicanery, money 
politics, repression, political assassination and violence, 
exploitation of regional, religious and ethnic cleavages; and
®® Hzongola-Ntalaja, "Beyond Mobutu", see also McCormick (1994) "Zaire 
II"., Peter Da Costa, "Togo: The Dictators Duet in Africa Report. November - 
December 1993, p.63., James P. Barnes "Gabon: Adieu, System Bongo?" in Africa 
Report. November - December 1993, and Barnes "The Tainted Win" in Africa 
Report. March > April, 1994.
64 Patton, Predatory Rule. Ibrahim, "Prom Political Exclusion"
Richard Joseph, "Zambia: A Model for Democratic Change" in Currant 
Miatorv. May 1992.
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they can be further delineated as tainted, reaalaitrant and 
reaiatant and aborted transitions.
In tainted 'democratic' changes which characterized 
countries such as, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Senegal, Togo and Zaire, the incumbent dictator either 
preempted popular pressures for democracy by convening a 
national conference and/or multiparty elections, or grudgingly 
acceded to competitive elections, but manipulated the process 
to ensure that he electorally succeed himself in power. While 
in many cases the immediate pre-election tyranny continued 
unabated, the convening of multiparty elections -- widely 
viewed by national and international observers to have been 
replete with systematic malpractice and irregularities -- and 
the initiation of cosmetic institutional reforms have often 
been enough to give the 'newly' elected dictatorship external 
legitimacy, if not domestic credibility.®®
Exhibiting similar traits as the former but differing in 
the stage of the transition process, long-standing dictators 
in Zaire and Malawi have publicly committed to a PTP (Banda 
did recently lose elections in Malawi) although they remain 
reaalaitrant and reaiatant to internal pressures on the 
content, character and direction of the democratic changes. As 
mentioned earlier, Mobutu of Zaire has utilized repression and 
cooptation with the aid of Western complicity, if not support.
®® Barnee, "Gabon". Ruby Ofori, "Ghana: The Election Controversy" in 
Africa Report. July - August, 1993.
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to retain power four years after announcing a one year PTP.
Lastly, the aborted transitions that characterized recent 
developments in Burundi, Nigeria and The Gambia further 
exhibits the precariousness of the process of political change 
in Africa today. Our case study in Chapter Three detailed 
Nigeria's tumultuous PTP which led to the military's 
abrogation of the June 12 presidential elections then later 
the dissolution of the transition programme by the Abacha 
military coup. Equally turbulent, in Burundi the democratic 
transition and processes of consolidation have been challenged 
by non-civilian control of the military. In October 1993, the 
new democratically elected President, Melchoir Ndadaye was 
assassinated in an unsuccessful coup, which plummeted the 
country back into the civic and ethnic strife that has 
repeatedly marred it since 1962. The success of the coup would 
have certainly spelled the end of the fledgling Burundian 
democracy. Yet again, in April 1994, the new President elected 
by the country's National Assembly, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was 
killed in the plane crashed that also claimed the life of the 
Rwandan president. This development has currently challenged 
the sustainability of the democratic project.
Finally, dieintegrative transitions refer to countries 
where political liberalization in the context of protracted 
crises of the state, civil society and economy has led to 
ethnic conflict and civil war or its renewal. Angola, Liberia, 
Rwanda and Somalia are current examples of such cases.
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although in most of these countries the civil war has ended 
and the process of post-war reconstruction, though fragile, is 
on the way. We provide this broad and brief tapestry of the 
recent transition processes in Africa and some general 
outcomes to date in order to underscore the precariousness and 
fragility of these changes.
One area both neo-liberal and radical analysts agree is 
crucial for the sustainability and consolidation of democracy 
is the strengthening of civil society. For neo-liberals like 
Diamond, civil society is the crucial factor at every stage of 
democratization, as it is the necessary arena to curtail the 
state's propensity towards predatory rule.®'' Akin to the de 
Tocquevellian perspective, Bratton®®, Lewis®® and Woods®® 
also view civil society and its associational life as the 
important bulwark to curb state excesses and ensure the 
protection of formal civic and democratic rights. Echoing 
these positions, Fitzpatrick, in the social democratic middle 
ground, sees civil society as an indispensable democratic 
'watchdog', required to retain the autonomy of its voluntary 
associations in order to lay irreverent criticisms on the
®̂  Diamond, "Roots of Failure".
®® Bratton, "Associational Life".
®® Lewis, "Dilemma of Civil Society".
®® Dwayne Woods, "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State
Power through a Public Sphere" in African Studies Review, vol.35, no.2, 1992.
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state's pretensions and prerogatives.®^ Radical analysts also 
embrace civil society and its strengthening as necessary to 
provide an edifice against state repression. Beyond 
safeguarding what Ibrahim has called 'pro-forma democracy', 
that is, the formal and abstract political rights historically 
associated with liberal democracy, the strengthening of civil 
society is also viewed by radical analysts as vital for the 
expansion of democratic space and the articulation of any 
alternative social project.^ Formal constitutionalism and 
its protection of civil liberties and the rule of the law is 
expected to expand the democratic space which better enables 
popular forces to press for concrete social and economic 
rights. While there seems to be a broad intellectual consensus 
on the need to strengthen civil society, the factors and 
forces which are to embolden the civic terrain and enhance the 
prospects for democratic consolidation, much like the 
conceptual application of civil society, remains widely 
contested. The remainder of this section revisits the 
competing explanations on state-civil society relations 
introduced in Chapter One against the backdrop of the Nigerian 
case study and experience elsewhere and the factors they deem 
as crucial for the strengthening of civil society. Broadly, 
the various schools of thought have identified the on-going 
dynamic of the process of informality, the proliferation and
Fitzpatrick, "A Response to Daryl Glaser" 
Ibrahim, "From Political Exclusion".
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the strengthening of NGOs, continued market reforms in the 
form of SAPs and the attendant rolling back of the state, as 
the important factor(s) and force(s) which are to embolden 
Nigeria's and Africa's nascent civic terrain and increase the 
prospects of democratic consolidation.
INFORMALITY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
A sub-theme or approach which has become quite common in 
the explanation of Africa's social reality emphasizes the 
political dynamics of informality as the crucial avenue 
supportive of democratization. Chapter Two detailed the key 
postulates of neo-liberal analysts whose central inquiry is 
the survivalist strategies in civil society and the manner in 
which the on-going process of informalization changes economic 
and political circumstances. Amidst the protracted African 
crisis, analysts such as Chazan, Bratton and MacGaffey argue 
that ordinary people are taking matters into their own hands 
and organizing an unofficial economy and similar institutions 
to compensate for the failure of the state and formal 
economy.Market reforms and informality reduce the reach of 
the state into the economy which enables subordinate classes 
to better bargain for survival. The process of informalization 
releases dormant entrepreneurial energies, spawns the creation 
of multifarious voluntary organizations, and facilitates
93 Azarya, "Reordering", Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society", Bratton, 
"Associational Life", MacGaffey, "Zaire's Other Path".
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popular evasion of the repressive and predatory African 
state.Informality and the new actors, organizations and 
institutions it spawns, fills the gaps left by the retreating 
state and delivers resources, employment opportunities and a 
rudimentary social safety net for the poor. What is crucial 
about the process of informalization according to Chazan et 
al. is the novel forma of participation it engenders and the 
implications for democratic renewal. Just like the process of 
informalization is held out to diminish the sphere of 
primitive accumulation for ruling class factions, thereby 
contributing to the strengthening of a bourgeois constituency 
to press for democracy, the survivalist strategies of non­
bourgeois classes and groups are also anticipated to break 
state patronage networks and challenge the legitimacy of the 
state in regulating private behaviour. This process, they 
note, is leading to grassroots agitation for the autonomy of 
the civic realm and democratic national politics. Therefore, 
informality has fostered tremendous vitality at the 
grassroots, contributed to the reconstitution of democracy in 
smaller units, created alternative poles and centres of power 
outside the ambit of the state, thus nurturing a change in 
state-civil society relations which is conducive to stable and 
consensual politics at the national level. This
94 MacGaffey, "Zaire's Other Path".
Bratton, "Associational Life", see also, Chazan, "Liberalization", 
MacGaffey, "Zaire's Other Path.
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interpretation of social reality in Africa has its 
counterparts elsewhere in the Third World. In Latin America, 
the work of Hernando de Soto and the Institute Liber tad y 
Democracia popularized informality and the link made between 
informal sector growth, the proliferation of voluntary 
associations and democratic renewal that has gained 
explanatory currency with respect to the recent African 
experience.
There is very little disagreement, if any, among 
development analysts that the continuing African and Third 
World crisis has engendered a process of economic 
informalization. Equally attested to is the acceleration of 
this process under neo-liberal market reforms. Chapter Two 
noted in the case of Nigeria that the cumulative effect of the 
structural adjustment project on the Nigerian state, economy 
and society where industrial closures have become rampant, 
capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector has been 
drastically reduced, the casualization of labour has 
intensified and the state has retreated from the social 
reproduction of marginalized groups -- has forced the majority 
of Nigerians to find creative ways to survive the crisis. With 
the constriction of formal sector employment and the dramatic 
decline in urban and rural real incomes, workers, peasant.- and 
even professionals employ multiple modes of livelihood to %arn 
a living.wage. Consequently, the informal sector has expanded
96 de Soto, Thé Other Path
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enormously in this period. Mustapha's writing on Nigeria noted 
that 70% of working populations in most cities are involved in 
the informal sector®’, a figure Cornia®® and the 
International Labour Organization placed at the upper limits 
of the sector's occupancy in most Third World countries.
But, while informality theorists have rightly focused 
intellectual lenses on the much neglected novel forms of 
informal production and participation, they have failed to 
capture the concrete dynamics of the current processes of 
socio-economic and political change in Africa or substantiate 
how informality strengthens civil society and supports 
democratic renewal. As a result, informality theory has been 
criticized widely on theoretical and empirical grounds.
Recently, Bangura and Gibbon scrutinized the conceptual 
framework of informality theorists, particularly the rigid 
dichotomies these writers make between the formal and informal 
sectors and the state and civil society.®® They agreed with 
Beckman's observation that juxtaposing "the wage 
economy... treated largely as an adjunct to a parasitic state 
sector, . . .with true civil society. . .seen to flourish primarily
97 Mustapha, "Multiple Modes of Social Livelihood", p,195,
®® 0. Cornia, "Adjustment at the Household Level; Potentials and
Limitations of Survival Strategies" in G. Cornia et al. Adiuitment with a Human Pao#, (Oxford: Clarendon Press for UNICEF, 1987),
®® Yusef Bangura and Peter Gibbon, "Adjustment, Authoritarianism and 
Democracy; An Introduction to Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues" in Gibbon 
et al. Authoritarianiam, Paaoeracv and Adjuatmant, 1992.
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in the non-wage economy""" is highly problematic since both 
the state/formal sector and civil society/informal sectors are 
integrated at various levels. Our examination of the Nigeria 
experience has shown that by virtue of the multiple 
interconnections with the dominant capitalist sector, on which 
it depends on raw materials, imported inputs, credit and 
access to markets, the informal sector has not been immune 
from the vagaries of the macro-economic environment of 
adjustment. Beyond pockets of vitality, our study suggests 
that informal sector growth, labour absorptive capacities and 
real incomes in the this sector have been negligible. Meagher 
and Yunusa's research into the developmental implications of 
informality in Nigeria, identified the limitations on informal 
sector growth by both supply and demand constraints, which are 
not supported but rather exacerbated by the economic policy 
prescriptions of the adjustment p r o j e c t . I n  any case, 
Bangura and Gibbon have rightfully noted that "workers and 
most other social groups hardly impose such rigid dichotomies 
between their formal jobs and involvement in the informal 
s e c t o r . T h e  dictates of survival have compelled workers 
and social forces attached to the formal sector in Nigeria to 
straddle various jobs simultaneously, bargaining scarce 
resources for social reproduction. But the retreat into the
Beckman, "Empowerment or Repression", p.91. 
Meagher and Yunusa, Limits of Labour Absorption. 
Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.21-22.
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informal sector is generally not a wilful exit from the 
parasitic state and formal sector as informality analysts have 
maintained. I have argued that the 'exit' of subordinate and 
middle classes into the informal sector is borne out of the 
crisis, declining real incomes, wage labour restructuring 
under SAPs and the resultant massive redundancy of formal 
sector employment engendered in its wake.
The corollary to this, where the informal sector is 
viewed by neo-liberal writers as an unencumbered social space 
possessing tremendous vitality is also taken to task by 
Bangura and Gibbon and others. They rightly noted that by 
conceiving the state and civil society and the formal and 
informal sectors in oppositional and mutually exclusive terms, 
neo-liberals obfuscate the multiple social contestations and 
conflicts which traverse these spheres. That is to say, there 
is an erroneous tendency in neo-liberal analysis to 
exclusively identify power and exploitive relations with the 
state and public sector, while civil society and the informal 
sector are portrayed with democratic, libertarian and self­
determining attributes.This conceptual framework fails to 
recognize that power relations that exist in the state and 
formal sector are ever present in civil society and the 
informal sector.
Informal sector participation, as we have detailed in the 
Nigerian case, is by no means devoid of power relations and
103 Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.20.
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social struggles for access to resources. Class and gender 
status continue to have an adverse differential impact on 
workers, peasants and women, constricting the manoeuvrability 
of these social classes and groups to cope with socio-economic 
exigencies. The working classes have very little access to 
commodities with which to bargain for survival. Women within 
this social class have increasingly borne the burden of social 
reproduction when male members of the household have lost 
formal sector jobs or seen real incomes deteriorate rapidly. 
Moreover, women's real incomes and autonomous power from pre­
existing informal sector activities outside state control and 
male domination, such as petty trading, continues to erode 
with the countless new male entrants into the sector. 
Informality analysts often downplay the low level of income, 
insecurity of jobs, the hazardous working conditions, the long 
hours and the super-exploitation of women and youth, and the 
environmental degradation engendered by this process. Though 
state retreat from markets and the social reproduction of 
marginalized groups, encouraged by adjustment, has forced 
ordinary people to find ways to survive the crisis, the state 
retains a determining influence on the process of 
informalization. Previous chapters have attested to the major 
influence of the state in the parallel economy, through which 
members of the higher circles have found a niche to boost 
lucrative but often unproductive accumulation. The scarcity of 
resources, even in the much celebrated informal sector have
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also given rise to all sorts of social anomies in the daily 
struggle of subordinate groups for survival. Petty theft, 
prostitution, armed robbery are such individualistic responses 
to cope with material decline, which vitiate the forging of 
collective responses to resolve the crisis from below. 
Similarly, the dearth of material resources, the time demands 
of daily survival and the general lack of surplus funds for 
people to contribute to associational activities are a few 
objective constraints that militate against informal forms of 
participation and associational life.
On empirical grounds, the neo-liberal prediction that 
envisaged the process of informalization as providing an 
avenue of democratization is untenable. Although, there is no 
gainsaying the fact that the 1980s have witnessed the 
proliferation of informal organizations in tandem with the 
crisis and adjustment, the African evidence suggests that 
these grassroots groups have marginally influenced the process 
of democratization. The Nigerian case study alluded to the 
mushrooming of various informal community development 
associations (CDAs) ranging from self-help voluntary 
associations to informal credit societies. While our 
investigation focused primarily on the democratic impact of 
intermediate formal NGOs, the Nigerian experience suggests 
that CDAs have had even less of an influence on the direction 
of political and economic development in the country. Jane 
Guyer's research into grassroots organizations in Rural
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Nigeria supports this conclusion. Guyer noted that a major 
constraint facing CDAs is the larger political environment in 
which these organizations operate. She asserted that 
"associations based on community are often too small to 
achieve much in any larger arena. Mustapha's
investigation into the multiple modes of livelihood spawned by 
the crisis and adjustment in Nigeria also casts doubts on the 
democratizing affect of community development associations. 
Recognizing the growth of CDAs in recent years, he observed 
that
...it would seem that the new, and more dynamic, forms of 
cooperation are not those organizations based on neighbourhoods 
or streets, but a resurgence of particularistic ethnic and 
religious groupings who not only help their members to cope with 
the crisis, but also help ultimately to fragment the collective 
spirit or identity of the neighbourhood or c o m m u n i t y .
Indeed, many forms of community based organizations which 
persist, such as farmers organizations, have mobilized rural 
producers around a shared economic interest beyond ethnicity 
and region. Some associations, like the militant farmers 
organizations, Agbekoya, have contested the direction of 
political development in Nigeria.^* Yet, by and large, the 
myriad of CDAs ranging from town unions, ethnic associations, 
women's groups and cooperatives whose democratic participation
Jane 1. Guyer, "Representation Without Taxation: An Essay on 
Democracy in Rural Nigeria, 1952-1990" in African fltudias R#vi#w, vol.35, 
no.l, 1992, p.66.
Mustapha, "Multiple Modes of Social Livelihood", p.213.
Doifie Ola, "No Respite for Abacha" in Th# Nawa. June 27, 1994,
p. 14.
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is most at stake are often localized, particularistic and 
inward-oriented, and rarely articulate broader positions on 
critical national issues.
The recent Rwandan experience, while at an extreme, 
provides an instructive illustration on the limits of informal 
forms of participation in engendering democratic renewal and 
the vulnerability of such organizations to manipulation by the 
state and ruling classes. A writer for the weekly magazine. 
West Africa, has noted that prima facie the proliferation of 
informal organizations, especially in the rural areas during 
Rwanda's Second Republic was a promising development for 
democracy. Autonomous from the state and increasingly 
intermeshed in larger federations, CDAs were a significant 
source of alternative mobilization of the peasantry around 
common economic interests which transcended ethnicity and 
region. Such a significant development the writer further 
noted, "provided fertile ground for democratic national 
politics with competing groups or parties based primarily 
around mutual economic interests.However, in the wake of 
the 1993 Arusha Accord -- ending the three year civil war 
which was anticipated to pave an immutable path to multiparty 
democracy in Rwanda, informal organizations were increasingly 
weakened, had little influence on the fragile transition 
process and were easily manipulated towards sectarian ends.
anon., "Why Rwanda?" in W##t Africa. June 27 - July 3, 1994,
p.1127.
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Most certainly many CDAs have disappeared during the recently 
ended four month civic and ethnic strife.
In countries such as Kenya, known for the most advanced 
CDAs in Africa, the experience has been similar. Claude Ake 
has noted that despite the success of rural self-help and 
voluntary organizations in achieving grassroots economic 
development, they have not appeared to catalyze any 
decentralization of power or affected processes at the 
national level. Consistent with experience in Nigeria and 
elsewhere, Ake further maintains that the limited democratic 
impact of CDAs is in part because the majority of these groups 
"are isolated and are not usually aggregated at higher 
organizational levels where they could have some potential for 
influencing policy."^®® Writing on Ghana, Kwame Ninsin has 
also noted that if the proliferation of self-help voluntary 
groups were any indication of the strengthening of civil 
society and the potential for democratic renewal, "then 
Ghana's transition to democratic rule should not [have been] 
so problematic."^® What is crucial to note about the 
democratizing influence of CDAs, as Ake aptly observed, is 
that the supposed reconstitution of democracy in smaller 
units, as maintained by Chazan and others, can lead to the 
disenfranchisement of local people if grassroots democracy is
Ake, "Rethinking", p.37.
Kwame A. Ninsin, "Some Problems in Ghana's Transition to 
Democratic Governance" in Africa Development, vol. xviii, no.2, 1993, p.15.
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not linked to popular participation at the national level. 
With direct reference to Ghana and in particular the Rawlinga 
government's 1989 introduction of District Assemblies as the 
stated agent to mobilize and incorporate rural people into the 
democratization process, Ake has maintained that such 
"granting of local authority is not a liberty but a 
c o n s t r a i n t S i n c e  "people are given some local space, not 
to integrate them into a democratic polity but to separate 
them from meaningful participation at the national level""', 
the process of decision-making on issues which effect their 
daily lives flows "from the central to the local government in 
a strictly one-way traffic.""^ Therefore, there is little 
African evidence that the process of informalization 
strengthens civil society and has spawned Africa's democratic 
reawakening. While the survival strategies of subordinate 
social groups in the informal economy have cushioned the fall 
in formal sector employment, declines in real incomes and cut 
backs in social welfare, the concomitant proliferation of 
grassroots organization has not translated into the 
delimitation of state arbitrariness and coercion or produced 
fertile ground for stable, democratic national politics as 
advocates of informalization postulated.
Ake, "Rethinking", p.37. 
Ake, "Rethinking", p. 37. 
Ake, "Rethinking", p. 37.
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NGO#, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
Although radical critics continue to challenge the 
democratic influence of the process of informalization, they 
have joined neo-liberal analysts in placing greater emphasis 
on the democratic implications of the growth of intermediate 
formal NGOs as opposed to CDAs. They are widely deemed the 
important, if not crucial factor for the strengthening of 
civil society and the potentialities of democratic 
development, as previous chapters attested. No longer simply 
commended by multilateral and bilateral agencies for their 
facilitation of micro-development, NGOs are now envisaged by 
the IFIs, donor agencies and intellectuals as the all 
important civic 'watchdog' to keep the state accountable. NGOs 
are also viewed as the crucial institution of mediation 
between the state and grassroots communities, serving to 
pluralize the national policy-making environment and empowers 
local communities to influence decisions that affect their 
daily lives. While the NGO sector in Africa is still in its 
infancy, NGOs in many countries have made important strides 
towards grassroots empowerment, have contested state 
arbitrariness and excesses and in some cases have been 
instrumental forces in democratic transitions across the 
continent. But overall, the contribution of NGOs to African 
democratization has been negligible. It has been my contention 
in this study, that to date, NGOs have not only contributed 
marginally to the strengthening of civil society in order to
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provide an edifice against state arbitrariness, but equally, 
if not more importantly, NGOs have failed to politically 
challenge the unequal distribution of power and resources in 
their respective societies. The Nigerian experience 
underscored the contradictions and constraints within the 
incipient NGO community similarly faced by NGOs continentally.
While this thesis has not set out a rigorous theoretical 
template for our examination of NGOs in Nigeria, five factors 
are considered crucial for any critical assessment of the 
democratic influence of NGOs: (1) the internal structure of 
NGOs; (2) relations between NGOs; and the (3) relationship 
between NGOs and other social forces, (4) the state and (5) 
donor communities. The Nigerian case suggests that due to the 
constraints and contradictions herein, in the future NGOs may 
at best make a limited contribution to democratic development 
and at worse simply function as an instrument for the 
reproduction of national and transnational capital domination.
To sum up, the internal limitations of NGOs, the lack of 
networking within the sector and between NGOs and popular 
sections of civil society, together with the increasing loss 
of NGO autonomy, have all contributed to rendering NGOs 
ineffective in mobilizing grassroots communities to change 
state-civil society relations.
Notwithstanding material constraints, such as the 
insufficiency of resources which continues to constrict 
progress on the stated empowerment project of NGOs and the
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often hostile and restrictive state regulatory environment 
NGOs must operate in, a major obstacle to the democratizing 
affect of NGOs and their operations is derived from within 
NGOs themselves. While most NGOs interviewed for this study 
attested to the transparent and participatory structures 
within the organization, a closer examination not only 
revealed the persistence of internal power relations, but also 
suggested that in many cases the question of even evolving 
democratic structures has not been a priority for many NGOs. 
Several of the NGOs in Nigeria revolve a. ound one prominent 
leader. Research on specifically Women's NGOs in Nigeria 
conducted by Trager and Osinulu similarly revealed that these 
groups "tend to be dependent on a single strong, dominant 
leader, usually the founder or one of the founders.""^ 
Often, NGO operations are top-down and devoid of institutional 
mechanisms to facilitate popular input in the conception, 
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
micro-projects and programmes. The vast majority of NGOs are 
formed and staffed by elites and members of the middle classes 
and largely lack a popular base. Even within the vibrant and 
progressive human rights NGO community, Mahmud has suggested 
that many organizations often operate as elite groups."^ A
Lillian Trager and Clara Osinulu, "New Women's Organizations in 
Nigeria: One Response to Structural Adjustment" in Christine Gladwin et al. 
eds., Structural Adjustment snd African Women Farmers. 1991, p.3Sr.
Mahmud, "The Failed Transition", p.93.
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number of analysts, such as Fatton“® and C l a r k , h a v e  
noted that NGO rhetoric about their 'grassrootness' is simply 
not substantiated by the African and Third World evidence 
since in the majority of cases their operations do not involve 
or reach the 'poorest of the poor' . They both cite Judith 
Tendler's study on seventy-five project evaluations of US NGOs 
which concluded that "beneficiaries were often in the middle 
and upper ranges of the income distribution".*” Very few 
Nigerian NGOs interviewed, such as the NEST and WIN have taken 
seriously the urgent need to broaden their middle class 
composition and likewise the imperative to build internal 
participatory structures, if the organization is to be 
relevant in empowering the grassroots. With the obvious 
exception of WIN and a few other Women's NGOs, most NGOs are 
not sensitive to gender issues and rarely take consideration 
of the needs of women into their programming. The Nigerian 
experience revealed that such an undemocratic environment has 
made NGOs susceptible to opportunism and corruption.
With the expansion of the sector and the widespread 
romance with NGOs in the Western media and bilateral and 
multilateral policy-making circles, many sophisticated '4-1-9' 
operations have emerged, privately prospering by cultivating
Fatten, Pr«d«torv Rul#, p. 135.
John Clark, Paaooratitlng Pavlppoant
Orqtniiabiona, (London: Earthscan, 1991), p.55,
Judith Tendler cited in Clark, Pemoeratt»ina Pgylopwnb, p.55,
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links with, and garnering resources from, the state and
external donor agencies in the name of the grassroots.
Fowler's research on NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa
with the exception of South Africa -- noted that "many local
NGOs are products of urban based educated elites with no
substantive roots in underprivileged groups or are just
consulting firms by another Similarly, John Clark
has observed that Southern NGOs are predominately elite and
middle class in composition and leadership, with many groups
revolving around a 'guru-like' leader. Such groups are
vulnerable to corrupt practises and as Clark suggests,
...tend to stagnate rapidly when the leaders are away more than 
a short period; are prone to decay and die when the leader moves 
on, cannot be replicated; and are likely to be fixed in their 
approach sometimes dogmatically so, being only as flexible and 
open to new ideas as their leader will allow."’
Though the mortality rate of such NGOs may be quite high,
Africa's material deterioration, the international legitimacy
accorded NGOs, together with the pervading lack of internal
democracy among many NGOs, provides an arable environment for
the rejuvenation and sustenance of self-serving NGOs. At a
recent international conference devoted to the theme
Empowering People: Building Community, Civil Associations and
Legality in Africa, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's keynote address
alluded to the opportunity NGO visibility has provided for
Alan Fowler, "The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society 
Relations; Perspectives from Eastern and southern Africa" in OevloBttint 
Pollev Review, vol.9, 1991, p.73. emphasis mine.
Clark, Democratisitia Developnent. p.46.
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self-interested individuals, when he implored NGOs to be 
"genuinely peoples' organizations, not just a cover up for 
some crooks seeking to make some money or to gain prestige for 
t h e m s e l v e s . A  paper presented by Emmanuel Baingana at the 
same conference, aptly observed that the undemocratic 
character of NGOs also "creates fertile ground for local 
dictators of these civil association to f l o u r i s h . H e  
further asserted that "when given a chance to gain 
governmental power, these petty tyrants become monsters, now 
to a broader population.Writing with specific reference 
to the Kenyan NGO human rights sector but applicable 
elsewhere, Shadrack Gutto supports this conclusion by also 
bringing attention to constraints which the paucity of 
internal democracy within NGOs poses for the wider democratic 
project. Gutto asserted that
...notwithstanding the fact that such instant "friends of the 
people" may appear useful and important in the immediate battles 
to remove the present dictators, and the fact that the people 
are so fed up that they readily tolerate such elements as 
"leaders", in the end such "heroes" are more likely than not to 
turn out to be as removed from, and hostile to, the masses as 
the dictator regime were or are. They are more likely than not 
to impose ready-made policies on the people rather than be 
involved in the difficult, but democratic, task of working out 
policies and choices with the people's participation. They 
naturally fear social and political accountability and
Noted from a videocassette of Julius Nyerere's keynote address to 
the International Conference on gmpowering Peoplet Building Coiattunltv, Civil 
Aasoaiatione and Legality in Africa, organized by the Institute of 
Development Studies of the University of Oar es Salaam, Tanzania and the 
Development Studies Group, University of Toronto, Canada, held in Arusha, 
Tanzania, August 1991. Reprinted in Sandbrook and Halfani eds.. Empowering 
People. 1993.
Emmanuel Baingana, "Views on Building Democratic NGOs: A Uganda 
Perspective in Sandbrook and Halfani eds.. Empowering People. 1993, p.84.
122 Baingana, "Building Democratic NGOs", p . 84
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transparency, except temporarily and in so far as it is limited 
to the struggle to change personnel in leadership, These types 
of "grassroots", "democracy" and "human rights" individuals and 
groups of individuals are mushrooming on the African scene.'"
The embryonic Nigerian NGO community, even its popular and
vibrant human rights sector, have been susceptible to
corruption, opportunism and state cooptation. Though Mahmud
may be right to infer that the cooptation of some human rights
activists by the Abacha regime is a tacit recognition even on
the part of the military of the growing strength of human
rights NGOs^S the implications for the democratic role of
NGOs may be disastrous. The acceptance of ministerial posts by
these activists, in spite of the protestations by popular
groups is more importantly, an illustration of the lack of
sound democratic structure within NGOs. In any case,
historically state cooptation of the leadership of popular
groups has been utilized to disarticulate contending
democratic forces in civil society. Such individuals upon
ascending to the corridors of state power tend to be hostile
to the popular groups they championed at an earlier period, as
Gutto suggests and as indicated by the positions taken by
these former activists towards the current pro-democracy
campaigns in Nigeria. The vulnerability of NGO leadership to
cooptation serves to increase popular disillusionment and in
the end weakens the struggle for civic and democratic rights.
2̂3 Gutto, "Human and Peoples Rights”, p.38, 
Mahmud, "The Failed Transition", p.95.
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Baingana has also noted that the "limited interaction among 
members of different civil associations means that the wide 
scope of [these] problem[s] remains hidden, which in turn 
limits the members opportunity to struggle for democratization 
of their organizations.
The internal democracy within NGOs, the strength of the 
NGO community and their ascribed catalytic role in emboldening 
civil society will ultimately depend on the extent to which 
NGOs forge linkages and networks, to enhance cooperation and 
coordination. NGO collaboration will redress the dearth of 
material resources, reduce the duplication of activities and 
strengthen organizational structures, which is paramount for 
the sustainability of micro-projects and programmes. All 
importantly, the fostering of closer links within the 
community, horizontally and vertically, is vital to enhance 
the organizational capacity of NGOs to mobilize and empower 
the grassroots, delimit the state, and evolve participatory 
structures in the process of development. The Nigerian and 
African NGO community have not reached this stage, in spite of 
the existence of continental, regional, national and domestic 
sectoral umbrella bodies. Many Nigerian NGO, like their 
continental counterparts, remain suspicious of building 
networks, usually for reasons of organizational autonomy, 
retaining personnel, protecting the independent recognition of 
its operations and/or maintaining privileged access to its
Baingana, "Building Democratic NGOs", p.84.
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funding base. Internecine rivalries have been common. The 
majority of Nigerian NGOs are localized and have little 
contact among each other even when operating in the same city 
or town. These factors have contributed to making existing 
apex bodies, such as NAVDO, politically ineffective in 
influencing public policy, curbing state oppression and 
mobilizing the grassroots to demand civic and democratic 
rights. The rapporteur of the NGO conference on Empowering 
People, Mohammed Halfani, maintained that in spite of the 
existence of umbrella bodies in virtually all African 
countries and particularly those in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe represented at 
the forum, "the degree of organizational linkages remains 
l o w . I n  support of our conclusions on the Nigerian 
experience, Halfani also noted that "civil association not 
only do not work with each other but often have little 
knowledge about one another or are even antagonistic.It 
would then seem that there is still little evidence of the 
emergence of a politically significant NGO community in 
Nigeria and Africa.
To be sure, the reproduction of the internal 
fragmentation within the NGO sector has been consistently 
assisted by state manipulation and coercion. The leverage
Mohamed Halfani, "The Challenges Ahead" in Sandbrook and Halfani 
eds., impowrina Peoela. p.204,
Halfani, "The Challenges Ahead", p.204.
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given to the state by NGOs' lack of financial and material 
resources, has enabled it to foster an apolitical and non­
combat ive NGO community. The majority of Nigerian NGOs rely 
inordinately on state subventions and to a larger extent on 
official aid. Stipulations attached to state funding since 
1988, such as the obligatory non-political status and the 
mandatory registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
have reduced NGO autonomy and increased statist control of the 
burgeoning sector. The registration process even when fully 
complied with by NGOs, has often been used to deny funding to 
popular groups, like the Civil Liberties Organization, in the 
effort to cripple them financially and thus organizationally, 
as Chapter Three noted. Experiences in Uganda and Kenya also 
reveal that new legislation, such as this insistence on NGO 
registration, has enabled the state to better control the NGO 
community."' Bratton has provided a comprehensive treatment 
of the instruments employed by the state to restrict the 
autonomy of non-governmental organizations. Demarcating such 
strategies by degree, he noted that African governments have 
utilized monitoring, coordination, cooptation and dissolution 
to control NGOs. According to Bratton
i. monitoring refers to the use of legislative regulations, 
particularly the control of the registration process and 
reporting requirements to gather information on NGOs and 
maintain a watchful eye on their operations, ii. coordination 
refers to state intervention into the NQO sector in the effort 
to increase NGO coherence in order to evolve rational rural 
planning, but also “government,..can be excessively rigid and 
ponderous in their requirements." iii. cooptation refers to a
Powler, "Agents of Democratization", p.331.
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"firmer form of control in which autonomous organisations are 
captured and guided by a superordinate agency." Through the 
establishment of state sponsored quasi-NGOs or state incursion 
on the autonomy of independently formed umbrella NGOs, the state 
has sought to encapsulate the NGO community, iv. dissolution 
refers to a number of government actions to impede the 
operations of NGOs and range from the arrest and detention of 
the leadership of groups to the reorganization of NGOs under 
state control and at an extreme the outright proscription of 
NGOs.
The Nigerian state has readily used these various 
strategies. Statist control over the registration process has 
served to deny registration and funding to popular NGOs. The 
state has played a prominent role in giving the NGO sector 
coherence. Though NGOs independently formed the national 
umbrella body, NAVDO, the state has been accorded an important 
role in the development of the sector. While to date, no INGO 
or NGO in Nigeria has been expelled or proscribed, the 
leadership of particularly human rights NGOs are frequently 
arrested and detained. The internal weakness and fragmentation 
within the NGO community has made it quite easy for the state 
to prevent the development of critical groupings. As a 
consequence, very few Nigerian NGOs including apex bodies such 
as NAVDO have challenged state arbitrariness and coercion or 
the direction of economic recovery under SAP. Indeed, many 
have and continue to highlight the disastrous consequences of 
SAPs on vulnerable groups, but NGOs in Nigeria have generally 
failed to articulate alternatives to SAPs through a 
politically significant network which could influence 
government policy. Korten is right to suggest that
129 Bratton, "Government-NGO Relations", p,576-580,
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"ironically, it at times seems easier for NGOs to work with 
government than with other NGOs."^^° Much like the apex body 
in Nigeria, Fowler's study has observed that the "the umbrella 
bodies in Sudan, Zimbabwe and Zambia are either identified 
with government or have not expressed views on issues which 
concern members, such as legislative reform and social 
p o l i c y . I n  fact, it is often through the existence of 
apex bodies that the state penetrates the nascent NGO 
community. The 1988 Company and Allied Act in Nigeria which 
made mandatory NGO registration also made known government 
intentions to establish a national NGO body to enhance NGO co­
ordination and collaboration, if not control. Similar to 
experiences in Togo and Kenya“  ̂ and parallel to recent 
developments in the Ghanaian NGO s e c t o r , i n  Nigeria, the 
government and official agencies like the United Nations 
Development Programme have actively promoted the compilation 
of a national NGO database through the auspices of NAVDO, with 
the stated aim of improving sectoral coherence and 
cooperation. In Ghana, this same effort has been advanced for 
the purpose of enhancing the implementation of PAMSCAD, the 
social programme adopted by the Rawlings government to
David Korten, "Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People- 
Centred Development" in World Devlooment vol. 15. Special Supplement on NGOs, 
Anne Gordon Drabek (ed), 1987, p.148.
Fowler, "The Role of NGOs", p.73.
Bratton "Government-NGO Relations", p.579.
Powler, "Agents of Democratization", p.331.
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mitigate the 'pains' of SAP on vulnerable groups. While apex 
bodies are crucial for the strengthening of the NGO community 
and may have their organizational capabilities enhanced by the 
development of a national database, such an instrument with 
state involvement may enhance the monitoring and control of 
NGOs leaving such bodies with less autonomy and by implication 
the entire sector. Though the state has consistently 
encroached on the autonomy of NGOs, the increasing dependence 
of NGOs on external actors for financial and material 
resources poses an equal, if not greater threat to the 
independence of local NGOs, essential for NGO authority and 
integrity in pursuit of popular empowerment and 
democrat i zat ion.
Since the early 1980s and the advent of SAP, both 
domestic and international NGOs have seen a significant rise 
in their funding from official agencies. A policy shift on the 
part of bilateral and multilateral donors in favour of funding 
channelled through NGOs, increased the amount of official 
development assistance (ODA) to NGOs from US$1.04 billion in 
1980 to US$2.14 billion in 1988.“'* Currently, five percent 
of ODA is disbursed by INGOs and increasingly official aid is 
being allotted directly to domestic NGOs. Given the anti­
statist logic of SAPs, yet the recognition in recent years of 
the need to 'humanize' adjustment through the provision of a 
minimalist social safety net for vulnerable groups, donor
Fowler, "Distant Obligations", p.15.
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agencies have turned to NGOs. As previously mentioned,
bilateral and multilateral donors have embraced NGOs for their
comparative advantage over African and Third World governments
in the delivery of micro-development projects and poverty
alleviation programmes and have been applauded for their
capacity to empower the grassroots and strengthen civil
society. In spite of the recession and 'aid fatigue' in the
West, by all indications aid flows, at least those transferred
via NGOs, are likely to increase.
The growing dependency of INGOs and NGOs on official aid
rather than on resources from the gift economy or through
self-financing, raises important issues on the operations of
non-governmental organizations and their actual capacity to
realize their stated democratic function. The degree of
dependency of INGOs on official aid, which often ranges from
between 70% to 100%, has led analysts like Yash Tandon to view
INGOs as agents of imperialism, merely operating as an adjunct
of the Foreign Ministry of their respective countriesAs
INGOs remain the principal source of financial assistance to
domestic NGOs, by extension they too may increasingly be
susceptible to cooptation by IFIs, bilateral donors and INGOs.
Fowler explains the dangers of NGO financial dependency well:
Greater official aid for NGOs inevitably incorporates them into 
propagating political reforms in the donor's image. A likely 
negative effect of this trend is that NGOs will be less able to 
offer critical or alternative views of associated economic 
policies, such as structural adjustment programmes, or question
Yash Tandon, "Foreign NGOs, Uses and Abuses : An African
Perspective" in IFPA D088HR. no.81, 1991.
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the validity of externally vaunted political models that are 
inconsistent with indigenous values and historical process. For 
the current dominance of multi-partyism as a suitable political 
system is for want of proven alternative models evolving from 
within the continent. NGOs assimilate into the structures and 
priorities of official aid, and could therefore come to be 
regarded as agents of a new form of imperialism,- a perception 
that will undermine their credibility and possibly their 
comparative advantages in social innovation.'^®
Even though Bade Onimode may be right to state, with reference
to Nigeria, that foreign resource dependency of NGOs has not
rendered them agents of external actors, *̂7 the extent of
donor influence over the operations of NGOs should not be
down-played. Data on the sources of NGO funding is difficult
to access, often due to their lack of transparency. However,
with the on-going crisis of state and economy, attendant
reductions in state subventions, the constriction of avenues
for local resource mobilization and the weakness of the gift
economy, it is likely that the dependency of NGOs on external
aid has increased. The majority of Nigerian NGOs interviewed
attested to the significant composition of foreign assistance
in their funding base, even if reluctant to confirm with
actual figures. External aid continues to be mainly disbursed
through INGOs, such as CUSO. Once primarily concerned with
funding state agencies, increasingly donor agencies, such as
the US-based Ford Foundation and the German-based, Friedrich
Naumann and Friedrich Ebert Foundations have expanded their
Powler, "Agents of Démocratisation", p.329-330. 
Interview with Bade Onimode, December 1993.
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funding profile to NGOs in Nigeria in recent years."*
The increasing reliance of NGOs on external resources 
while easing material constraints and often enhancing 
organizational effectiveness, "undermines initiative, 
superimposes a donor perspective in the definition of goals 
and objectives (in order to qualify for funding), and 
disorients civil organizations by preoccupying them with the 
tasks of aid administration (accounting, reporting, 
supervision, and requisitioning), thus vitiating the 
empowerment project."^” Though NGOs have prided themselves 
on their autonomy and responsiveness to grassroots needs, the 
imposition of onerous reporting and accounting requirements by 
INGOs and external donors, together with the growing external 
influence over the orientation of local NGOs makes them 
increasingly answerable to external agents and erodes their 
already tenuous accountability to the local constituencies 
they seek to empower. C l a r k , F o w l e r , S c h m i t z  and 
H u t c h f u l ^ ' ^  have also highlighted the limits of the 
historical tendency of official aid policies to promote 
community development in the narrow project oriented sense.
Interview with Yahaya, January 1994. 
Halfani, "The Challenge Ahead", p.204. 
Clark, Denooratiainq Development.
Fowler, "The Role of NGOs", and Fowler, "Agents of 
Democratization".
Schmitz and Hutchful, Pooular Participation.
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The modus operandi of project aid, Powler maintained, is based 
"on a mechanistic cause and effect paradigm" which 
dissuades participation or treats popular input merely "in an 
instrumental fashion, as a cost reducing input. The 
process of decision making tends to be dominated by local 
elites, with often little grassroots participation, especially 
of women, in the conception, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of micro-projects. Such an approach to grassroots 
community development encourages a localized, particularistic 
and apolitical NGO community and "steers NGOs away from 
activities designed to remove the social and political 
structures which hold the poor in their disadvantaged 
position.
Ultimately, NGO project-geared development disempowers 
the grassroots, for it fails to enhance the capacity of 
ordinary people to influence their daily lives, individually 
and collectively and discourages the evolution of politically 
significant NGO networks to challenge the state which retains, 
though distant, a strong influence over local processes. It 
also serves to strengthen the state at its margins through its 
sustenance of a social service system which the state has 
absconded under adjustment and thus reproduces the political 
economy of poverty and underdevelopment, rather than seeking
Fowler, "Distant Obligations", p.17. 
Fowler, "Distant obligations". 
Fowler, "The Role of NGOs", p.70.
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its transformation. While the majority of Nigerian NGOs 
interviewed were acutely aware of the unequal division of 
labour between INGOs/external donors and local NGOs, stemming 
from the former's control of resources, very few have evolved 
concrete policy measures to protect their autonomy and local 
relevance. Popular NGOs, such as the NEST and WIN, which until 
recently had resisted external assistance for reasons of 
autonomy, have both adopted policies which screen funding 
sources for 'hidden agendas' and negative records of donor 
collaborations. They have also sought to diversify their 
funding base to reduce their vulnerability to cooptation, 
while consistently searching for innovative means of 
generating resources internally which is the surest means of 
reducing external influence over NGO operations. They are 
however, the exception not the norm.
The experience of Nigeria's nascent NGO community 
underscores the need to temper the often enthusiastic 
responses to NGO operations and their stated ability to 
empower the grassroots with a critical assessment of the 
actual capacity of NGOs to enhance political liberalization, 
strengthen civil society and instigate democratic renewal. To 
date, the Nigerian and African NGO sectors have contributed 
marginally to this process. Like any other social force in 
civil society, non-governmental organizations, even the most 
popular and democratic, are vulnerable to manipulation, 
cooptation, and colonization by the forces of the higher
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circles, internal and external. The middle class character, 
the lack of internal democracy and a popular base of the 
majority of NGOs, coupled with their growing dependence on 
financial and material aid from the state and external donor 
agencies make them particularly susceptible to cooptation. 
With the increasing legitimacy of the rhetoric of 
'grassrootsness' in policy and analysis, NGOs may be rendered 
mere stepping stones for its middle class leadership and 
membership seeking to increase their societal influence and 
power as Fatton has suggested.^* A relevant NGO community 
must seek to empower the grassroots not simply to effectively 
execute isolated local development projects but more 
importantly to evolve politically significant and democratic 
NGO networks, vertically and horizontally, not only to curb 
state excesses but also to challenge the state and restructure 
the unequal relations of power and resource distribution in 
their respective societies. It is not enough for NGOs to 
simply concentrate on a myriad of micro-development projects. 
While primary health care projects, school and shelter 
construction, agricultural extension services, cottage 
industry promotion, revolving credit loan schemes, etc., 
undertaken by NGOs have been indispensable in providing a 
social safety net and access to resources for ordinary people 
in their daily struggles for survival, -- particularly as the 
state retreats from the social reproduction of vulnerable
146 Patton, Pradatorv Rul#. p.5.
468
groups -- increasing the capacities of the grassroots to 
engage the broad political arena must be pursued in tandem. 
Poverty, as Clark has noted "will not be defeated just by 
tackling it at the micro-level, important as that work is for 
the millions of people who benefit directly from grassroots 
development projects....to stem the mounting tide necessitate 
attacking the root causes of poverty at the macro-level.""^ 
A non-combative and apolitical NGO community may render NGOs 
simply third millennium missionaries. That is to say, the 
activities of NGO, regardless of how genuine, benign and 
important to the social reproduction of the poor, may be the 
conduit through which capitalist expansionism seeks to shelter 
potentially revolutionary subordinate groups from socio­
economic exigencies since these forces may pose a threat to 
the state and transnational domination. While serving the 
imperative of market globalization at the African and Third 
World end, NGO operations may also do double duty by 
mitigating migratory pressures to the West."® In short, 
NGO's simple pursuance of micro-projects divert attention from 
the urgent need to agitate for the transformation and 
democratization of the state and the creation of participatory 
political institutions in which popular forces have a 
determining role in the policy decisions that influence local 
and national development. In this process, NGOs must
Clark, Piftocratialng D#y#l0Dm#nt, p.198. 
Powler, "Distant Obligations", p.25-26.
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democratize their internal structures, forge networks with 
other NGOs and seek to build linkages with progressive social 
forces in what Beckman has called 'actually existing civil 
society.'
ADJUSTMENT, DESTATIZATION, CIVIL SOCIETY AMD DEMOCRACY
There has been no shortage of neo-liberal approaches that 
have intervened to interpret and proffer solutions to Africa's 
on-going socio-economic and political crisis. If market forces 
are held out by neo-liberal analysts as the catalyst for 
political liberalization as I have noted in section one, then 
further economic reform in this direction is paramount for the 
strengthening of civil society and democratic consolidation. 
In this view, democracy is best served by the ongoing 
adjustment exercise because it emboldens the market and civil 
society relative to the state. Economic deregulation and 
liberalization promote the formation of alternative poles of 
association and centres of power outside the ambit of the 
state, providing an 'enabling environment' for the 
strengthening of civil society, consensual democratic politics 
and economic recovery and development. Political pluralism, 
public transparency, accountability, empowerment and the 
devolution of decision-making to the grassroots are thus an 
outgrowth of market reforms.
As previously mentioned, informality approaches and the 
emphasis on the survivalist strategies of subordinate groups 
and the manner in which this process changes state-civil
490
society relations has gained resonance in unravelling the 
complexity of African social reality. Similarly, the urJban 
biaa/coalition and the economy of affection schools of thought 
elaborated in Chapter Two have been favoured neo-liberal 
approaches to understanding the problems of African 
development. While differing in their interpretation of the 
dimensions of the African crisis, both schools of thought 
agree that the encapsulation of the African state by either an 
urban coalition or persisting affective ties lay at the roots 
of post-colonial development failures and the crisis of 
governance on the continent which can only be remedied by the 
release of market forces. A new approach, termed governance, 
has grown significantly in the literature on African 
development in recent years. It has been popularized by the 
World Bank, the Ford Foundation and in the academic writings 
of Africanists attached to the African Governance Programme of 
the Carter Centre of Emory University.^'*® Goran Hyden's work 
has been recognized for elevating the divergent neo-liberal 
usage of governance "to an umbrella concept defining an 
approach."^®” The governance approach, according to its 
proponents, seeks to move beyond the predominant academic and 
policy focus on the economic facets of Africa's development
^̂ ® World Bank, LTPfl. Richard Joseph, "Africa: The Rebirth of 
Political Freedom " in Journal of Pettocracv. vol.l, no.4, 1991, See also 
Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton ede,, Oevarnanca and Politics in Africa, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
Michael Bratton and Donald Rothchild, "The Institutional Bases of 
Governance in Africa" in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton eds., Governance and 
Polities in Africa. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) p.266.
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problems to place greater emphasis on the political dimension 
of this process, particularly turning intellectual lenses to 
"issues of state responsiveness and accountability, and the 
impact of these factors on political stability and economic 
development."^®^ Governance, Goran Hyden maintained, differs 
and transcends the voluntarism of some neo-liberal approaches 
and the pessimistic and deterministic perspectives of Marxist 
and non-Marxist structuralist frameworks.
Hyden asserted that governance is "characterized by 
reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relations of power between 
the governors and governed; in this respect 'governance' 
differs from 'rules' which does not presuppose 
legitimacy. At the core of the governance framework is 
the assumption that politic a is devoid of social contestation 
on the basis of fundamental conflict of interests. Rather for 
Hyden, politics can be viewed as a "positive sum-game; where 
reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relation of power between 
governors and governed prevail; and where everybody is a 
winner not only in the short-term but also in the long 
term."“® In the continuum of classical liberal democratic - 
theorists, especially contract theorists, to whom Hyden pays
Bratton and Rothchild, "The institutional Bases", p,263.
Hyden quoted as cited in Bratton and Rothchild, "The Institutional 
Bases", p.266-267.
Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Study of Politics" in Goran Hyden 
and Michael Bratton eds., Gevrnanca and Poll ties in Africa, (Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner, 1992) p.10.
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homage, he maintained that citizen's legitimize state 
authority by voluntarily accepting an asymmetrical 
relationship with the state and political leaders in a quid 
pro quo for effective governance and the resolution of 
societal problems. Governance analysts further argued that 
though political actors seek to enhance personal power and 
opportunities to amass wealth, they derive satisfaction from 
their performance in public service. The key for Hyden, is to 
initiate institutional changes "so as to make individual 
actors expend their energies in the labour of public 
interest.""* The familiar values and procedures historically 
associated with liberal democracy, mainly the rule of law, 
public accountability, the pluralization of policy making 
processes and the regularization of competitive elections are 
at the core of institutional reforms advocated by governance 
analysts. Through such reforms "leaders can mobilize popular 
energy in support of developmental actions, and...followers 
can keep leaders honest and accountable.""® However, civil 
society and its associations! life remains a crucial 
'democratic watchdog' to check state excesses. According to 
Hyden, the sustainability of governance and reciprocal 
relations "dependts] on the extent to which individuals are 
free to form associations to defend and promote their interest
"* Hyden cited in Bratton and Rothchild "The Institutional Bases",
p.269.
Bratton and Rothchild, "The Institutional Bases", p . 269.
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at the public realm. The governance framework, like other 
neo-liberal approaches supports further market reforms and the 
'rolling back' of the state as crucial for strengthening civil 
society and democratic consolidation.
The governance approach, much like its neo-liberal 
intellectual cousins, is not helpful in deciphering the 
complexity of Africa's social reality and obfuscates the 
relationship between the state and civil society. In an 
attempt to restore human agency to the understanding of 
political and socio-economic development in Africa, but in a 
stated middle ground between action and structuralist 
development theories, the governance approach shows a 
disregard for the objective parameters which constrain 
creative politics. Notwithstanding the stated recognition by 
governance analysts of the structural constraints in the 
evolution of 'reciprocal legitimate relations', and Hyden's 
incorporation of the Marxist dictum: "human beings make their 
own history but not in circumstances of their own choice 
the ascription of politics "to an independent and 
superordinate factor in the study of development"^^ leads 
these analysts to ignore the material realities in Africa; the 
unequal internal relations of power, politics and resource 
distribution and the uneven integration of the continent into
Hyden, "Governance", p.14, 
Hyden, "Governance", p.8. 
Hyden, "Governance", p.8,
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the global economy. While it is important to recognize human 
agency, a crucial factor long-neglected in the development 
literature, the analysis and understanding of on-going 
processes of change cannot be divorced from the objective 
parameters which are always constraints, albeit not immutably. 
Hyden and other governance analysts simplify politics in 
Africa, emptying it of contradictions and conflict. 
Criticizing the new governance approach, and its ascriptions 
of political authority with the 'general will', Fatton aptly 
notes that governance "imparts to politics a supreme benignity 
that conjures away the manifest realities of economic 
injustice, brutal oppression, and social conflict."̂ ®® He 
pointedly asks; "how can human beings truly share a community 
of interest when they are divided into classes of perpetrators 
and victims of exploitation?"How can it be conceived 
that the fundamentally unequal distribution of wealth and 
gross disparities in life-chances that characterize most 
African regimes are merely accidental, or worse yet, 
symptomatic of a voluntary acceptance of an asymmetrical 
relationship?"^®^
Much like informality theory, which erroneously portrays 
the formal and informal sectors as mutually exclusive arenas, 




Fatten, Pradatorv Rul*. p.4. 
Fatton, Predatory *ul#, p.4. 
Fatton, Predatory Rule, p.142.
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polarize the state and civil society. Central to the 
conceptual framework of my thesis and the analysis of the 
problematic of civil society and democracy in Africa, is the 
recognition of the interconnection of the objective and 
subjective factors and force in development and the explicit 
appreciation of the dialectical quality of state-civil society 
relations. To accurately and holistically unearth the concrete 
dynamics of Africa's nascent civil society and the factors and 
forces which strengthen and weaken the civic terrain, 
particularly its popular sectors, it is paramount to recognize 
the dialectical unity of the state and civil society as "the 
state is transformed by a changing civil society, likewise 
civil society is transformed by a changing state. Though 
the state is an assemblage of competing social forces, 
national and transnational, seeking access and control of 
resources, and where these social classes and groups vie to 
influence the allocation of resources and the direction of 
development, the state is controlled and serves the interest 
of the factions of the ruling class (national and 
transnational) and seeks to consummate ruling class hegemony 
in civil society.
This interpretation of Hyden and the economy of affection 
school of thought, in which the African state is viewed as 
suspended in 'mid-air without any structural roots' in civil 
society, is totally unfounded. It ignores that the state in
Fatton, Pradatorv Rula. p.12.
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capitalist social formations, even an underdeveloped one, are 
political expressions of particular interests in civil
society, conditioned by inequities in property and production 
r e l a t i o n s . The factions of the ruling classes, as 
represented in the civic space through such favoured neo­
liberal institutions as the chambers of commerce, have 
monopolized the state realm and have had a determining 
influence on how societal choices are made, rules are defined, 
resources allocated and benefits enjoyed. To be sure,
subordinate and popular social forces and groups in civil 
society, such as trade unions, civic association, students and 
women's groups do also seek to influence processes at the 
state level, agitating for material concession from the state 
and that "it... lay down and enforce rules in their 
favour. The state has and does make economic concessions 
to subordinate groupings and on occasions eases the 
restrictions on political space, but only insofar as improved 
wages, expanded social expenditure and limited democratic 
rights do not obstruct the accumulation project of factions of 
the ruling classes, as the African and global crisis 
reconfirms. Mamdani observed that governance theory, like much 
of the neo-liberal conceptualizations of state-civil society 
relations, ignores the interconnection of these two spheres.
In a review of the proceedings of the 1989 inaugural
Bangura, "Theoretical Discourse", p.29.
Beckman, "Liberalization of Civil Society", p.29
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conference of the African Governance Programme of the Carter 
Centre, he argued that in so doing, governance theory and 
their intellectual associates "misrepresents the manner in 
which forces within society penetrate the state 
differentially, just as the state power reinforces certain 
social interest and undermines other.
Civil society by no means enjoys an independent existence 
from the state, despite the general belief in neo-liberal 
writings that market reforms, the attendant role back of state 
intervention in the economy, and the curtailment of state 
redistributive policies has created a vacuum for civil society 
to grow unencumbered by the state. The state interfaces with 
civil society through rules and transactions "multiple 
economic interventions, its disciplinary regulations of 
private behaviour and its ideological interpellations.In 
the quest to promote the interests of the ruling classes and 
their hegemony in the civic terrain, yet retain the veneer of 
representing the general interest, the state responds to the 
demands from subordinate forces. However, any semblance of a 
'benign aloofness' that the state may have enjoyed since the 
early years of the post-colonial period has been eroded by the 
deepening crisis of accumulation which mitigated against its 
ability to improve the living conditions and life-chance of 
subordinate groups, thus contributing to the current
Mamdani cited in Beckman, "Liberation of Civil Soci^Ly, p.23-24, 
Fatton, Predatory Kule. p.13.
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legitimation crisis of the African state. State attempts to 
reproduce its hegemony through cooptation has been ineffective 
while coercion only serves to further alienate civil society. 
State repression paradoxically galvanizes counter-hegemonic 
struggles, intra and inter-class, agitating for 
democrat ization.
But Africa's reinvigorated civil society should not be 
simplistically portrayed with democratic and libertarian 
attributes, emptied of political and ideological struggle, nor 
should the vibrancy of its associâtional life, the plurality 
of social movements and institutions be viewed as united in 
the same social project of democratizing the state as is 
commonly assumed by neo-liberal analysts.^®’ Civil society is 
not a neutral terrain but rather a sphere of multiple 
contestations and conflict on the basis of class, gender, 
ethnicity, race and religion; an arena of hegemonic, 
ideological and resistance struggles. Much like the state, 
political contestation is ever-present in civil society, which 
transverses trade unions, multinational corporations, 
political parties, civic associations, universities and NGOs. 
The civic terrain is fraught with "interests and tendencies 
that are parochial, sectarian, full of insoluble 
contradictions and bear a strong tendencies to act in 
undemocratic, if not authoritarian, ways."“® In short.
Schmitz and Mutchful, Popular Participation, p.8. 
Ninsln, "Some Problems", p.16.
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elements in the civic terrain are protean and have "no 
determining essential properties, neither 'democratic' nor 
'undemocratic'.^* The myriad of community development 
associations, NGOs, women's groups and rural cooperatives, in 
addition to trade, student and professional unions, while 
mobilized to increasingly agitate for democracy have to 
varying degrees also manifested anti-democratic tendencies, as 
the Nigerian experience underscored. Internal processes within 
civic associations, particularly around electoral competitions 
have been plagued by the contradictions of the wider society. 
For example, internal relations in the trade union movement 
have been marred by a lack of internal democracy, corruption, 
internecine ethnic and religious conflict, a hostility towards 
gender issues and prone to manipulation to suit the political 
ambitions of opportunistic leaders as the Bafyau incumbency 
has shown. Professional associations, especially the Nigerian 
Bar Association also exemplified quite clearly how intra-union 
electoral contestation exhibited a proclivity towards naira 
politics, electoral rigging, ethnic and regional manipulation 
and the political thuggery and violence that have 
characterized national politics and national electoral 
competition in the post-colonial period. Likewise the 
embryonic NGO sector as previously mentioned, has not been 
immune to these anti-democratic ills. Moreover, the recently 
concluded Annual Convention of the NANS, at Obafemi
Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.21.
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Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, illustrated that even the 
indomitable national student body, which has survived 
successive military regimes, its intermittent proscription and 
the most brutal aspects of the state repression to remain the 
'conscience of the nation', has been subject to anti­
democratic practises. In spite of the resilience of the NANS 
and its seemingly internal participatory structure, the 
convention was beset with fierce intra-union antagonisms, 
allegations and counter-allegations by factions centred on 
mutual charges of state infiltration, nearly ending in the 
disintegration of the union.”" Similarly, the February 1994 
Second National Convention of the Campaign for Democracy held 
in Ibadan, was marred by the convergence of "the internal 
contradiction within the organization as well as the 
contradiction of the society it [has sought] to 
transform."”  ̂The CD which had emerged as the most credible 
popular group to lead Nigerians in the historic pro-democracy 
struggles in the wake of the June 12 annulled election, had 
its legitimacy tainted in the embroglio touched off by the 
flirtation of its leadership with the military wing of the ING 
on the eve of the Abacha coup. The CD crisis was acutely 
manifest in the mutual allegations between the Beko-led and 
Ubani-led factions, citing undemocratic leadership, financial
p. 10.
Emma Eke, "No to Paction" in African Sumrdlan, May 30, 1994, p.9. 
Adebayo Williams "Icons against Icons" in Ths N#wm, March 7, 1994,
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improprieties and state collaboration, but at its roots 
reflected an ideological conflict over the orientation, 
principles and strategies to guide popular struggles. 
Commenting on the CD's leadership conflict, Adebayo Williams 
noted that the crisis was inevitable since the umbrella body 
"emerged as an omnibus democratic bandwagon in protest and 
agitation against the Babangida junta, it could not transform 
into a conventional political party and thus lacked
ideological c l a r i t y . C a u g h t  up in the immediate task of 
confronting the Babangida dictatorship, the CD was unable to 
give priority to its long-term interests in creating sound 
internal structures and failed to adopt a constitution, a well 
articulated programme and a set of guiding principles, While 
the CD struggled to sort itself out, the pro-democracy
umbrella lost some credibility in civil society. To some, the
romance of certain CD members with the military, the intensity 
of the conflict at the Ibadan convention, the mutual
allegations of corruption and undemocratic ills exhibited, was 
a microcosm of, and bore no difference to the kind of politics 
that had plagued Nigeria since independence and which the CD 
had sought to transform. In fact, the lull in CD activities in 
the first few months of the Abacha coup and the failure of its
Abayoml Cgundeji, "A House Divided" in African OUTditn, February 
21, 1994. See Also: Mikail Mumuni, "The Enemy Within" in tMll> February 21, 




national 'stay at home' strike organized in May to protest the 
on-going petrol scarcity and the military junta's self-imposed 
mandate, can in part be attributed to the fall-out from the 
convention.^'* To be sure, financial and organizational 
constraints together with state clampdown on the CD leadership 
on the eve of the planned action, contributed largely to the 
ineffectiveness of the action. But in no small measure, the 
CD's internal conflict did challenge the leadership of the 
democratic umbrella.
It has been argued in this thesis that in spite of the 
emboldening of the Nigerian civic terrain in recent years, it 
remains weak, divided by economic, social, ethnic and 
religious conflict and subject to state manipulation and 
domestication. The persisting fragmentation of civil society, 
the susceptibility of its organizations, particularly its 
popular organs, to corruption and opportunism and the lack of 
internal democracy and accountability has made the civic 
terrain especially vulnerable to state cooptation and 
colonization, and reduced the political weight of popular 
forces to determine political and social-economic 
developments. Currently, in the reinvigorated calls to oust 
the Abacha junta and uphold the sanctity of June 12 elections, 
it initially appeared that the CD had lost the initiative in 
determining the direction of pro-democracy agitations. In the
Isodl Dike, "Excesses of a Campaign for Democracy" in TflM. May 22, 
1994. See also: Dele Ajaja, "Sorry, We are Working" in Tell, May 23, 1994 and 
Felix Oboagwina, "Thumbs Down for CD" in The Week. May 23, 1994.
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crystallization of factions of the political class -- from 
reformed militarist to progressives -- into the NADECO and the 
new found resolve of MKO Abiola to lay claim to the 
presidency, the pedestrian and often opportunistic political 
class who had largely abandoned the June 12 issue on the eve 
of the Abacha coup, appeared to be leading the struggle for 
democracy in Nigeria. The NADECO has featured prominently in 
the campaigns to boycott the government-sponsored national 
constitutional conference and the increasing demands for a 
Sovereign National Conference. Highlighting the internal 
contradictions within the CD, in no way diminishes its 
continued strong leadership of popular and pro-democracy 
forces in the country. The CD retains over 50 affiliates which 
include the country's two strategic oil unions, NUPENG and 
PERGASSON. These unions have been central to the intensified 
popular agitation for civil liberties and democracy. Since 
July 1994, the oil unions have launched a national strike, 
which has crippled oil production, the country's economic 
life-line, and intensified the pressure on the military junta. 
These unions, have demanded the sanctity of the June 12 
elections and the release of MKO Abiola who was arrested and 
detained on June 22 and is currently being tried on treason 
charges for announcing a parallel government. The June 12 
issue and Abiola's release have all been linked to the on­
going calls for an SNC as the modality to restructure 
Nigeria's political and economic terrain.
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But the intensified agitation of broad sections of civi3 
society to bring an end to one party, no-party rule and the 
militarization of the state and civil society in Nigeria and 
Africa, should not lead to the assumption that ail civic 
groups share a common commitment to democracy, or are 
uniformly in agreement on its form and content. While in 
recent years a cross section of civil society have been 
mobilized against erstwhile dictatorships, the various anti­
authoritarian forces drawn into political action have varying 
interests in ending predatory rule. In Nigeria, the political 
class throughout the duration of the now defunct FTP, showed 
an opportunistic attachment to democracy, and defended it only 
insofar as the pluralization of the political space opened up 
access to the citadels of state power. Given this antecedent, 
the renewed agitation of the NADECO may simply be spawned by 
the marginalization of the political class in the current 
power equation, rather than a commitment to institutionalize 
pluralist and consensual politics. Likewise, the interest of 
the bulk of the middle classes in democracy may be simply 
conjunctural. While it is true that the crisis, material 
deterioration and the pauperization and proletarianization of 
broad sections of the middle classes have galvanized class 
fractions and hitherto conservation professional bodies, such 
as the ASUU, NBA and the NUJ to agitate for the rule of law, 
press freedoms, civil liberties and social justice, others may 
"see... the move towards greater political democracy as an
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occasion to loosen state... [monopoly on] the channels for 
wealth accumulation."”® in contrast, for subordinate social 
classes the struggle for democracy underscores the desire for 
a 'second independence.' Although democratic campaigns are 
manifest in the call for civil liberties and multiparties, 
they are underpinned by popular aspirations for the betterment 
of life-chances and a determining role in the direction of 
development and thus an influence on the decision that affect 
their daily lives, as both Ake and Ampaw highlight with such 
lucidity in the introductory quotes to this chapter.
In popular contestations to democratize the state, pro­
democracy groups confront elements in civil society seeking to 
resist and undermine the democratic project. The machinations 
of the conservative factions of Nigeria's ruling classes is a 
case in point. The CD and other democratic forces consistently 
challenged, politically and legally, the anti-democratic 
activities of the Association for Better Nigeria and its 
effort to prolong the Babangida dictatorship. The interplay of 
these forces is not characterized by benignity, but rather 
fierce contestation over fundamental conflict of interests and 
world-views. It may be more accurate then to view civil 
society and its associational life as Pereira suggests in the 
Latin American context, as struggling "against one another and 
against state managers to use state institutions for their own
Harsch, "Democracy Movement", p.22,
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ends."̂ ''̂  In this regard, it is also erroneous to 
mechanistically impart on civil society a neo-liberal 
programme that conflates the development of the civic terrain 
with the market and where all civic groups are held to be 
dedicated to minimizing the role of the state in the economy 
and society.
Various social forces in civil society have opposed SAPs, 
maintained statist positions but still demanded the 
democratization of the state and the autonomy of the civic 
terrain. Workers, of course, remain at the core of popular 
opposition to SAPs. The cumulative effect of public and 
private sector 'wage restructuring' and the attendant wage 
freezes, cut backs and redundancies, in tandem with the 
removal of subsidies, have drastically reduced the living 
standards of workers. Devaluation induced inflation has eaten 
into the real incomes of workers. While trade liberalization 
has brought imported goods back onto store shelves, price 
levels have risen beyond the purchasing power of the working 
classes. Workers have borne disproportionately the burden of 
adjustment and, although the leadership of the central labour 
body, the NLC, has often been coopted on the side of the neo- 
liberal project, workers have joined equally aggrieved urban 
social forces, such as students and a strata of the middle 
classes in opposing the SAP. In spite of the expectation of 
proponents of SAP, that trade and exchange rate deregulation
Pereira, "Democracy and Civil Society", p.371,
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would benefit the bulk of rural dwellers, small-scale and 
middle-scale food and export commodity producers too have been 
aggrieved by the SAP. The initial beneficiaries of the 
restructuring of price incentives and favourable international 
conjunctures for certain export crops, the inflationary spiral 
in the Nigerian economy has eroded both productive gains and 
real incomes of rural producers. Similarly, factions of the 
higher circles have also resisted the policy instruments of 
the SAP. While the benefits of SAPs have been hotly contested 
by factions of capital, the disastrous consequences of 
adjustment on industrial production have led domestic 
manufacturers and their organizations, such as the MAN, to 
call for the "reflation of the economy through a significant 
increase in the consumer purchasing power, a lowering of 
interest rates, the expansion of credit and liquidity,"''' 
and are joined by workers and the middle classes in the demand 
for the upward review of the naira. The decision of the Abacha 
junta to accede to the agitation of these social groups, 
particularly productive capital, and peg the naira and 
interest rates in its 1994 Budget is indicative of the 
continued contestation around adjustment and the direction and 
design of economic recovery.
Rather than the neo-liberal anticipation of an 
attenuation of statist demands under market reforms, "in which 
the expansion on non-state activities...[renders] the state
Olukoshi, "General Introduction", p.10.
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irrelevant in the economic and political calculations of 
specific groups"'’®, different social forces continue to have 
strong expectation of the state. Urban social classes demand 
the restoration of real incomes, the expansion of employment 
and social welfare, likewise rural dwellers. Rural producers 
pressure the state for roads, jobs, affordable seeds, 
fertilizers, etc. Local manufacturers, as mentioned pressured 
the state for the introduction of fixed exchange and interest 
rates, in addition to agitating for the rationalization of 
trade in order to protect domestic industrialist against 
transnational competitors. While they do support the 
commercialization and privatization of parastatals, factions 
of domestic productive capital seek state adjudication in the 
process in order to guard against transnational domination of 
prized privatized enterprises.
In spite of the statist perspective of various social 
forces, particularly urban popular groups, they have been at 
the centre of agitation to defend the autonomy of civil 
society and social struggles for civic and democratic rights. 
Independent popular political action in Nigeria has been 
largely the preserve of the organizations of workers, students 
and sections of the middle stratum. It is the associations of 
these social groups that have consistently challenged state 
arbitrariness, seeking to delimit the state and enthrone 
democracy, drawing support from the youth, urban unemployed.
178 Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.22.
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petty traders and informal sector participants. Workers 
continue to agitate for trade union autonomy, collective 
bargaining and for the democratic right to use union dues for 
political purposes. The 1989 attempt by workers to form the 
Nigerian Labour Party in order to give expression to 
subordinate social forces in the political realm is indicative 
of this, though the initiative was aborted shortly after by 
the state. Similarly, the academic union has consistently 
agitated for academic freedom and university autonomy. 
Likewise, the respective organizations of the fourth estate 
and legal practitioners have struggled for press freedoms, the 
independence of the judiciary and have joined workers, 
students, women's groups, human rights NGOs in the demand for 
civil liberties, democracy and social justice.
However, it is these urban social forces that neo-liberal 
analysts variously portrayed as parasitic 'urban coalitions' 
and 'vested interests' , which have featured prominently in 
democratic agitations in Nigeria and throughout Africa and 
have shown the greatest capacity to act as civil society's 
democratic 'watchdog'. As pointed out in Chapter One, the 
urban bias/coalition thesis popularized by Lipton and Bates 
gave theoretical legitimacy to the on-going market reforms, 
delegitimizf - urban popular opposition to SAPs and justified 
their repression, since these analysts blamed the presumed 
'self-seeking' and 'privileged' 'urban coalition' for 
precipitating post-colonial development failures, through
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their manipulation of the state and its resources toward 
sectoral ends, which thereby reduced the majority of rural 
dwellers to s q u a l o r . I n  this scenario, social actors in 
the urban and rural sectors are viewed as homogenous, with 
workers exploiting peasants and town oppressing country. 
Portraying urban and rural sectors as mutually antagonistic 
poles, devoid of any recognition of social stratification and 
hierarchies, as we have shown, grossly negates how post­
colonial development and the current market reforms have 
disastrously affected the living conditions of subordinate 
groups, urban and rural. In so doing, these analysts eliminate 
any role for organized formal urban groups to catalyze changes 
in state-civil society relations and negate any basis for a 
popular alliance of shared interests between urban and rural 
subordinate groups to bring about political restructuring.
Urban bias proponents have been joined by informality 
analysts who also down play or negate the role of formal 
organized groups, such as trade unions and professional 
associations, in catalyzing democratic changes to the 
political system. The intellectual lenses of these analysts 
have focused on the democratic implications of a retreating 
state, the liberating dynamics of market reforms and the 
pluralizing influence of the processes of informalization. 
Tending to concentrate exclusively on informal forms of 
associational life flourishing outside the state realm, they
179 Lipton, Why Poor PaAnl# St<iv Boor, and Bates, Market# and States■
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too neglect any examination of the responses of formally- 
organized social forces in civil society to SAPs and predatory 
rule, also ignoring how informal organizations relate to urban 
groups and the manner in which alliances have been built 
between "'formal' and informal groups' to intervene in the 
political arena as they seek to introduce changes in the 
political system.
Certainly, as we have seen, post-colonial development led 
to wanton rural neglect and impoverishment. In the pursuit of 
the 'modernizing project' successive national development 
plans extracted cheap food and export revenues in support of 
rapid industrialization but relegated the rural sector to the 
fringes of civil society. Moreover, it is equally true that 
workers, like other social groups, are 'self interested' and 
'self-seeking' in defence of their interests as wage-earners. 
In the context of the crisis and adjustment, the attendant 
unemployment, rising inflation, hard hitting affect on the 
living standards of workers, and the resultant trade union 
weakening, "trade union activitfies] have become oriented 
towards the protection of past gains, rather than the 
advancement of present n e e d s a n d  they may simply seek to 
defend the corporate interest of workers rather than 
articulating wider societal concerns. Similarly, the 
organizations of professional groups also seek to serve the
Bangura and Clbbon, "An introduction", p.23-24.
Mustapha, "Multiple Modes of Social Livelihood", p,213-214.
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corporate demands of their respective constituencies, and with 
their pauperization in recent years they too may be solely 
concerned with the parochial interest of their members. In 
addition, the 'urban coalition' of workers and professionals 
may have conflicts of interest with rural producers over 
access and distribution of state resources, particularly with 
the current restructuring of price incentives under SAPs.“* 
However, contrary to the postulates of urban coalition 
analysts, the Nigerian case suggests that in struggling for 
their own narrow interests, urban social groups tend to 
articulate wider societal concerns and enter into broad 
coalitions and campaigns with other social groups. In the 
NLC'8 consistent opposition to the recurrent removal of oil 
'subsidies' and the country's intermittent fuel scarcity, they 
have drawn various social groups into national campaigns to 
protest against the government's SAP, which often provided a 
platform to enunciate broader popular grievances. For 
instance, in listing its demands to the government after the 
April 1988 fuel crisis, the ad-hoc trade union committee 
formed on the eve of negotiations demanded not only the 
restoration of previous petroleum prices and a review of 
government attitudes towards the NLC -- which was dissolved a 
month earlier--, but also called for the lifting of the ban on 
the ASUU and NANS. In addition, the committee demanded an 
immediate implementation of a SAP relief packages and measures
182 Bangura, "The Question of Democracy in Nigeria", p.49.
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to cushion vulnerable groups, urban and rural, from socio­
economic exigencies. In fact, the agitation of the so-called 
'urban coalition' is often only effective when linked to 
broader national concerns. For instance, the ASUU's 1988 
industrial dispute with the federal government was largely 
unsuccessful because union demands were concentrated on ' bread 
and butter issues'. Three years later, learning from the 
limitations of the 1988 agitation, the ASUU launched a more 
effective strike action which linked its corporate interests 
around issues of wage increases and job security to wider 
societal concerns over under-funding in the educational 
sector, academic freedom and university autonomy, and as a 
consequence gained the support of not just workers and 
students, but civil liberties and human rights NGOs and other 
democratic forces.
The penchant of neo-liberal analysts to employ rigid 
dichotomies in their analytical frameworks such as state-civil 
society, formal/informal sector and rural/urban with the 
complementary tendency to ascribe contrasting attributes to 
these juxtaposed realms, has often led to an over­
simplification of the complex dynamics of African social 
realities. The political interaction of social actors in the 
formal and informal economy, like that between urban and rural 
dwellers and their collective responses to material decline 
and state authoritarianism, is much more complex than neo­
liberal analysis projects. Without subscribing to the economy
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of affection thesis of Hyden and its deterministic reduction 
of social relations in the state and civil society to the 
affective ties rooted in a monolithic and 'uncaptured' 
'peasant mode of production' and the resultant view that the 
social and political orientation of urban social groups has 
remained rural, we are cognizant that the enduring strength of 
traditional group identities and the contact of urban and 
rural residences through familial and community obligations 
have tended to make urban popular groups acutely aware of the 
popular demands of rural society. Taking cognizance of rural 
concerns, Mkandawire has argued that in the post-colonial 
period, "demands of labour have had positive spill-over 
effects benefiting other social groups other than labour; free 
education and health care are classic examples". While 
workers and middle class stratums organize in unions and 
professional associations, they also are participants in 
ethnic, religious, and community-based organizations and are 
active contributors to rural self-help and micro-development 
projects. In the context of the crisis, urban actors and 
community organizations have become increasingly important in 
providing financial assistance, shelter, employment and 
educational opportunities, although with material decline, the 
ability of assistance varies particularly within and between 
social classes. Likewise material deterioration has
Mkandawire, "Democratic Face", p.309.
Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.23-24,
515
constrained collective initiatives to provide local 
constituencies with access to resources and social welfare 
provisions.
Similarly, organized social groups in the formal sector 
in Nigeria have made alliances with urban informal groups, in 
forging survival strategies to cope with the crisis, in 
agitation against increases in petroleum prices and in pro- 
democracy struggles. Bangura and Gibbon have observed that 
"informalization has a levelling effect on society, in terms 
of getting people of diverse backgrounds to experience each 
others' work situations and social practices."'"^ Popular and 
urban-based organizations, like WIN have promoted income - 
generation activities in both urban and rural areas, launched 
campaigns around a wide range of gender issues, politically 
and legally challenged retrogressive gender discriminatory 
policies of the now defunct state legislatures, usually with 
the support of market-women's association and women's groups, 
urban and rural. The examination in Chapter Three of the 
intensified democratic struggle in the wake of the June 12 
annulled elections, illuminated the active participation of 
urban informal groups in the coordination and execution of the 
civic campaigns to oust the Babangida dictatorship. Although 
to date, in pro-democracy struggles in Nigeria and most of 
Africa rural dwellers have remained on the margins of civil 
society, the CD and other democratic groups continue to give
Bangura and Gibbon, "An Introduction", p.23-24,
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expression to rural popular demands and have consistently 
sought to strengthen organizational capabilities in order to 
draw the rural populous and their organizations to the centre 
of on-going democratic campaigns. In light of the Nigerian and 
African evidence, Beckman is right to point out that by a 
'definitional trick', neo-liberal analysts rule out of civil 
society social groups, particularly urban popular ones, not 
supportive of their own social project.'®® In the neo-liberal 
intervention in defence of civil society against the predatory 
state, they have sought to delegitimize the popular grievances 
and opposition of urban social actors hardest hit by SAPs and 
likewise with the most advanced nationalist and welfarist 
consciousness, as part of the on-going effort to discredit the 
state as an agent of development and to prop up forces 
supportive of further market reforms.
Confronted by the neo-liberal onslaught, some radical 
democrats, while critical of the power of market forces to 
promote capital accumulation, economic growth, efficient and 
equitable allocation of resources and sustainable development, 
have acceded to the anti-statist logic of SAPs in the current 
retreat into civil society and the one-sided call for its 
strengthening, devoid of a discourse on the character of the 
state and the urgent need for its democratic transformation. 
Whether attributed to the general disillusionment with state 
and state-centric perspectives, the dismal developmental
Beckman, "Liberation of Civil Society".
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record of one- and no-party states in Africa, the emergence of 
pro-democracy movements throughout the continent and/or 
theoretical reflections on the anti-democratic ills of the 
former state socialism regime in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, radical democrats have apparently now come to 
appreciate the time-honoured respect in liberal democratic 
discourses for the autonomy and emboldening of the civic 
terrain necessary to guard against state encroachment and 
repression. Radical democrats have given credence to the 
conventional neo-liberal wisdom that democracy and development 
is best served by a minimalist and weakened state. Of course, 
radical analysts have a different agenda than their neo­
liberal counterparts in the call for the strengthening of 
civil society and state delimitation. The neo-liberal 
arguments in favour of a minimalist state, as we have alluded 
to, appear to be an admixture of the enduring liberal 
democratic assumption in which 'destatization' in the economy 
concomitantly fostered, "energized and transformed by liberal 
economic growth, demand[ed] and require[d] liberal 
politics", complemented by a recent managerial
perspective, which conversely links political reforms to the 
construction of political legitimacy for further market 
reforms. Chapter One detailed the classical liberal democratic 
discourses on state-civil society relations and the advocacy 
of the need to put limits on state power, which has informed
Diamond cited in Harach, "Democratic Movement", p. 10.
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the contemporary perspectives of the various neo-liberal 
schools of thought discussed in this chapter. Conventionally, 
neo-liberal8 argue that unlike the interventionist state, -- 
blamed for the inefficient allocation of resources, 
bureaucratic irrationality, corruption, nepotism, lack of 
transparency and accountability that precipitated the crisis - 
- a minimalist state attenuates ruling class factional 
conflict in the pursuit of state power, promotes the efficient 
use of scarce resources and encourages production all of which 
foster a material base more conducive for social and political 
stability and democracy. The managerial perspective is clearly 
exhibited in the World Bank's 1989 LTPS. As previously 
mentioned, this historical Report in which for the first time 
the Bank recognized that "underlying the litany of Africa's 
development problems is the crisis of governance,"”® noted 
also that "history suggest[ed] that political legitimacy and 
consensus are a precondition for sustainable development."”® 
For the Bank, Africa needs both less and better government. 
Departing from its usual technocratic approach to Africa's 
development problems, the Bank called for 'grassroots 
empowerment ', the pluralization of policy-making processes and 
a bottom-up and participatory approach to development. 
Furthermore, intermediate NGOs, grassroots institutions and a 
free and vigilant press were all identified as important
” ® World Bank, L T M . p.60, 
®̂® World Bank, Loa.cit.
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'civic watchdogs' to provide countervailing powers to keep the
state transparent and accountable. Beyond the rhetorical
attachment to the grassroots and civil society, Beckman argued
that the Bank's call for:
empowerment has more to do with releasing the presumably dormant 
and repressed entrepreneurial talents and energies of 'civil 
society' than with democratization. Similarly, accountability 
and the rule of law are related more to the development of an 
enabling environment for private investment than to the 
establishment of a democratic political order.
Moreover, the Bank's advocacy of state delimitation and the
strengthening of civil society seems to have "less to do with
checking power in the interest of democracy, than it has with
ensuring that resources are spread in certain directions."”'
The Bank's managerial perspective, which underscored the need
to build legitimacy for further market reforms, strongly
influenced the recent drive by Western governments toward
political conditionalities, as suggested in section one. But
whether in its quintessential liberal democratic form or in
the nuanced version of the World Bank and bilateral donors, in
the current historical conjuncture it has become a virtual
unassailable truth that market reforms and a minimalist state,
provide an enabling environment for the strengthening of civil
society, multiparty democracy, economic growth and
'sustainable development with equity'.
Beckman, "Empowerment or Repression?", p.67, Beckman provides an 
in depth and critical examination of the Bank's 1989 Long-Term Permneetiv# 
Study.
Graeme Bloch, "Lets Have Some Action: Action for Change-Revisiting 
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In contrast, radical analysts support the fortification 
of civil society, but expect it not to just provide an edifice 
against arbitrary and repressive state power but also to 
expand the political space in order to enable popular forces 
to better press for greater equality and social justice. It is 
this view that informs the apparent alliance between some 
radical and neo-liberal analysts in their support of liberal 
democracy. In his polemical work cited earlier, Ibrahim 
vehemently reminded radical African democrats, especially the 
'icons' -- deemed to be still waging an 'anti-liberal 
democracy' war -- that the struggle for liberal democracy is 
simply not a bourgeois project, but rather an integral part of 
the on-going campaigns for popular democracy. Drawing
lessons from the European historical experience, Ibrahim and 
others have pointed out that a liberal democratic framework 
enabled the European working classes and their socialist and 
Marxist allies to win the "right to free trade unions, 
independent labour parties funded by unions, the extension of 
the franchise to workers and women and the welfare State.
Additionally, radical democrats defend liberal democracy for
the democratic culture which this political framework
engenders, particularly in the promotion of a culture of 
tolerance, free debate and self criticism, which is also held 
to foster broad internal democracy within popular
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom".
Bargura, "The Question of Democracy in Nigeria", p.49.
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organizations in civil society, without which popular groups 
and struggles become dominated by self-serving cliques 
"arrogating to themselves the responsibility of deciding the 
level of participation and freedom to be enjoyed by the rest 
of society. While a liberal democracy is the preferred 
political framework to expand political space, democratic 
consolidation requires the strengthening of popular 
organizations and the autonomy of the civic terrain, which 
needs to be independent from the state and political parties 
in order to play the necessary democratic 'watchdog function' . 
Beckman has pointed out that while in recent years there has 
been a retreat from the historically held view of most radical 
democratic theories in which solutions to the crisis of 
underdevelopment were sought through the capture of state 
power, the new focus of radical democrats on civil society and 
the search for ways to influence state power from an organized 
popular base has not meant an abandonment of its quest, 
despite its remoteness, given the formidable objective and 
subjective constraints, domestically and globally.
The principal proposition set out in this thesis has been 
that democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Africa is not 
simply a question of strengthening the autonomy of the civic 
realm. Though crucial, the level of organization and autonomy 
of civil society and the manner in which popular forces are 
able to restructure the state (from local to national levels)
Bangura, "The Question of Democracy in Nigeria", p.49.
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and change the balance of power, politics, and production and 
exchange is critical for democratic renewal and consolidation. 
Without a doubt, the institutionalization of liberal democracy 
on the African political landscape would be a monumental 
achievement and an advancement over the despotic rule of the 
last three decades, in which civil society was repressed in 
the name of an unachieved material improvement, even if it can 
only compel the state and ruling classes to respect human 
rights and civil liberties. But in as much as the fragile 
transitions towards multiparty democracy in Africa, have 
enla’ ged welcomed political space, liberal democracy far from 
provides institutional expression of the aspirations of the 
popular social base that have fuelled pro-democracy movements. 
While popular struggles for democracy in Africa are currently 
manifest in demands for multiparties, civil liberties and the 
rule of law they are inextricably linked to the improvement of 
material conditions and the betterment of life chances. In 
this process popular forces must be instrumental in defining 
and creating the institutions that will ensure their 
participation and influence on the development process while 
maintaining the autonomy of the civic terrain.
Ibrahim, Bangura and others, are right to point out that 
historically, liberal democracy was not simply the product of 
class contestations between the nascent bourgeoisie and the 
landed feudal class, but its full consolidation was the result 
of trade union agitations for both the extension of the
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franchise and social democratic rights. Certainly, "were 
democratization dependent on the bourgeoisie as is generally 
asserted in liberal ideology, we would all still be discussing 
how much money and how much education defined a responsible 
citizen."^®® Likewise, the social democratic gains in Western 
capitalist countries in the last five decades would be far 
more limited even when compared in the context of the current 
roll backs. Therefore, historically, in the West liberal 
democracy not only provided a political framework to regulate 
the social conflict within ruling class factions emanating 
from the sphere of production and in civil society, but also 
between social classes, including the working classes. 
Nonetheless, we must be careful in equating the strengthening 
of civil society, popular participation and democracy in 
Africa and elsewhere with liberal democracy, the pitfalls of 
which are well known. Liberal democracy constitutes a limited 
form of democracy. Based on the ideological separation between 
abstract political and legal rights from concrete social and 
economic rights, liberal democracy while providing a formal 
judicial framework to protect civil liberties ?.nd check state 
excesses, disguises and ignores "the real relationship among 
the citizens in real societies, the inequalities, the 
relations of domination and subordination, and the social
9̂6 Chris Allen, Carolyn Bayliea and Morris Szeftel, "Editorial; 
Surviving Democracy?" in ROAPg. no.54, 1992, p.9.
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divisions and classes that exist in real life".”® It will 
not suffice for radical analysts to downplay this association 
in the emphasis on the presumed expansion of the democratic 
space liberal democracy proffers, its undisputable superiority 
over erstwhile dictatorships and its comparative advantage 
over authoritarian regimes in the promotion of economic growth 
and development. Likewise, the tendency of governance 
analysts, like other neo-liberals, to view the civic terrain 
as a sphere of competing individuals and groups, freely formed 
with equal political-legal rights and resources with which to 
'defend and promote their interests at the public realm', 
ignores the inequalities in wealth and power which mitigate 
against popular realization of these abstract rights.
In the Western consolidation of liberal democracy, which 
involved the historical processes of the socialization of 
politics, privatization of production and the 
bureaucratization of administration, several key social and 
economic institutional realms are absolved from the ethic of 
democracy.”' At the level of access, representation and 
control of political and bureaucratic structures, liberal 
democracy institutionalizes alienation rather than 
empowerment. First, access to the state and policy making 
processes is unequal between social classes and groups. 
Typically, in liberal democratic systems social groups seek to
Ampaw, "Political Liberalism", p.37.
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular PartAoipateicai, p.16.
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influence the decision making process through political and 
bureaucratic institutions in which access to the former is 
gained in regularized electoral competitions, while in the 
case of the latter political influence tends to be informal. 
Given existing unequal distribution of power and resources, 
access to political institutions through elections is usually 
the preserve of social groups and classes with the money and 
resources with which to influence and mobilize electoral 
support. Similarly, since access to decision-making processes 
in bureaucratic institutions tends to be informal, building 
contacts and networks to provide political access, requires 
the resources to lubricate these channels and often utilizes 
corrupt means. Secondly then, the representation of social 
forces in decision-making processes is also conditioned by the 
inequalities in civil society. In electing political 
representatives, ordinary people choose between candidates in 
whose candidature they had no say. Therefore rather than being 
decision-makers the majority of people choose between aspiring 
decision-makers. Democratic choice "already limited to options 
produced by an oligarchic party machine is rendered all the 
more meaningless by the increasing similarity of political 
parties caused by the delegitimization of fundamental criteria 
such as social class and asymmetrical power relations."̂ ®'-'
Post, "Some Theoretical laaues", p.45-46.
Claude Ake, "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa", Keynote 
Address at the symposium on Démocratie Transition in Africa, organized by the 
Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, University of
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While in elected office, a representative, even if he/she 
performs poorly, is largely exempt from the judgement of 
constituents whose democratic rights to institutionally 
express their displeasure, does not extend in any significant 
manner beyond voting in elections that may follow several 
years later.
Even if liberal democracy were as desirable as neo­
liberals and radical analysts now contend, it is unlikely to 
take roots under current African conditions. As we have 
discussed in the previous section, the 'proper' bourgeois 
constituency, anticipated in liberal democratic discourses to 
compel political reforms once liberated by market reforms has 
not arrived on the African political scene. To the contrary, 
the Nigerian case suggests that the macro-economic environment 
of the SAP, rather than fostering a national bourgeoisie which 
accumulates capital through production has contributed to the 
strengthening and reproduction of the lucrative but 
unproductive, commercial, speculative and corrupt practices of 
the dominant comprador elites. The state is still the primary 
locus of accumulation. In the unyielding intra-ruling class 
contestation to control the state and its resources, 
conditions are created unconducive to consensual politics. 
Historically, under these circumstances, factions may opt for 
authoritarian forms of governance. In addition, the middle 
classes, expected to also be supportive of democracy, have
Ibadan, 1992, p.2.
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been caught up in the daily rigors of survival, remain 
conservative and susceptible to supporting authoritarianism, 
although in recent years stratums have joined popular 
struggles for civil liberties, democracy and social justice. 
Examining the unique case of African democracy, Claude Ake has 
also noted that the sustainability and consolidation of 
liberal democracy is unlikely, given its predication on a 
socially atomized society in which interests are so 
particularized, conditions that do not exist in the African 
socio-economic and cultural c o n t e x t . I n  Africa, outside 
urban locales, primary group loyalties and pre-capitalist 
social structures remain strong. Thus, for Ake the 
conventional values and attitudes of individualism, 
competition and abstract universalism associated with liberal 
democracy, contradict the values of collectivity, cooperation 
and the concrete particular, emanating from rural Africa. Tn 
this regard, Ake has argued that the political arrangements of 
liberal democracy make little sense in Africa, and may be 
simply an exercise in alienation, since the "dominant paradigm 
of democratization is neither interested in what we are.,.our 
cultural and social experience... nor in the historicity of 
what it wants us to become.
Of course, our critique of liberal democracy its
200 Ake, "The Unique Case", p.243.
Claude Ake, "is Africa Democratizing?" in The Ouerdian. December 12, 
1993, p. A8. The 1993 Guardian Annual Lecture at the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs, Lagos.
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suitability and unlikely sustainability in contemporary 
Africa, in no way suggests that a meaningful democracy is 
undesirable, inappropriate or cannot take strong roots on the 
continent, nor does it ignore the need to delimit state power. 
It neither devalues civil liberties and the rights 
historically associated with liberalism or offers an apologia 
for dictatorships, as many analysts seem to infer from any 
critique of liberal democracy in the current historical 
conjuncture. Instead, it emphatically suggests that a stable 
and sustainable democracy in Africa must recognize the 
continent's historical experience, contemporary specificities, 
the interests of the popular social base underlying pro­
democracy movements and thereby the need to evolve structures 
and novel institutional forms that give expression to popular 
aspirations and their participation in the decisions and 
policies that affect their daily lives. Such a political 
framework in which popular forces dictate the content and 
direction of development will provide the environment to 
fulfil the popular desire for material improvement and the 
betterment of life-chances. Although it is entirely possible 
to erect the superstructural manifestations of liberal 
democracy -- parliaments, multiparties, elections -- if 
democracy in Africa is to overcome its historical urban and 
ruling class character in which constitutional safeguards were 
not nearly enough to prevent the abuse of limited civic and 
democratic rights, popular groups, urban and rural, must be
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centre stage in any meaningful and sustainable 
democratization.
It is in this context that Claude Ake's keynote address 
at the 1993 Annual Guardian Lecture lamented that in the 
discourses on democracy in Africa today, there has been a 
total indifference to the character of the state and its 
influence on the democratization process. He aptly observed 
that :
democratic elections are being held to determine who will 
exercise the powers of the state with no questions asked about 
the character of the state as if it has no implications for 
democracy. But its implications are so serious that elections in 
Africa give the voter only a choice between oppressors. This is 
hardly surprising since Africa largely retains the colonial 
state structure which is inherently anti-democratic, being the 
repressive apparatus of an occupying power, Uncannily, this 
structure has survived, reproduced and rejuvenated by the legacy 
of military and single-party rule. By all indications it is also 
surviving democratization, helped by the reduction of democracy 
to multiparty elections. So what is happening now by way of 
democratization is that self-appointed military or civilian 
dictators are being replaced by elected dictators. What is the 
point of choosing 'democratically' those who will control a 
state apparatus which is inherently undemocratic? The state must 
be transformed structurally before such elections can become a 
meaningful exercise in democracy,''^
Based on the evidence of newly elected regimes, Ake has strong
grounds for concern. The nascent multiparty systems have
neither increased or protected civil liberties nor promoted
the articulation of the interests of subordinate groups. The
enthronement of Western-style liberal democracy has not led to
any qualitative change in the political practises that
characterized predatory regimes of the past three decades.
Neo-liberal expectations that liberal democracy would
eliminate or at least reduce corruption, clientalism and
Ake, "Africa Democratizing", p.AT. emphasis mine.
530
intra-ruling class conflict, if not inter-class contestations, 
have not been borne out by the African evidence. Largely
failing to resolve intra- and inter class conflict, the new
democratic framework has also not institutionalized mechanisms 
to establish firm civilian control of the military. In the two 
celebrated democratic transitions in Africa, Benin and Zambia, 
multiparty politics have been plagued by corruption and
nepotism, mirroring the practices of their predecessors. As we 
elaborate on in the next section, the inability of the new 
state forms to regulate social tensions, particularly with the 
intensification of social struggle prompted by renewed 
government efforts to implement adjustment programmes, has 
increased state authoritarianism.
For example, in Benin, the initial euphoria and popular 
enthusiasm that followed the national conference and the
ensuing ouster of President Kerekou in multiparty elections 
held in March 1991, have dissipated in the three years of the 
new government headed by a former World Bank official, 
Nicephero Soglo. In its short tenure, the regime has been 
beset by factional conflict and widespread corruption. The 
chairman of the 1990 national conference. Bishop Isidore de 
Souza, noted that the extent of corruption of the Soglo 
government has far exceeded that of the previous 
dictatorship.^" Parliamentary politics have been marred by
Ernest Harach, "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State 
Corruption in Africa" in The Journal of Modern African Studies. vol.31, no.l, 
1993, p.47.
531
destructive contestation between rival cliques in which the 
historic tool of ethnic manipulation has been utilized in the 
conflict over scarce resources. President Soglo has been at 
the centre of allegations which accuse high ranking government 
officials of nepotism. Furthermore, efforts towards
institutionalizing civil liberties and providing 
constitutional checks and balances have been resisted by the 
government. Only as recently as June 1993 did the government 
institute a Constitutional Court to aid in this direction, 
after widespread and recurrent protests over the delays 
Political tensions and intensified social conflicts traversing 
the state and civil society have been exacerbated by the
inability of the new government to move towards restructuring 
the country's military institutions, which has left the
fledgling democracy susceptible to praetorian politics. Such 
vulnerability was played out in May 1992, when a suspected 
coup bid led by former members of Kerekou's presidential guard 
was foiled.^®® Also, popular protests against worsening
social-economic conditions under the SAP have been met with 
repression. In response to a student-led protest, the Soglo 
government quickly sent out the armed forces to quell the 
demonstration. In like manner, a conference on human rights 
organized by civic associations was banned by the government
Harach, “Democratic Movement", p.25.
anon. , "Benin: All Quiet on the Military Front" in African Quardiao, 
August 17, 1992, p.11.
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before it could be convened.
The Zambian experience has been similar. The 
international optimism which anticipated "Zambia...becoming a 
beacon of political li.herty"*'’® in Africa, has waned over the 
last three years. More importantly, the new government, the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which came to power - 
- in the electoral victory over the erstwhile one-party regime 
of Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP) in November 1991 -- with broad 
popular support and a strong commitment to transparency, 
accountability and social justice, has since lost credibility 
in civil society. Led by Frederick Chiluba, -- the former 
General Secretary of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions -- 
the MMD government has done little to transform the country's 
political structures. Anticipated legal and constitutional 
reforms to balance legislative and executive powers have been 
consistently delayed, and have consequently blurred the 
separation of governmental powers leading to the erosion of 
parliamentary autonomy. As a further result, the excessive 
presidential powers, allegations of patronage, corruption and 
drug trafficking that had characterized nearly three decades 
of one-party rule are increasingly being levelled against the 
Chiluba government. Cabinet appointments, according to Baylies 
and Szeftel "seem to reproduce the factional intrigue" of the 
Kaunda regime.*®’ Several cabinet ministers and members of
Richard Joseph, "Democratic Change", p.199.
Baylies and Szeftel, "Multi-Party Politics in Zambia", p.91.
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parliament have resigned or been dismissed after accusing the 
government of corruption, drug dealing and the obstruction of 
judicial and legislative responsibilities.^®” From March to 
May 1993 a state of emergency was declared by the Chiluba 
government, in the name of protecting the young democracy from 
a few "citizens who [were] bent on plunging the nation into 
chaos, Subsequently, several opposition politicians were 
arrested and detained without charge. The two independent 
media houses have been under consistent attack by the 
government. The police have retained wide-reaching powerr, 
banning demonstrations and executing criminal suspects without 
any recourse to a judicial process.^" Under such 
authoritarian conditions and deepening economic woes 
exacerbated by the implementation of the SAP, Zambians now 
question the government's commitment to civil liberties and 
democracy, with many beginning to remember the repressive 
years of the Kaunda-led UNIP regime with nostalgia.With 
the intensification of political and economic instability 
since the Zambian elections, rumours of coups and plots 
against government officials abound. Recently, an automobile
Melinda Ham, "An Outspoken Opposition" in Africa Report. November 
- December 1993,
Melinda Ham, "History Repeats Itself" in Africa Rapert. May - 
June, 1993, p.14.
Melinda Ham, "One Year On" in Africa RaPor_t. January -February,
1993, p.40,
Jowie Mwiinga, "Chill for Chiluba" in Africa Raport. March -
April, 1994, p.60.
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accident involving Levi Mwanawasa, vice-president of Zambia, 
implicated a top ranking military official -- General 
Miyanda.
Three years on, the Benin and Zambian 'democratic' 
experiences provide a sobering reflection on the high 
expectations of neo-liberals and to a lesser extent radical 
analysts and the assumptions that electoral competitions and 
the enthronement of liberal democracy would increase civil 
liberties and democratic rights and in turn create a stable 
environment for economic recovery and development. The 
anticipation by radical analysts that the opening up of 
constitutional space would allow popular forces to press for 
greater equality and social justice is also not supported by 
the recent African evidence. While radical analysts have 
rightfully paid increasing attention to the strengthening of 
popular organizations in civil society vis-a-vis the state -- 
after the apparent historical neglect of the need to delimit 
the state -- in the current retreat from questions of state 
power in the face of the neo-liberal onslaught, they have 
failed to relate the manner in which popular forces are to 
influence the state and the direction of development. Even in 
accepting liberal democratic frameworks, radical analysts have 
called on popular organizations to retain their independence 
from the state and political parties, in order to act as an 
effective civic 'watchdog', but have yet to proffer solutions
212 Baylies and Szeftel, "Multi-Party Politics In Zambia", p.90.
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to the issue of political mediation which is necessary to 
enable popular groups to articulate their interests at the 
state level. In spite of the historical limitations of 
political parties and their proclivity to coopt and colonize 
popular groups, some mechanism is required to give expression 
tu popular concerns and dictates at the state realm. The one­
sided focus on strengthening the autonomy of civil society 
while neglecting political mediation, leads to what Robert 
Fine has called 'anti-politics', as it disempowers popular 
forces and retains state power as the exclusive preserve of a 
small minority of the population.^" So, if not political 
parties, then some institutional mechanism is required to 
ensure popular participation beyond neo-liberal rhetoric of 
its attainment under liberal democracy. Certainly crucial for 
popular democracy, Chapter One illuminated the contribution of 
Wamba-dia-Wamba in this direction and his call for the 
rejuvenation of democratic institutions rooted in African 
traditions and historical experiences. While I agree with the 
need for civil society to remain autonomous in order to 
delimit and check state excesses, the key question is how 
popular groups in Africa can play a role both inside and 
outside the state in order to have a determining influence in 
the decision-making processes that effect their daily lives. 
The challenge of any meaningful democratization process is to 
build sustainable democratic institutions which ensure
Robert Fine, “Civil Society Theory".
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widespread popular participation, transparency and 
accountability, while retaining the autonomy of the civic 
terrain.
It is in this context that the current call in mainstream 
discourses for a minimalist state is misconceived for any 
meaningful democracy, even liberal democracy. Weak states tend 
to be predatory and undermine civil society, which serves 
neither democracy or development. A strong, democratic and 
autonomous state is crucial for the preservation of the 
integrity of political structures, dissuading corruption and 
clientalist relations, and curbing arbitrariness and predatory 
rule. Stadler has noted that the integrity of civil society 
depends on the integrity of the state. A strong and 
interventionist state is not simply to strengthen the 
institutional mechanisms that historically have safeguarded 
civil liberties and democratic rights under liberal 
democracies, but necessary to promote production, economic 
growth and the redistribution of resources required to give 
not only meaning to abstract democratic rights, but more 
importantly to truly empower popular forces.
Of course, this is in direct contravention to the neo­
liberal mechanistic association between a minimalist state in 
tandem with market reforms as the fundamental requisite for 
efficiency, rationality, economic growth, development and
Alf stadler, "A Strong State Civilisée Society; A Response to 
LouW in Work In Ptooraei. December 1992, p.34.
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democracy. Beyond the anti-statist logic of the current neo­
liberal offensive and the idolatry of market reforms, state 
intervention has always been an indispensable part of 
capitalist development. Non-radical and certainly radical 
analysts have for a long-time recognized the banality of the 
notion of the natural, spontaneous and inevitable birth of 
laissez-faire or unfettered market forces. In the liberal 
tradition, Karl Polanyi's examination of 18th and 19th century 
Britain in his seminal work The Great Transformation, clearly 
pointed out the extent of state intervention in the economy 
which was necessary for the removal of the barriers to 
capitalist development. Polanyi noted some time ago, that "the 
road to free markets was opened and kept open by an enormous 
increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
[state] interventionism. While neo-liberals prescribe a 
minimalist state in Africa and the Third World, the state in 
advanced capitalist countries remains interventionist, 
promoting and facilitating capital accumulation, regulating 
the market through legislation on cartels, managing money 
supplies, exchange and interest rates, interceding to provide 
some environmental protection, maintaining subventions on 
agricultural production and retaining subsidies on health 
care, housing, education and transportation -- albeit 
increasingly curtailed. Although, rolling back social
Karl Polanyi, Th# Oremt Tranaforaiationi Th# Political and Soonoaig
Origin» of Our Tim##. (Boston! Beacon Hill Press, 1944), p. 140,
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welfarism, the state has augmented the funding of its coercive 
arm, resisting cuts in military expenditures after the 'cold 
war' and raising police budgets in order to cope with the 
ungovernability and rising crime resulting from increasing 
poverty and social inequality. The US Clinton Administration 
initiative to pass a strong Crime Bill, in which the House of 
Representatives recent approved a US$30.2 billion crime 
package, with two-thirds of this budget earmaiked for 100,000 
more police officers and more prisons and border guards is a 
case in p o i n t . I n  other contexts, Sandbrook has noted that 
"whether in 19th century Russia or 20th century Japan, Taiwan, 
and South Korea...extensive government involvement [was] 
essential for achieving rapid economic growth."®^’ It is now 
recognized that the high rates of economic growth experienced 
by the East Asia NICs during the 1960s and 1970s and to a 
lesser extent in the 1980s, had more to do with the geo­
strategic interests in the region, the relatively higher 
levels of foreign aid, investment and greater market access in 
the West and indeed active state intervention, rather than the 
so-called 'miracle' of the market.
In the case of Africa, neo-liberals and radical analysts
Graham Fraser, "US Crime Bill Passes" in The Glob# end Mall. 
August 22, 1994, p.Al.
Richard Sandbrook, "Taming the African Leviathan" in World Policy 
Journal. vol.vii, no.4, 1990, p.681.
Harris, "The End of the Third World". See also Manfred Bienefeld, 
"Dependency Theory and the Poli tical Economy of the Africa Crisis" in R0Ag8, 
no.43, 1988.
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alike now accept that the state has been inefficient, over­
bloated, corrupt and largely unable to perform basic 
developmental tasks. Certainly, the extent of state ownership 
and control in the economy should be reduced. Yet, with the 
overwhelming evidence from Africa, that the 'freeing of market 
forces' has not led to greater efficiency and better economic 
performances, this should be enough to invalidate the call for 
a minimalist state. Sandbrook has aptly asserted that while 
Africa needs better government, it certainly does not require 
less government. According to him, a strong, democratic and 
interventionist state is required to:
mobilize domestic and foreign savings; identify potentially 
lucrative niches within the global market; orchestrate 
incentives to ensure that domestic firms play their assigned 
roles and have access to requisite factors of production; foster 
local mastery (rather than simply transfer) of modern 
technologies; and perhaps participate directly in strategic 
investment when high risks discourage private investors/"*
The question then does not simply revolve around the wholesale 
removal of state intervention in the economy, but rather the 
character and nature of the intervention. The transparency of 
the ideological construct of anti-statisra is particularly 
evident in that the "beneficiaries of neo-liberal state 
intervention are as profoundly dependent on state promotion 
and p r o t e c t i o n p r o s p e r i n g  through lucrative, but 
unproductive activities vis-a-vis access to the state.
In contrast, a strong and truly democratic state is
Sandbrook, “Taming", p.682.
Beckman, "The Liberation of Civil Society", p.30-31.
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required to make the productive interventions in the economy 
necessary to create the conditions for capital accumulation. 
Moreover, a transformed and democratic state must pursue a 
popular programme which gives people access to clean water, 
health care services, education and transportation, all of 
which ultimately contribute to economic growth and development 
and legitimizes and stabilizes the state, economy and polity. 
Development is not simply an economistic and technocratic 
project, but must be a function of democracy in form and 
design. This implies that the popular aspirations for
"democracy must be linked to development in a single
project... for as long as economic scarcity and poverty 
predominate there can be no meaningful democracy or
development. Therefore, ordinary people must be truly 
empowered by increasing their capacity individually and 
collectively, to have the power and control over their daily 
lives. Popular empowerment gives ordinary people "both
autonomy and freedom, particularly the freedom from domination 
and exploitation at the interpersonal, community and larger 
structural levels."”^
In addition, only a democratic state can resolve the 
national question, beyond simply creating new states or 
provinces and 'settling' the elites of disaffected ethnic
Ben Turok, "Democracy and Development" in Ben Turok ed., Debt and 
. (London: Institute for African Alternatives, 1991), p.111.
Akin Aina, "Empowering Environmental NGOs", p.140.
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minorities. The effort of the Africa state to placate regional 
and ethnic factions of the higher circles or to legislate or 
decree against the political expression of ethnic identities, 
have only served to keep the national question alive and has 
in fact sharpened ethnic c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . of course, the 
co-existence of multiple ethnic identities is not inherently 
antagonistic or inimical to democracy and national 
development. Historically, colonial penetration in Africa and 
the ensuing effort by the colonial state and capital to 
reproduce transnational domination, relied not only on 
coercion but on the manipulation of ethnic identities as well. 
In the period of decolonization, transnational capital 
institutionalized regional and ethnic divisions into the body 
politics in order to ensure their continued domination over 
the emerging independent states. In the post colonial period, 
the weak and generally unproductive ruling classes have 
reproduced the manipulation and politicization of ethnicity in 
the fierce contestation to reside over the state and its 
resources, such that ethnicity has fragmented civil society, 
been divisive in the pursuit of development and has militated 
against the evolution of a national identity. Only a genuine 
democratic project can resolve the enduring national question 
in Africa today. As Ake explains well:
Democratization does not constitute ethnicity as a problem. On
the contrary, democratization is a solution to some of the
Edwin Madunagu, "Questions on the National Question" in Tbt 
Guardian. March 4, 1993, p.13.
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problems which the manipulation of ethnicity has caused 
especially, the antipathies between ethnic groups, the violent 
intensity of political competition, caused by fear and ethnic 
domination, the dissolution of a political society into 
ethnicities and the failure to crystallize a national identity 
arising from the tendency to be loyal to the ethnic group rather 
than the state. Ethnic identities displace national identity for 
good reasons. The state in Africa is tendentiously uncaring and 
most ordinary people experience it as a hostile force. The 
ethnic group cares and delivers. A democratized state would be 
responsible to social needs, and thus reduce, if not eliminate 
the need to seek safety and support in the ethnic group. In a 
truly democratic society, state power would not be privatized 
and used to terrorize, exploit and oppress as is currently the 
case in most of Africa, Ethnic groups would not be so desperate 
about avoiding domination and the premium on power would not be 
BO high when there is the rule of law, equality of opportunity 
and equitable sharing of the kurdens and rewards of citizenship.
Those who are suggesting that democratization could unleash a 
prolific anarchy of ethnic conflicts are mistaken. 
Democratization is precisely the answer to the problems which we 
associate with ethnicity.
The recent examples of African countries (in which
liberalizing transitions in the context of a protracted
economic crisis led to civil war and internecine ethnic
conflict) highlighted above provide other glaring indications
that a weakened state does not necessarily serve to strengthen
civil society, nor increase the prospects for democracy or
development. Drawing lessons from the European experience,
Schmitz and Hutchful have similarly pointed out that in Europe
a strong civil society was a product of a strong state.
A strong state is crucial for the strengthening of civil
society democracy and development in Africa in the 1990s.
Bratton and Rothchild have recently noted "that perhaps
the time has come to acknowledge the values of liberal
democracy are spreading universally, especially among the
Ake, "Africa Democratising", p.A9.
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation.
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growing ranks of the educated middle classes in the developing 
world. These analysts are also encouraged that some 
prominent African intellectuals have now come to appreciate 
the core liberal democratic principles, and its overwhelming 
superiority over second-best forms of governance based on 
'authentic' African cultures. Bratton et al. point out that in 
any case, historically the appeals to 'primordial values' and 
a unique case of African democracy rooted in the continent's 
traditions were usually made by incumbent elites and despots 
or ambitious elites "who see particularism as a path to 
power. In a related argument, Larry Diamond also observed 
that increasingly African elites and middle classes are 
becoming much more receptive to democratic practices and 
values. But as "the liberal influence of Western culture 
further presses [the elites] in a democratic direction"^", 
he laments that unfortunately "this is counterbalanced by the 
lack of support for democracy among the alienated lower 
classes" who tend to be "largely illiterate and uneducated 
with little understanding and appreciation for...democratic 
structures."^* These analysts have advanced arguments 
reminiscent of the Eurocentric bias of modernization
Bratton and Rothchild, "The Institutional Bases", p.269, 
Bratton and Rothchild, "The Institutional Bases", p.269. 
Diamond, "The Roots of Failure", p.14.
Diamond, "The Roots of Failure", p.14,
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theory
It is true, as Bratton suggests that in the post-colonial 
period part of the ideological interpellation made by the 
continent's despots to legitimize predatory rule drew on the 
'appropriateness' anü 'authenticity' of the one-party state, 
deemed to be rooted in African cultures and traditions. But 
this in of itself, does not dismiss the need to tailor 
democracy to African specificities. A sustainable democratic 
project, must be rooted in the historical experiences and 
specificities of African countries, which recognizes the 
continent's material conditions, cultural context and reflects 
the vital interests of the social movements fuelling 
democratic campaigns. The resolutions of the 1990 UN and NGO 
sponsored conference on Popular Participation in Development 
and Transformation in Africa clearly recognized the need to 
incorporate positive elements of African traditions and 
cultures into the democratic project so as to ensure popular 
participation and self-reliant development from local to the 
national levels.The point here is not a retreat into an 
abstract romanticization of African tra- .tions and cultures as 
Bratton intimates and as others have strongly suggested, 
for as the historical record indicates "by its very nature, 
tradition, is a contested terrain, open to ambiguity and
Harsch, “Democratic Movement", p.21. 
Ibrahim, "Left Stardom".
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constant reinterpretavion and manipulation; the dialectic of 
despotism and popular accountability and participation."^” 
What is crucial is to concretely identify the empowering and 
democratic aspects in Africa's historical experience and 
traditions, and rejuvenate and incorporate them into the 
democratic project.
Democracy is not a once and for all phenomenon. Liberal 
democracy even if it is desirable cannot simply be 
'parachuted' onto African soil and be expected to take root. 
The grave error these analysts make is that they fail to 
distinguish between the principles of democracy which are 
arguably universal and the institutional arrangement of 
liberal democracy which was a product of a specific historical 
conjuncture in the West. A sustainable democracy in Africa 
will emerge from the social struggles of Africans, given its 
contours from their practical experiences and shaped by the 
vital interest of the popular social base. In this respect, 
African democracy will be an advance and autonomous 
contribution to the democratic experience not simply a 
replication of Western liberal d e m o c r a c y I n  light of the 
fact that liberal democracy took over three hundred years to 
consolidate and in recent years suffered serious roll backs to 
democratic rights, "Western democracy does not form some 
perfect or immutable model beyond which other countries cannot
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation, p.6. 
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation.
546
move. The homelessness, increasing unemployment, attack
on union rights, crime and despair in the contemporary
experiences of advanced capitalist democracies are stark
reminders that the political and social freedoms extended in
an earlier period are by no means irreversible.
We began the chapter with the dual inquiry into the
forces and factors fuelling the democracy movement and the
form and content of the democratic project for those whose
participation is most at stake. African experiences strongly
suggest that it has been precisely the ' largely uneducated and
illiterate lower classes' that Diamond laments lack a
democratic ethos that have been at the social base of the
drive for civic and democratic rights on the continent. While
the leadership of pro-democracy movements were by and large
middle class in composition, "the movements were truly
popular, and often the decisive initiatives towards action
came from the more plebian ranks. For popular forces,
democracy cannot simply mean holding...elections periodically 
whilst [they] continue to endure poverty, misery, illiteracy, 
hunger and poor health facilities and whilst many..able-bodied 
citizens are unable to find employment. We cannot divorce any 
discussion on the structures or process of government from the 
economic necessity of providing for the basic needs for 
society.
If popular forces have been the central defenders of democracy 
in contemporary Africa as I have argued in this exposition.
p.16,
Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Pertiolpatloa. p.16.
Harsch. "Democratic Movement", p.22.
Rawlings cited in Schmitz and Hutchful, Popular Participation,
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and the only hope for its enthronement and sustainability, the 
democratic project must give expression to these popular 
aspirations, The next section further explores the contours of 
articulated policy alternatives from below for democratic 
development in Africa in the 1990s.
SECTION THREE: BEYOND ADJUSTMENT: CONTINUING POLICY DEBATES 
ON AFRICA'S RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990s AND 
DEMOCRATIC AFRICAN ALTERNATIVES FROM BELOW
There is no longer any doubt, if there ever was, that 
African countries need to restructure their economies in order 
to recover from the protracted socio-economic downturn which 
has beset the continent for nearly two decades. Whether or not 
disagreements still exist as to the roots and dimensions of 
the African crisis, development analysts agree that strong 
policy measures must be undertaken by African governments to 
reduce inefficiency and waste, stimulate domestic savings and 
investment, catalyze production and reduce the continent's 
external dependency. What remains contested is the direction 
and design of economic recovery and development. However, in 
its 1989 LTPS. the World Bank was optimistic that a broad 
consensus had been reached on Africa's development needs for 
the 1990s. Claiming that the differences between the Bank and 
its critics, particularly the UNECA, had narrowed during the 
1980s, the LTPS noted that a "broad agreement exisc ted] on the 
gravity of the problems...and whatever the political vantage 
point, there is a broad understanding that... structural
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adjustment [programmes are] necessary, but [they] must be 
sustained -- without dogmatism"^^®, take greater account of 
their social impact and require good governance to create an 
enabling environment for further market reforms. Contending 
that certain problems persist, the World Bank consigns them to 
the technical level, where the issue of the time-frame of 
trade and exchange rate deregulations for instance, can be 
debated by technocrats. But according to the Bank, this in "no 
way diminish[es] the broad consensus on objectives, which is 
the starting point for working together.Apparently 
included in this consensus are African governments, bilateral 
and multilateral agencies, INGOs and NGOs who have been 
enjoined by the LTPS to form a new Global Coalition for Africa 
with the mandate to consult and make recommendations on a wide 
range of long-term development issues. According to the 
Report, such a forum would facilitate the consolidation of the 
emerging development compact on Africa, without "diminish[ing] 
Africa's right to determine what happens on the continent, 
[while]... respond[ing] to the concerns and insights of the 
external community. It also establishes a firm basis for 
"effective collaboration among the many partners in Africa's 
development"^! which ultimately seek the "high ground of
World Bank, LTPS. p.185, 189. 
World Bank, LTPS, p.185. 
World Bank, LTPS. p.194. 
World Bank, LTPS. p. 185.
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agreement and to move from words to deeds.
If there was ever any doubt about the fallacy of the 
Bank's declared 'broad consensus' on Africa's developmental 
needs, which ironically excluded domestic popular forces, it 
certainly became apparent in the move towards the formation 
the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) and even more obvious 
with the recent release of the new World Bank study on Sub- 
Saharan Africa titled Adjustment in Africa: Reforms. Results 
and the Road Ahead(1993) . In the recommendations for a GCA 
initiative, the imploring of African's to indigenize SAPs and 
in the complementary emphasis on the need for SAPs to go 
beyond orthodoxy and dogmatism to focus more closely on long­
term development objectives in Africa, the LTPS dodged the 
intellectual and popular contestations around the short-term 
socio-economic implications of SAPs and avoided confronting 
the nationalist and structuralist concerns of the Bank's 
c r i t i c s . B u t  right from the inauguration of the GCA, 
launched at the meeting of its Advisory Committee held in 
Paris in September 1991 -- which set out to act as a political 
forum to further the consensus building process around the two 
key issues for African recovery in the 1990s, market-led 
economic reforms and good governance, it was clear that rather 
than a move towards furthering the presumed broad 
developmental consensus, the direction of economic recovery
World Bank, LTP8, p.185,
Beckman, "Empowerment or Repression"
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remained hotly contested. With its launching coinciding with 
the Final Review of the UNPAAERD (1986-1990) -- the UN's
medium and long-term priority programme for Africa discussed 
in Chapter Two --in addition to the initial donor resistance 
to support a second UN African recovery programme for the 
1990s, the GCA initiative was viewed with suspicion and 
criticized by UN organizations, African NGOs and international 
and regional NGO networks. While many were concerned that the 
GCA would duplicate the UN's role as a forum for debates on 
Africa's development priorities, the principal criticism 
centred on the degree of representation within the new group, 
the lack of UN and NGO participation in the formation of its 
structures and defining of its programmes, its independence 
from the UN and the resultant lack of accountability, as well 
as the GCA's close association with Washington based 
international finance institutions.^* Commenting on the 
launching of the GCA, Carol Capps of the Church World Service, 
asserted that the GCA could be "little more than a front for 
the pursuit of World Bank policies in Africa."^*® A briefing 
paper by the NGO committee of UNPAAERD asked:
why [is] the OCA. . .an organ independent from the UN or OAU[?I ... 
of particular concern for NGOs is the prospect that the 
responsibility for coordinating and monitoring programmes for 
Africa will be taken over by an agency so closely associated 
with the World Bank, which has spearheaded the austerity 
programmes that have caused so much havoc on the African
anon., "Global Coalition for Africa Sets Out its Agenda" in Africa 
Recovery. December 1991, p.16.
Carol Capps cited in anon., "NGOs Launch Grassroots Agenda" in 
Africa Recovery, December 1991, p.28.
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continent. UN agencies like UNICEF and the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa have at least provided a differing and 
often opposing perspective on the effects of SAPs. Removing 
Africa from the agenda of the UN will virtually guarantee 
ideological supremacy of the World Bank's vision of development 
in Africa. NGOs view the GCA as yet another mechanism imposed on 
Africa by the World Bank and donor agencies.^**
Judging form the responses of the US, the World Bank and other 
donor delegations to the UN's Final Review of UNPAAERD and the 
ensuing negotiations which led to the launching of the UN New 
Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UNNADAF) in 
December 1991, NGOs and others had strong grounds for concern. 
Far from a consensus on Africa's development priorities in the 
1990s, deliberations surrounding the Final Review and the new 
UN African programme pitted donor agencies against the UN 
system, African NGOs and INGOs, especially in debates centred 
on debt relief and the socio-economic performance of SAPs.
With the UNPAAERD "̂"' widely judged by the UN system, 
donors and NGOs to have failed to meet its immediate 
objectives towards resuscitating Africa's stagnating economies 
and the medium-term aim to diversify the continent's 
monocultural production base, the then UN Secretary General, 
Javier Perez de Cuellar's Report and Appraisal at the Final 
Review, particularly highlighted the hostile international 
division of labour which hampered the attainment of the goals 
set out in the UN's Africa programme and emphasized the need
NGO Committee of UNPAAERD, "A Briefing Paper: NGOa Express Grave 
Doubts About Global Coalition for Africa", New York, September 6, 1991, p.l- 
2 .
See Salim Lome et al., Special section devoted to the Final Review 
of UNPAAERD in Africa Recover*, vol.5, no.2-3, 1991.
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for any future UN initiative to comprehensively tackle issues 
of debt relief, commodity prices and development assistance to 
the continent. Noting that as a result of the precipitous 
decline in commodity prices Africa lost well over US$50 
billion between 1986 and 1990 and became increasingly indebted 
by the end of the UNPAAERD period, the Secretary-General's 
Report pointedly asserted that "it is simply not possible for 
African countries to develop under an existing debt burden 
exceeding $270 billion, [since] the servicing of that debt 
alone consumes over 30 percent of total exports, with the 
average loss nearing $21 billion per annum."**® Towards 
tackling Africa's mounting debt problems, the Report 
recommended that any UN Plan for the continent in the 1990s 
must embody exceptional debt relief measures which inter alia 
included the cancellation of official bilateral debt, the 
significant discounting of private/commercial debt 
complemented by supporting initiatives such as debt equity 
swaps and debt for environment schemes. In particular, the 
Report recommended that Africa's multilateral debt 
obligations, consisting of 40% of the continent's debt profile 
should be substantially reduced. These far-reaching debt 
relief measures advocated by the Secretary-General were met 
with significant opposition form the US, the World Bank and
**® Cited in the 1991 Report of the U.N. Secreterv General: Prepared 
for the Session of the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Whole of the UN General 
Assembly at the Final Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the 
Onitad Nations at Action fcr African Recovrv and Development 1986-
1990. September 3-13, 1991.
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Other donor communities and subsequently diluted in the final 
policy prescriptions of the UNNADAF. Consequently, where the 
Secretary-General recommended the outright cancellation of 
official bilateral debt, the UNNADAF simply included the 
option to reduce such debt. Where the significant discounting 
of private/commercial debt was strongly encouraged by the 
Secretary-General, the UNNADAF eliminated references that even 
implied donor governments should take steps to reduce private 
debts. And, where the Secretary-General's Report vehemently 
called for the substantial reduction of multilateral debt, the 
UNNADAF suggested serious considerations be given to reducing 
Africa's multilateral debt. Rather than reflecting a broad 
consensus instead, on the issue debt relief the UNNADAF 
proposed a donor favoured compromise, which emphasized the 
orthodoxy of "a growth-oriented solution to the problems of 
African developing countries with serious debt servicing 
problems, including those whose debt is mainly to official 
creditors or to multilateral institutions."^* Though the US, 
World bank and other donors had unsuccessfully campaigned to 
place any follow-up initiatives for Africa in the 1990s under 
the ambit of the GCA so as to abscond from the responsibility 
and accountability of the UN, multilateral and bilateral 
donors left a strong imprint on the new UN African Agenda for 
the 1990s. Yet much like the UNPAAERD which failed to gain the
Salim Lome, "New Africa Agenda Adopted at the UN" in Africa 
Recovery, vol.5, no.4, 1991, p.21.
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development assistance projected for the programme period, 
with the UNNADAF heavily dependent on ODA in the context of an 
increasingly competitive environment for resource flows since 
the opening up of Eastern Europe, it is unlikely that donors 
will support programmes not directly replicated in their own 
image.
The on-going debates on if and how well structural 
adjustment programmes are working in Africa which was 
revisited during the negotiations around the UNNADAF is 
indicative of donor hostility towards opposition to liberal 
market reforms. The debate was sparked by the resounding 
criticism made by the NGO Committee of UNPAAERD of the 
disastrous implication of SAPs in Africa. In the report 
presented by Charles Kareraano, a Rwandan NGO activist, the NGO 
committee strongly argued that contrary to the assertions of 
the IFIs, "there are no examples where SAPs have improved the 
lives of ordinary people...[instead] the macro-economic 
policies imposed upon the people of Africa have resulted in 
economic stagnation, increasing poverty and death.
The Secretary-General's Report made a similar observation 
that the socio-economic decline in Africa has continued 
unabated in the UNPAAERD period, during which most countries 
have adopted short-term stabilization measures under the
cited in the Statement to the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Whole on the 
Pinal Review and Appraisal of the Pnlted Metione of Action for
African Keonomic Recovery and Development. delivered by Charles Karemano on 
behalf of the NGO Committee of OMPAAgRP. September 4, 1991.
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auspices of the World Bank and IMF, but was tentative in 
making any direct associations between SAPs and the increasing 
impoverishment on the continent.
The donor communities were quick to posit in opposition 
to the mounting criticism against SAPs that adjustment 
programmes were in fact working to revive economic growth. 
Scott Spangler the then Assistant Administrator of the Africa 
Bureau of the USAID pointed out that if the assessment of SAPs 
were disaggregated between 'non-adjusting' and 'adjusting' 
countries it would become clear that African countries 
instituting market reforms exhibited measurable economic 
gains, but the "poor performance of non-adjusting countries 
offset the gains by reforming countries, causing the 
continent-wide figures to be negative."^' Drawing the same 
causality between adjusting and non-adjusting African 
countries, the World Bank's Vice-President for Africa, Edward 
Jaycox, was even more encouraged by SAPs, noting that while in 
the main "evidence is growing that economic reforms are taking 
effect and with every passing day there are signs of 
improvement""^, some adjusting African countries had in fact 
accomplished 'economic miracles'
Scott Spangler cited in the excerpts from the speeches of the 
Pinal Review of UMPAABRD. see anon., "UNPAAERD Speeches Debate Issues of 
Debt, Governance and Aid Plows" in Africa Recovery, vol. 5, no. 4, 1991, p. 25.
Edward Jaycox, cited in anon., "UNPAAERD Speeches", p.27,
Edward Jaycox cited in anon., "How Well is Adjustment Working?" in 
Africa Recovery, vol.5, no.4, 1991, p.20.
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Of course, these international debates on the performance 
of SAPs in Africa are not new. Since the mid-1980s the World 
Bank and IMF have repeatedly praised the presumed success 
stories of adjusting countries in Africa, though later taken 
to task by the EGA on Lheir empirical findings. Chapter Two 
detailed this now infamous debate between the Bank and the EGA 
stemming from a 1989 World Bank Study titled, Africa's
Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s. In this study the Bank 
marshalled data to prove that 'strong adjusters' in the 1980s 
attained compara ively better growth rates over 'weak' and 
'non-adjusting' African countries, but was strongly rebuked by 
the EGA who challenged the inconsistencies in the statistical 
techniques of the Report and produced a preliminary assessment 
which suggested that growth rates in the respective categories 
did not signifiv .ntly vary. In part stemming from the 
acrimonious exchange between the Bank and EGA, the 198 9 LTPS 
released less than six months later tempered the triumphant 
pronouncements of its preceding study, such that it even 
acknowledged that the rates of success of SAPs in Africa had 
not been very impressive.
What is of particular interest in the renewed
contestation surrounding SAPs that surfaced in the 
deliberations of the Final Review of UNPAAERD is the World 
Bank's retreat from the humbler tone of the LTPS. with regards
not only to its tempered assessment of the economic
Browne, "The Continuing", p.33.
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performance of SAPs, but additionally, the apparent withdrawal 
from the rhetoric of human-centred development, empowerment, 
grassroots participation and indeed an increasing move towards 
an abandonment of the fictitious veneer of a broad consensus 
on Africa's development that it sought to construct in the 
LTPS. This can in part be attributed to the changing global 
economy in which Africa has become increasingly marginalized 
both economically and geo-strategically after the cold war. 
With the collapse of Eastern Europe and the redirection of 
trade, investment and aid towards the former Second World, all 
occurring in tandem with Africa's persisting debt peonage and 
growing international insignificance, it would appear that the 
Bank does not feel compelled to even superficially address the 
concerns of its critics in order to sustain its adjustment 
project as it had in the LTPS.
It is in this context that Adjustment in Africa (1993), 
the Bank's latest and controversial contribution to the 
discourses surrounding market-led economic recovery, extols 
the successes of adjustment contrary to the substantial body 
of empirical studies on SAPs in Africa, marking a significant 
departure from the 1989 LTPS which had sought to placate the 
Bank's critics and was also less optimistic about the macro- 
economic record of SAPs. Adjustment in Africa is much more 
imperial in tone, and while slightly less forceful than the 
orthodox position of the 1981 World Bank Berg Report, it is 
closer to the 1981 Report in the technocratic and economistic
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interpretation of the crisis and the prescriptive remedies, 
leaving behind its apparent appreciation of the political 
dimension of economic reform in the LTPS. The 1993 Report 
ignores the human-centred, participatory and long-term 
structural transformative approach of the UNECA initiated 
alternative recovery programmes for Africa embodied in the 
1989 AAF-SAP and the 1990 African Charter. It also neglects 
the strong condemnation of the disastrous short-term socio­
economic impact of SAPs on vulnerable groups made by domestic 
popular organizations, NGOs, UNECA, UNICEF and the ILO among 
others. Thus, the myth of a development consensus on Africa's 
recovery and development in the 1990s the Bank sought to 
conjure in the LTPS became quite evident.
Reminiscent of the four successive World Bank studies 
since the late 1980s comparing the growth rates of strong, 
weak and non-adjusting countries, the 1993 Report also 
provides a comparative assessment of 29 African countries and 
concluded unequivocally that "in the African countries that 
have undertaken and sustained major policy reforms, adjustment 
is working. In contrast, the precipitous decline in 
material conditions or marginal economic improvements of the 
majority of African countries studied is attributed to their 
failure to adjust rather than a failure of adjustment. Of the 
26 countries closely examined, six, which included Ghana, 
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Tanzania, The Gambia and Zimbabwe were
World Bank, Adiugtment in Mrlo«. p.l.
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distinguished as the most improved in instituting market 
reforms in the periods of 1981-1906 and 1987-1991, and as a 
result showed a marked revival in macro-economic indicators. 
The Report found that in these periods, the countries with 
'large improvements' in macro-economic policies had attained 
a median change in average annual GDP per capita growth of 
1.8% in comparison to 1.5% for countries with 'small 
improvements' in macro-economic policies and -2.6% for 
countries with 'deterioration' in macroeconomic policies. 
Similarly, the median change in average annual growth rate in 
exports were 7.9%, 3.0% and -0.7%, in industry 6.1%, 2.8% and 
1.7% while in agriculture, -0.2%, 0.3% and -0.1%,
respectively.^®® Beyond the colourful bar graphs and numerous 
charts used to demonstrate that SAPs are working and need to 
be sustained, the study is fraught with statistical 
inconsistencies in the assessment of agricultural and 
industrial production, rural incomes as well as in the affect 
of trade liberalization on African economies to name a few, 
and has been widely criticized by the UN, African NGOs and 
INGOs. Commenting on Adjustment in Africa, a
representative of Oxfam-UK described the ;.ew World Bank Report 
as "a blend of half-truths, oversimplifications and
World Bank, Adjustment in Africa, p.s.
Roy Laishley, "World Bank Says Adjustment Works" in Afrlo# 
Racovmrv. vol.7, no.3-4, 1994.
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institutional propaganda."^®* Two aspects of the Bank's 
controversial study, namely its assessment of the impact of 
SAPs on the poor and the political sustainability of 
adjustment are of particular interest here and require further 
detail.
In the riposte to the growing academic and policy 
consensus on the urgent need to humanize adjustment 
popularized by UNICEF's two volume study on SAPs, the 1993 
Report not only failed to systematically examine the social 
impact of SAPs, but boldly declared that the "majority of the 
poor are probably better off and almost certainly no worse 
Qff,i2E9 under SAPs. The Report further stated that "faster 
growth in all likelihood reduced the deterioration in the 
conditions of the poor" such that "there is every reason to 
think that [the SAP] has helped the poor. . . [and in fact] often 
the poor would have benefited from more adjustment, not 
less. "2** In a Report the Bank called the 'most 
comprehensive' to date, there is a striking paucity of data on 
the relationship between SAPs and poverty-alleviation and the 
largely unsubstantiated conclusions are veiled in ambiguous 
language. Yet after making such claims, the Bank of its own
Salim Lome, "Adjustment Report Skirts Questions of Poverty, 
Sustainability" in Africa Recovery. vol.7, no.3-4, December 1993-March 1994, 
p.18. See also section on "Some Questionable Interpretations" p.47.
World Bank, Adimtmtnt in Africa, p.165, 167.
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accord admits that there is no concrete supportive 
evidence,although empirical studies substantiating the 
adverse consequence of SAPs on the poor abound.
In constructing the case for SAPs' presumed attenuation 
of poverty, the Bank's study borrows from the 'urban 
coalition' thesis to legitimize the hard-hitting affect of 
adjustment on urban social groups. In a number of insidious 
statements given widespread acknowledgment in academic and 
policy-making circles which asserted that workers and other 
urban groups have unequally borne the burden of SAPs, as well 
as the prolific outbreak of popular protests against SAPs over 
the past decade, the Bank's report argued that though 
"government feared that the reduction in public employment 
would lead to major civic unrest and increase the number of 
poor people. . . [such] fears have not been realized to any great 
degree Similarly, the Report asserted that "the
likelihood is strong that comprehensive adjustment programs 
have arrested significant deterioration in the incomes of 
workers. The Bank attributed the presumed low level of
urban poverty to the costly and inefficient compensation 
packages and job-retraining progiammes adopted by governments 
to cushion workers from wage restructuring. Moreover, the 
Report surmised that workers have adopted alternative income-
World Bank, Ad-luataant in Afrtc», p. 164.
World Bank, Ad4u#tm*nt in Afrioa, p.170,
World Bank, Adiuitmant in AfriOA, p.209.
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generation activities in the rural and/or informal sector such 
that the majority of workers are now earning at least as much 
as before leaving the public sector.Again, the Bank does 
not bother to substantiate its claims to any degree, largely 
basing its assertions on the abstract deduction of the urban 
bias theory in which a small parasitic urban coalition --of 
which workers are an integral part -- are blamed for post­
colonial development failures and the exploitation and 
pauperization of Africa's 'silent majority' in the 
countryside. The Report serves to legitimize the restructuring 
of price incentives under neo-liberal market reforms and its 
disastrous consequences on the urban social forces while also 
side-tracking urban popular opposition to SAPs.
But likewise the Bank's proposition "that key 
reforms...[which] include the reduction in disincentives to 
the production of tradeable goods, as well as other agrarian 
reforms such as liberalizing markets... are likely to have 
helped the rural poor,"*®® is also based on a neo-liberal 
abstract deduction, unrelated to current African realities. 
The Nigerian case strongly suggests that the neo-liberal 
assumptions in which trade and exchange deregulation would 
increase agrarian production and rural incomes have not 
materialized. While it is true that in the initial stages of 
economic reform both agrarian production and incomes rose for
*®® World Bank, Adiu»tm»nt in Afric». p.170. 
*®® World Bank, Ad4u#tm*nt in Afgiea, p.165.
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certain food and export crops, once devaluation induced an 
inflationary spiral in the Nigerian economy productive gains 
diminished due to higher costs of inputs and services, 
contributing to and erosion of any gains in real rural 
incomes. The deterioration of the material conditions of rural 
producers was also aggravated by the removal of subventions on 
fertilizers, transportation and storage facilitates all of 
which further served to increase production costs. 
Additionally, despite government claims to ease the access to 
formal sector credit for rural producers, most small- and 
medium-scale farmers have been unable to acquire loans to 
increase agrarian productivity.
Our study further suggests that the abolition of 
monopolistic state marketing boards, generally did not benefit 
rural producers since the retreating state managers were 
quickly replaced by private merchants entering the vacated 
regulatory space to now expropriate surplus value from medium 
and small-scale rural producers. In the case of export 
commodity producers the unfavourable international global 
economy, in which protectionism in the West, declining global 
demand for agricultural commodities and productivity gains in 
other adjusting Third World countries have all conspired to 
exert downward pressures on the international prices of export 
commodities -- the so-called 'adding up problem' or the 
'fallacy of composition' -- such that $US 50 billion in 
potential African export earnings was lost between 1986 and
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1990. Contrary to the conclusions of the Bank's Report, the 
combined effect of devaluation, subsidy removals, tight credit 
policies, and unfavourable market conditions for export 
producers have led to the deterioration of the living 
conditions of small- and medium-scale farmers who were 
expected to benefit from the deregulation of trade and 
exchange rates.
Given the Bank's conclusion that SAPs are helping the 
poor it is not surprising that it has retreated from the 
earlier advocacy of the need to take greater account of the 
socio-economic exigencies of economic reforms on the poor. 
While taking cognizance of the agitation to protect vulnerable 
groups and conceding that "poverty reduction was not an 
explicit central objective of early adjustment programs"^®®, 
the 1993 Report distances itself from the support of 'socially 
conscious' programmes to mitigate the social costs cf 
adjustment. Rather than seeking to improve upon the current 
limitations of such social packages -- eg. their lack of 
consistency and funding, poor grafting onto SAPs and poor 
implementation -- the Bank now prefers an ad-hoc and selective 
approach in the provisioning of a basic social net for the 
poor. Though such programmes never questioned the model of 
accumulation and basically were supported by the Bank to 
prevent social protests in order to sustain neo-liberal market 
reforms, the Bank appears to believe that the provision of a
World Bank, Adju«tm#nt in Africa, p.171.
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comprehensive social-safety net for the poor amounts to a 
'buying off' of politically powerful 'losers' under adjustment 
which may ultimately undermine the overall goals of the market 
reform.^"
But in perhaps the most contradictory and absurd segment 
of the 1993 Report, the Bank draws conclusions from Ghana, its 
vaunted 'success story' touted over the past decade as a model 
for African development, that even at its current annual GDP 
growth rate of 5% per year the average poor Ghanaian will not 
cross the poverty-line until the year 2044 -- another 50 
y e a r s . H o w  this assertion bodes for the raiaon d'etre of 
the 1993 Report which seeks to unequivocally prove that 
adjusting countries have seen a marked improvement in economic 
performances and poverty reduction such that the 'road ahead' 
for Africa lies with further market-led reforms necessary for 
economic recovery, poverty amelioration and development is not 
quite clear. While in the interval the Bank callously resigns 
two generations of Africans to impoverishment in the 
anticipation that further retrenchment, cut backs in health 
care and education, increased user fees and the attendant rise 
in poverty, malnutrition, diseases and death will ultimately 
improve the living conditions of the yet unborn. In a recent 
statement from an unlikely source commenting on the process of 
market reforms in the former Soviet Union but directly
World Bank, Adiu>tm<nt in Africa, p.218. 
World Bank, A<Huat»<ttt in Africa, p.40-41.
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applicable to Africa, Malcolm Forbes, editor-in-chief of 
Forbes magazine aptly stated,
...they [the poor) do not need more mindless austerity. Some 
Western Agencies seem to suggest that the poorer you get, the 
better off you will be, because it will build character. The 
idea that we have to wait a couple of generations before 
countries can get truly on their feet is absolute nonsense. You 
do not make an economy healthy by making the people within it 
poor.
With the mounting criticism, in a presentation to the US 
Senate, Douglas Hellinger of the Development Group for 
Alternative Policies asserted that the 1993 World Bank Report 
is a "deceptive...and an insensitive attempt to dismiss the 
realities and suffering of the poor with self-serving 
assumptions."*’” Certainly, subordinate classes and their 
organizations will not be satisfied with today's pains for 
such an uncertain World Bank guided 'road ahead' in which the 
majority are unlikely to survive to enjoy the benefits of.
Domestic contestations abound on the direction and 
designs of African recovery and development in the 1990s. 
Thomas Callaghy has recently noted that critics of structural 
adjustment programmes, both inside and outside Africa, do not 
have a viable alternative to the orthodoxy or the neo­
orthodoxy.*” Of course, this is not entirely true. From the 
Laoos Plan of Action to the African Charter for Popular
Malcolm Forbes cited in anon., "An Unhappy 50th Birthday" in Waat 
Africa, July 25-31, 1994, p.1303,
Lome, "Adjustment Report Skirts Questions of Poverty", p.18.
Thomas Callaghy, "Africa: Falling Off the Map?" in Currant 
Hiatorv. January 1994.
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Participation there have been no shortage of African 
alternatives to the crisis. In the hegemonic drive toward the 
consolidation of the neo-liberal project the proponents of 
SAPs have sought to delegitimize African policy alternatives 
to the crisis, based on the notion that in spite of the 
limitations of market reforms the on-going adjustment exercise 
is more likely to instigate economic recovery and development 
than the 'second-rate' African solutions. Bangura and Beckman 
have noted that neo-liberal attempts to challenge the 
legitimacy of the opposition to SAP, by citing a failure on 
behalf of the opposition to offer a viable alternative, "must 
be exposed for what [they are],...attempt[si to enforce 
submission by way of psychological warfare. The problem 
then is not a lack of viable alternatives outside the ambit of 
the IFIs, but the political and structural constraints that 
prevent their implementation.
Despite the World Bank's reversion to a technocratic 
treatment of the African crisis, outside the IFIs there is 
growing consensus that African countries must democratize 
their societies, increase popular participation and open 
debate and dialogue in order to provide a stable political 
framework for economic recovery and development in the 1990s. 
The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's First Report 
on UNNADAF pointedly noted that "development is a political 
undertaking, as well as an economic undertaking...development
272 Bangura and Beckman, "African Workers", p.91.
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strategies that fail to take the political dimension of 
development into account, are certain to fail."^’̂ The 
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and 
Transformation adopted by UNECA and over 500 African NGOs 
expressed all too well that the crisis that has deepened on 
the African continent in the last decade is not simply an 
economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and social 
crisis. In this regard, its condemnation of SAPs stemmed from 
both the disastrous socio-economic consequences of the 
programme for already marginalized groups, in addition to its 
neglect of the indispensable role of popular participation for 
long-term self-reliance and self-sustained development. 
According to the Charter;
...nations cannot be built without popular support and full 
participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be 
resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without 
the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular 
enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people. After all, it is 
to the people that the very benefits of development should and 
must accrue. We are convinced that neither can Africa's 
perpetual economic crisis be overcome, nor can a bright future 
for Africa and its people see the light of day unless the 
structures, pattern and political context of the process of 
socio-economic development are appropriately altered.” *
Therefore, in the African Charter popular participation is not
simply resigned to regularized voting in elections but rather
ordinary people must be involved in the development process,
from the conceptualization of strategies and policies to the
formulation, implementation and monitoring of prescriptions.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Mobilizing Support For Africa" in Africa 
Raeovrv: Update on New Agenda for Africa, December 1993, p.3.
274 EGA, African Chart#;, p.7.
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Such an encompassing scope of participation, will ultimately 
lead to the mobilization of the population in the development
process in which people evenly accept the pains of recovery
and share equitably in the benefits of development. The 
Charter complements the EGA's African Alternative Framework to 
Structural Adjustment Programme(AAF-SAP) and the document's 
principal focus on the structural roots of Africa's economic 
crisis, which AAF-SAP noted requires policy remedies not 
simply aimed at short-term 'adjustment' but towards the long­
term 'structural transformation' of African economies.
Halfani has accurately observed that the old saying that 
Africa consumes what it does not produce and produces what it 
does not consume is not simply a cliche, since a dependent
society is a powerless society.^’® Some thirty years after
political independence, African economies are still 
essentially colonial economies and so long as they are not 
restructured, democratic development will continue to be 
hindered. Any alternative programme must give serious policy 
priority to reducing Africa's structural dependency, via an 
increase in the level of productive forces, a reorientation 
and enhancement of domestic linkages between sectors of the 
economy, the utilization and expansion of the local resource 
base, and the diversification of production in the first 
instance to meet basic needs domestically. Popular groups in
M, Halfani, "Constraints on Empowerment" in R.Sandbrook and M. 
Halfani eds., Bnpowring Paoala, 1993.
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Nigeria and throughout Africa have long articulated 
alternative programmes to SAPs, calling for a restructuring of 
the state under popular democratic control, especially the 
military, police force and judiciary in order to accommodate 
and fulfil development goals. Novel ways must also be created 
to link the state to civil society while retaining the 
autonomy of the civic realm. Furthermore, a democratic state 
will reduce the premium on state power and consequently curb 
corruption, inflated contracts and other practices that have 
drained public coffers for the last thirty years. The 
alternative programmes will, of course, require considerable 
state intervention in the economy, but in many areas such as 
the electronic and print media, for instance, the state must 
retreat and leave ownership to the private sector. However, 
the state must be active in promoting and expanding 
employment, and the provision of essential services like 
health care, education and transportation. Productive 
increases cannot be expected to occur when the majority of the 
population is reduced to squalor, with little access to social 
safety nets. Agrarian producers must be ensured a minimum 
income in order to have any incentive to increase 
productivity. Resources must be mobilized internally and 
scarce foreign exchange conserved. Military expenditures 
should be significantly curtailed. A comprehensive taxation 
system must be instituted, taxing the rich and adopting 
measures to prevent evasion. Unnecessary external commitments
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of African governments such as the number of embassies must 
also be significantly curtailed and perks for government 
officials eliminated.
The exchange rate must be revalued and export earnings 
centralized and reallocated by the Central Banks to eliminate 
the anarchic exchange auctioning system which has only served 
to fuel speculative activities in the adjustment period. 
Privileged access to foreign exchange must be given to the 
agrarian and industrial sectors but efforts must be made to 
increase sectoral linkages and reduce the dependency on 
foreign inputs. Therefore, emphasis must also be placed on 
investment in a capital goods sector. Interest rates must be 
reduced in order to facilitate productive investment. 
Marketing boards must be reinstated but restructured under 
popular control since despite their historical inefficiency 
and mismanagement the reasons for marketing boards, namely to 
cushion rural producers from the vagaries of the world market 
persists. The state should further provide supportive 
investments to boost food production, for Africans cannot 
continue to depend on the importation of food as it leaves 
them prone to perpetual food-shortages and at the 'mercy' of 
international relief agencies in the event of a natural 
disasters.
Trade must be rationalized. Africa's fledgling industries
Bangura and Beckman, “African Workers", p.123. See also Adebajo 
Adedeji, “Structural Adjustment with a Social Pace?" in African Poruft. vol.2, 
no.2, 1992,
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cannot be expected to increase capacity utilization, generate 
employment and increase the local utilization of inputs when 
they are undercut by the dumping of cheaper foreign inputs on 
African markets. Unessential imports must be banned, while 
incremental tariff changes must be made to the importation of 
capital goods in order to encourage their domestic production. 
Transnational capital should be encouraged into sectors of the 
economy that meet domestic priorities and to reinvest profits 
in African economies. Serious efforts to recoup national 
resources deposited in international banks by a legion of 
corrupt elites must also be made. Additionally, the unfettered 
emphasis on the export of primary commodities must be tempered 
as it makes little sense to continue increasing export 
production for rapidly declining commodity earnings. In this 
light, the absurdity of the 'export first rule' again 
recommended to African countries by the World Bank's 1993 
Report should become quite clear. On its own admission in the 
1989 LTPS. the Bank clearly stated that international prices 
for primary commodities are poor and will continue to be low 
during the 1990s, an observation the Bank has made yet again 
in Adjustment in Africa while still advocating the need to 
boost export commodity production. Of course, Africa will 
still have to export commodities into a hostile international 
division of labour in order to earn much needed foreign 
exchange to fund internal development, but this must be 
complemented by state efforts to diversify the export base.
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while also giving priority to production for domestic markets. 
Another element that must be included to support Africa's 
development is the establishment of a ceiling on the 
escalating debt-servicing obligations to multilateral and 
bilateral donors, which continues to drain scarce resources. 
Initiatives should also be pursued within Africa and elsewhere 
in the Third World towards eventually forming a debtor cartel.
Though some of these prescriptions may seem unrealistic 
given prevailing international and domestic realities, what is 
clear is that two decades of IMF/World Bank guided SAPs have 
done little to revive African economies, expand the domestic 
productive base or to improve the living standards of the 
majority of Africans. While civil society and popular forces 
may be too weak and fragmented to transplant the social 
project of domestic elites, transnational and national, and to 
dictate the direction of economic recovery and development, 
they are certainly strong enough to obstruct the full 
implementation of neo-liberal designs as ten years of 
adjustment have illustrated. Nonetheless, despite constricting 
objective parameters they are never immutable. Increasingly 
popular forces have been galvanized to agitate for the 
democratization of their society and to have a determining 
influence on development processes.
SECTION POUR: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR 
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA IN THE 1990a
In this exposition we have critically examined the
574
problematic of civil society and democracy in Africa, focusing 
especially on the internal factors and forces that hamper or 
strengthen civil society and increase the prospects for 
democratic renewal and consolidation. The new international 
division of labour and the global power configuration in which 
Africa is becoming increasingly marginalized is a formidable 
exogenous constraint to democratic and self-reliant 
development in the lS90s, fraught with dangers but portending 
new hopes. It would appear that Africa is increasingly 
"falling of the map", as a recent review article on the 
continent's political economy was appropriately titled.^’' 
The region's principal export commodities are in less demand 
globally, given their abundant production by other Third World 
countries. Moreover, with scientific and technological 
advances in the West and the resultant development of numerous 
synthetic products, Africa's exports have become even less 
relevant. Reflecting a rapidly dwindling share of world trade, 
between 1986 and 1990 the continent lost over US$50 billion in 
much needed resources to fund internal development. 
Concomitantly, Africa is faced with the contemporaneous 
realities of the contradictory processes of market 
globalization, regionalization of trading blocs and Western 
domestic protectionism, all of which restrict market access 
for the continent's export commodities. The conclusion in 
December 1993 of the Uruguay Round of GATT began the
277 Callaghy, "Palling Off the Map"
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consummation of a new world trading order in which the 
interests of particularly Africa but other Third World regions 
have again been subverted in the self-interest of Western 
countries and transnational capital,^’® Under the new GATT 
agreement in which the West is expected to reap US$135 billion 
or 64% of total annual gains from trade deregulation, it is 
anticipated that already crisis-ridden African countries will 
lose US$2.6 billion annually in the period to 2002, lesulting 
from the dissolution of preferential access to EU markets 
under successive Lome Conventions but also from the survival 
of Western protectionist measures such as the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement -- which has long blocked the expansion of African 
textile exports -- under the new trade arrangement.^’̂® For 
Africa, the double standard evident in the Western drive 
towards global market liberalization, yet with the Western 
retention of domestic protectionist measures, is exacerbated 
by the simultaneous break-up of the global trading system into 
powerful regional trading blocs such as the European Union, 
the US-led North America Free Trade Agreement and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations under the leadership of 
Japan. Increasingly Africa will "find itself becoming ever 
more vulnerable and isolated...[its nations,] small competing 
exporters, dependent on these regional giants to purchase
Kevin Watkins, "GATT; A Victory for the North" in ROAPB. no.59,
1994.
anon., "Africa Seeks Redress for GATT Losses" in Afrio# Hscovsrv, 
vol.7, no.3-4, December 1993-March 1994, p.9.
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[their] outputs and supply [their] needs.
At the same time, official development assistance and 
foreign direct investment to Africa have been on a precipitous 
decline during the 1980s, but peaked at $19.7 billion in 1990 
and $2.2 billion in 1989 respectively.^®^ However, with the 
end of the 'cold war' and the opening up of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, the competition for Western aid and 
investment has sharply increased. Given Western geo-strategic 
and economic interest in this region, resource flows which may 
have otherwise supported African and Third World development 
have increasingly been redirected to bolster market 
transitions in Russia, other CIS and Eastern European 
countries. As a consequence, ODA to Africa has drastically 
declined from the 1990 levels to $12.1 billion in 1992.̂ ®̂  
Similarly, with the political and economic environment in 
Africa increasingly unconducive to doing business, 
transnational capital has steered away and/or shifted 
investments from Africa such that foreign direct investment 
dropped drastically from the 1989 level to $0.6 billion in 
1990 and marginally increased to $1.0 bn in 1992,^®’ with
Browne, “Continuing Debates", p.36.
World Bank and EGA statistics cited in Africa Recovery, vol.7, 
no.3-4, December 1993-March 1994, p.36,40.
World Bank and EGA statistics cited in Africa Recovery, vol.7, 
no.3-4, December 1993-March 1994, p.36,40.
World Bank and EGA statistics cited in Africa Recovery, vol.7, 
no.3-4, December 1993-March 1994, p.36,40.
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disinvestment becoming a growing trend. The disinterest in 
Africa is such that in the 1992 alone, foreign direct 
investment to Indonesia exceeded the total investment to Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Simultaneously, Western geo-strategic interest 
in Africa has been drastically devalued after the end of the 
'cold war', reflected in the disinterest of the West to broker 
resolutions and support peace accords to quell regional 
conflicts exacerbated by former superpower rivalries. Beyond 
the scale of intervention in the 1992 Somalian crisis, the 
West has shown an ambivalence towards civic conflict on the 
continent evident in the recent response to the Rwandan 
debacle and the general neglect of other regional conflicts, - 
- Angola, Liberia and the Sudan for example --in contrast to 
the response to geo-strategic regions such as Eastern Europe.
But although the West has increasingly shown a 
disinterest in Africa, it has retained a strong influence over 
economic and political processes on the continent. Concomitant 
to the continent's geo-strategic and economic marginalization, 
Africa's mounting indebtedness and dependency on external 
resource flows has maintained Western leverage and latitude to 
dictate the content and design of development policies on the 
continent via the IFIs. The former Secretary-General of the 
UNECA, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, may indeed be correct in the 
previously cited statement that the IMF and World Bank have 
now become more powerful in Africa than the former colonial
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masters.*®'* If the imperial tone of the World Bank's 1993 
Study is any indication, it appears that in the current global 
conjuncture in which Africa's room to manoeuvre and to access 
financial assistance outside the domain of the IFIs and 
bilateral donors has become severely constricted, the Bank and 
the Fund may have a carte blanche on decisions that influence 
African development, as they continue to zealously advocate 
further market reforms and the presumed supportive liberal 
democratic political framework.
Yet, it has become increasingly clear that market reforms 
in Africa are incompatible with democracy, even in the limited 
liberal democratic form. The policy recommendations of 
adjustment which promote downward wage restructuring and 
retrenchment, cut backs in social expenditures, subsidy 
removals and the imposition of users fees have and continue to 
be resisted by popular forces that remain the bedrock of 
democratic campaigns in Africa. In as much as it would appear 
that the proprietors of Africa's debt, buyers of the 
continent's exports and managers of development assistance 
flows do not seem willing to entertain African human-centred 
and participatory approaches to development, popular 
democratic struggles will increasingly confront repression by 
the ancien regime or the new multiparty states attempting to 
force through market reforms. Already, as our study indicates, 
the new democratic regimes in Zambia, Benin and Cape Verde,
Adedeji cited in Ake, "Rethinking", p.41.
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have become increasingly repressive in response to popular 
resistance to government efforts to implement SAPs. Commenting 
on the on-going endogenous drive towards market reforms and 
the current global economic and political environment, Salim- 
Salim aptly notes, that democratization in Africa "...will be 
hamstrung by the non-democratic international economic system 
in which we operate and which militates against our 
development.
However, reflecting the contradictory nature of external 
processes, a growing viewpoint in the West has suggested that 
"the African crisis really should be left to the international 
financial institutions, and if their salvage efforts work, 
fine; if not, so be it, the world economy will hardly 
notice."^®® Herein lies the potential opening of 
opportunities for democratic, self-reliant and sustained 
development in Africa in the 1990s. With Africa's growing 
strategic and economic marginalization, the West may leave 
African countries to their own designs, neither supporting 
democracy or authorita-^ianism. In any case, the movements for 
democratic development have long existed. In the current 
conjuncture they have intensified and will inevitably face 
set-backs, but are ultimately irreversible. Confronted with 
external constraints and internal conflict and contradictions.
®̂® Salim Salim cited in Salim Lome, "Africans Adopt Bold Charter For 
Democratization" in Africa Kecovrv. vol.4, no. 1, April-June 1990, p.29.
2S6 Callaghy, "Falling Off the Map", p.32.
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ordinary people and their movements in Africa's burgeoning 
civil society are overcoming objective constraints and 
increasingly transcending subjective limitations such as geo- 
ethnic and religious cleavages, democratizing their internal 
structures, developing a popular democratic culture, building 
politically significant networks, horizontally and • ertically, 
and articulating development and democratic strategies beyond 
structural adjustment and narrow multipartyism. Popular 
movements are emphasizing empowerment, popular participation, 
human rights and civil liberties, gender equality, social 
justice and greater national and community self-reliance. It 
is at this level that the foundation for popular democracy and 
the restructuring of state, economy and civil society are 
being forged in order to foster democratic development in the 
last decade of the millennium.
APPENDIX
NON-OOVERMMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF NIGERIA
A central inquiry of this thesis related to the democratizing 
potential currently accorded to the operations of NGOs in 
Africa. With specific reference to Nigeria, I investigated the 
role of NGOs, both indigenous and international, in the 
intensified democratic contestation in the country in recent 
years. Of particular importance was the manner in which NGOs 
contribute to the strengthening of civil society and their 
capacity to mediate between popular movements and political 
institutions. A number of factors were of crucial importance 
in assessing the impact on NGOs on the democratization process 
in the Africa.
1. Internal Structures of NGOs
2. Relationship between NGOs
3. Relationship between NGOs and INGOs
4. Relationship of NGOs to the A) State B) Other
Social forces, and, C) Donor Community.
I limited the scope of the investigation of NGOs in Nigeria to 
specifically human rights NGOs and self-defined people- 
oriented NGOs. Due to the limitations of time and resources, 
I conducted 14 open-ended questionnaire interviews with NGOs, 
relatively balanced along the three tiers highlighted by Aina 
(Chapter 1:4), and all concentrated in Southern Nigeria.
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APPENDIX
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICAt 
THE CASE OF NIGERIA 
QUESTIONNAIRE INTERVIEW 





TIME AND PLACE ADMINISTERED:
QUESTIONNAIRE INTERVIEWS:
The questionnaire interviews administered was organized around 
six areas.
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Brief history: What needs were identified that led to your 
organization's activities in Nigeria?.
ii. Nature of NGO's operations: What is the nature of your
organization's activities; specifically what, projects and/or 
programmes do you conduct?
2. INTERNAL STRUCTURE:
i. Manner of decision-makino; How are decisions made in your 
organization; specifically, how are projects and programmes 
evaluated? Supplementary: Do Nigerian NGOs (in the case of 
INGOs) or the people (irrespective of category of NGOs) 
participate in the decision-malcing and/or evaluation process?
ii. Composition of Membership: What is the composition of the 




3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOe:
i. INGOs and AfrNGOs; What is the relationship between your 
organization and African (or vis-a-versa)?
ii. AfrNGOs and AfrNGOs : What is the relationship between your 
organization and other Nigerian NGOs? Supplementary: What is 
the relationship to other African NGOs?
iii INGOs and INGOs ; What is the relationship of your 
organization and other International Non-Governmental 
Organizations?
iv. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOS AND UMBRELLA NGOs What is the 
relationship of the organization to (NAVDO) Nigerian Agency 
for Voluntary Development Organizations?
4. NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
i. Relationship Between NGOs and Social Movements : Do any 
linkages (horizontally or vertically) exist between the your 
organization and other civic associations?
ii. Character of Linkages: What are the nature of these links?
iii Relationship to the Pro-Democracy Movement: Does the
organization have any affiliation with the Campaign for 
Democracy or support its activities?
5. NGOs AMD THE STATE
i. NGOs AND THE TRANSITION NIGERIA'S THIRD REPUBLIC; What is 
the position of your organization on the current 
democratization process?
ii. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE; Are there any linkages 
between your organization and the former Babangida 
administration, Interim National Government, or the current 
Abacha regime?
6. NGOs AMD THE DONOR COMMUNITY
i. NGOs and SAP; What are your general perceptions on the 
current structural adjustment programme in Nigeria?
ii. sourCE(S) OF FUNDING: What are the sources/structure of 
the organization's funding? ie. donations, self, foreign aid.
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1. Interview with Chief (Mrs) Soyege, Oyo State Branch
President of the National Council of Women's Societies (NCWS), 
Agbowo, Ibadan, Oyo State, January 17, 1994.
2. Interview with Ms. M.A. Feyisayo, National President of 
the COWAD, Agbowo, Ibadan, Oyo State, January 18, 1993.
3. Interview with Ms. Eva Murray, National Director of CUSO-
Nigeria, lyaganku GRA, Ibadan, Oyo State, December 16, 1993.
4. Interview with Prof. Bade Onimode, national director of 
IFAA-Nigeria, Ibadan, Oyo State, December 10, 1994.
5. Interview with Prof. Bolanle Awe, Coordinating Chairperson 
of WORDOC, held at the Institute of African Studies,
University of Ibadan, Oyo State, December 10, 1993.
6. Interview with Ms. Rita Ayaegbu, Programme Assistant of 
the NEST, Bodija, Ibadan, January 18, 1994.
7. Interview with Prof. Sotonye Amalciri, national secretary 
of the Friends for the Preservation of the Delta Environment, 
Port Harcourt, Rivers State, January 7, 1994.
8. Interview with A.Y. Yahaya, Administrative Secretary of 
NAVDO, Ojoo, Ibadan, Oyo State, December 17, 1993.
9. Interview with Glory Kilanko, National Co-ordinating 
Secretary of the WIN, Yaba, Lagos, January 12, 1994.
10. Interview with Segun Maiyegun, former National President 
of the NANS Anthony Village, Lagos, January, 13, 1994.
11. Interview with Pastor Isaiah Ogundele, (Chairman) of the 
Farmers Development Union, Agodi, Ibadan, January 17, 1994.
12. Interview with Canon. Ogbonna, Coordinator, Nalt United 
Self-Help Organization, Nsukka, Enugu State, Jan. 6, 1994.
13. Interview with Prof A. Akiryele, Coordinator, of the Food 
Basket Foundation, Ibadan, January 18, 1994.
14. Interview with Uzomha V.C. Uzomha, President, Umudaduru 
Youth Association, Orlu, Imo State, December 29, 1993.
These taped interview of HOOs in Nigeria are yet to be tranaeribed but are 
available front the author upon request.
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